SZBFQ v Minister for Immigration
[2005] FMCA 197
•10 June 2005
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZBFQ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2005] FMCA 197 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a protection visa – applicant claiming ethnic, particular social group and religious persecution in Azerbaijan – adverse credibility findings made by the presiding member – whether the RRT should have disclosed credibility concerns to the applicant – whether the findings by the presiding member reasonably open to him – whether the RRT erred in considering the particular social group claim – the RRT committed a jurisdictional error in determining that women could not constitute a particular social group under the Convention. |
| Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.424A |
| Abebe v The Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14 Applicant S469 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 214 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 Minister for Immigration v Khawar [2002] HCA 14 Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 SAAP v Minister for Immigration[2005] HCA 24 Tobasi v Minister for Immigration (2002) 122 FCR 322 WAEJ v Minister for Immigration [2003] FCAFC 188 |
| Applicant: | SZBFQ |
| First Respondent: Second Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1632 of 2003 |
| Judgment of: | Driver FM |
| Hearing date: | 1 March and 20 May 2005 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 10 June 2005 |
REPRESENTATION
The applicant appeared in person
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr G Kennett |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The Refugee Review Tribunal be joined as the second respondent to these proceedings.
A writ of certiorari shall issue removing the record of the Refugee Review Tribunal into this Court for the purposes of quashing the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal handed down on 16 August 2001.
A writ of mandamus shall issue requiring the Refugee Review Tribunal to redetermine the proceedings according to law before a differently constituted Tribunal.
There shall be no order as to costs.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1632 of 2003
| SZBFQ |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction and background
This is an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”) made on 31 July 2001 and handed down on 16 August 2001. The RRT affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant is from Azerbaijan and claimed persecution as a Russian, as a woman, and as an Orthodox Christian.
The applicant arrived in Australia on 9 January 1997. She applied for a protection visa on 22 December 1997. Her application was refused by the delegate on 18 February 1998. She applied to the RRT for review of that decision on 2 March 1998.
I adopt as further background paragraphs 3-9 of Mr Kennett’s initial written submissions:
In her initial protection visa application the applicant claimed that she had been harassed by the police and armed people from “The People’s Front” – apparently because of her Russian appearance. She was stopped on the street, taken to the police station, interrogated and insulted. She also claimed that people had broken into her family’s flat, looking for Armenians, and threatened the family. She referred to incidents where Russian and Armenian women had been beaten, raped, killed, or forced to marry Azeri men.[1]
[1] court book, pages 39-40.
Later, the applicant’s advisers summarised her claims to the RRT in the following terms:
·she is of Tatar/Russian ethnicity and an Orthodox Christian;
·she experienced “verbal abuse, threats, detention and assaults”;
·she feared that she would be “abused, assaulted and possibly raped or murdered by Moslem Azeris”; and
·she believed that the authorities would not protect her because they were “hostile to ethnic Russians”.[2]
[2] court book, page 106.
The RRT summarised these claims[3] and proceeded to describe the evidence given at the RRT hearing.[4] At the hearing the applicant added to and modified her claims in several respects. For example, she claimed that:
[3] court book, pages 361-363.
[4] court book, pages 363-367.
·nationalists in Azerbaijan were still pursuing her and meant to kill her;
·the break-in at her flat had occurred because she was Russian;
·she had been sacked from her job in 1995 and (contrary to claims she had made in earlier applications, supported by documents) she had not obtained other employment;
·she and her mother had been assaulted in their apartment; and
·her sacking from work occurred after her boss had pressured her to marry him by threatening to force her into prostitution otherwise.
The RRT considered the long delay between the applicant’s arrival in Australia and her protection visa application, the reasons for that delay, and the changes in her claims referred to above. It concluded that she had fabricated significant parts of her story and exaggerated other parts, and that she was not a reliable witness. It did not accept her claims that she had ever been arrested, assaulted or raped.[5]
The RRT accepted that the applicant had been sacked, but not for the reasons advanced by her. It did not accept that her dismissal had anything to do with Convention grounds. It also found that she had been able to obtain work with another company, apparently at a more senior level.[6]
The RRT accepted that there was some societal discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities in Azerbaijan but did not consider that the evidence disclosed a level of likely harm sufficient to amount to persecution.[7] It also considered that the position of women, or young Russian women”, in Azerbaijan was not sufficient to make them a “particular social group” in the Convention sense, and the level of societal discrimination against women was not sufficiently serious to constitute persecution.[8]
Accordingly, the RRT was not satisfied that the applicant was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations.[9]
[5] court book, pages 378-379.
[6] court book, pages 379-380.
[7] court book, page 380.
[8] court book, page 381.
[9] court book, page 381.
The application and submissions
In her application filed on 15 August 2003 the applicant raises objection to the presiding member’s findings that the applicant fabricated her claims because she changed her story, delayed seeking a protection visa and raised claims at the hearing before the RRT that had not been raised previously. The applicant asserts that the RRT erred in law in that there were credible explanations for the applicant’s inconsistency, her addition of more detailed claims and her delay in seeking a protection visa. These were made known to the presiding member. She asserts that the relevant factors were not explored by the RRT.
The applicant filed an outline of submissions on 24 February 2005. In that she again challenges the finding by the presiding member that her claims were fabricated because of inconsistencies. She submits that she should have been given the opportunity to comment on the adverse credibility view held by the presiding member. She submits that she should have been given notice pursuant to s.424A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”). She relies on the Federal Court decision in WAEJ v Minister for Immigration [2003] FCAFC 188.
I gave leave for the applicant to file supplementary submissions in court on 1 March 2005. In those supplementary submissions the applicant responds to paragraph 11 of Mr Kennett’s written submissions in which he wrote:
The rejection of many of the applicant’s claims was, however, a purely factual conclusion. It amounted to an assessment of the applicant’s credibility, which is “the function of the primary decision-maker par excellence”.[10] It was a matter for the RRT to decide what evidence it found persuasive in deciding to reject the applicant’s claims. Disagreement with the RRT’s conclusions would not provide a basis upon which its decision could be set aside.
[10] Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67]; Tobasi v Minister for Immigration (2002) 122 FCR 322, 344 [87].
The applicant contends that Mr Kennett’s submissions miss the point. She submits that the issue is one of procedural fairness, namely whether the RRT erred in failing to give her a statement of the alleged inconsistencies leading to an adverse view upon the credibility of her claims. The applicant produced to me a letter sent to an applicant in another matter in which the applicant was represented by her migration agent[11] as demonstrating that the RRT has, in at least one other matter, provided a notice under s.424A(1) giving particulars of issues likely to lead to an adverse outcome to the applicant. It is apparent from the letter that the claimant in that case was from Russia and had made claims of political persecution. The letter details information concerning freedom of speech in the press and freedom of assembly in Russia, the existence of an Ombudsman in Russia and the departure of the applicant legally from Russia with a passport in his own name. The letter also draws attention to the fact that the applicant had not made a complaint to his local police or the Omudsman or his local human rights centre about what he said happened to him and there was no independent evidence to suggest that his local police target ethnic Russians whose political views are supportive of the treatment of caucuses peoples. I agreed to accept that letter as an aide memoir rather than as evidence.
[11] Arthur Volonski – who I permitted to assist the applicant in the hearing before me as a McKenzie friend
The applicant also produced two documents relating to another case: SZCZY and Minister for Immigration which I note was a matter in my docket. The case concerned an applicant from Bulgaria who had claimed political persecution. The amended application in that case raised three grounds of review, the second of which was an asserted failure to give the applicant particulars of matters adverse to his claims pursuant to s.424A(1) of the Migration Act. The applicant in that case also relied on the Federal Court decision in WAEJ v Minister for Immigration. The other two grounds in that case have no connection with this case. The second document relating to that case was a letter from the Minister’s solicitors to the applicant advising that the Minister agreed to the decision being returned to the RRT to be heard and determined according to law. I note that I approved consent orders in that case to that effect. I invited Mr Kennett to take instructions on whether the outcome in that case has any impact on the present proceedings, on the basis that it is desirable that the Minister act consistently.
When the hearing of this matter resumed on 20 May 2005 Mr Kennett advised that his instructions were that the present case raises different issues to SZCZY and that no concession would be made by the Minister.
In her supplementary submissions the applicant asserts that the outcome could well be different if she was given the opportunity to have a second hearing before the RRT. She disputes factual findings made by the presiding member and denies that her claims were inconsistent with available country information. She also seeks to deal with the delay in bringing the present proceedings to this Court.
I put to the applicant that I did not see how her claim based upon s.424A(1) of the Migration Act could succeed, given that the credibility concerns of the presiding member were derived either from country information or from material the applicant had presented herself[12]. Of course, given the time at which the applicant applied for review to the RRT, there was also an obligation on the RRT to comply with procedural fairness obligations under the general law.
[12] see s.424A(3) of the Migration Act.
I also raised with the applicant other issues of potential concern in the decision of the RRT. Those were that the presiding member’s statements concerning the applicant’s membership of a particular social group (court book, page 381) appeared dubious. The presiding member said:
I consider that being a woman in itself is not a particular social group as meant by the Convention.
I doubted that the presiding member would have made that statement if he had had the benefit of the High Court decision in Minister for Immigration v Khawar [2002] HCA 14. The presiding member also stated that there was no evidence to suggest or support the view that there is a particular social group as meant by the Convention of young, ethnic Russian women. I said that that statement is contestable by reference to the available country information. The applicant further asserted that the presiding member misrepresented the result of an inquiry undertaken by the RRT (court book, page 384). The RRT received advice that, shortly after the independence of Azerbaijan in the early 1990s, there was a “strong resentment” against people of Russian descent as they were sometimes accused of association with the bloody suppression by Russian forces of the independence movement, as well as support for the Armenians in their conflict with Azerbaijan. Many Russians left Azerbaijan in the first part of the 1990s for fear of their security. The presiding member stated on page 377 of the court book that the response received was that there was “some” resentment against Russians in the early 1990s as they were sometimes accused of being accomplices of repression by Russian troops of independence struggles.
The applicant also asserted interpretation difficulties at the hearing conducted by the RRT. However, when I pointed out that I had no transcript of the hearing before the RRT and that she would need to provide a transcript, together with evidence from someone qualified to deal with the quality of the Russian interpretation, she decided that it was not worth pursuing that issue.
I put to the applicant that her main concern appeared to be with the adverse credibility finding made by the presiding member. She agreed. She said this showed a lack of good faith but I put to her that that would be difficult to prove. I indicated that the credibility finding could be addressed in different ways, namely, that she might assert that the finding was not open to the presiding member on the material before him, or that the presiding member asked himself the wrong question or failed to ask himself the right question or, that the finding was so irrational and inconsistent with the available information that it indicates that the presiding member did not understand the task that he had to perform or that the presiding member should have considered himself, on the available material, unable to reach the degree of satisfaction required in order to reject her application. The applicant invited me to consider her application on all of those bases.
The applicant raised several other issues which she said were factual errors made by the presiding member but, after discussion, she agreed with me that these did not appear to be serious issues.
Mr Kennett prepared further written submissions on the particular social group issue, filed on 17 May 2005:
These submissions address issues raised at the hearing on 1 March 2005 concerning the manner in which the RRT dealt with the question whether the applicant faced persecution in Azerbaijan as a member of a “particular social group”.
The RRT’s statement that “being a woman in itself is not [membership of] a particular social group as meant by the Convention”,[13] read in isolation, would appear to be inconsistent with comments by Gleeson CJ in Minister for Immigration v Khawar.[14] However, other members of the Court did not express a conclusion as to whether “women” or “women in [country X]”, would denote a “particular social group” within the meaning of the Convention.[15]
Further, this statement by the RRT follows directly after a reference to having considered the independent evidence, for the purpose of deciding whether this applicant was a member of any “particular social group”. If the statement is read in that context, it becomes clear that the RRT was not stating an a priori position that “women” per se could not constitute a “particular social group”. Rather, it was a conclusion reached upon the evidence in relation to circumstances in Azerbaijan. The existence of such a group was treated as a question of fact, consistently with the reasoning of all Justices in Khawar.[16]
Similarly, the RRT rejected the argument that there was a “particular social group” of “young ethnic Russian women” on the evidence.[17] The observation that there was “no evidence” to support the existence of such a group should not be understood as expressing a conclusion of law,[18] since the question whether or not there was “evidence” was not part of any issue the RRT had to decide. The RRT was merely observing that it did not regard the argument for the existence of such a social group as finding any support in the material before it. That, of course, was a matter for the RRT. Its conclusion would not be set aside on the basis that the Court considered that there was material supportive of the existence of such a social group.
In any event, the RRT went on to find that the “societal discrimination” against women and ethnic Russians was not such as “could be considered as persecution as meant by the Convention”. That finding was reached in response to the applicant’s contentions as to membership of a particular social group and must be understood as a conclusion that, even if a particular social group of “women” or “young ethnic Russian women” could be identified, the harm which the applicant might face as a member of that group would not amount to persecution. That finding was itself sufficient to support the RRT’s conclusion that the applicant did not have a well founded fear of persecution on the ground of membership of a particular social group.
Accordingly, there was no relevant error in the RRT’s rejection of claims based on membership of a “particular social group”.
[13] court book, page 381.
[14] (2002) 210 CLR 1, 13-14 [32]-[33].
[15] McHugh and Gummow JJ considered a much more closely defined group (210 CLR at 27-28); Kirby J noted the difficulties with such a broadly defined group (at 43), as did Callinan J (at 48-49).
[16] And see Applicant S469 v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 214 at [3], [7].
[17] court book, page 381.
[18] Cf. Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, 355 per Mason CJ.
The applicant also filed two sets of supplementary submissions.
In supplementary submissions filed on 16 May 2005 the applicant asserts that the RRT intentionally altered or misrepresented information obtained by the RRT about the applicant’s claim and appearing at page 384 of the court book. This amounts to an allegation of bad faith. Secondly, the applicant contends that the information obtained by the RRT, if considered in the terms in which it was actually presented, compelled a decision that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution in Azerbaijan as an ethnic Russian. This amounts to an assertion of unreasonableness. Thirdly, the applicant asserts that there was no proper consideration of her claim of ethnic persecution by reference to the available information because the presiding member misconstrued the concept of persecution. Finally, the applicant asserts that these errors constitute jurisdictional errors.
I also permitted the applicant to file in court a further written statement headed, “Applicant’s Oral Submission” which set out submissions that the applicant wished to make orally but felt better able to make in writing. The only new matter raised in that document was an assertion that the RRT erred by failing to consider a claim by the applicant of political persecution.
Reasoning
The last matter raised by the applicant can be dealt with simply. She had made no claim of political persecution that required consideration by the RRT. She had made claims of ethnic, religious and particular social group persecution. The only reference to any political issue arose in the country and other information available to the presiding member which indicated that there was a political dimension to the resentment felt by Azeris towards ethnic Russians. That political dimension was that Russians were resented because of their opposition to the Azerbaijan liberation movement which succeeded in separating Azerbaijan from the Soviet Union, and also the perceived Russian support given to Armenians in their separatist action in Nagorno‑Karabakh. There was no suggestion that the applicant herself had been politically active. Neither was there any suggestion that any political opinion had been imputed to her except by reference to her Russian ethnicity[19]. As I put to the applicant at the hearing on 20 May 2005, the issue raised by the applicant and in the available information before the RRT only called for the consideration of whether the applicant faced a well-founded fear of persecution as an ethnic Russian. The RRT considered that claim. There was no error by the RRT in failing to consider a political persecution claim that was never articulated and which, on the available material, even if it had been articulated, would have been on all fours with the ethnic persecution claim.
[19] See court book, page 106
There is also no substance to the claim of bad faith. There is no evidence that the RRT deliberately altered the intent of paragraph 2 of the email appearing on page 384 of the court book in order to support a different result than what otherwise might have flowed. It is true that the presiding member referred to “some resentment” while the email referred to “strong resentment”. That was probably a mistake on the part of the presiding member. The presiding member also did not deal specifically with the statement in paragraph 2 of the email that Russians in Azerbaijan were resented for their perceived support for the Armenians in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. He only referred to the resentment stemming from the suppression by Russian forces of the independence struggle in Azerbaijan. That may have been a mere oversight or it may have been the presiding member thought that there was no need to specifically refer to both causes of the societal resentment. In any event, I reject the contention that there was any dishonest misrepresentation of the email in the RRT decision and reasons.
The claim of unreasonableness also fails. In order to establish that the available information (in particular the document relied on at court book, page 384) compelled a decision that the applicant had a well‑founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason the applicant would need to satisfy me that there was only one conclusion that could be drawn from it. It is certainly possible that a different presiding member may have reached a different conclusion on that question on the available material. On the other hand, the email at court book, page 384 only dealt with strong resentment against ethnic Russians in Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. The author noted that many Russians left Azerbaijan at that time. It did not necessarily follow that the strong resentment against Russians apparent in the early 1990s continued to the time of the RRT decision. The presiding member made a factual error in referring to “some resentment” rather than “strong resentment” against ethnic Russians. Other information, including the information set out on page 230 of the court book, also supported a view that anti-Russian sentiments in Azerbaijan was a concern which had not necessarily abated. Reasonable minds may differ on the merits of the RRT decision on this point. However, I cannot say that only one conclusion was open to the presiding member. The presiding member may have been wrong but the conclusion that a well-founded fear of ethnic persecution had not been established was open to him on the available material.
I reject the claim of procedural unfairness. The only material relied upon by the RRT that was detrimental to the applicant’s claims was her own evidence and country information. Neither was required to be disclosed to her, pursuant to s.424A(1) of the Migration Act by reason of the operation of s.424A(3). A claim of procedural unfairness under the general law has not been established. In particular, in the absence of evidence (apart from the green book filed on 3 December 2003) I am unwilling to make any factual findings as to what may or may not have been disclosed to the applicant at the hearing conducted on 16 September 1999. It obviously did not include the email on page 384 of the court book, which was obtained after the hearing. However, the substance of paragraph 2 of that document is consistent with the information at page 109 of the court book, which came from the applicant’s solicitors. It follows, and I find, that prior to the hearing before the RRT, the applicant was aware of the issue of anti Russian resentment in Azerbaijan.
The applicant’s claims were in part dealt with by the presiding member on the basis of adverse findings on credibility. Mr Kennett submits, and I accept, that, with the exception of the evidence accepted by the presiding member at court book, page 380, the applicant’s claims were rejected on credibility grounds. The presiding member might have taken a more generous view on his approach to assessing the applicant’s credibility than he did. I had the benefit of observing the applicant over two days and I formed the view that she is genuinely terrified of returning to Azerbaijan. The country information available to the RRT indicates that there are sound reasons for the applicant to be afraid. The applicant had difficulty in expressing herself clearly in the proceedings before me, even with the assistance of her migration agent and a Russian interpreter. She also adopted the approach in the proceedings before me of advancing every conceivable challenge to the decision and reasons of the RRT, most of which lack any merit. She seems to have taken a similar approach before the RRT. It did not necessarily follow that her claims were lies. As has been noted previously, asylum seekers engaged in a desperate struggle for freedom, even life itself, may seeks to embroider their claims in order to enhance their chances for success[20]. Where there is doubt, applicants should be given the benefit of the doubt.
[20] see Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14 at [191]
The presiding member was in no doubt that the greater part of the applicant’s claims should be rejected as lacking credibility. His reasons are clear and firm and, in the circumstances, he was not obliged to consider those claims as if they were true. Another presiding member might have been more generous. However, the approach taken by the presiding member was open to him and is not vitiated by jurisdictional error.
In my view, this case turns on the consideration of the particular social group claim made by the applicant. The presiding member dealt with that claim in the following manner[21]:
In relation to her being a woman, I have considered the independent evidence to ascertain whether there can be said to be a particular social group as meant by the Convention to which the applicant could belong. I consider that being a woman in itself is not a particular social group as meant by the Convention.
I accept that women do suffer discrimination as detailed in the US Department of State Report 2000. The applicant’s evidence consisted of claims which are largely inconsistent with independent evidence relating to Azerbaijan. Whilst I accept that there is societal discrimination I consider, as mentioned above, that if there was anything more serious than this it would be reported on by these international groups. There is no evidence to suggest or support the view that there is a particular social group as meant by the Convention of young ethnic Russian women. There is some evidence noted above relating to societal discrimination against women and against ethnic Russians, there is also evidence about prostitution, and people trafficking. Whilst I accept that there is societal discrimination I do not accept that it is [of] such [a] degree as could be considered as persecution as meant by the Convention. I consider that if such were occurring it would be mentioned in the independent reports. The situation relating to prostitution and people trafficking speaks in general terms without it being limited to or exclusively a problem for a particular group of women.
[21] court book, page 381
The difficulty with this passage is that the presiding member has expressed himself fairly generally and various parts of the passage are open to alternative interpretations. Mr Kennett submits that I should find that the presiding member considered whether women were a particular social group in Azerbaijan by reference to some unspecified information and decided that they were not. The alternative interpretation is that the presiding member considered whether women per se could constitute a particular social group under the Convention, and decided that they could not. The Minister concedes that if the latter interpretation prevails then the finding is inconsistent with the High Court decision in Khawar. Mr Kennett took me to paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Full Federal Court decision in Applicant S469 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 214. That case stands as authority for the proposition that the identification of particular social groups in Azerbaijan was a matter of fact to be determined by the RRT. That does not detract, however, from the proposition that if, regardless of the facts, the presiding member took the view that women could not constitute a particular social group under the Convention he was wrong and the error may be viewed as a jurisdictional error.
The presiding member clearly found that there was no such particular social group in Azerbaijan of “young ethnic Russian women”. He also found that the problems suffered by Russians in Azerbaijan, while constituting discrimination, did not constitute persecution. The presiding member went on to say that prostitution and people trafficking was not an issue exclusively for any subset of women but it was a problem facing women in Azerbaijan generally. In my view, this leaves open the question whether forced prostitution and people trafficking in Azerbaijan is a risk of such seriousness that it may constitute persecution of women as a group. In my view, the presiding member, in saying that he considered that being a woman in itself is not a particular social group as meant by the Convention, was making a statement of principle rather than a finding of fact by reference to the available material. The statement of principle was wrong in excluding the possibility that such a particular social group existed. The error made by the presiding member meant that there was a constructive failure to consider whether the applicant faced a well-founded fear of persecution as a woman by reference to the risk of her being forced into prostitution and being trafficked as a prostitute in Azerbaijan. This was a key component of the applicant’s claims.
I conclude that the error made by the RRT was a jurisdictional error and that as a result, the applicant should receive relief in the form of constitutional writs. Having regard to the decision of the High Court in SAAP v Minister for Immigration [2005] HCA 24 at [43], [91], [173] and [180], the RRT is a necessary party to these proceedings. I will therefore join it as the second respondent.
As to costs, the applicant was assisted by her migration agent but was not legally represented. She has also succeeded on an issue raised by the Court and has not succeeded on the issues she herself has raised.
In the circumstances, I will order that there be no order as to costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty (30) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Driver FM
Associate:
Date: 10 June 2005
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