SZQOY v Minister for Immigration & Anor

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZQOY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2012] FMCA 289

MIGRATION – Persecution – review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – visa – protection visa – refusal.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Allegation that Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error by reason that it denied the applicant procedural fairness, ignored her claims, did not believe her, made findings unsupported by the evidence, failed to have regard to relevant material, took an irrelevant consideration into account and was overbearing.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Refugee Review Tribunal – when functus officio.

Migration Act 1958, ss.425, 430, 430B, 430D, 474, 477, 477A, 486A
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 2008
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 2009
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164
Swift v SAS Trustee Corporation [2010] NSWCA 182
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
SZQCN v Minister for immigration & Citizenship [2011] FMCA 606
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKKC (2007) 241 ALR 523
Semunigus v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 96 FCR 533
Applicant: SZQOY
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 1924 of 2011
Judgment of: Cameron FM
Hearing date: 22 March 2012
Date of Last Submission: 22 March 2012
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 19 April 2012

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D. Godwin
Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

  1. A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing its decision dated 27 July 2011.

  2. A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine according to law the application for review dated 5 April 2011.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1924 of 2011

SZQOY

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Nepal who arrived in Australia on 12 September 2008 as the dependent spouse of an overseas Nepali student. The applicant remained in Australia after her husband returned to Nepal in January 2011. On 17 January 2011 she lodged an application for a protection visa claiming that she had had an inter-faith relationship in Nepal. She claimed that she became pregnant as a result and that her parents forced her to have an abortion. She claimed to fear persecution in Nepal on the basis of these events. She also said that her marriage had been a sham and implied that she had arranged her student dependent visa to escape her circumstances in Nepal.

  2. On 10 March 2011 a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) refused the applicant’s application for a protection visa. The applicant then applied to the second respondent (“Tribunal”) for a review of that departmental decision. She was unsuccessful before the Tribunal and has applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.

  3. In these…

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Details
Case
[2012] FMCA 289
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

SZQOY sought judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, which had dismissed her application for a protection visa. The primary issue was whether the Tribunal was functus officio when it received submissions from its independent advisers after it had made its decision. This meant that the court had to determine when the Tribunal had completed its function and was no longer able to reconsider its decision. The Minister argued that the Tribunal became functus officio when it prepared its written statement, in accordance with section 430(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant contended that the Tribunal did not become functus officio until it had conveyed the decision to the Tribunal registry for publication. The court found that the Minister's interpretation of section 430(2) was incorrect as it did not express any intention to determine when the Tribunal discharged its function. Instead, the court held that the Tribunal became functus officio when it had communicated its decision to the applicant and the Minister. The court quashed the Tribunal's decision and ordered the Tribunal to reconsider the applicant's application for a protection visa.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing its decision dated 27 July 2011.

2.

A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine according to law the application for review dated 5 April 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Returning to the question of whether the Tribunal was functus officio at the time the advisers’ submissions were received, s.430 of the Act relevantly provides:430Refugee Review Tribunal to record its decisions etc.(1)Where the Tribunal makes its decision on a review, the Tribunal must prepare a written statement that:(a)sets out the decision of the Tribunal on the review; and(b)sets out the reasons for the decision; and(c)sets out the findings on any material questions of fact; and(d)refers to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based.(2)A decision on a review (other than an oral decision) is taken to have been made on the date of the written statement. … The Minister submitted that the point at which the Tribunal became functus officio was to be determined by reference to s.430(2), notwithstanding that s.430(2) ostensibly expresses nothing on that subject and appears to be concerned only with determining on which day a Tribunal decision is made, which is not necessarily determinative of when the Tribunal has discharged its function. The Minister referred in this regard to the decision of Smith FM in SZQCN v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] FMCA 606, which was relevantly to the effect that s.430(2) provides that a Tribunal decision is taken to have been made at the first moment of the day whose date it bears, regardless of when on that day it was actually signed or even whether it was signed on some earlier day, although a back-dating of the decision would be an abuse of power. The Minister submitted that his Honour’s construction of the Act ascribed to the parliament the unlikely intention of deeming a decision-maker to be functus officio even before his or her statement of reasons had been completed. He submitted that a better construction of the provision was that a Tribunal decision is final at the point when the presiding member has conveyed it to the Tribunal registry for publication to the applicant. In SZQCN, Smith FM gave some historical context to s.430:The procedures of the Tribunal in relation to the completion of its jurisdiction by the making of a legally operative decision have changed in its practice and legislation over its lifetime. Under normal administrative law principles, and absent any specific legislation defining the commencement time of a legally operative decision, a ‘decision’ made under a statutory power to decide a matter takes operative effect only when some act of ‘communication or manifestation’ of the decision has occurred (see authorities cited by Higgins J in Semunigus v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 96 FCR 533 at [67]-[68]). The judgments in Semunigus accepted that these principles applied to a decision of the present Tribunal which was made at a time when the Migration Act referred only to the Tribunal having ‘made’ a decision, and then required it to give the applicant a copy of a written statement setting out the decision and its reasons (see s.430 in its terms prior to 1999). Their Honours held that no decision was ‘beyond recall’ prior to publication of the decision, in the absence of any specific provision governing the time when the Tribunal became functus officio (see Spender J at [13], Higgins J at [75] and [78], and Madgwick J at [103]).Under the procedures at one time followed by Commonwealth administrative tribunals who were in the same position, certainty was given to the point of time when irrevocable publication of a decision occurred, by the tribunal emulating the practice of courts and appointing a hearing purely for the purposes of publishing its decision. Express provision for such a procedure by the present Tribunal was inserted in the Migration Act by Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 1998 (Cth), which commenced in December 1998. Under these amendments, unless the Tribunal had given an oral decision at its hearing, it was required to give notice of an intended ‘handing down’ of a Tribunal decision, and was then required to publish the decision by giving a copy to the applicant or his agent and the Secretary (if they attended) “on the day, and at the time and place, specified in the notice”. It was then provided that “the date of the decision is the date on which the decision is handed down” (see previous s.430B(2) and (4)). An alternative provision allowed the Tribunal to give “an oral decision”, and deemed the decision to be notified on that date (s.430D). An implication of these provisions was that the Tribunal became functus officio at the precise time when the ‘handed down’ occurred or an oral decision was announced. (at [44]-[46])

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Although there may be difficulty in using the legislative intention underlying one statute to assist in the understanding of another, nevertheless, the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008 which became the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2009 sheds light on the context in which s.430(2) was introduced. That Act introduced redrafted amendments to ss.477, 477A and 486A. One of the provisions introduced by those amendments was s.477(3)(b) which relevantly provides:(3) In this section:date of the migration decision means:(a) …(b)in the case of a written migration decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal—the date of the written statement under subsection 368(1) or 430(1) …That definition is also employed in ss.477A and 486A as amended. In paras.62 and 63 of the explanatory memorandum to the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008, the link between the amendments to ss.477, 477A and 486A and the earlier insertion of s.430(2) was made clear:… for migration decisions made by the Migration Review Tribunal and the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunals’), the Full Federal Court held in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKKC [2007] FCAFC 105 (‘SZKKC’) that the time period for seeking judicial review of a Tribunal decision will begin to run only if the applicant is personally served with the written statement of reasons of the Tribunal by a person authorised by the Registrar of the Tribunal. It would be expensive and impractical for the Tribunals to implement the practice of personally serving a written statement of the reasons for the decision. As a result, the time limits for seeking judicial review of a migration decision in subsection 477(1) are not currently effective.The change to the ‘date of the migration decision’ from which time commences to run for the purpose of time limits for seeking judicial review of a migration decision, will provide greater certainty and overcome the practical difficulties associated with personally serving a written statement of reasons. Item 2 of this Schedule inserts a definition of “date of the migration decision” In light of this history, to which Smith FM was apparently not taken, I cannot agree with his Honour’s statement in SZQCN at [50] that s.430(2) was intended to operate not only as a provision governing the calculation of time for the purposes of time limits on judicial review and otherwise, but also to deem a point in time when a valid decision of the Tribunal takes legal effect and is incapable of recall or reconsideration. One of the effects of the amendments made by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2008 was to repeal provisions which provided a means to determine when the Tribunal was functus officio but neither that Act nor the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2009 replaced those earlier provisions. Given the legislative history of s.430(2), I conclude that the expressed legislative intention of providing a simpler procedure for the notification of Tribunal decisions to applicants concerned only the commencement of the limitation period, not the discharge of the Tribunal’s function. The mischief to which the repeal of the then ss.430A, 430B and 430C, the related insertion of s.430(2) and amendments to ss.477, 477A and 486A were addressed was the finding in SZKKC which rendered the relevant time limits under the Act “virtually … nugatory”. As a result, I see no reason to imply into s.430(2) an operation which it does not express, namely one which bears on when the Tribunal discharges its review function.