FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZQOY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2012] FMCA 289 |
| MIGRATION – Persecution – review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – visa – protection visa – refusal. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Allegation that Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error by reason that it denied the applicant procedural fairness, ignored her claims, did not believe her, made findings unsupported by the evidence, failed to have regard to relevant material, took an irrelevant consideration into account and was overbearing. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Refugee Review Tribunal – when functus officio. |
| Migration Act 1958, ss.425, 430, 430B, 430D, 474, 477, 477A, 486A Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 2008 Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 2009 |
| Applicant: | SZQOY |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1924 of 2011 |
| Judgment of: | Cameron FM |
| Hearing date: | 22 March 2012 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 22 March 2012 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 19 April 2012 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appeared in person |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr D. Godwin |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | DLA Piper Australia |
ORDERS
A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing its decision dated 27 July 2011.
A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine according to law the application for review dated 5 April 2011.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1924 of 2011
| SZQOY |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant is a citizen of Nepal who arrived in Australia on 12 September 2008 as the dependent spouse of an overseas Nepali student. The applicant remained in Australia after her husband returned to Nepal in January 2011. On 17 January 2011 she lodged an application for a protection visa claiming that she had had an inter-faith relationship in Nepal. She claimed that she became pregnant as a result and that her parents forced her to have an abortion. She claimed to fear persecution in Nepal on the basis of these events. She also said that her marriage had been a sham and implied that she had arranged her student dependent visa to escape her circumstances in Nepal.
On 10 March 2011 a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) refused the applicant’s application for a protection visa. The applicant then applied to the second respondent (“Tribunal”) for a review of that departmental decision. She was unsuccessful before the Tribunal and has applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
In these…
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- Case
- [2012] FMCA 289
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing its decision dated 27 July 2011.
2.
A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine according to law the application for review dated 5 April 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Although there may be difficulty in using the legislative intention underlying one statute to assist in the understanding of another, nevertheless, the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008 which became the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2009 sheds light on the context in which s.430(2) was introduced. That Act introduced redrafted amendments to ss.477, 477A and 486A. One of the provisions introduced by those amendments was s.477(3)(b) which relevantly provides:(3) In this section:date of the migration decision means:(a) …(b)in the case of a written migration decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal—the date of the written statement under subsection 368(1) or 430(1) …That definition is also employed in ss.477A and 486A as amended. In paras.62 and 63 of the explanatory memorandum to the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008, the link between the amendments to ss.477, 477A and 486A and the earlier insertion of s.430(2) was made clear:… for migration decisions made by the Migration Review Tribunal and the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunals’), the Full Federal Court held in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKKC [2007] FCAFC 105 (‘SZKKC’) that the time period for seeking judicial review of a Tribunal decision will begin to run only if the applicant is personally served with the written statement of reasons of the Tribunal by a person authorised by the Registrar of the Tribunal. It would be expensive and impractical for the Tribunals to implement the practice of personally serving a written statement of the reasons for the decision. As a result, the time limits for seeking judicial review of a migration decision in subsection 477(1) are not currently effective.The change to the ‘date of the migration decision’ from which time commences to run for the purpose of time limits for seeking judicial review of a migration decision, will provide greater certainty and overcome the practical difficulties associated with personally serving a written statement of reasons. Item 2 of this Schedule inserts a definition of “date of the migration decision” In light of this history, to which Smith FM was apparently not taken, I cannot agree with his Honour’s statement in SZQCN at [50] that s.430(2) was intended to operate not only as a provision governing the calculation of time for the purposes of time limits on judicial review and otherwise, but also to deem a point in time when a valid decision of the Tribunal takes legal effect and is incapable of recall or reconsideration. One of the effects of the amendments made by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2008 was to repeal provisions which provided a means to determine when the Tribunal was functus officio but neither that Act nor the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2009 replaced those earlier provisions. Given the legislative history of s.430(2), I conclude that the expressed legislative intention of providing a simpler procedure for the notification of Tribunal decisions to applicants concerned only the commencement of the limitation period, not the discharge of the Tribunal’s function. The mischief to which the repeal of the then ss.430A, 430B and 430C, the related insertion of s.430(2) and amendments to ss.477, 477A and 486A were addressed was the finding in SZKKC which rendered the relevant time limits under the Act “virtually … nugatory”. As a result, I see no reason to imply into s.430(2) an operation which it does not express, namely one which bears on when the Tribunal discharges its review function.