Semunigus v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Semunigus v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 240

CATCHWORDS

IMMIGRATION – appellant denied protection visa – decision affirmed by Refugee Review Tribunal – Tribunal had received additional submissions from appellant after decision maker had forwarded reasons for decision to registry for recording and dissemination – whether Tribunal was functus officio at the time submissions received – whether Tribunal obliged to have regard to additional late submissions – whether failure to consider submissions constituted a reviewable error under s 420(2)(b) and s 476 of Migration Act 1958.

Migration Act1958 (Cth), s 55, 415, 420(2), 425, 427, 430, 439, 476, 476(1), 485

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 162 ALR 577, [1999] HCA 21
Evans v Friemann (1981) 53 FLR 229
Rice Growers Co-operative v Bannernan (1981) 56 FLR 443, (1981) 38 ALR 535
Jayasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs  (1997) 145 ALR 532, (1997) 76 FCR 301
Attorney-General (Cth) v Queensland (1990) 25 FCR 125
Makisi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1995) 37 ALD 420
Schokker v Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 38 ATR 339, 98 ATC 4263
Neal v Commissioner for Superannuation (1987) 6 AAR 532, 76 ALR 261; 13 ALD 460
Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Cho (1999) 164 ALR 339
R v Hertfordshire County Council; Ex parte Cheung 26 March 1986, TLR 4 April 1986
R v Kensington & Chelsea Rent Tribunal; Ex parte MacFarlane [1974] 1 WLR 1486 at 1493
Leung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 79 FCR 400
Sloane v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affair (1992) 37 FCR 429 at 443
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Capitly [1997] FCA 193
Austereo v Trade Practices Commission (1993) 41 FCR 1
Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 247

GETACHEW SEMUNIGUS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

A33 OF 1999

SPENDER, HIGGINS, MADGWICK JJ
16 MARCH 2000
CANBERRA


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

A33 OF 1999

On appeal from a single Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

GETACHEW SEMUNIGUS
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGES:

SPENDER, HIGGINS, MADGWICK JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

16 MARCH 2000

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The appeal be dismissed with costs.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

A33 OF 1999

On appeal from a single Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

GETACHEW SEMUNIGUS
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGES:

SPENDER, HIGGINS, MADGWICK JJ

DATE:

16 MARCH 2000

PLACE:

CANBERRA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SPENDER J:

  1. I have had the advantage of reading in draft form the Reasons for Judgment of Higgins J.  I agree with his Honour that the appeal should be dismissed, but for different reasons.

  2. The sole ground of appeal argued was that the…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 240
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Semunigus v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant, a refugee applicant with psychological impairments, sought to challenge a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) which dismissed his application for refugee status. The core issue before the court was whether the RRT was precluded from reconsidering new evidence presented by the appellant after a preliminary decision had been formulated but not yet communicated to the parties. This case involved an examination of the principle of functus officio and the circumstances under which a decision-maker might be permitted to revisit a decision.

The court explored the legal principle of functus officio, which typically bars a decision-maker from revisiting a decision once it has been made. However, the court distinguished between decisions that have been communicated to the parties and those that have not. It held that a decision is not final until it has been communicated to the applicant or irrevocable steps have been taken to communicate it. In this case, since the decision had not yet been communicated to the appellant, the RRT still had the capacity to consider the new evidence. The court emphasised that administrative practices and case management protocols cannot override the need for justice, and therefore, the RRT was not functus officio.

The reasoning of the court was that until a decision is communicated or irrevocable steps are taken to communicate it, the decision-maker retains the authority to revisit and reconsider the decision. This approach ensures that the administrative processes do not inadvertently deprive applicants of their right to a fair hearing. The court concluded that the RRT could, and indeed should, have considered the new material presented by the appellant.

The court dismissed the appeal with costs. This outcome underscored the importance of ensuring that administrative bodies do not prematurely finalise decisions without properly considering all available evidence, particularly in cases involving vulnerable applicants with significant personal stakes.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

I have had the benefit of reading the reasons of Higgins J in draft. I can therefore be relatively brief.The essential facts The appellant is a psychologically impaired applicant for refugee status with a genuine fear of return to his homeland. The question for the Refugee Review Tribunal was whether his fear met the requirements of the relevant Convention, that is, whether it was a “well-founded” fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons recognised in the Convention definition. The appellant wished to put new and late material before the RRT after he had had both a hearing and a further opportunity to put in supplementary material. His agent sent that material to the RRT member who had heard his case. By the time it arrived, the RRT member had formulated a decision and reasons for it adverse to the appellant, and had put in train internal RRT procedures to have the appellant and the respondent Minister notified of the decision and reasons. However, no irrevocable step had been taken to notify them. The RRT member was not told, by those in the service of the RRT who received it, of the new material nor of the applicant’s desire to rely on it. It is not a foregone conclusion that the new material could not sustain the applicant’s claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. Nor is it a foregone conclusion that, had the RRT member been given the opportunity of considering the application to have the new material considered, such an application must necessarily have failed. This case raises the question whether the applicant is to have no redress against the bureaucratic short shrift that he apparently suffered at the hands of (or as the result of oversight by) the RRT’s clerical staff, and whether he had a remediable right at least to have his application, that further material be taken into account, considered by the RRT member seised of his case.“Functus Officio” The case was conducted before Finn J on the assumption that, if the RRT member had made a decision, the RRT’s statutory power to consider the applicant’s claims was thereupon exhausted. There may, however, be cases, despite decisions such as Jayasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 76 FCR 301 (with which, in general, I respectfully agree), where even after a decision of sorts has been communicated to the parties, the RRT can still recall the matter: see, for example, R v Hertfordshire County Council; Ex parte Cheung 26 March 1986, TLR 4 April 1986, R v Kensington & Chelsea Rent Tribunal; Ex parte MacFarlane [1974] 1 WLR 1486 at 1493 and Leung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 79 FCR 400. In Leung Finkelstein J (with whose reasons Beaumont J agreed) said:“If the decision is valid when made can it be ignored merely because all of the interested parties wish it to be ignored? Surely the decision-maker could only act in pursuance of the statute that defined his or her powers. I do not see how jurisdiction to ignore any act can be conferred on a statutory decision-maker merely by the consent of the persons who might be affected by that act. It is the Parliament, through its legislation, that confers power on a decision-maker and not those citizens whose rights, privileges or interests might be affected by the decision-maker.But what if the decision is invalid? Can the decision be ignored if the consent of all interested parties is obtained or is there some other principle that governs the situation? In my opinion, the true principle is this. To ignore an invalid decision is not to revoke it.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, HIGGINS, MADGWICK JJ
As a general statement of principle I cannot better the way Finn J expressed it:“For present purposes I am prepared to hold that the making of a decision involves both reaching a conclusion on a matter as a result of a mental process having been engaged in and translating that conclusion into a decision by an overt act of such character as, in the circumstances, gives finality to the conclusion - as precludes the conclusion being revisited by the decision-maker at his or her option before the decision is to be regarded as final.What constitutes such an act can obviously vary with the setting in which the decision is made: it may be no more than a written notation of a conclusion on a departmental file; it may be publication of the conclusion in a particular forum, or communication of it to another; it may be performing a consequential or collateral act that presupposes the decision’s having been made, etc.” (emphasis added)However, I cannot agree with his Honour’s application of the principle. As a matter of undoubted fact, the conclusion to which the RRT member had arrived in his own mind had not been communicated to anyone outside the RRT’s own staff. The taking of administrative steps, as part of an orderly general system of case management, to have support staff communicate the decision (and the reasons for it) to the parties could therefore plainly have been halted or countermanded by the RRT member. That must be the case, as a matter of administrative necessity: a RRT member might have had second thoughts about the proper factual conclusions in a case; or a new judicial decision might change the member’s understanding of the relevant law. Mere case management practices, even if publicly decreed, cannot stand in the way of justice being done: Queensland v JL Holdings (1997) 189 CLR 146. In a case of the kinds dealt with by the RRT, a decision is no decision, in my opinion, until either it has been communicated to the applicant or irrevocable steps have been taken to have that done. I speak of communication to the applicant because, before the RRT, the applicant is the only party. There is no need to regard a decision as irrevocable before it must be considered to have passed into the public domain. As a matter of the RRT’s usual practice, the “overt act”, in Finn J’s apt phrase, required to complete the decision will generally be the dispatch of the s 430(2) statement. In such a case, s 430(2) is complied with by the very act of making the decision. But that is only so because of the way the RRT has chosen to complete the making of the decision. That usual practice is not, however, the only way that a decision may legally be completed. It might be completed by the RRT communicating it orally to an applicant at the conclusion of a hearing: the RRT might wish to end an applicant’s uncertainty as to his or her fate at the earliest opportunity, the case may be as plain as a pikestaff, yet it may still take some time to prepare the s 430(2) statements.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER, HIGGINS, MADGWICK JJ

Full text does not contain this section.