Sutton v Hunter (No 2)

Case [2021] QSC 268


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Sutton v Hunter (No 2) [2021] QSC 268

PARTIES:

KATE ANN SUTTON

(plaintiff)

v
LAUREN NICOLE HUNTER

(First Defendant)

AND

ALLIANZ AUSTRALIA INSURANCE LIMITED

(ACN 000 122 850)

(Second Defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BD 10195/2020

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Claim BD10195/20

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Southport (transferred on 6 September 2021)

DELIVERED ON:

22 October 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

Written Submissions

JUDGE:

Freeburn J

ORDER:

The second defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs on the District Court scale, excluding:

(a)   the costs of the application to transfer the proceeding from the District Court (at Southport) to the Supreme Court; and

(b)  the fees and expenses incurred for the expert reports of Mr Lee of Vincents, and any costs associated with obtaining those expert reports, or associated with preparing and leading that evidence.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS GENERALLY – POWER TO ORDER – Where plaintiff was successful in the primary judgment – Whether applicant gave respondent a mandatory final offer – Whether claim falls within District Court or Supreme Court Jurisdiction – Whether order as per costs should be made – Whether the plaintiff ought to recover the costs of an expert’s evidence where that evidence was deemed inadmissible.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 360
Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), s 51C

Lawes v Nominal Defendant [2007] QSC 103, considered.

Brown v Daniels & Anor (No 2) [2018] QSC 232, followed.

Val Eco Homes Pty Ltd (in liq) v Jason Hall t/a JHL Lawyers [2021] QDC 182, applied

Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 1111, considered.

COUNSEL:

Mr C Newton
(Plaintiff)

Mr R Morton

(Second Defendant)

SOLICITORS:

Southside Legal
(Plaintiff)

McInnes Wilson

(Second Defendant)

REASONS

Introduction

  1. On 7 October 2021, I gave judgment for the plaintiff, Ms Sutton, in the sum of $314,345.[1]  I directed that the parties be heard on costs.

  2. Both parties have filed and served written submissions on costs. Ms Sutton’s counsel contends that, having regard to a mandatory final offer pursuant to s 51C of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) (the ‘Act’), Ms Sutton ought to have her costs on an indemnity basis. Alternatively, Ms Sutton ought to have her costs on a standard basis. Or, ‘at the very worst’ Ms Sutton ought to have her costs on a standard basis on the District Court Scale.[2]

    [2]Plaintiffs’ Costs Submission at [16].

  3. Allianz contends that Ms Sutton’s costs ought to be restricted to costs on a standard basis and that Ms Sutton ought not be able to recover the costs of three specific aspects of the case.[3]  Alternatively, Allianz’s counsel contend the preferred course would be to order that Ms Sutton recover 75% of her standard costs.

    [3]Second Defendant’s Submissions as to costs at [36].

    Section 51C

  4. Section 51C(10) of the Act requires that the…

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AGLC
Sutton v Hunter (No 2) [2021] QSC 268
Case
[2021] QSC 268
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sutton v Hunter (No 2) involved a dispute between the plaintiff, Sutton, and the defendant, Hunter. The primary judgment had already been delivered, with Sutton being successful. The matter before the court was to determine the appropriate costs order, specifically whether Sutton should be allowed to recover the costs of an expert’s evidence deemed inadmissible, and whether the claim fell within the District Court or Supreme Court jurisdiction. Additionally, the court needed to consider whether Sutton should receive a proportion of her costs from Allianz, the second defendant.

The court considered the general principles governing costs in civil proceedings, particularly the appropriateness of apportioning costs based on the time spent on various issues. It was noted that such orders often aim to avoid the inutility and expense of dividing legal fees. However, the court also recognised that percentage apportionment involves an evaluative element based largely on impression, where the court lacks detailed information about the preparation time and effort for each issue. The court found that an order could be crafted to exclude specific aspects of costs, which would not be difficult to assess and would fairly reflect the circumstances of the case.

In crafting the order, the court decided that the second defendant, Allianz, should pay Sutton's standard costs on the District Court scale. However, this order excluded the costs of the application to transfer the proceeding from the District Court to the Supreme Court and the fees and expenses related to the expert reports of Vincents, including costs associated with obtaining those reports and preparing and leading that evidence.

The court’s final order was that the second defendant, Allianz, pay the plaintiff’s costs on the District Court scale, excluding the costs of the transfer application and the fees and expenses related to Vincents’ expert reports. This decision aimed to balance the need for a fair costs order with the practical considerations of assessing legal fees in complex litigation.

Orders

Orders of the court

The second defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs on the District Court scale, excluding:

(a) the costs of the application to transfer the proceeding from the District Court (at Southport) to the Supreme Court; and

(b) the fees and expenses incurred for the expert reports of Mr Lee of Vincents, and any costs associated with obtaining those expert reports, or associated with preparing and leading that evidence.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In those circumstances, there is not sufficient reason for departing from the general rule and it is proposed not to make a separate order as to gratuitous care.Conclusion One consideration is whether to order that Allianz pay a proportion of Ms Sutton’s costs. Those types of orders are often made because there is often an inutility and expense to the parties and to the court in dividing legal fees based on the amount of time spent on various issues.[27] On the other hand, there is an evaluative element to a percentage apportionment.[28] It is an exercise largely based on impression,[29] in circumstances where the court is not aware of the preparation time, effort and expense involved in each issue. For example, the time spent on an issue at trial may not be a good guide to the time spent in preparation for trial. [27]Kirby J in Sanders v Snell (No. 2) (2000) 174 ALR 53 at 57.[28]Dal Pont (supra) at [8.7]; Australian Trade Commission v Disktravel [2000] FCA 62 at [5].[29]Dal Pont (supra) at [8.7]; Beagle Holdings Pty Ltd v Equus Financial Services Ltd [2000] WASC 128 at [32]. In this case, it seems to me that an order can be crafted which excludes the two aspects of costs which the plaintiff ought not recover, and that such an order is not likely to cause difficulty in assessment. The order will be that the second defendant pay the plaintiff’s (standard) costs on the District Court scale, but excluding:(a)the costs of the application to transfer the proceeding from the District Court (at Southport) to the Supreme Court; and(b)the fees and expenses of Vincents and any costs associated with obtaining the expert reports of Vincents, and preparing and leading that evidence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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