AZK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AZK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1444

Citation: AZK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1444
Appeal from: AZK15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2303
AZK15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No 2) [2015] FCCA 2330
Parties: AZK15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1073 of 2015
Judge: JAGOT J
Date of judgment: 18 December 2015
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court – whether primary judge erred in dismissing application for judicial review of a decision to refuse to grant a protection visa – no error established – appeal dismissed

COSTS – whether primary judge erred in making a fixed sum costs order – appellant denied procedural fairness – fixed sum costs order set aside and substituted with the usual order as to costs

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 36(3), 427(1)(d), 499(2A)
Cases cited: Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510
AZK15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No 2) [2015] FCCA 2330
AZK15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2303
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 73 ALD 321
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 194 ALR 244
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1
NBKE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 126
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; (2007) 96 ALD 1
SZMYO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 506
SZUQZ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1552
SZUWX v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2151
Date of hearing: 27 November 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 69
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Williams
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Markus of Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1073 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

AZK15
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

JAGOT J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 DECEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Subject to the orders below, the appeal be dismissed.

2.Order (3) made on 27 August 2015 as to costs be set aside.

3.In lieu thereof, the applicant be ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs of the application to the Federal Circuit Court as agreed or as taxed.

4.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal as agreed or as taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1444
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of AZK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves the appellant challenging the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss his application for judicial review of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection’s decision to refuse to grant him a protection visa. The appellant argued that the primary judge made several errors in his decision, including failing to consider the possibility of Malaysian citizenship and the Tribunal’s failure to exercise its powers under Section 427 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court was required to decide whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the application for judicial review and whether the primary judge was correct in making a fixed sum costs order.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in dismissing the application for judicial review. The court found that the Tribunal had considered the appellant’s claim that his Malaysian citizenship had been acquired for money and rejected all claims that Malaysia might treat him as a non-citizen or persecute him or send him back to Yemen. The court also found that the Tribunal did not fail to consider the appellant’s claim that his Malaysian citizenship had been acquired for money and thus Malaysia might treat him as a non-citizen or persecute him or send him back to Yemen. The court found that the Tribunal did not fail to consider the appellant’s claim that his Malaysian citizenship had been acquired for money and thus Malaysia might treat him as a non-citizen or persecute him or send him back to Yemen. The court also found that the Tribunal did not fail to consider the appellant’s claim that his Malaysian citizenship had been acquired for money and thus Malaysia might treat him as a non-citizen or persecute him or send him back to Yemen.

The court found that the primary judge erred in making a fixed sum costs order. The court found that the appellant was denied procedural fairness in this regard. The court found that the appellant had not demonstrated any error by the primary judge other than in relation to costs. The court set aside the fixed sum costs order and substituted it with the usual order as to costs. The court found that the appellant had not demonstrated any error by the primary judge other than in relation to costs. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal as agreed or as taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Subject to the orders below, the appeal be dismissed.

2. Order (3) made on 27 August 2015 as to costs be set aside.

3. In lieu thereof, the applicant be ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs of the application to the Federal Circuit Court as agreed or as taxed.

4. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal as agreed or as taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The notice of appeal to this Court involves 13 grounds, particularised in 30 paragraphs (the last three of which relate to a costs issue). While the grounds overlap I will deal with each ground separately.Ground 1: No evidence of Malaysian citizenship1.The primary judge erred at [22] in AZK15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2303 (AZK Judgment No.1) by finding that [i]t is clear that these were matters taken into account by the Tribunal, and in my opinion, it was open to the Tribunal to find that the applicant was a legitimate Malaysian citizen, and it was open to the Tribunal to find that he had legally obtained a passport in Malaysia.’ 2.There was no evidence before the Tribunal or the Court that the appellant was a legitimate Malaysian citizen or that he had legally obtained a passport in Malaysia. The basic proposition put for the appellant was that because he had obtained his Malaysian citizenship documents by a fraud and “fraud destroys everything” it necessarily followed that there was no evidence before the Tribunal that the appellant was a citizen of Malaysia. The contention is misconceived in numerous respects. First, the existence of foreign laws and their content are a question of fact, not law. Evidence is required to prove the existence and content of a foreign law. Second, the appellant never asserted that his citizenship and associated documents were frauds. To the contrary, he asserted that his Malaysian passport was genuine (eg para 11 of his second statutory declaration and para 4 of his third statutory declaration). He asserted only that he had obtained his Malaysian citizenship by a payment of money, not that the citizenship so obtained was itself a fraud. There is a difference between a document being fraudulently obtained and a document itself being a fraud which the appellant’s counsel did not acknowledge. Third, it is not the case that it can be simply assumed that under Malaysian law citizenship obtained as a result of the payment of money means that the citizenship was fraudulently obtained, still less that the citizenship itself is fraudulent. The question was one of fact for the Tribunal. Fourth, the Tribunal considered the facts (which it put to the appellant) including that it was widely known in Malaysia that citizenship had been given in Sabah to change the electoral balance, including a Royal Commission into the practice which resulted in no findings being made, and that where 70,000 such citizenships had been granted in the last 50 years it was unlikely the appellant’s citizenship would be revoked because it was “to all intents and purposes genuine”. In other words, the Tribunal considered that based on the facts about Malaysia a citizenship obtained by the payment of money was accepted by Malaysia as and thus treated as genuine. Fifth, the only basis on which the appellant appeared to challenge this conclusion was that it went without saying, at least according to the submissions for the appellant, that “fraud destroys everything”. This maxim assumes that a citizenship obtained by the payment of money in Malaysia is necessarily fraudulently obtained. This is not a matter that can be assumed but is a matter for evidence. It also assumes that the citizenship obtained is itself fraudulent. Again, this cannot be assumed but is a matter for evidence. It also assumes that if fraudulent, the citizenship does not exist. This too cannot be assumed but is a matter for evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Be that as it may, I accept that if the appellant wanted to see proof of the costs incurred then the discretionary options available to the primary judge consistent with the requirements of procedural fairness were only two. The primary judge could have adjourned the matter to enable the Minister to provide an affidavit proving the costs. Alternatively, the primary judge could have decided that in the circumstances the usual order as to costs should be made, the appellant’s claimed impecuniosity not being a sufficient reason to adjourn the costs issue as set out above. The primary judge erred in making the fixed sum costs order. The appellant was denied procedural fairness in this regard. Given the circumstances I consider that this aspect of the matter should not be remitted to the primary judge. Rather, I should make an order setting aside the costs order and replacing it with an order for the usual order as to costs.Conclusions For the reasons given the appellant has not demonstrated any error by the primary judge other than in relation to costs. The appeal should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

To the extent this ground has not been addressed above, the identification test details confirmed that the appellant had been born in Yemen not Malaysia as he claimed and had held a Yemeni passport. This was never in issue before the Tribunal. What was in issue was the significance, if any, of the appellant’s claim that he paid for his Malaysian citizenship. It was that issue with which the Tribunal was required to, and did, grapple. In so doing it was not bound to consider the identification test details. They were a given which did no more than confirm the undisputed fact that the appellant was born in Yemen and had a Yemeni passport (which he used to travel to Malaysia). Otherwise, the issues raised by this ground are merely repetitive.Ground 11: Unreasonableness – Section 427 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)23.The primary judge erred at [35] in AZK Judgment No.1, by finding that ‘[i]nsofar as the applicant argued that the Tribunal was required to take further steps under s.427 in relation to either Yemen or Malaysia I do not accept that the Tribunal was required to do so. Nor was it unreasonable for the Tribunal, or in any way a denial of procedural fairness to take no further steps to contact Malaysian or Yemen authorities. There is no substance in the contention of a breach of s.427 of the Act.’24.The failure of the second respondent to address the applicant’s contention meant that the second respondent did not consider whether this was an occasion when it should exercise its powers of inquiry under s 427(1)(d) of the Act to ascertain from the Malaysian authorities whether in the applicant’s circumstances, the applicant would be entitled to Malaysian nationality, and whether he would qualify for protection by the Malaysian state. Nor did the second respondent ascertain from the Yemeni authorities whether his Yemeni nationality was still in force and he would qualify for protection by the Yemeni authorities. The first answer to this ground is that the Tribunal did not fail to consider the appellant’s claim that his Malaysian citizenship had been acquired for money and thus Malaysia might treat him as a non-citizen or persecute him or send him back to Yemen. The Tribunal considered and rejected all of these claims. The second answer to this ground is that, contrary to the appellant’s submissions, NBKE is not authority for the proposition that it would be unreasonable for the Tribunal not to exercise its powers under s 427(1)(d) of the Act to “ascertain from the Malaysian authorities whether in the appellant’s circumstances, the appellant would be entitled to Malaysian nationality, and whether he would qualify for protection by the Malaysian state… [or to] ascertain from the Yemeni authorities whether his Yemeni nationality was still in force and he would qualify for protection by the Yemeni authorities”. Section 427(1)(d) provides that the Tribunal may “require the Secretary to arrange for the making of any investigation, or any medical examination, that the Tribunal thinks necessary with respect to the review, and to give to the Tribunal a report of that investigation or examination”. It is a discretion vested in the Tribunal. I am unable to see any circumstance which made it unreasonable in the present case for the Tribunal not to exercise that power. The appellant’s submission is the equivalent of saying the Tribunal was bound to require an investigation before it could decide the application for review. I do not accept this proposition. Nor do I consider that the Tribunal was bound to consider exercising its discretionary power. The appellant, represented by a migration agent at the hearing (and a solicitor otherwise), made no such request.