SZHBC v Minister for Immigration
[2007] FMCA 692
•11 May 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZHBC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2007] FMCA 692 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a Protection (Class XA) visa – no reviewable error – application dismissed. |
| Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Part 7 of Division 4, ss.91X, 424A, 483A |
| Le v Minister for Immigration [2005] FCA 1530 Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 M257 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 131 Minister for Immigration v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507 Minister for Immigration v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61 Minister for Immigration v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration (2004) 214 ALR 264 Refugee Review Tribunal, Re; Ex parte H (2001) 75 ALJR 982 SBCC v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCA 270 SBSC v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCAFC 77 Tin Shwe v Minister for Immigration [2000] FCA 988 Smits v Roach (2006) 228 ALR 262; (2006) 80 ALJR 1309; [2006] HCA 36 SCAA vMinister for Immigration [2002] FCA 668 SZELD & Anor v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 74 VFAB v Minister for Immigration (2003) 131 FCR 102; 77 ALD 23; [2003] FCA 872 WABC of 2002 v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCAFC 286 Yit v Minister for Immigration [2000] FCA 885 |
| Applicant: | SZHBC |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File number: | SYG2431 of 2005 |
| Judgment of: | Lloyd-Jones FM |
| Hearing date: | 18 April 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 11 May 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Advocate for the Applicant: | The applicant appeared in person with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr J Mitchell |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Ms H Blackman of Blake Dawson Waldron |
ORDERS
The name of the first respondent be amended to read ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.
The application filed on 31 August 2005 is dismissed.
The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application, fixed in the sum of $4,700.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG2431 of 2005
| SZHBC |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The proceedings
These proceedings were commenced by an application under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) invoking s.483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) filed in the Sydney Registry of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia on 31 August 2005 for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal decision was made on 14 July 2005 and handed down on 4 August 2005, affirming a decision of the delegate of the first respondent made on 19 February 2005, refusing to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa. The applicant seeks relief in the form of constitutional writs against the decision of the Tribunal.
The applicant in these proceedings is not to be identified pursuant to s.91X of the Act and has been given the pseudonym “SZHBC”.
A Court Book ("CB") prepared by the first respondent's solicitors was filed on 23 November 2005. I have marked this as Exhibit “A" and the contents were read into evidence.
The affidavit of Hayley Anne Blackman, affirmed on 2 April 2007, was formally read and admitted into evidence.
Background
The Tribunal decision of L Hardy, reference N05/50867, provides the following background information:
The Applicant, who claims to be a national of the PRC, arrived in Australia on 14 June 2005.
On 16 November 2004 the Applicant lodged an application for a protection (class XA) visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA/the Department under the Migration Act 1958 (the Act)).
On 19 February 2005 a delegate of the Minister for Immigration refused to grant a protection visa and on 29 March 2005 the Applicant applied for review of that decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT/the Tribunal).(CB 61)
The applicant’s claims
The Tribunal decision sets out the applicant’s claims as follows:
The Applicant claims fear of persecution in the PRC for Convention-related reasons of “political opinion” and “religion”.
In his protection visa application, the Applicant has made two broad and unsupported claims, the first being that he “actively supported” the student-led pro-democracy movement in 1989 and that in 1998 he became a follower, or “member”, of Falun Gong which he correctly identifies as an illegal group. He said he did this for his health. He provided no detail about the teachings of Falun Gong.
The pro-democracy movement was focused in Beijing. The Applicant, a farmer, evidently lived his whole life in Fujian. He has provided no details as to how he supported the pro-democracy movement, or as to what particular interest he might have in the idea of “freedom and democracy”.
The Applicant made a vague and undetailed claim about a police raid on a Falun Gong exercise session he claims to have attended in 2004. He claims the police failed to arrest him along with others because his wife helped him leave on time. He claimed he was able to get a visa for Australia with the help of his friend. This evidence about the Applicant’s visa is not relevant to the Applicant’s standing with any authorities other than Australian ones.(CB 64)
Tribunal’s findings and reasons
The Tribunal decision contains the following information under the heading ‘Background’:
The Tribunal wrote to the Applicant on 12 May 2005 advising that it had considered all the material before it relating to his application but was unable to make a decision favourable to him on the basis of that information alone. The Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend a hearing before it on 14 June 2005. The Applicant, who is not represented by an adviser, did not reply to the invitation. The Applicant has failed to avail himself of the opportunity to appear before the Tribunal without providing any reason. In these circumstances, and pursuant to s426A of the Act, the Tribunal has decided to make its decision on the review without taking any further action to enable the Applicant to appear before it.(CB 61)
The Tribunal decision contains the following details under the heading ‘Findings and Reasons’:
The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant is a national of the PRC. The Tribunal does not accept on the vague and thinly-sketched claims in this application that the Applicant’s claims are genuine. The Applicant has displayed no knowledge or understanding of Falun Gong or the pro-democracy movement. His silence in this matter is not helpful to him.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant faces a real chance of Convention-related persecution in the PRC. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant has a well-founded fear of Convention-related persecution in the PRC. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that he is a refugee within the meaning of the Convention.
Having considered the evidence as a whole, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention. Therefore the Applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2) of the Act for a protection visa.(CB 64-65)
Application for review of the Tribunal’s decision
On 31 August 2005, the applicant filed an application for review under s.39B of the Judiciary Act setting out the following grounds:
1.The Tribunal officer had bias against me when considering my application for a protection visa. The Tribunal officer mentioned that my application was vague and thinly-sketched claims in my application. The officer had bais against me about my limited education, The Tribunal officer therefore did not consider my application with the proper procedure. The Tribunal officer did not refer to any independent information for the consideration of my application.
2.The Tribunal did not carefully consider my application.(copied without alteration or correction)
At the first Court date, the applicant was granted leave to file an amended application identifying each ground of review relied upon with complete particulars by 13 December 2005. The amended application contains the following grounds:
1.The Tribunal had bias against me when considering my application, which arises fro mthe following statement: “ The Pro-democracy movement was focused in Beijing. The Applicant, a farmer, evidently lived his whole life in Fujian. He has provided no details as to how he supported the pro-democracy movement, or as to what particular interest he might have in the idear of “freedom and democracy”.
The Tribunal officer believed that a farmer who were living in Fujian would not have participated in pro-democracy movement. Other evidence and explanation were therefore not considered thoroughly by the officer.
2.The Tribunal officer did not refer to any independent information for the consideration of my application because of the bias against me.
3.The Tribunal did not consider my claims about my involvement with Falun Gong because the Tribunal believed that my claims were vague and undetailed, the officer did not refer to any independent information. did not consider my claims in details and refused my whole application immediately.
4.My application was not considered with the normal procedure, correct steps, I believe that the Tribunal did not carefully consider my application at all.
5.The Tribunal did not consider my application correctly failed to consider my claims.
6.The Tribunal did not provide evidence or logical foundation to refuse my application for a protection visa.(copied without alteration or correction)
At the directions hearing on 23 February 2006, the applicant was granted leave to file a further amended application giving complete particulars of each ground of review relied upon by 1 June 2006. In response to this order, the applicant filed a further amended application containing the following grounds:
1. The Tribunal failed to carry out its statutory duty
Particulars
(a) The only information before the Tribunal was that contained in the First Respondent's file and that given to the Tribunal by the Applicant
(b) The Tribunal was required to provide particulars of the information that was the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision. Migration Act 1958 s.424A. The Tribunal also was required to explain why the information was relevant and provided the applicant with an opportunity to comment upon it.
(c) The above particulars had to be provided in writing: SAAP v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS (2005) HCA 24 (18 May 2001)
(d) The information to be given extends to that information given by the Applicant to the First Respondent as part of his application for a visa: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v AL SHAMRY (2002) 110 FCR 27
The court did not accept the Ministers argument that “Application” in the context was said to mean “all information given by the applicant to officials in the department (including that provided to the Tribunal) for the purposes of determining whether to grant a protection visa to the applicant.”
(e) The Tribunal based its findings on the information, or lack of information, contained in the Applicant's application for a visa and was required, by s.424A to give particulars of the information, explain why the information is relevant and provide the Applicant with an opportunity to comment upon it. The Tribunal's failure to so act was a jurisdictional error.
Submissions and reasons
The applicant is a self-represented litigant and appeared with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter. At the commencement of the hearing, the applicant was asked to indicate to the Court which set of grounds he wished to rely upon. However, he was unable to answer the question and appeared to have no comprehension of the contents of any of the grounds in the three applications. As allegations of bias were contained in the original application and amended application, but not in the further amended application, I decided that none of the applications should be abandoned and that the grounds contained in all three documents should be considered the grounds of review. I further note that the grounds in the further amended application are regularly seen in this Court in the form reproduced in the paragraph above, without amendment or modification, and regardless of the actual matter before Court. Recent examples are:
a)SZGYX v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 477;
b)SZINA v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 210;
c)SZIKB v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2006] FMCA 1398;
Further applications containing these formulaic grounds have been filed and are yet to be heard by this Court.
When the applicant was invited to make oral submissions, he declined to do so, indicating that he would rely upon the documents filed.
Mr Mitchell, for the respondents, assisted the Court with written submissions which addressed the further amended application filed on 1 June 2006. They addressed the asserted jurisdictional error based on breaches of the Tribunal’s “statutory duties”, particularly a breach of s.424A(1) of the Act.
The first respondent’s written submissions contend that the Tribunal complied with the procedures prescribed in Part 7 of Division 4 of the Act: Minister for Immigration v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61.
The first respondent’s written submissions identify the following material in support of that contention:
4.2 (a)The Tribunal invited the Applicant to a hearing in accordance with s 425A. Specifically:
(i) The invitation dated 12 May 2005 gave the Applicant notice of the day, time and place of the hearing before the RRT: CB 52-3.
(ii) The invitation contained a statement of the effect of s 426A: CB 52.
(iii) The period of notice given by the Tribunal was more than that prescribed by regulation 4.35D. Regulation 4.35D required 14 days notice after the date of such receipt, such receipt being deemed by s 441C(4)(a) to be 7 working days after the date on the documents as long as the document was dispatched within 3 working days of the date on the document. The postal dispatch records indicate that the date of dispatch of the Registered Post letter containing the invitation was 12 May 2005: Affidavit of Hayley Anne Blackman affirmed 2 April 2007. The invitation was dated 12 May 2005 and the hearing was on 14 June 2005: CB 52.
(iv) The invitation was dispatched by prepaid post to the last address for service provided to the Tribunal by the Applicant in connection with the review: CB 47 and 52.
(b)Having complied with s 425A such compliance was sufficient for compliance with s 425 and gave rise to the Tribunal’s exercise of discretion pursuant to s 426A: VNAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 134 at [14]. There is no evidence to suggest the Tribunal’s exercise of discretion miscarried.
(c)In respect to the Tribunal decision, that decision was based on an appraisal of the Applicant’s claims as being “vague and thinly sketched” and an appraisal of the material as not demonstrating any understanding of Falun Gong or the pro democracy movement. This appraisal was based on the perceived inadequacy of the information, in the sense of an absence of detail and extrinsic explanation which had been invited by the invitation to hearing: CB 52. This appraisal of the information conveyed by the Applicant’s application was not itself information: SZEZI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1195 at [29]; SZCIA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 238 at [14] – [15]; VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 at [24]. Accordingly those appraisals were not subject to s 424A(1).
I accept that these submissions are correct. I agree with Mr Mitchell that the Tribunal has complied with the legislative procedures and that there is no basis for the claim that it breached its statutory duty as suggested by the applicant’s further amended application.
The original and amended applications allege bias on the part of the Tribunal, which are not particularised nor supported by any form of evidence. The original application does not contain particularised grounds of review, but two general statements, one of which claims bias.
Although the applicant filed an amended application on 13 December 2005, it became apparent at the directions hearing of 23 February 2006 that he had not been in contact with the allocated panel lawyer and the amended application had been prepared by an unidentified person. On that date, the applicant was provided with a photocopy of the Court letter with contact details for the panel lawyer, and again given leave to file an amended application. A new filing date of 1 June 2006 was granted.
The Court file indicates that the applicant did not contact the panel lawyer, and that despite the efforts of the panel lawyer to contact the applicant, there was no response to these attempts. The further amended application filed on 1 June 2006 was again prepared by an unidentified person, as is apparent from the distinctive handwriting that appears on a range of documents filed in these proceedings. Attached to the further amended application was a photocopied list of the formulaic grounds referred to at [11] above. It is clear that the applicant had no comprehension of the contents of any of the documents filed by him in these proceedings, or how or where they were lodged. In some instances, he was even unaware that a document had been prepared or filed, although he confirmed that the signature that they all bore was his.
I had previously considered a general allegation of bias in the decision of SZELD & Anor v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 74. That decision contains a convenient statement of the law on bias and apprehended bias, which was adopted from the written submissions of the first respondent’s counsel, Mr Mitchell, who also appears in this matter. I set that summary out as follows:
a)Actual bias can be said to exist where the RRT member had a pre-existing state of mind which disabled him from undertaking or rendered him unwilling to undertake any proper evaluation of the relevant materials before him which were relevant to the decision to be made: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [35] and [72]. Actual bias may be said to exist where the RRT member is so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented: Jia at [71] and [72].
b)A party alleging actual bias on a decision maker’s part carries a heavy onus and it must be clearly proved: Jia at p.531. The existence of actual bias may be inferred from facts and circumstances but caution should be exercised, in the absence of evidence of partisanship or hostility, before inferring actual bias from factual errors or faulty reasoning on the part of the RRT member: Tin Shwe v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 988 at [27]; Yit v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 885 at [36].
c)Further, a case of actual bias is seldom made out by reference solely to the reasons for decision and no inference of bias or prejudgment can be drawn from the mere fact of adverse findings in the RRT’s reasons: VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 102 at [21]; SCAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 at [38]; WABC of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 286 at [3].
d)Apprehended bias will exist where a fair minded lay observer, who is properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings, the matters in issue and the conduct of the RRT, would not apprehend that the RRT member might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided: Refugee Review Tribunal, Re; Ex parte H (2001) 75 ALJR 982 at [27]; Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 293-294. Examples of such apprehended bias were:
i)The applicant has been overborne or intimidated by the RRT: Refugee Review Tribunal, Re; Ex parte H (2001) 75 ALJR 982 at [31].
ii)Fact finding of the RRT was conducted in a manner which was:
(i)substantially unreasoned;
(ii)in the nature of mere assertion that lacked rational or reasoned foundation;
(iii)at times plainly and ex facie wrong; and
(iv)selective of material going one way: NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264 at [115].
e)A determination as to whether an administrative decision is affected by apprehended bias should be informed by the following considerations:
i)Natural justice does not require the RRT member’s mind to be absent of any predisposition or inclination for, or against, an argument or conclusion. All that is required is for the RRT member to be open to persuasion: Jia at [72] and [86].
ii)Apprehended bias, in the context of an administrative decision maker, is not attended with the strictures that apply in the case of judicial prejudgment: Jia at [179]-[187]; [244]-[245]; NADH at [19]. In NADH Allsop J (Moore and Tamberlin agreeing) described this difference as follows:
“The tribunal does not administer public justice. The elements which affect the public confidence in the adjudication of disputes by an independent and impartial arm of government (in the broad sense) and which may be seen to inform what might be said to be freestanding norms of conduct and behaviour by judges conducting public hearings are not necessarily as easily transposable as strict obligations of administrative decision-makers acting in private. The tribunal here must investigate the facts for itself unaided by counsel presenting the parties’ cases, to the degree and extent it thinks appropriate. The tribunal which has to reach a state of satisfaction may want to test and probe a recounted history. It may have particular matters troubling it for resolution, which require questioning and expressions of doubt which are entirely appropriate, but which if undertaken or said by a judge in open court in adversary litigation might give rise to an apprehension of a lack of impartiality.”
f)Where credibility is in issue, the RRT member will necessarily have to test the evidence presented – often vigorously: Ex parte H at [30]. The requirements of procedural fairness will often require that the applicant be plainly confronted with matters which bear adversely on their credit or which bring their account into question. Further, the decision maker’s assessment of the applicant’s credit will often depend upon the demeanour of the witness and the manner in which they give evidence: Ex parte H at [34].
g)Bias does not necessarily arise from illogical, irrational decision-making or inferences: Applicant S20/2002 at [52], [75], [99]-[101]. Further, a manifestly defective or illogical approach to the consideration of evidence, and even irrationality in the reasons for a conclusion, may create an impression of confusion, lack of care or incompetence. But such an approach, without more, does not necessarily demonstrate apprehended bias: Applicant S20/2002 at [101] and [136].
The law on bias and apprehended bias has been considered in M257 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 131, SBCC v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCA 270, Smits v Roach (2006) 228 ALR 262, (2006) 80 ALJR 1309, [2006] HCA 36, Le v Minister for Immigration [2005] FCA 1530 and VFAB.
On a fair reading of the Tribunal decision and in the absence of a transcript of the hearing, there was nothing in the Tribunal’s decision-making process which would give rise to a claim of actual bias; nor would there be an apprehension on the part of a fair-minded lay observer of a possibility of bias. On the contrary, the Tribunal member did not make an adverse comment or an adverse finding in respect of the applicant. Instead, the Tribunal was unable to reach the requisite level of satisfaction requiring Australia to have obligations to the applicant under the Refugees Convention: SBSC v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCAFC 77 per Lander, Rares and Besanko JJ; SJSB v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 215 per Ryan, Jacobson and Lander JJ. The Tribunal noted that the applicant was invited to attend a hearing but failed to reply or attend, thus denying it the opportunity to further explore his claims which were “vague and thinly-sketched”.(CB 61) The applicant did not display any knowledge or understanding of Falun Gong or the pro-democracy movement.
The second ground in the amended application alleges that the Tribunal did not refer to any country information in considering this application. Mr Mitchell submits that no general duty of enquiry arises in a review of a protection visa application. The fact that the Tribunal did not refer to independent country information does not give rise to bias: Minister for Immigration v SGLB [2004] HCA 32.
The third ground of the amended application claims that the Tribunal did not consider his claims because it believed that they were vague and lacked detail. Mr Mitchell submits that those findings were clearly open to the Tribunal based on the evidence that the applicant gave. There was nothing unreasonable about the appraisal of information presented. Certain information was given by the applicant and it was open to the Tribunal to find his claims sketchy and vague. Mr Mitchell submits that the fourth ground of the amended application was addressed in the first respondent’s written submissions and I have outlined them at [16] above.
In respect of the fifth ground of the amended application, the Tribunal decision under the heading ‘Claims and Evidence’ clearly went through the applicant’s claim and made an appraisal that the claims were vague and thinly sketched.(CB 64) The Tribunal then made findings that reflected that appraisal and there is no error in those factual findings. In respect of the sixth ground, Mr Mitchell again referred the Court to SBSC and submits that it was for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal of his claims. The Tribunal is not required to give the applicant any benefit of the doubt and a failure to satisfy the Tribunal requires it to affirm the decision for review. I accept the above submissions by Mr Mitchell in respect of issues raised in both the original and amended application. This particularly applies to the allegations of bias. I am satisfied that these claims cannot be sustained.
When the applicant was invited to reply, he said that he had not been invited to a Tribunal hearing. I directed him, with the assistance of the interpreter, to turn to the Tribunal’s hearing invitation letter in the Court Book.(CB 52-53) The applicant then confirmed that it did refer to him but that it was sent to the wrong address. The applicant was then directed to his Tribunal application form and specifically to a mailing address he provided as 198/422 Pitt Street, Sydney.(CB 47) The applicant acknowledged that the form was signed by him.(CB 48) That address was also contained on the letter notifying the applicant of receipt of his application (CB 50-51), the invitation letter (CB 52-53), notification of handing down of the decision (CB 55-56) and notification with attached copy of the decision (CB 57-65). All of these documents were sent by registered post. However, the applicant insisted that this was not his mailing address.
To avoid any confusion, the applicant was asked to confirm his residential address and he gave one in Cabramatta. He stated that this had been and still remains his address since the filing of his original protection visa application: see CB 2, Q14, Q17; CB 4, Q35; CB 13, Q 65; CB 9; CB 31; CB 32; CB 46.
The applicant was asked about the mailing addresses, 198/422 Pitt Street, Sydney, in his Tribunal application, 198/460 Pitt Street, Sydney, in his Federal Magistrates Court application and 198/226 Elizabeth Street, Surry Hills, in the Notice of Change of Address for Service filed on 25 September 2006 in these proceedings. The applicant said that he did not recognise of any of these addresses. He agreed that each of these documents contained his signature but maintained that he had not visited any of these addresses nor received any correspondence at 198/422 Pitt Street.
When I asked the applicant how he became aware that the application to the Tribunal was unsuccessful and that he had 28 days from notification of that decision within which to file an application for review in the Federal Magistrates Court, he declined to answer.
The Tribunal decision and the notification letter addressed to the applicant at 198/422 Pitt Street were both dated 4 August 2005. The notification letter also carries a registered post tag. The Court Book indicates that this was the only notification of the decision issued by the Tribunal. The application to this Court was filed on 31 August 2005 and within the 28 days allowed under the Act. When these issues were flagged to the applicant he persisted with the claim that the address was wrong but declined to say how he became aware of the Tribunal decision.
Conclusion
The applicant is a self-represented litigant appearing with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter. It is apparent that he has been relying on an unidentified person or persons to prepare and submit material for his original protection visa application, the Tribunal review and the application to this Court. Clearly, the applicant had no comprehension of any of these documents. During the course of these proceedings this set of antiquated post office boxes have been transferred on three occasions in the Pitt Street area of Sydney. The original mailing address at 460 Pitt Street is now closed and the second address at 422 Pitt Street is now a construction site. These post office boxes are now located at the back of a convenience store in Elizabeth Street, Surry Hills, and appear to be operate in conjunction with the unidentified person or persons preparing the various documents.
The original application to this Court, together with the amended and further amended application, address issues which have no relevance to the applicant’s claims. This is particularly evident in the further amended application which is a formulaic document regularly seen in this Court and bears no relationship to the issues in this Tribunal decision. I am satisfied that none of the grounds identified can be sustained. Neither is it apparent that any other ground of review exists to suggest that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in its decision-making process. The applicant’s claim should be dismissed.
I am satisfied that an order for costs should be made in this matter. I order that the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to this application, fixed in the sum of $4,700.
I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lloyd-Jones FM.
Associate:
Date: 10 May 2007
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