SZODV v Minister for Immigration
[2010] FMCA 585
•4 August 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZODV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2010] FMCA 585 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a Protection (Class XA) Visa – no reviewable error – application dismissed. The Applicant in these proceedings is not to be identified pursuant to s.91X of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and has been given the pseudonym “SZODV”. |
| Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91R(3), 91X, 422B, 424A, 441A, 476, 477 Aronson M, Dyer B, Groves M, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd Ed, 2004) |
| Abram v Bank of New Zealand [1996] 18 ATPR 41 – 507 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61 Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang 1996) 185 CLR 259 MZYCQ v Minister For Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1286 Neil v Nott (1994) 121 ALR 148 Paul v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1196 SCAA v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCA 668 SZBYR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62 SZKMS v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 499 SZMOO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 211 SZMPN v Minister for Immigration [2009] FCA 203 |
| Applicant: | SZODV |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 278 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Lloyd-Jones FM |
| Hearing date: | 27 April 2010 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 4 August 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant: | The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter. |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Sparke Helmore (Bernadette Rayment) |
ORDERS
An extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is refused.
The application filed on 12 February 2010 is dismissed.
The Applicant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application fixed in the amount of $3,700.00.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 278 of 2010
| SZODV |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application filed on 12 February 2010 pursuant to s.476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 6 June 2007. The application for judicial review has been filed handing down of the Tribunal decision in the vicinity of two and a half year. The solicitors representing the Minister sought to have the matter listed for a Show Cause Hearing under r.44.12 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth). At the Show Cause hearing, following hearing the issue of an extension of time and the grounds of review, I dismissed the application.
The Applicant is a self-represented litigant and appeared with the assistance of a Mandarin – English interpreter. I believe it was in both parties’ interest to know with some certainty the future progress of the matter. Consequently, I made orders at the completion of the hearing and indicated that I would publish my reasons for these orders where I stated:
Now, I will prepare written submissions for my decision other than the few small comments I have made this afternoon, but I think it warrants some detailed explanation of why this was made….
The proceedings
The Applicant was born on 1 February 1961and is a male citizen of the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC). He completed nine years of education and was self-employed from October 1999 until his departure from China on 25 August 2005.
The Applicant’s claim for Protection is as follows:
a)He studied Falun Gong in 2003 through Li Qiang;
b)He began practising Falun Gong in August 2003;
c)He invited fellow Falun Gong practitioners to his house for joint classes;
d)He was arrested by the PSB in May 2004 and detained for 15 days for conducting Falun Gong and was released as his wife paid the them RMB1,500;
e)He continued to practice Falun Gong after leaving his home where he was forced to learn political studies by community officials;
f)He paid RMB 4,000 for a passport for me and travelled to Australia;
g)He travelled to Australia in a tour group which he deserted on arrival; and
h)After his arrival he found fellow Falun Gong practitioners in Campsie.
The Applicant arrived in Australia on 29 December 2006 and applied to the Department of Immigration & Citizenship for Protection (Class XA) visas on 8 January 2007. On 19 February 2007 a delegate of the Minister for Immigration & Citizenship refused the application for a Protection visa and the Applicant was notified of this decision by way of letter dated 19 February 2007. The Applicants applied for a review of this decision with the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 6 March 2007 and the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the Applicant a Protection visa on 6 June 2007. It is this decision, RRT case number 071228894, a decision of Shahya Roushan that is the subject of these proceedings
A Court Book (“CB”) was prepared by the first Respondent’s solicitors and marked Exhibit “A”. This is the only evidence before the Court.
The Grounds of review pleaded in the Application filed on 12 February 2010 are as follows:
(1)RRT considered my case unfairly. They doubt my claim about substantive evidence.
(2)Procedural fairness has been denied by RRT.
(3)RRT did not consider my situation in China. I will be put in jail if I go back.
The original application also seeks an extension of time under the provisions of s.477 of the Act. The grounds pleaded for the extension of time are:
(1) When I got RRT refusal letter. I felt upset.
(2)I am not familiar with Australian law at that moment. So I missed the time to lodge in the application in FMC.
(3)I did not have enough money to pay more money. So I had to delay.
At the first court date directions hearing, the Applicant indicated he wished to participate in the Federal Magistrate’s Court legal advice scheme. He was subsequently allocated a panel advisor, attended a conference and received written advice. The Applicant was granted leave to file an amended application but did not avail himself of this opportunity.
The Tribunal’s findings
The Applicant attended a hearing of the Tribunal on 1 May 2007 and provided copies of photographs purportedly depicting the Applicant holding a banner and the Falun Gong demonstration in Sydney’s Chinatown (CB 54 – 56). On 3 May 2007 the Tribunal sent an invitation to the Applicant to comments on or respond to information pursuant to s.424A (CB 57 – 59). The preparation and distribution of this letter complied with the requirements of ss.424A and 441A. The letter outlined numerous matters in the Applicant’s evidence that the Tribunal considered might not be believed, or did not support his claims. It also informed the Applicant that the totality of this information might cause the Tribunal to find that he was not a credible or truthful witness. The letter explained the relevance of the matters to the review in the manner required by s.424A and in a way which enabled the Applicant to respond: Paul v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1196 per Allsop J at [104]. The Tribunal received no response to this letter (CB 72.9).
The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 6 June 2007 and handed down its decision on 28 June 2007 (CB 62). The Tribunal found that the Applicant was not a credible witness and rejected his claims to have practiced Falun Gong in China and to have been arrested by the authorities. The Tribunal cited numerous inconsistencies in the Applicant’s evidence as to where he resided in China, his employment history and the length of his involvement with Falun Gong in China (CB 75.4 – 76.2). The Tribunal found that the Applicant’s delay in leaving China after obtaining his passport cast doubt on the genuineness of his claims to fear persecution (CB 76.6). The Tribunal also found that the Applicant had displayed a distinct lack of knowledge of Falun Gong (CB 76.8 – 77.4). The Tribunal found that the totality of the Applicant’s evidence showed a propensity to exaggerate and to tailor his evidence to achieve his own purpose (CB 76.7).
The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant had been involved in Falun Gong related activities in Australia but, in view of the Applicant’s credibility, did not accept that he was engaged in other than for the purposes of strengthening his claims. Accordingly, the Tribunal disregarded this conduct in accordance with s.91R(3) (CB 76.6).
Consideration
Application for extension of time
At the directions hearing on 9 March 2010, orders were made that all evidence relied upon by the parties was to be presented by way of affidavit and that the Applicant must file and serve any such affidavits by 7 April 2010. The Applicant complied with this direction and filed an affidavit affirmed 14 March 2010, attached was a Statutory Declaration dated 10 March 2010 and a attached 2 page typed statement which the Applicant advised the Court had been prepared with the assistance of his then migration agent, a Yeow Li. There was no interpreter certification contained within that document so the interpreter present in Court was requested to read the two page statement to the Applicant, in order for the Applicant to verify the contents. After the document had been read to the Applicant, he confirmed that it contained the evidence that he wished to give in respect of his application for an extension of time and that there was nothing in the document which he sought to change.
That document states:
My name is [SZODV], born in Shenyang City of China on 1st February 1961. My application for a protection visa was refused by RRT on June 6th 2007. I submitted an application to the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia on Feb 12 2010, and attended the Directions Hearing on 9 March 2010 at 9.30am and I was listed 27 April 2010 for a show cause hearing. In the Directions hearing on 9 March 2010 the judge raised a question that why I submitted the application to the court two years and eight months after my application for a protection visa was refused by RRT, and he allowed me to give a written explanation. My explanation is as follows:
I got to know an agent Jie Wang through a friend’s introduction in January 2007. A t that time I just arrived in Australia and did not know much about the Australian law. I just feared going back to China, as there’s no religion freedom there. I was persecuted by the Chinese government and detained for 15 days in China because I was a Falun Gong practitioner. I came to Australia to escape the persecution. The four of us paid Jie Wang $500 altogether and he promised to apply refugee protection for us. Afterwards, we found that the private agent was extremely irresponsible. Every time he asked us to meet at some stations. There’s no fixed place for the agency and all the correspondence were sent to our own addresses. We did not understand English, so we’d call Jie Wang when we received letters. However, sometimes he didn’t answer our calls. He used the excuse of being busy for not answering the calls. This resulted in our failure to attend the interviews of DIAC.
I remember I just attended a hearing of RRT once. Jie Wang notified me the time of RRT hearing and told me the address and let me to attend the RRT hearing by myself. After the hearing, I received a letter from RRT in June 2007. As I didn’t know English, I did not understand the content of the letter. I called Jie Wang but I can’t get in touch with him because he has changed his mobile number and I didn’t know the exact location of his agency.
In such an urgent situation, I found another agent to process my refugee application. This time my friend introduced a Ms Zhang in Campsie to me. She was a slim woman about 30 years old with long hair. She opened an immigration agency in her home. I was not sure whether she had a license for immigration agency, but her charge was pretty cheap, so I asked her to help my refugee application. I took all the correspondence from DIAC and RRT to Ms Zhang’s home. After she read my files, she charged me $700 and promised to help me apply to the Federal Magistrate’s Court. I agreed to leave all documents to her. I didn’t expect that in the following months, when I called her, she said she was very busy. When I said I would go to her home, she said she was not at home. I didn’t believe her and I went to her home. However, she did not live there any longer. By then I realised that I was deceived again. After I was deceived twice, I did not believe in any Chinese agencies. I had given all the correspondence to Ms Zhang and did not keep any copies, besides, I did not know much about the Australian law, so I did not make further application. But I feared going back to China, so I chose to remain here illegally.
I had acute testitis in July 2008. I remember that I felt very painful in the stomach on the morning when the disease broke out, and I went to the bathroom frequently. At 3pm the pain aggravated and I can hardly move. At about 7pm, I was sent to Canterbury Hospital by ambulance. The doctors had a discuss and decided to carry on an operation on that night. An operation was carried out to cut off my single testicle and part of the large intestine. After the operation the doctor told me that if I was sent to hospital some time later, my life would have been in danger. As I had neither medical insurance nor legal residential right and I had to pay a huge medical cost, I felt that I was in the most unfortunate period of my life. I had to sell my property in China to pay off most of the medical cost.
My statement above is true and I would provide evidence to prove my application.
The amendments to s.477 of the Act which commenced on 15 March 2009 apply to this application. The Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 2009 (Cth) has the effect that the “date of decision” is deemed to be 15 March 2009. In order for the Application to have been lodged within 35 days, it was required to be lodged by 20 April 2009. As the Application was not lodged until 12 February 2010, it is nine months late and incompetent by virtue s.477(1). Section 477(2) provides that the Federal Magistrate’s Court may extend time if an application for an extension of time has been made in writing and the Court is satisfied that it is “necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order”.
In the affidavit material set out above, the purported explanation for the delay is attributed to a “deception” by a “Miss Zhang” and a medical condition suffered in July 2008. Ms Rayment, appearing on behalf of the Minister, cross-examined the Applicant on this evidence.
I acknowledge the difficulties faced by the Applicant as a self-represented litigant who is required to give evidence and be cross examined in a foreign language dependant on an interpreter. However, the Applicant was extremely evasive in identifying the parties with whom he had dealt and was holding responsible for his failure to pursue his review rights. Some of the initial testimony given in respect to the completion of the original Protection Visa application may have been due to the period of time that has elapsed since that task was completed and being in the unfamiliar position of giving evidence before the Court. The witness indicated that he had sought the assistance of a number of people to read documentation sent to him by either the Department or the Tribunal and explain their contents. His evidence when asked to identify these people by name resulted in answers that he did not know or that he had introduced by a “friend”. When requested to identify the “friend”, the Applicant declined to respond.
In the evidence of what steps the Applicant took after he had found that Ms Zhang had moved premises and could not be contacted, the following cross-examination occurred:
Ms Rayment: So where you say in your evidence that you realised that you were deceived again, you realised that at the end of July 2007; is that correct?
Interpreter: Correct
Ms Rayment: And where you say in your evidence that you feared going back to China so you Chose to remain here, you made that choice in 2007. Is that correct?
Interpreter: After the fraud by Ms Zhang I made this decision. I couldn’t fund her.
Ms Rayment: You made the decision to remain in Australia illegally knowing that you had not filed an application with the court.
Interpreter: Yes.
Ms Rayment: You took no further steps to review the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal until you filed your current application with the court on 12 February 2010. Is that correct?
Interpreter: Yes. During the period of the illegal, you know, stay – of stay, also suffered this disease.
Ms Rayment: Your illness was not a reason you chose not to come to court. Your evidence is that you made the decision in July 2007 and you took no further steps.
Interpreter: Correct.
Ms Rayment indicated to the Court that the Minister is not prejudiced in cases where an extension of time is sought pursuant to s.477. However, an exception arises in cases of gross delay where the documents may have been destroyed. Prejudice cannot be the basis on which to grant an extension of time, especially as it is in the public interest to dispose of cases of this nature expeditiously: SZKMS v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 499 per Lander J at [29] –[30].
Although the Applicant’s evidence was confused, evasive and in some respects non-responsive, I am satisfied that the Applicant knew in July 2007 that the delegate of the Minister had refused to grant him a Protection visa and that the subsequent review by the Refugee Review Tribunal had also been unsuccessful. Further, he was aware that he had a right of review with the Federal Magistrate’s Court and that there were time limits which applied to the filing of that application. Without equivocation he stated that he was aware that the time limit was approaching when he realised that, he had lost contact with Ms Zhang. In his evidence he clearly stated that he consciously decided to remain in Australia illegally and decided to take no further steps at that time. I note that he gave his evidence in relation to this decision indicating that he was fully aware of his changed status at the expiry of the review period. This evidence can be strongly contrasted to that given when asked to identify particular people involved in providing him with assistance or advice and in the reading and interpretation of various notification documents.
Section 477(1) of the Act contains a 35 day time limit in which to make an application to this Court for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. Section 477(2) grants the Court discretion to extend that time if there has been an application made in writing setting out why the Applicant considers that it is in the interest of the administration of justice to grant an extension. The relevant delay in this application is lengthy, being approximately 9 months. This has been effectively reduced in this case because of the amendment in the legislation which came into effect on 15 March 2009. The Applicant has failed to take any steps to rectify his position for a period in the vicinity of two years and eight months and so benefited from the amended legislation. The Applicant has not put forward any explanation about why he delayed pursuing action from 20 April 2009 until he filed the application on 12 February 2010. Throughout this period he was aware of his rights and elected to remain in Australia illegally from July 2007.
I note that the Applicant is a self-represented litigant who is pursuing these proceedings with the disability that he does not speak the language and is totally reliant on the interpreter. It is also apparent that he has no understanding or comprehension of the Australian Immigration laws. He has been assisted by a number of unidentified individuals, to the extent that he was aware that certain steps were required to be taken within specific time limits but he elected not to pursue this approach.
I acknowledge the decision in Abram v Bank of New Zealand [1996] 18 ATPR 41 – 507 where the Full Federal Court applied the decision of the High Court of Australia in Neil v Nott (1994) 121 ALR 148 at [50], where it found thatt where a party is not represented, a court must assume a burden endeavouring to ascertain the rights of the party which are obfuscated by their own advocacy. What a Judge must do to assist an Applicant in person depends on the litigant, the nature of the case, the litigant’s intelligence and understanding of the case. In this matter, although the Applicant has been unable to persuade me to grant an extension of time in which to file the application, I believe that in fairness and I should proceed to review the decision of the Tribunal to determine whether it contains any jurisdictional error. The Applicant’s application in these proceedings contains three unparticularised and simplistic grounds for review and I will consider those grounds.
Ground 1
The Applicant claims that the Tribunal considered his case “unfairly” and doubted his claim “without substantial evidence”. This claim is unparticularised and no argument has been advanced by the Applicant to support this claim. On a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision, it gave detailed reasons affirming the delegate’s decision, including setting out the identified inconsistencies in the evidence that the Applicant had given. It was open to the Tribunal to reach this view, on the material placed before it. An allegation that the Tribunal considered the case “unfairly” is an allegation of actual or apprehended bias.
Actual bias involves the state of mind on the part of the decision maker whilst exercising a decision making power that is so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence may be presented: SCAA v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCA 668 per Von Doussa J at [36]. I am satisfied that there is no evidence to support the view that has been put before the Court, nor is it apparent from the Tribunal record that the Tribunal’s mind was not “open to persuasion” and an allegation that the decision maker’s mind was not so open must be “distinctly made and clearly proved”: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17; at [69]. In the absence of any evidence to support this allegation, this leaves the Applicant in the position of having to rely on the Tribunal’s decision record. His Honour Von Doussa J observed in SCAA v Minister for Immigration at [38] (supra) in a passage that has since been cited with approval in SZMOO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 211 per Reeves J at [19] and SZMPN v Minister for Immigration [2009] FCA 203 per McKerracher J at [24] that it will be a “rare and exceptional case where actual bias can be demonstrated solely from the published reasons of the decision”.
I accept the written submissions made on behalf of the Minister that the Tribunal’s reasons in this case do not fall within “the rare and exceptional” category of cases in which its reasons alone are sufficient to establish actual bias. Its findings have a clear evidentiary basis and were open on the evidence before it. Those findings were made after the Tribunal conducted a hearing with the Applicant, the Tribunal’s summary of which suggests that the Applicant had every opportunity to articulate his claim in detail. After the hearing, the Tribunal sent the Applicant a letter in which it sets out the inconsistencies which were of particular concern to it. The inconsistencies identified relate to information contained in the Protection Visa application and his subsequent evidence to the delegate and the Tribunal. The Tribunal also provided him with an opportunity to respond further to its concerns notwithstanding that such inconsistencies did not constitute “information” for the purposes of s.424A of the Act: SZBYR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Calinan, Heydon & Crennan JJ at [19] – [20].
Further, I agree with the submissions that the Tribunal did not accept the Applicant’s claims because it did not accept that he was a credible witness for the reason that he could not explain inconsistencies which the Applicant had not been able to explain to its satisfaction. The Tribunal has raised credibility concerns with the Applicant at the hearing (CB 70.5 – 71.3). The fact that the Tribunal reached this conclusion is not, on the basis of its reasons alone, sufficient to establish pre-judgment: MZYCQ v Minister For Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1286 per Sundberg J at [16].
For an allegation of apprehended bias to be satisfied, the Applicant would have to satisfy the Court that a hypothetical, fair minded lay-person, be informed as to the nature of the proceedings and the matters and conduct in issue, might reasonably apprehend that the decision maker might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex Parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 at [27] – [28]. In the absence of any pleaded particulars, submissions or arguments advanced by the Applicant and relying on the only evidence before the Court, being the contents of the Tribunal decision, I am satisfied that the Tribunal conducted itself in a manner that could not be perceived by the hypothetical, fair minded lay-observer, as failing to bring an impartial mind to its deliberations. Consequently, this ground of review cannot be sustained and should be dismissed.
Ground 2
The Applicant asserts that he was denied “procedural fairness” which again is an allegation made in the absence of any particulars or evidence. This is a matter in which s.422B of the Act applies, and the Applicant was entitled only to the rights afforded to him under Part 7 of the Act and the Tribunal was not required to afford the Applicant common law procedural fairness or natural justice: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61 and SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62. Again on a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision, which is the only evidence on which the Court can rely, I am satisfied that the Tribunal validly complied with its obligations under Part 7 of the Act. This ground cannot be sustained and should be dismissed.
Ground 3
This ground asserts that the Tribunal did not consider the Applicant’s situation that if he was required to return to China, and his claim that he would be gaoled on his return. The Tribunal expressly considered whether the Applicant had a well founded fear of persecution in China in the reasonably foreseeable future and was not satisfied that he did (CB 78.1). I further accept the written submissions of the Minister which advances the argument that the Applicant’s complaint in this ground amounts to impermissible invitation to the Court to review the merits of the Tribunal’s decision. Clearly, a merits review is not available in this Court: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang 1996) 185 CLR 259 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh & Gummow JJ at [31] where their Honours stated:
… any Court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must be aware of turing the review of the reasons of decision maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision.
A merits review is an assessment of the appropriateness of a decision as distinct from a judicial review which focuses on the lawfulness of a decision. A judicial review questions whether the decision maker was authorised to do what he did under the prevailing law, not whether the actual decision was the best decision that could have been made in the circumstances. A merits review provides the complete rehearsal of all of the issues relevant to the application.
Mark Aronson, Bruce Dwyer and Mathew Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd Ed, 2004) at 14 focused on this distinction and the difficulties that can be experience with the distinction:
His Honour [Justice Brennan] stated in Attorney General (NSW) v Quin that judicial review often remedies administrative injustice or error, but that this is an occasional consequence rather than its rationale, which is simply to enforce obedience to the law. His Honour acknowledged that occasional difficulty in distinguishing between administrative actio’sn merits and its legality, but insisted that, to the extent that a distinction was feasible, the ‘merits of administrative action [were]…for the repository alone’. The High Court has repeatedly endorsed His Honour’s cautious words in Quin, emphasising the need to distinguish an administrative decision on its merits and its legality (Citations omitted).
It would appear that this ground is doing no more than expressing the Applicant’s dissatisfaction with the Tribunal’s process of reasoning and the Applicant’s failure to succeed in light of the Applicant’s extremely limited understanding of the proceedings which he is pursuing and the assistance that he has received from unidentified third parties who also have an extremely limited understanding of the arguments and procedures necessary to advance this review. This ground of review cannot be sustained and should be dismissed.
Conclusion
The Applicant has not failed to establish any ground to satisfy the Court that an extension of time should be granted for the filing of this Application, nor has he been able to establish any ground of jurisdictional error in the original Tribunal decision that he seeks to challenge. If the discretion to extend the time for filing was exercised, the Applicant is unable to establish that the Tribunal decision was subject to jurisdictional error. In these circumstances the application should be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lloyd-Jones FM
Associate:
Date: 4 August 2010
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