SZOIG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZOIG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 547

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: SZOIG v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 176
File number: NSD 225 of 2016
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 19 May 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court – no reasonable prospects of success – appeal dismissed.
Legislation:

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 91R (repealed), 424A

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss24(1A), 43(2)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12

Cases cited:

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30

AZK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1444

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559

MZXRN v Minister for Immigration and  Citizenship [2008] FCA 1622

Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 168 ALR 407

Ruddock v Vadarlis [2001] FCA 1865; (2001) 115 FCR 229

Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347

Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286

SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; (2007) 235 ALR 609

VAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 123; (2004) 206 ALR 471

WAFU v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1238

Date of hearing: 17 May 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 42
Counsel for the Applicants: The applicants appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms C Hillary of DLA Piper
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 225 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZOIG

First Applicant

SZOIH

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 MAY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2.The applicants are to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRY J:

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. These proceedings arise from a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal or AAT) to refuse to grant the applicants protection visas under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)(the Act). That provision prescribes criteria for the grant of a protection visa where the Minister is satisfied that the person…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 547
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, SZOIG, sought leave to appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had dismissed their application for a protection visa. The applicants, Indian nationals and Sikhs of Lubana ethnicity, had previously applied for a protection visa on the basis of the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) before the complementary protection provision in s 36(2)(aa) was enacted. Following a Full Court decision in SZGIZ, they made a second application for protection visas on the basis of complementary protection. The delegate refused their second application, and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirmed that decision, finding that the applicants did not have a real risk of significant harm in India due to their ethnicity or religion. The applicants sought leave to appeal the Federal Circuit Court's decision, arguing that the primary judge had failed to consider legal and factual errors by the Tribunal and that the Tribunal had erred in not considering certain events postdating its decision.

The court considered whether the applicants had demonstrated that the Federal Circuit Court had exercised its discretion to dismiss the appeal wrongly. The court found no merit in the applicants' arguments that the primary judge had failed to consider legal and factual errors by the Tribunal or that the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error. The court held that the primary judge had not erred in dismissing the applicants' appeal as there was no arguable case for the relief claimed. The court further held that the Tribunal was not required to consider events postdating its decision.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicants were ordered to pay the Minister's costs. The Federal Circuit Court's decision that the applicants were not eligible for protection visas under the complementary protection provision was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicants are to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the application for leave to appeal must be dismissed with costs. 2. BACKGROUND2.1 The visa application and the decision of the delegate The applicants applied for protection visas on 17 August 2009. Those applications were refused on 25 November 2009. Subsequently, the Full Court of this Court in SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71; (2013) 212 FCR 235 (SZGIZ) delivered its decision. In SZGIZ, the Full Court held that the bar imposed by s 48A of the Act upon a non-citizen making a further application for a protection visa while in the migration zone did not prevent a non-citizen who had made a valid application on the basis of the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) before the enactment of s 36(2)(aa) from making a further application on the basis of the complementary protection provision in s 36(2)(aa) following its enactment. Accordingly, on 4 September 2013 the applicants made a second application for protection visas. The delegate refused the second protection visa application on 18 July 2014.2.2 The Tribunal Decision The applicants sought merits review of the second decision of the delegate on 12 August 2014. On 8 July 2015, the applicants appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present argument. In line with the decision in SZGIZ, the Tribunal’s decision was confined to a consideration of the applicants’ complementary protection claims. On 16 July 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants protection visas, finding that it was not satisfied that the applicants are persons in respect of whom Australia has complementary protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. This was despite accepting that the applicants were nationals of India as claimed, that they were Sikhs, that they were of Lubana ethnicity and that their home region in India was the area claimed. The Tribunal’s reasons were accurately summarised by the Minister’s written submissions in the Federal Circuit Court which were adopted by the primary judge as follows (at [8]):9.The AAT did not accept the applicant's evidence for reason that it was contrary to available country information. i.The AAT accepted it was plausible that the applicant was subject to some harm prior to the cessation of the secessionist insurgency in 1993. However the AAT found that country information indicated that circumstances in the Punjab had changed substantially such that the applicants would not be at real risk of significant harm (see [16]). ii.Having regard to country information, the AAT was not satisfied that the applicants have a real risk of significant harm for reason of their Labuna [sic] ethnicity (see [20]). Further, on the basis of country information, the AAT was not satisfied that the applicants have a real risk of significant harm in [their home region] for reason of their Sikh religion or Lubana ethnicity (see [29]).iii.The AAT found that the applicant's recollection of political claims was vague (see [31]). In any event the AAT concluded that based on country information, it was not satisfied that the applicant had any problems practising his religion, being the source of his alleged political activities (see [32]).iv.Having regard to country information and the applicant's evidence about his political activities, the AAT was not satisfied that the applicant was anything more than a mere supporter of the Lok Dal party in his home village …(see [39]). Based on country information the AAT did not accept that the applicant did anything for Lok Dal that would cause him to be of any ongoing adverse interest (see [39]). Accordingly the AAT did not accept that the applicant was of ongoing adverse interest for any political reason and rejected any related claims including that his truck was damaged (see [41]).10.The AAT also found that the applicant had a lack of knowledge about politics in [their home region] and that this was indicative of a lack of real interest in politics such that he was not at a real risk of harm for his actual or imputed political opinion (see [43] - [44]).11.The AAT considered the applicant's health condition and that of his wife. i.The AAT found that there was no material evidence to suggest a deliberate withholding of medical treatment in India (see [49]). The AAT found that any lack of sophistication in health services was not intentional discrimination (see [49]). The AAT was satisfied that the applicants would be able to access medical assistance which is usually made available to persons in India (See [50]).ii.In relation to conduct of the hearing, the AAT indicated to the applicant that the hearing could be re-scheduled if the applicant felt unwell however this was refused by the applicant (see [14]).12.The AAT considered whether the applicants could safely and reasonably relocate within India (from [55]).i.The AAT did not accept that the applicant was of ongoing adverse interest to anyone in India or that the applicants or their children were threatened when the children returned to their home village in 2014 (see [56]). The AAT was satisfied that the applicants would be able to access a relocation place even in [their home region] (see [56]). The AAT found that the applicants could safely relocate in India and not have a real risk of significant harm (see [56]). Having regard to country information the AAT was not satisfied that any such relocation would cause the applicants to experience a lack of food, clean water, shelter or health care (see [58]). Further the AAT was not satisfied that language, education or employment would be a barrier for relocation of the applicants (see [61] - [63]). The AAT was not satisfied that it would be unreasonable for the applicants to relocate within India should they not wish to return to their home village (see [63]).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The delegate refused the second protection visa application on 18 July 2014.2.2 The Tribunal Decision The applicants sought merits review of the second decision of the delegate on 12 August 2014. On 8 July 2015, the applicants appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present argument. In line with the decision in SZGIZ, the Tribunal’s decision was confined to a consideration of the applicants’ complementary protection claims. On 16 July 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants protection visas, finding that it was not satisfied that the applicants are persons in respect of whom Australia has complementary protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. This was despite accepting that the applicants were nationals of India as claimed, that they were Sikhs, that they were of Lubana ethnicity and that their home region in India was the area claimed. The Tribunal’s reasons were accurately summarised by the Minister’s written submissions in the Federal Circuit Court which were adopted by the primary judge as follows (at [8]):9.The AAT did not accept the applicant's evidence for reason that it was contrary to available country information. i.The AAT accepted it was plausible that the applicant was subject to some harm prior to the cessation of the secessionist insurgency in 1993. However the AAT found that country information indicated that circumstances in the Punjab had changed substantially such that the applicants would not be at real risk of significant harm (see [16]). ii.Having regard to country information, the AAT was not satisfied that the applicants have a real risk of significant harm for reason of their Labuna [sic] ethnicity (see [20]). Further, on the basis of country information, the AAT was not satisfied that the applicants have a real risk of significant harm in [their home region] for reason of their Sikh religion or Lubana ethnicity (see [29]).iii.The AAT found that the applicant's recollection of political claims was vague (see [31]). In any event the AAT concluded that based on country information, it was not satisfied that the applicant had any problems practising his religion, being the source of his alleged political activities (see [32]).iv.Having regard to country information and the applicant's evidence about his political activities, the AAT was not satisfied that the applicant was anything more than a mere supporter of the Lok Dal party in his home village …(see [39]). Based on country information the AAT did not accept that the applicant did anything for Lok Dal that would cause him to be of any ongoing adverse interest (see [39]). Accordingly the AAT did not accept that the applicant was of ongoing adverse interest for any political reason and rejected any related claims including that his truck was damaged (see [41]).10.The AAT also found that the applicant had a lack of knowledge about politics in [their home region] and that this was indicative of a lack of real interest in politics such that he was not at a real risk of harm for his actual or imputed political opinion (see [43] - [44]).11.The AAT considered the applicant's health condition and that of his wife. i.The AAT found that there was no material evidence to suggest a deliberate withholding of medical treatment in India (see [49]). The AAT found that any lack of sophistication in health services was not intentional discrimination (see [49]). The AAT was satisfied that the applicants would be able to access medical assistance which is usually made available to persons in India (See [50]).ii.In relation to conduct of the hearing, the AAT indicated to the applicant that the hearing could be re-scheduled if the applicant felt unwell however this was refused by the applicant (see [14]).12.The AAT considered whether the applicants could safely and reasonably relocate within India (from [55]).i.The AAT did not accept that the applicant was of ongoing adverse interest to anyone in India or that the applicants or their children were threatened when the children returned to their home village in 2014 (see [56]). The AAT was satisfied that the applicants would be able to access a relocation place even in [their home region] (see [56]). The AAT found that the applicants could safely relocate in India and not have a real risk of significant harm (see [56]). Having regard to country information the AAT was not satisfied that any such relocation would cause the applicants to experience a lack of food, clean water, shelter or health care (see [58]). Further the AAT was not satisfied that language, education or employment would be a barrier for relocation of the applicants (see [61] - [63]). The AAT was not satisfied that it would be unreasonable for the applicants to relocate within India should they not wish to return to their home village (see [63]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge found that neither ground gave rise to an arguable case for the relief claimed. 3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Relevant principles Leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is necessary under s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) because a decision summarily dismissing an application under r 44.12(1)(a) is interlocutory in nature: see r 44.12(2) of the FCC Rules. In deciding whether or not to grant leave to appeal, relevant factors include whether the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and, if it is assumed to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicant if leave to appeal were refused: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397. In this regard, the power exercised by the Federal Circuit Court in dismissing the application was discretionary. As such, it would be necessary for the applicant to demonstrate that the primary judge made an error of the kind identified in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505 in the exercise of discretion, namely that the primary judge acted upon a wrong principle, was guided by extraneous or irrelevant matters, ignored relevant matters, made a mistake of fact, or that the discretionary decision is unreasonable or plainly unjust.3.2 Grounds 2 and 3: alleged failure by the primary judge to consider legal and factual errors by the Tribunal It is convenient to deal first with grounds 2 and 3 of the draft notice of appeal. I do not consider that there is any merit in ground 2 alleging that the primary judge failed to consider legal and factual errors in the Tribunal’s decision; nor, to the extent if any that it has any different meaning, ground 3 that the primary judge failed to consider that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in so far as it made findings that were not open on the evidence before the Tribunal. While these grounds did not identify any specific findings by the Tribunal which the applicant sought to challenge, at the hearing the applicants submitted that the Tribunal did not give proper consideration to the first applicant’s heart condition. The applicants also raised events that had occurred in their home region after the Tribunal’s decision. As to the last of these points, the first respondent correctly submitted that the Tribunal cannot be found to have erred in failing to take into account events which postdate its decision. The task of the Tribunal is to make the correct and preferable decision on evidence as at the date of its decision: Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 at 589; Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286 at 298-299[35]-[38], 304[60] (Kirby J). While the first respondent also correctly accepted that in some cases, subsequent events might be a ground on which an application for Ministerial intervention under s 417 of the Act might be sought, that is not a matter which is before this Court or was before the Federal Circuit Court.