Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2002] FCAFC 305

MIGRATION – appeal from single judge dismissing application for review of decision of Migration Review Tribunal – Tribunal had refused to consider application as appellant had lodged her application outside the statutory time requirements of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appellant did not receive letter advising of delegate’s decision – evidence of letter sent within statutory time requirements

MIGRATION – Tribunals - purported decision of Migration Review Tribunal to refuse to consider appellant’s application – decision made by Deputy Registrar – supposed delegation of power by Principal Member unlawful

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 53, 66, 347, 348, 353A, 354, 395, 396, 397, 407
Migration Regulations  reg 5.03
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 58, 69, 135,

Santos v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 74 FCR 334, followed
National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309, considered
Daw v Toyworld (NSW) Pty Ltd (2001) 21 NSWCCR 389, cited
Kingham v Sutton (No 3) FCA [2001] 1117, cited
Vitali v Stachnik [2001] NSWSC 303, cited

PMT Partners (in liq) v Australian National Parks and Wildlife Services (1995) 184 CLR

301, cited
FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268, cited
Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178, cited
Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, referred to
Fenton v Hampton (1858) 11 Moo 347, followed
Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424, followed
Semunigus v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 240, referred to
Inderjit Singh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 73, referred to
Akand v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 626, referred to
R v Hickman; Ex parte Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598

Odgers “Uniform Evidence Law” (5th ed.) Federation Press

JEONG MIN LEE V MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
N283 of 2002

MADGWICK, MERKEL & CONTI JJ
4 OCTOBER 2002
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N283 of 2002

BETWEEN:

JEONG MIN LEE

APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MADGWICK, MERKEL AND CONTI JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

4 OCTOBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N283 of 2002

BETWEEN:

JEONG MIN LEE

APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MADGWICK, MERKEL AND CONTI JJ

DATE:

4 OCTOBER 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MADGWICK J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of Hely J of 20 March 2002 dismissing an application for review of a decision apparently taken by a Deputy Registrar of the…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 305
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involves the applicant, Jeong Min Lee, who appeals against the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) to dismiss her application for review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs to refuse her application for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa. The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the applicant's appeal, given the late filing of the application for review. The court was required to determine if the letter notifying the applicant of the decision was sent within the required time frame and if the applicant's application for review was lodged within the statutory time limit.

The court examined the documentary evidence provided by the Department of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) and the testimony of Ms. McGee, an officer with DIMA. The court found that the letter dated 19 March 2001, signed by the delegate, Julieanne Coorey, and the accompanying notation in DIMA's records, constituted admissible evidence under Section 69 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The court accepted that the notation was made by a person with personal knowledge of the asserted fact that the letter was sent on 19 March 2001. The court concluded that the pre-condition for the deeming provisions in Regulation 5.03(1) was satisfied, and thus, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the applicant's argument that the letter was not sent on 19 March 2001 was not supported by the evidence. The court held that the applicant's application for review was lodged beyond the statutory time limit, and the Tribunal was correct in dismissing the appeal. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

In summary, the court found that the documentary evidence provided by DIMA, along with the testimony of Ms. McGee, established that the letter was sent within the required time frame. The court concluded that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal, and the applicant's application for review was lodged beyond the statutory time limit. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The second piece of evidence relied upon is another copy of the letter dated 19 March 2001 found in the file maintained by DIMA, which contains the following handwritten notation:“20/3/01Scanned indelivery centre20/3/01Aust Post says”That notation was made by a person unknown, apparently as a result of a communication with an unknown person from Australia Post.The primary judge’s acceptance of the evidence Section 69 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (“the Evidence Act”) provides:“(1) This section applies to a document that: (a) either: (i)is or forms part of the records belonging to or kept by a person, body or organisation in the course of, or for the purposes of, a business; or (ii)at any time was or formed part of such a record; and (b)contains a previous representation made or recorded in the document in the course of, or for the purposes of, the business. (2)The hearsay rule does not apply to the document (so far as it contains the representation) if the representation was made: (a)by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact; or (b)on the basis of information directly or indirectly supplied by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the representation:(a)was prepared or obtained for the purpose of conducting, or for or in contemplation of or in connection with, an Australian or overseas proceeding; or(b)was made in connection with an investigation relating or leading to a criminal proceeding. (4) If: (a)the occurrence of an event of a particular kind is in question; and (b)in the course of a business, a system has been followed of making and keeping a record of the occurrence of all events of that kind; the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence that tends to prove that there is no record kept, in accordance with that system, of the occurrence of the event. (5)For the purposes of this section, a person is taken to have had personal knowledge of a fact if the person's knowledge of the fact was or might reasonably be supposed to have been based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived (other than a previous representation made by a person about the fact).” As to Ms McGee’s evidence, his Honour said:“The ICSE database, and the copy of the letter bearing the notation RP10485615 are business records of the respondent in terms of s 69 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) which contain a previous representation made or recorded in those documents both in the course of, and for the purposes of the business of DIMA. Section 69(2)(a) of the Evidence Act provides that the hearsay rule does not apply to a document containing a previous representation made or recorded in the document if the representation was made by a person who had, or might reasonably be supposed to have had, personal knowledge of the asserted fact. Section 183 of the Evidence Act allows me to draw reasonable inferences from the document itself as well as from other matters from which inferences may properly be drawn. The relevant person in this case for the purpose of s 69(2)(a) is Julieanne Coorey. She had signed the notification letter of 19 March 2001 and the information contained in the extract of the ICSE is said to have been recorded by her. The asserted fact is that a registered letter containing notification of the decision was sent to the applicant in Australia on 19 March 2001 under the notation ‘RP10485615’. Ms Coorey is a person who, on the evidence, might reasonably be supposed to have had a personal knowledge of the asserted fact, hence the respondent has established the pre-condition in Regulation 5.03(2) such that the deeming provisions in Regulation 5.03(1) operate.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant argues that:(i)whether the MRT had jurisdiction is a question of jurisdictional fact for the Court to decide; this is to be objectively determined and s 474 of the Act therefore has no relevance;(ii)the question is whether there was admissible evidence that Australia Post had the letter by 22 March 2001;(iii)Ms McGee’s affidavit does not alone prove the time at which Australia Post received the letter from the Respondent’s officers;(iv)The note attached to the copy letter was inadmissible as:-its author’s identity is not known;-nor is the identity of the person at Australia Post to whom it apparently refers;-in particular, his Honour erred in holding that the note satisfied s 69(2)(b) of the Evidence Act, as there was no evidence as to its origin; the Evidence Act does not permit documents to authenticate themselves: National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309 (Bryson J), approved Daw v Toyworld (NSW) Pty Ltd (2001) 21 NSWCCR 389 at [46] per Heydon JA.(v)his Honour erred in not ruling on the appellant’s objection, taken with s 135 of the Evidence Act in mind, that the probative value of the note was substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to the appellant.Conclusion Despite the careful argument presented by counsel for the appellant, there is a short point which is fatal to the appellant’s case. This is that Ms McGee’s affidavit is in evidence, without any testing of that evidence having occurred. Ms McGee says:“The notation ‘RP10485615 to client 19/03/2001’ is a record that the notification letter was sent by registered mail, registered number 10485615, on 19 March 2001.…I refer to annexure AM2 [copy of letter dated 19 March 2002 from DIMA to appellant] and specifically to the barcode appearing at the bottom right hand corner of the letter, namely RP10485615. It is the practice of officers in this office that this barcode is taken from a registered post envelope and placed on a copy of the letter which is placed into that envelope. The copy of the letter with the affixed barcode is then placed on the applicant’s file. The details of the barcode are then entered into the ICSE database.I generated annexure AMI [extract from ICSE database] on 13 March 2002.” Counsel invited the Court to read the affidavit as indicating only that on 19 March 2001 the envelope containing the letter was made ready for delivery to Australia Post, and not actually delivered to it, so that the letter was not necessarily “sent” on 19 March, as the regulation requires, despite Ms McGee’s assertion that, assuming the used language in its ordinary sense, it was so sent. It would, however, be wrong, in my opinion, to read down what Ms McGee has said without some evidentiary basis for doing so. Nothing else in the evidence would indicate that it should or might be so read down, except (possibly) for the disputed note. If, contrary to the appellant’s submission, one looks at that note, it tends in any case (and for other reasons) not to avail the appellant.Sections 58, 69 and 135 of the Evidence Act

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I draw heavily and gratefully on his Honour’s judgment, without further acknowledgement, in explaining what the case is about.A letter from the Migration Review Tribunal (“MRT”) apparently goes astray·On 16 February 2001 the applicant applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa. The application was made to the Rockdale Regional Office of the Department of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs ("DIMA"). ·On 19 March 2001 a decision was taken by the Minister´s delegate to refuse the application. The delegate was J Coorey. ·DIMA´s records include a copy of a letter dated 19 March 2001 signed by J Coorey, addressed to Jeong Min Lee at 129/438 Forest Road, Hurstville NSW 2220, advising of the refusal of her application and enclosing the decision record which contained the reasons for that refusal. The letter stated that Ms Lee could seek review of the decision by applying to the Migration Review Tribunal ("MRT") no later than 21 days after receiving notification of the decision. The letter goes on to say that: "You are taken to have received this decision seven (7) days from the date of this letter". ·It is common ground that the letter was correctly addressed to the applicant at the postal address which she had nominated for correspondence. ·On 26 April 2001 the letter was returned to DIMA and marked "return to sender". ·On 25 July 2001 the applicant attended the DIMA office at Rockdale to enquire as to the state of progress of her application. She was then informed that her application for a visa had been refused, although on that occasion she was not supplied with any documentation in relation to that refusal. ·On 8 August 2001 a copy of the letter bearing the date 19 March 2001 was provided to the applicant´s solicitor, Mr Levingston, who provided it to the applicant on the following day. On 10 August 2001 the applicant lodged an application for review of the delegate´s decision with the MRT.MRT staff deal with matters On 8 October 2001 a letter was forwarded to the applicant´s solicitors on the letterhead of the MRT, signed by Ian Dunston "for Deputy Registrar" which stated as follows: “I am sorry to advise you that we cannot accept the application of Ms Jeong Min Lee to the Tribunal for the review of the decision to refuse her a subclass 560 visa.As you are aware, Ms Lee´s application to the Tribunal should have been lodged within a 28-day time limit. The letter from the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs informing Ms Lee of the decision was dated 19 March 2001, and on this basis I have calculated that the last day on which she could have lodged a valid application for review was 16 April 2001. However, Ms Lee´s application for review was not received at the Tribunal until 10 August 2001. The Tribunal has no power to extend or waive time limits but it is possible that an error may have been made in calculating the period, or that the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs did not properly notify Ms Lee of the decision. In this regard please note that I have taken into account the circumstances as detailed in your letter of 9 August 2001, and have determined that the Department properly notified Ms Lee of the visa refusal at the correct address for notification last nominated by her.I have also noted your views on the Federal Court decision in the matter Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (N496 of 2000, 4 April 2000), and it´s [sic] appropriateness to the circumstances in this case. You have correctly stated that in this matter the Federal Court found that Regulation 5.03 was defective. However, from 1 July 2000, Regulation 5.03 was amended to include Regulation 5.03(2) which addressed the issues raised by the Federal Court. As such, the Tribunal´s view is that Ms Lee´s application for review is ineligible for consideration and will therefore be finalised accordingly. I am arranging for the application fee of $1400.00 to be refunded and Ms Lee should receive a cheque in the near future. Please contact me … if you have any further enquiries.”