SZMPN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZMPN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 203

SZMPN and SZMPO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

NSD 1925 OF 2008

MCKERRACHER J
6 MARCH 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1925 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZMPN
SZMPO
Appellants

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 MARCH 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants are to pay the costs of the first respondent fixed at $2,300. 

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website..


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1925 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZMPN
SZMPO
Appellants

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE:

6 MARCH 2009

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellants are husband and wife, and citizens of India.  They arrived in Australia on 30 November 2007.  On 4 January 2008 they lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship.  Only the husband pursued a claim for refugee status.  His wife relied on his claims as a dependent family member.  (The appellant husband will be referred to as the appellant)  A delegate of the first respondent refused the application for a protection visa on 28 March 2008.  On 11 April 2008 the appellants applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) for a review of that decision.  The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.

  2. This is an appeal from a judgment of a Federal Magistrate delivered on 11 December 2008 (SZMPN & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2008] FMCA 1702). His Honour dismissed an application for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal handed down on 17 July 2008.

    THE APPELLANTS’ CLAIMS

  3. The appellant claimed to fear persecution because of his political opinion.  He claimed that he lived in Mumbai and worked in the cloth manufacturing business.  He had gone into that business partnership with another man whom he claimed was a member of the Congress Party.  His partner suggested to the appellant that he join the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with a view to keeping his business partner informed about information concerning that party.  After an incident in Mumbai in which trains were bombed, one of the appellant’s workers at the factory was arrested by the police.  The appellant feared that he would also be implicated in the bombings because this person worked for him.

  4. He claimed that he was threatened by anti-social elements.  One night when returning home he was attacked by people on motorbikes, was injured, and had to…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 203
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZMPN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved the appellants, SZMPN, appealing against the decision of the Federal Court of Australia which upheld the Minister's decision to cancel their visas on the basis that they were not genuine refugees. The appellants argued that the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of their credibility and that they were entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the appellants' credibility and whether it failed to consider the principle that the benefit of the doubt should be given to generally credible applicants who are unable to substantiate all of their claims.

The court found that the appellants' argument was misconceived. The court noted that the principle of giving the benefit of the doubt to generally credible applicants was contained in the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, which was merely a practical guide rather than an authoritative interpretation of the Convention. The court further held that the Tribunal was not required to uncritically accept any or all of the allegations made by the applicant. The court found that the Tribunal had not accepted the appellants' evidence as credible and had made firm adverse credibility findings, which were not unreasonable. Therefore, the appellants were not entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent, fixed at $2,300. The court held that it was not for it to review the merits of the appellants' claims or the fairness and correctness of the Tribunal's findings as to those claims.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants are to pay the costs of the first respondent fixed at $2,300.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MCKERRACHER J
His Honour's conclusion was correct.CONCLUSION The appeal will be dismissed. The appellants are to pay the costs of the first respondent fixed at $2,300.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MCKERRACHER J

To the extent that the appellant complains about the Tribunal’s findings themselves, it is not for the Court to review the merits of the appellant’s claims or the fairness and correctness of the Tribunal’s findings as to those claims (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272; NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [10]). CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL GROUND The appellants claim that the Court below erred in that it ought to have held that on the evidence before the Tribunal it was open to the Tribunal to find that the appellants were refugees. In assessing the applicant’s credibility, the Tribunal must be sensitive to the difficulties often faced by applicants and should give the benefit of the doubt to those who are generally credible, but are unable to substantiate all of their claims: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437. However, the Tribunal is not required to uncritically accept any or all of the allegations made by the applicant: Randhawa. The reasons of the learned Federal Magistrate do not address this contention because it was not raised in the proceedings before his Honour. In any event, the ground is misconceived. The principle referred to is contained in the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (1979) published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. But the Handbook is to be regarded more as ‘a practical guide for the use of those who are required to determine whether or not a person is a refugee than as a document purporting to interpret the meaning of the relevant parts of the Convention’: Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 392 per Mason CJ. The Tribunal is under no obligation to uncritically accept any and all allegations made by an applicant: Randhawa 52 FCR 437 at 451. Moreover, the Handbook states that ‘the benefit of the doubt should, however, only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility’: Randhawa at 451. Even if this guiding principle did impose some obligation on the Tribunal (which it did not), it is clear from the Tribunal’s decision that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant was a truthful witness or that his claims were plausible. The Tribunal, whilst accepting that the appellant was a Hindu from Mumbai working in the clothing industry, did not accept any involvement by himself or any associate in the bombings in Mumbai in 2006. The Tribunal found that the appellant's oral and written evidence as to who he believed wished to harm him and their motivation for such to be most unconvincing. It found evidence about the link between the claimed arrest of an employee following a bomb attack on the train and threats of harm to the appellant were most unclear. The Tribunal, not unreasonably, made firm adverse credibility findings, on the basis that it found his evidence ‘most unconvincing’, ‘vague’, ‘ambivalent’, ‘evasive’, ‘shifting’ and ‘most unclear’. The Tribunal did not find the appellant to be credible and thought his evidence was evasive and shifting. As such, the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of any doubt.