Amir v Director of Professional Services Review

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Amir v Director of Professional Services Review [2022] FCAFC 44

Appeal from: Amir v Director of Professional Services Review [2021] FCA 745
File number: NSD 760 of 2021
Judgment of: LEE, STEWART AND CHEESEMAN JJ
Date of judgment: 28 March 2022
Catchwords: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – the meaning of the terms “decision”, “decide”, “decides” and “decided” in the context of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) – whether primary judge erred in her construction of ss 88A and 94(1) – where the Chief Executive Medicare requested the Director of Professional Services Review to review the provision of services by Dr Amir pursuant to s 86(1) – whether Director made a decision on 4 April 2019 or 16 April 2019 to undertake the review in accordance with s 88A(1) which set time running for the purpose of s 94(1) – where Director subsequently decided to refer Dr Amir to a Committee pursuant to s 93(1) on 14 April 2020 to determine if inappropriate practice had occurred in providing the services – where primary judge found that the decision to refer Dr Amir to a Committee was made within time and was valid – where primary judge held that a decision under s 88A(1) must be an externally manifested communication of an irrevocable commitment – where the words “decide” and “decision” do not focus on the Director’s mental state but on the external manifestation of that mental state in an irrevocable or firm way – where primary judge was correct to construe a decision under s 88A as being of a firm, committed or final character – where other grounds of appeal alleging errors in fact finding must fail because Dr Amir’s primary construction argument fails – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA

Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) ss 79A, 80(3), 80(4), 80(5), 80(6), 80(7), 80(8), 80(9), 80(10), 82, 83, 86(1), 86(2), 87(1), 87(2), 88A(1), 88A(2), 88A(3), 88A(4), 88A(5), 88A(6), 88A(7), 89, 89B, 89C(1), 89C(2), 91(1), 91(2), 92(1), 93(1), 93(6), 93(7), 94(1), 106ZM(2), 106Q(1)

Cases cited:

Amir v Director of Professional Services Review [2021] FCA 745

Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; 248 CLR 378

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2020] FCAFC 192; 282 FCR 1

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 197 ALR 389

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; 250 CLR 503

National Home Doctor Service Pty Ltd v Director of Professional Services Review [2020] FCA 1016; 276 FCR 382

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355

Semunigus v The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 422

Semunigus v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 240; 96 FCR 533

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area:
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Details
Case
[2022] FCAFC 44
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Amir v Director of Professional Services Review, the Court was called upon to determine whether the primary judge correctly interpreted the terms “decision”, “decide”, “decides” and “decided” in the context of sections 88A and 94(1) of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth). The appeal was brought by Dr Amir, who argued that the Director of Professional Services Review did not make a timely decision to refer his case to a Committee under the Act, and that the Director was therefore deemed to have made a decision to take no further action, as per section 94(1). The key issue before the Court was whether the primary judge erred in her construction of these statutory provisions and whether the Director’s decision to refer Dr Amir’s case to a Committee was made within the legally prescribed timeframe.

The Court found that Dr Amir’s arguments misconstrued the primary judge’s reasoning and failed to adequately consider the statutory context. The Court held that the primary judge was correct in her interpretation that a decision under section 88A(1) must be an externally manifested communication of an irrevocable commitment. The Court emphasised that the words “decide” and “decision” should be understood in their ordinary meaning as “a making up of one’s mind” and that the primary judge correctly construed a decision under section 88A as being of a firm, committed or final character. The Court also noted that the primary judge was correct in finding that the Director’s decision to refer Dr Amir to a Committee was made within the required timeframe and was therefore valid.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and held that the primary judge’s construction of the statutory provisions was accurate. The Court further noted that other grounds of appeal, which were predicated on alleged errors in fact finding, could not succeed because Dr Amir’s primary argument concerning the statutory construction failed. The Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Dr Amir has failed to demonstrate error on the part of the primary judge. The first ground of appeal challenges the construction attributed by the primary judge to the word “decision” and its related terms (“decide”, “decides” and “decided”). The submissions advanced on behalf of Dr Amir are premised on a misreading of the primary judge’s reasoning and fail to reflect adequately the statutory context. Ground 1 must be dismissed. Ground 2 falls with Ground 1. Grounds 3 fails because it adds nothing not already covered by the other grounds. Ground 4 challenges findings of fact and is predicated on the success of Dr Amir’s challenge to the primary judge’s construction of ss 88A(1) and 94(1) and the acceptance of his construction of those provisions as covered by Ground 1. Since Ground 1 fails, Ground 4 does not arise.PRIMARY FACTS The facts are summarised by the primary judge at J [19] – [29]. On 4 April 2019, pursuant to s 86(1), the Chief Executive requested that the Director review Dr Amir’s provision of services for the period 1 September 2017 to 31 August 2018. This request was made by email at 2.48 pm. The email enclosed a letter of request with five attachments (together comprising 102 pages): J [57]. By the time the request was made, there had been an earlier separate request to review the provision of services by Dr Amir in the period from August 2016 to 31 July 2017. The Director referred that earlier request to a Committee under s 93 prior to receipt of the request relevant to this appeal. Also on 4 April 2019, a delegate of the Chief Executive notified Dr Amir of the request which had been made to the Director. At 3.06 pm on 4 April 2019, Andrew Shelley, an Agency staff member, emailed other Agency staff circulating the request and all the accompanying materials from the Chief Executive. On the same day, at 3.08 pm, the Director sent an email to certain Agency staff stating that (as written):I have reviewed the referral and decided to conduct a reviewPlease prepare the necessary paperworkHe is back again for another 80/20 breach plus excessive pathology and PBS items.I had a brief chat to Andrew and we'll proceed as per usual but not in any hurry so as to give the Committee time to progress. … Dr Amir relies on this email to contend that the trigger decision to review under s 88A(1) was made by the Director on 4 April 2019. It is, however, to be noted that the Director’s guidance not to proceed “in any hurry” sits uneasily with that contention because it indicates that in the Director’s mind, the trigger decision had not yet been made. Indeed, if a decision had been made, the Committee would not be getting further time to progress the other matter before this matter was also potentially referred to the Committee. The reference the Director makes to having had a brief chat with Andrew is likely a reference to Mr Shelley, who then forwarded the Director’s email to certain other staff at 3.18 pm, stating:I think given the lawyers in the committee matter are Avant, we shouldn’t approach them about whether they act in this matter – it's possible Dr Amir has made a decision not to tell his insurer about a further review.I'd send the kick-off letter directly to Dr Amir, unless (noting they won’t get signed for more than a week) we hear from Avant in the meantime

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 94(1) contains a mechanism by which, if the Director has not made a decision in respect of a request within the designated time period, the Director will be deemed to have made a decision to take no further action in relation to the review. The provision in s 88A(1) (the trigger decision) and the deeming mechanism in s 94(1) give rise to the construction issue on the present appeal. Section 94(1) relevantly provides:(1) If:(a)the Director decides to review the provision of services by a person; and(b)before the end of the period of 12 months after making the decision, the Director has not:(i)made a decision under section 91 to take no further action in relation to the review; or(ii)entered into an agreement with the person under section 92 (whether or not the agreement has been ratified by the Determining Authority); or(iii)referred the provision of one or more of the services to a Committee;then, the Director is taken to have made a decision at the end of that period to take no further action in relation to the review.… The purpose of s 94(1) is to encourage the Director, having decided to undertake a review, not to be dilatory in completing the review and taking one of the actions referred to in s 94(1)(b): National Home Doctor Service Pty Ltd v Director of Professional Services Review [2020] FCA 1016; 276 FCR 382 (NHDS No. 2) at [56]. The effect of s 94(1) whereby the Director “is taken to have made a decision” at the end of the relevant period is to create a statutory fiction. It operates to deem a decision to have been made at a point in time when no such decision has in fact been made: NHDS No. 2 at [55] – [56]. THE ISSUE ON APPEAL The validity of the Director’s decision to refer the request made in respect of Dr Amir to a Committee is challenged on the basis that the referral was not made within time, with the consequence being that the Director is deemed to have made a decision to take no further action: s 94(1). The timeframe within which the Director may make a decision to refer to a Committee is limited to 12 months plus, relevantly, any extension to that period under s 94(3). Dr Amir contends that the Director’s decision to refer the Chief Executive’s request in respect of him to a Committee was made one day outside the relevant period and was therefore invalid. Dr Amir further contends that by the effluxion of time and operation of s 94(1), the Director is deemed to have made a decision to take no further action on the day before the Director purported to make a decision referring the matter to a Committee. The first and third respondents, the Director and the Commonwealth respectively, contend that the Director’s decision to refer the matter to a Committee was made within time. The second respondent, Professional Services Review Committee No 1306, filed a submitting appearance save as to costs, and accordingly did not participate in the hearing. The primary issue between the parties turns on the proper construction of the terms “decision” (and “decide”, “decides” and “decided”) in the particular statutory context. The immediate focus is on the proper construction of ss 88A and 94(1). It is common ground that the Director referred, or purported to refer, Dr Amir to a Committee under s 93 on 14 April 2020.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Dr Amir raised four grounds of appeal. As noted above, the critical ground is Ground 1 by which it is alleged that the primary judge erred in respect of the construction of ss 88A and 94(1) of the Act. There is a substantial overlap between Grounds 1 and 2. The remaining grounds are essentially concerned with alleged errors in fact finding. CONSIDERATIONPrinciples The relevant principles which inform the task of statutory construction are not in dispute. It is well established that the task requires consideration of the text, context and purpose: see, in particular, s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth); Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355 at [69]; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; 250 CLR 503 at [39]; Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; 248 CLR 378 at [25]–[26]; SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362 at [14]; Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2020] FCAFC 192; 282 FCR 1 at [4]. The meaning of the term “decision” in ss 88A(1) and 94(1) is to be ascertained by applying the above principles.Ground 1 and 2: Construction of ss 88A and 94(1) of the Act Ground 1 seeks to demonstrate error in the primary judge’s approach at J [42] and J [45] to construing ss 88A and 94(1) of the Act and the verbs “decide”, “decides”, “decided” and the noun “decision”. The parties agreed that the references in s 94(1)(a) “[i]f the Director decides to review…” and s 94(1)(b) “…12 months after making the decision…” involve a decision by the Director under s 88A(1) of the Act (“…the Director must, within 1 month after receiving the request, decide whether or not to undertake the review”). The primary judge accepted Dr Amir’s submissions that (at J [34]): (1)the scheme of the Act consistently distinguishes between the act of making a decision and the act of notifying the making of that decision – see, for example, ss 86(1) and 87(1), 88A(1) and 88A(4), 91(1) and 91(2), 93(1) and 93(7): J [34(1)];(2)the distinction between the making of a decision and its notification is also apparent from ss 87(2), 88A(5) and (7) to the effect that failure to comply with the notice requirement does not affect the validity of the decision: J [34(2)];(3)“decision” and “decide” should take their ordinary meaning in the Act of “a making up of one’s mind”: Macquarie Dictionary online: J [34(3)]; and(4)the cases upon which the Director relies to support the proposition that a decision must be externally manifested concern different statutory regimes and different legal issues (specifically, the operation of the doctrine of functus officio) and do not govern the construction of s 94(1)(b) of the Act: J [34(6)];but concluded that these propositions did not lead to the conclusion for which Dr Amir advocated: J [35].