FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZHPI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 306
SZHPI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 1934 OF 2007BRANSON J
11 MARCH 2008
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1934 OF 2007
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SZHPI
AppellantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 MARCH 2008
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1934 OF 2007
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SZHPI
AppellantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE:
11 MARCH 2008
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The appellant claims to be entitled to a protection use under s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on the basis that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in Lebanon, his country of nationality, on the ground of religion and political opinion. He claims to be a Christian affiliated with the Church St George, Tripoli, North Lebanon and to have experienced a violent attack on his home by fanatic Islamic terrorists.
His claim was rejected by a delegate of the Minister and by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The appellant gave evidence before the Tribunal. The Tribunal member regarded his evidence in important respects, namely his places of residence and employment in Lebanon, as “internally inconsistent, implausible, and so far fetched as to be fanciful”.
The appellant unsuccessfully sought judicial review by the Federal Magistrates Court of the decision of the Tribunal.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
The appellant’s appeal to this Court from the judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court is brought on two grounds. The first ground is that the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that the Tribunal had not applied the wrong test in determining his credibility. The particulars of this ground are that the Tribunal failed to apply the ordinary meaning of the terms “reside” and “live” and therefore applied the wrong test in determining the credibility of the appellant. The second ground is that the Federal Magistrate should have found that the decision of the Tribunal was vitiated by bias.
I have concluded for the following reasons that the appeal should be dismissed.
GROUND 1
Evidence concerning residence
A transcript of the appellant’s hearing before the Tribunal has been placed before the Court. It discloses that at an early stage of the hearing the Tribunal member asked the appellant where he resided in Lebanon. The appellant nominated a city and a street name. The transcript then records the following exchange:
Q.And how long did you live at that address?
A.Six…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 306
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of the appellant's credibility and if the Tribunal had failed to apply the correct legal test in its decision-making process. Specifically, the appellant argued that the Tribunal did not properly consider the distinction between the words "reside" and "live," and thus failed to correctly interpret his evidence. The court examined the transcript of the Tribunal's proceedings and the written reasons for decision to determine if the Tribunal had indeed overlooked parts of the appellant's evidence or misapplied the legal terms. The court found that the Tribunal had given sufficient consideration to the appellant's evidence, including exploring the nuances of his statements and asking clarifying questions through the interpreter.
The court concluded that the Tribunal member had appropriately exercised her discretion in forming a view about the appellant's credibility, and that this was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The court did not find any error of law in the Tribunal's decision and held that unless an error of law was shown, findings of fact were not open to judicial review. The court also determined that the Tribunal had not misapplied the ordinary meanings of the terms "reside" and "live," and had considered the entirety of the appellant's evidence. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.
ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BRANSON J
I interpolate again that it cannot be determined by reference to the transcript alone whether during the above exchange the Tribunal member overlooked the appellant’s earlier answer to the effect that he did not stay at home after the problem happened. An alternate possibility may be that the Tribunal member’s “problem” arose from both the appellant’s earlier answer to the effect that he didn’t stay at home after the incident happened and his later expanded evidence to the same effect.Consideration The written reasons for decision of the Tribunal reveal that it did not accept the appellant’s evidence about having “left home” after the alleged incident in October 2002. Findings concerning the appellant’s credibility are findings of fact and thus plainly within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67]). Unless an error of law is shown to infect the finding it is not open to judicial review; there is no error of law involved in merely making a wrong finding of fact (Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [137]). The appellant’s notice of appeal contented that the Tribunal’s findings concerning the appellant’s credibility were infected by an error of law in that the Tribunal applied the “wrong test”. The application of the “wrong test” was particularised by reference to the ordinary meaning of the words “reside” and “live” and to the alleged failure of the Tribunal to consider the whole of the evidence. I am not satisfied that the Tribunal failed to apply the ordinary meaning of the words “reside” and “live”. As the passage from the transcript set out in [6] above reveals, the Tribunal went to some length to explore what the appellant meant when he said that he lived for six years at the address that he gave. It is, of course, true that one can live at the one address for a continuous period of time without sleeping there every night. It is also not to be overlooked that the appellant gave his evidence through an interpreter. For that reason it would have been inappropriate for the Tribunal to place weight on fine nuances of meaning without making further enquiry to clarify the precise import of his evidence. However, it was for the Tribunal to form a view, having regard to the totality of the evidence given by the appellant, what weight it should attribute to the fact that the appellant initially said, in effect, that he lived continuously at a particular address and did not move anywhere else but subsequently said that he left home as a result of the alleged October incident. Nor, in my view, can it be demonstrated that the Tribunal failed to look at the evidence as a whole to determine the veracity of the evidence given by, and thus the credibility of, the appellant. The transcript reveals that it was the appellant, not the Tribunal, who first identified six years as the period the appellant lived at the address given by him. When asked if he resided there continuously he answered “continuously for six years”. It was the appellant who clarified that he thereby meant “live there and didn’t move somewhere else” and that he “never left the place”. It was only thereafter that the appellant made reference to a “problem” happening.