SZBOT v Minister for Immigration - [2005] FMCA 1282

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZBOT v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION

[2005] FMCA 1282

MIGRATION – Application to review decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Tribunal applied the wrong test or applicant denied procedural fairness.

Migration Act 1958, ss.91R, 420, 474(1)

SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Khawar [2002] HCA 14
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41
R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner; Ex parte Moore (1965) 1QB 456
Associated Provincial Picturehouses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation(1948) 1 KB 223
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairsv Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20 of 2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59
NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] ALR 264

Applicant:

SZBOT

Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

File Number:

SYG2068 of 2003

Judgment of:

Barnes FM

Hearing date:

22 August 2005

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

7 September 2005

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Tzoraras Legal

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr A. McInerney

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

That the Refugee Review Tribunal be joined as a Respondent to these proceedings.
That the application is dismissed.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG2068 of 2003

SZBOT

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) handed down on 29 August 2003 affirming a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa. Consistent with the decision of the High Court in SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24 the Tribunal should be joined as a respondent to the proceedings. The applicant, who is a citizen of India, arrived in Australia on 18 June 2002 and lodged an application for a protection visa. The application was refused and he sought review by the Tribunal. The applicant claimed to fear persecution for his political activities and beliefs as a former member of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and as a Hindu in India. He claimed to fear persecution at the hands of Muslim fundamentalists, that the Indian government sought the support of the Muslim community and could not provide him with protection.
The Tribunal reasons for decision record that in the Tribunal hearing the applicant explained that he had joined the BJP in about 1978 while living in Kerala and had been a district vice president. After he returned to live in Pune in about April 1987 he ceased his political activities. He had not personally suffered at the hands of members of the Muslim community. Nor had he experienced any inter-communal violence in Pune, although there was sporadic violence there. The applicant told the Tribunal that while he had not suffered serious harm at the hands of Muslims or Muslim fundamentalists he was always anxious to avoid trouble. That was why he had come to Australia. He believed he could live peacefully here and things were unsettled in India. The Tribunal recorded that it put to the applicant doubts that in the Hindu nationalist environment in India it was plausible that there would be government sponsored mistreatment of Hindus and that he replied that the government did not support Islamic groups and tried to control them. He told the Tribunal that he had never sought protection from the police, but that the police could not do anything. He conceded that they acted on complaints, but said they had difficulty enforcing the law. He claimed to have been suspected by members of the Muslim community of being a police informant about 18 years earlier. When the Tribunal put to him that there was difficulty in seeing that as a Hindu and a past BJP official he could not get effective protection in Gujarat or Maharashtra, he said once you ceased to be involved in politics you were a non-entity. He did not know why he would still be regarded as a threat but then claimed he would still be seen as a political activist. It was put to the applicant that even if there was trouble the Indian government would be able to contain it. The applicant said that providing protection was not easy. He agreed that even if the protection was not always completely effective, the same standard of protection was available to all citizens of India.
The Tribunal recorded a discussion with the applicant of relocation in India. The Tribunal then put to the applicant that it had difficulty thinking of a safer place in India than Pune. The applicant is recorded as responding that Pune had not been so safe since the destruction of the Babri Mosque in 1992.
In its reasons for decision the Tribunal then stated in relation to independent information “I have not found it necessary to look beyond the independent information contained in the decision of the delegate which I accept in its entirety”.
The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was a reliable witness. Based on cited country information it accepted that various parts of India had suffered and continued to suffer inter-communal violence between Hindus and Muslims (in particular the state of Gujarat) and that the violence between Muslims and Hindus in India “is not systematically organised or institutionalised in any way” and is mostly “the product of unpredictable frictions over a range of issues” (as advised by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in a 1998 Country Report). The Tribunal accepted that Hindu/Muslim violence was an ongoing problem in India, that authorities had not always been successful in containing it and that some states (such as Gujarat and Kashmir) were particularly prone to communal violence. It also accepted that on occasions the authorities were known to have committed human rights violations against Muslims and Hindus who were either involved or suspected of being involved in communal violence. However despite these acknowledged shortcomings the Tribunal was satisfied that in general the Indian government had demonstrated a willingness and ability to provide protection to citizens irrespective of their religious beliefs. It noted that this had been conceded by the applicant at the hearing.
The Tribunal observed that the applicant’s original claims were very general in nature and that apart from one reference to the possible perception of Muslims that he was still a political activist, he was unable to point to any particular mistreatment he had suffered at the hands of either Muslim extremists or members of the Muslim community. He had conceded he had not been actively involved in politics since arriving in Pune about 16 years earlier.
The Tribunal found that apart from the claim that he was still considered a political activist, there was nothing in the evidence of the applicant to suggest that he was of any concern to either Muslim political activists or members of the Muslim community or that in the last 16 years he had ever suffered mistreatment at their hands. The applicant had told the Tribunal it had always been his policy to avoid confrontation. It observed that he did not claim, and the evidence before it did not suggest, that in the last 16 years he had ever been subjected to serious harm together with “systematic and discriminatory conduct” as required by paragraph 91R(1)(c) of the Migration Act1958. The Tribunal found nothing in the evidence before it from which it could conclude that there was a real chance that the applicant would be persecuted in the reasonably foreseeable future upon his return to India either because of his Hindu religion or because of anything which happened in the distant past in Kerala when he was politically active with the BJP before he relocated to his present home in Pune.
The Tribunal went on to find that even if the applicant were to have difficulties in the foreseeable future in Pune it was satisfied that effective protection would be available to him whether in Pune or elsewhere in India, stating that he himself conceded that the police do investigate complaints, that the government tries to control Muslim activists and that the same standard of protection is available to all Indian citizens. It found that despite the applicant’s contention at the hearing that the police can do nothing it was satisfied that if the applicant were to seek assistance or protection from the police it would be provided. The Tribunal concluded that it was not satisfied that there was a real chance that the applicant faced persecution in the sense required by s.91R of the Migration Act 1958 in the foreseeable future upon his return to India. It was therefore not satisfied that the applicant’s claimed fears of future persecution in India were well founded.
The applicant sought review of the Tribunal decision by application filed in this Court. He relies on an amended application filed on 16 August 2004. There are two grounds in the amended application.

The wrong test issue

The applicant claimed that the Tribunal applied the wrong test in assessing whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution. The amended application contains four particulars in relation to this ground. They are as follows:
(a)The Tribunal has based its finding on whether the Applicant suffered persecution in the past rather than whether he would face persecution in the future.
(b)The Tribunal dismissed the application on the basis that “the same standard of protection was available to all citizens of India” and did not enquire whether that level of protection could still amount to persecution.
(c)The Tribunal found that “relocation is viable” without enquiring whether relocation was reasonable in all the circumstances.
(d)The Tribunal required that for any inter-communal violence to amount to persecution it must be systematically organised on institutionalised in some way and cannot be “the product of unpredictable frictions over a range of issues”.
It was submitted first that the Tribunal erred in basing its finding as to whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution on whether he had suffered persecution in the past, rather than considering whether he would face persecution in the future. It was conceded that past persecution was a relevant consideration, but contended that it was not determinative of the question for the Tribunal, which had to determine whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution at the current time. It was said that in its application of s.91R(1) the Tribunal fell into a misconception of the operation of that provision (which modifies the definition of persecution). It was argued that it is the fear of persecution that brings one within the Refugees Convention notion of well-founded fear of persecution not the persecution itself, as was pointed out by Gleeson CJ in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Khawar [2002] HCA 14 at [23]. It was contended that whether or not an applicant had experienced past persecution was not determinative of whether his or her fear was well-founded and that the Tribunal had demonstrated a misplaced reliance on s.91R.
It has not been established that the Tribunal erred by basing its findings on whether the applicant suffered persecution in the past rather than by applying the correct test of well-founded fear of persecution in the future. The Tribunal summarised the applicable principles and the correct test in the first part of its decision. It repeated the question that it was required to determine (whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason) at the commencement of the findings and reasons part of its decision.
In determining whether the applicant’s fear of persecution for a Convention reason was well-founded it was appropriate for the Tribunal to have regard to a number of factors as it did, including the extent of the applicant’s claims, the independent country information relevant to the claims about the situation in India and the availability of state protection, the generality of the applicant’s claims, the lack of any claim of past particular mistreatment and the fact that the applicant had not been actively involved politics for some 16 years. The Tribunal also addressed the claim that, despite this lack of involvement the applicant claimed to be still considered a political activist. It then found that the evidence did not suggest that in the last 16 years the applicant had ever been subjected to serious harm together with systematic and discriminatory conduct constituting persecution. It was on the basis of all of these factors (not merely the absence of past persecution) that the Tribunal went on to find nothing in the evidence before it from which it could conclude that there was a real chance that the applicant would be persecuted in the reasonably foreseeable future because of his Hindu religion or because of anything which happened in the distant past in Kerala when he was politically active.
The Tribunal went on to find that even if the applicant were to have difficulties it was satisfied that effective protection would be available to him, whether in Pune or elsewhere in India. Thus it was on the basis of the absence of evidence of any real chance of persecution and the availability of effective protection that it reached the conclusion that it was not satisfied there was a real chance the applicant faced persecution in the sense required by s.91R of the Migration Act 1958 in the foreseeable future upon return to India and hence was not satisfied that his claimed fears of future persecution in India were well-founded. It is clear that in this critical part of its findings and reasons the Tribunal addressed not simply the claims about the past and whether the applicant had been persecuted but rather whether the applicant faced a real chance of persecution in the future and hence whether his claimed fear of future persecution in India was well-founded. In making its findings about what occurred in the past the Tribunal was merely, appropriately, setting out the necessary factual basis in order to assess whether the fear as to the future was well founded. Reading the Tribunal reasons fairly and as a whole and without an eye too keenly too attuned to error (Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 I am satisfied that the Tribunal did in fact apply the correct test (see Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 572 – 573.
It was also contended (as particular (b) of this ground) that the Tribunal erred in dismissing the application on the basis that the same standard of protection was available to all citizens of India and in failing to enquire as to whether that level of protection could still amount to persecution or whether that level of protection was sufficient in the applicant’s case. In particular it was submitted that the Tribunal had found there was inter-communal violence in India but had not considered whether there was effective state protection from that violence.
However it is apparent, reading the Tribunal reasons for decision fairly and as a whole, that the fact that the same standard of protection was available to all citizens of India was not the only basis for the Tribunal’s conclusion in relation to effective protection. The Tribunal referred to particular independent country information in relation to inter-communal violence. It is relevant that the Tribunal also accepted the country information contained in the decision of the delegate. Such information dealt with the issue of the protection available to Hindus or members of the BJP (such as the applicant had been). In that context the Tribunal found that, despite acknowledged shortcomings, it was satisfied that, as was conceded by the applicant at the hearing, in general the Indian government had demonstrated ‘a willingness and ability’ to provide protection to citizens irrespective of their religious beliefs. This finding, based on independent information and the applicant’s concession, as well as the other matters conceded by the applicant (being that the police do investigate complaints, that the government tries to control Muslim activists and that the same standard of protection is available to all Indian citizens) formed the basis for the Tribunal’s satisfaction that effective protection would be available to the applicant. The Tribunal also addressed the applicant’s contention that the police ‘can do nothing’. However it was satisfied that if the applicant were to seek assistance or protection from the police (something he had never done) it would be provided. Read as a whole it is clear that the Tribunal was not simply applying a test of the same standard of protection being available to all.
The third particular of this ground is that the Tribunal found that “relocation is viable” without enquiring as to whether relocation was reasonable in all the circumstances. However, contrary to the applicant’s submissions, the Tribunal did not make such a finding. It raised the question of relocation and impediments to relocation with the applicant in the course of the Tribunal hearing. In that context it recorded that it put to him that it seemed to it that he was a person for whom relocation was a viable option. In the findings and reasons part of its decision the Tribunal did not make a finding that relocation was viable. Rather it found that there was no real chance that the applicant would be persecuted in the reasonably foreseeable future on his return to India and that if he were to have difficulties in his home town in Pune it was satisfied that effective protection would be available to him whether in Pune or elsewhere in India. The finding of the availability of effective protection in Pune (as well as elsewhere in India) meant that the Tribunal did not have to address the reasonableness of relocation as contended.
The final particular of ground one is that the Tribunal required that for any inter-communal violence to be persecution it must be systematically organised or institutionalised in some way and that it could not be “the product of unpredictable frictions over a range of issues”.
In support of this contention it was submitted that the Tribunal’s error was apparent from a consideration of its decision and that in stating “I accept advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade that the violence between Muslims and Hindus in India is not systematically or institutionally organised in any way” and “it is mostly the product of unpredictable frictions over a range of issues” the Tribunal was setting a test that to have a fear of persecution the fear needed to be of something systematic and not the product of unpredictable frictions. It was contended that this was an error, as an unpredictable friction could lead to fear of persecution. Hence it was submitted that in basing its ultimate finding on whether s.91R(1) was satisfied the Tribunal failed to turn its mind to the right question, that is, whether there was a well-founded fear of persecution in the future.
The relevant part of the decision complained of is as follows:
I do accept that various parts of India have suffered and continue to suffer inter-communal violence between Hindus and Muslims, in particular the state of Gujarat where such violence pre-dates Indian independence. (See UK Home Office, Country Information and Policy Unit, 2002, India Assessment, Section on Religious Freedom, April, at USDOS Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2002, India, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor March 31, 2003.
I accept advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade that the violence between Muslims and Hindus in India “is not systematically organised or institutionalised in any way” and it is mostly “the product of unpredictable frictions over a range of issues” (DFAT, 1998, Country information report no. 286/98 India: situation of Muslims in Hyderabad, 14 July – CS30520).

It is clear that in this part of the reasons for decision the Tribunal was accepting independent information and advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade about the nature of violence between Muslims and Hindus in India. The Tribunal was not making a finding that set a test that to have a fear of persecution the fear needed to be of something systematic and not the product of unpredictable functions. It went on, as explained above, to apply the correct test of well-founded fear of persecution.
No jurisdictional error has been established on any of the bases contended for in ground one of the amended application.

Procedural fairness issue

It was contended that the applicant was denied procedural fairness. The particulars of this ground are as follows:
(a) The Tribunal failed to base its decision on reasonably probative evidence in making the following findings:
(i) I am satisfied that if the Applicant were to seek assistance or protection from the police it would be provided.
(ii) …that I had difficulty thinking of a safer place in India than Pune.
(iii) The Tribunal based its findings on outdated “independent information”.
(b) The Tribunal found that “the Applicant is a reliable witness” but then dismissed his evidence, given under oath, as “There is nothing in the evidence before me …”
It was contended for the applicant that the Tribunal failed to base its decision on reasonably probative evidence and that this was a denial of procedural fairness or natural justice consistent with the remarks of Deane J in Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41 at 67 – 68. In that case Deane J had referred with approval to what had been said by Diplock LJ in R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner; Ex parte Moore (1965) 1QB 456 AT 487 – 488 agreeing “that it is an ordinary requirement of natural justice that a person bound to act judicially ‘base his decision’ upon material which tends logically to show the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the issue to be determined” and that … “implicit both in Diplock LJ’s conclusion and in that well established principle [that a decision of a statutory Tribunal must ordinarily be based on evidence which is reasonably capable of sustaining it] are both the requirement that findings of material fact of a statutory Tribunal must ordinarily be based on logically probative material and the requirement that the actual decision of such a tribunal must, when relevant questions of fact are in issue, ordinarily be based upon such findings of material fact and not on mere suspicion or speculation”. It was said for the applicant that this approach was referred to with approval in Inderjit Singh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1366. However no more recent authority was cited in support of this proposition. In Singh Weinberg J suggested that it was open to doubt whether a failure to consider rationally probative evidence was clearly distinct from coming to a decision which was ‘irrational’ (in the sense of so-called Wednesbury unreasonableness: Associated Provincial Picturehouses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation(1948) 1 KB 223). Nevertheless he suggested that there was some justification for saying that if a decision was not reached as a result of the rational consideration of the probative evidence this could mean that the Tribunal breached its obligations to act according to substantial justice and the merits of its case as required by s.420 of the Migration Act 1958. However Singh concerned the statutory grounds of review available under the former s.476 of the Migration Act and in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairsv Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 the High Court held that s.420 did not create rights or grounds of review. (Also see Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 357 and note that counsel for the applicant expressly disclaimed any reliance on a ‘no evidence’ ground.)
In any event it is not necessary in this instance to determine the extent to which a failure to base a decision on reasonably probative evidence constitutes a jurisdictional error. No such failure is established. The factual basis for a claim that the Tribunal failed to base its decision on reasonably probative evidence in making its findings is not established.
The first ‘finding’ that was challenged on this basis was the finding of the Tribunal that it was “satisfied that if the Applicant were to seek assistance or protection from the police it would be provided”. The applicant’s complaint is that the Tribunal based its finding in this respect on outdated evidence rather than evidence which proved the situation in August 2003, the date of its decision. The written submissions referred to two of the three documents cited in the Tribunal reasons for decision in relation to inter-communal violence, being the UK Home Office India Assessment of April 2002 and a DFAT 1998 advice on the situation of Muslims in Hyderabad. In fact the Tribunal also referred to a more recent USDOS Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 India which was released on 31 March 2003. It is apparent from the Tribunal reasons for decision that the parts cited from each of these reports related to the violence between Hindus and Muslims in India. As to the specific issue of police protection, the Tribunal relied on evidence from the applicant himself as well as on country information. The applicant himself, as the Tribunal stated, had conceded that the police in India do investigate complaints, that the government tries to control Muslim activists and that the same standard of protection is available to all Indian citizens. Based on the evidence of the applicant it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that if the applicant were to seek police assistance it would be provided. Such findings were also consistent with independent country information referred to in the delegate’s decision. This was independent information which the Tribunal accepted “in its entirety”. It is apparent from the delegate’s decision that there was information to the effect that members of the party to which the applicant claimed to have belonged (the BJP) received positive support from the police (albeit the same support might not be available to Muslims) and that where communal violence did occur the Indian authorities sought to end it as early as possible. Rather than there being no evidence, or no reasonably probative evidence, to support the Tribunal’s findings there was the evidence of the applicant’s concessions which were themselves sufficient to support this finding together with consistent country information which provided a separate basis on which such finding was open to the Tribunal. This is not a case in which, as Deane J said in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 367, the findings of fact upon which the decision was based were unsupported by probative material or where inferences of fact upon which the decision was based could not reasonably be drawn from such findings of fact (also see Gleeson CJ in Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20 of 2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 and the authorities discussed by Allsop J in NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] ALR 264 at [129]-[136]).
The applicant next contended that the Tribunal’s ‘finding’ that it had difficulty thinking of a safer place than Pune was not based on probative evidence. However this was not a finding. It was a comment put to the applicant for his response in the course of the Tribunal hearing. Further it was appropriate for the Tribunal to proceed in this manner. While the Tribunal is not obliged to put its thought processes to an applicant, if it does so this does not constitute jurisdictional error so long as it does so fairly and gives the applicant the opportunity to address concerns raised.
The other aspect of the first particular to ground two is a general contention that the Tribunal based its decision on outdated country information. I have considered this contention in relation to the question of evidence of police protection. It was submitted that the information relied on pre-dated the Tribunal decision by some considerable time. It was also contended that the Tribunal could not simply adopt the reasoning of the delegate, as it did, but rather that it had to review the application. It was suggested that the Tribunal should have assessed the information in the delegate’s decision and asked whether it was correct.
First, I am not persuaded that the Tribunal simply accepted the delegate’s reasoning as contended. Rather it stated that it was not necessary to look beyond the independent information contained in the decision of the delegate, which it accepted in its entirety. This finding related only to the independent information, not to the reasoning of the delegate. It is apparent that the Tribunal went on to consider the claims of the applicant and conduct the review required under the Migration Act 1958.
As to the claim that the evidence relied upon by the Tribunal was outdated and hence of little if any probative value, it was contended in particular that the 1998 report was so distant from the time of the Tribunal’s findings as to be unreliable. However, as set out above, the Tribunal based its findings in large part on the concessions made by the applicant as well as independent information including the 1998 report. Insofar as its findings were based on independent information it did not fall into error in the manner contended in relying on information which pre-dated the Tribunal decision. This complaint is, in effect, a complaint as to the weight to be given to independent country information. There is nothing to suggest that more recent or contrary country information was before the Tribunal or that the Tribunal findings were not open to it on the information before it. In such circumstances, where there was some evidence before the Tribunal from which it could draw inferences to reach the findings of fact that it reached, it is for the Tribunal to determine what weight is to be given to the information relied upon. The Tribunal’s treatment of independent information does not establish error in the manner contended.
Finally it was contended that the applicant was denied procedural fairness because he was found to be a reliable witness but then his evidence given under oath was dismissed by the Tribunal as ‘there is nothing in the evidence before me’. No error is established in the manner contended. The Tribunal did accept that the applicant was a reliable witness. It accepted not only his evidence of what had occurred in the past but also the concessions that he made about certain aspects of the situation in India. As the Tribunal stated in its findings and reasons, the applicant did not claim and the evidence before it did not suggest that he had ever been subjects to serious harm in the past 16 years. In light of this factor and the willingness and ability of the Indian government to provide protection to citizens irrespective of their religious beliefs which the Tribunal found (and which was conceded by the applicant) it was open to the Tribunal, and did not in any way impugn the credibility of the applicant, to find that there was nothing in the evidence before it from which it could conclude there was a real chance that the applicant would be persecuted in the reasonably foreseeable future. Whatever the applicant’s subjective fears as to the future might be, the Tribunal was not satisfied that any fear that he held was well-founded. This finding does not ‘dismiss’ his evidence as contended. No jurisdictional error has been established by ground two.
As no jurisdictional error has been established the decision is a privative clause decision to which s.474 of the Migration Act 1958 applies and the application must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Barnes FM

Associate:

Date: 7 September 2005