Structural Monitoring Systems Ltd v Tulip Bay Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   STRUCTURAL MONITORING SYSTEMS LTD -v- TULIP BAY PTY LTD [2017] WASC 379

CORAM:   MARTIN CJ

HEARD:   17 OCTOBER 2017; 3, 13 & 20 NOVEMBER 2017

ON THE PAPERS

DELIVERED          :   22 DECEMBER 2017

FILE NO/S:   ARB 7 of 2016

BETWEEN:   STRUCTURAL MONITORING SYSTEMS LTD

Applicant

AND

TULIP BAY PTY LTD
First Respondent

KENNETH JOHN DAVEY
Second Respondent

Catchwords:

Arbitration - Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA) - Application to set aside arbitral award on ground of misconduct - Whether denial of procedural fairness - Whether excessive delay in the delivery of the award - Whether the matter was heard and determined by two arbitrators where three arbitrators had been appointed - Application dismissed

Legislation:

Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA)
Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 (WA)
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth)

Result:

Application dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr A P Rumsley

First Respondent           :     Mr M P L Noonan-Crowe

Second Respondent      :     Mr M P L Noonan-Crowe

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Alan Rumsley Commercial Disputes Lawyer

First Respondent           :     Valenti Lawyers

Second Respondent      :     Valenti Lawyers

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation v Whybrow & Co [1910] HCA 8; (1910) 10 CLR 266

Cargill International SA Antigua v Sociedad Iberica De Molturacion SA [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 489

Dental Board of Queensland v B [2003] QCA 294; [2004] 1 Qd R 254

Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 189; (2004) 140 FCR 17

Monie v Commonwealth of Australia [2005] NSWCA 25; (2005) 63 NSWLR 729

Morgan & Australian Workers' Union v Rylands Brothers (Australia) Ltd (1927) 39 CLR 517

Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2004] WASCA 149; (2004) 29 WAR 273

Murcia & Associates (a firm) v Grey [2001] WASCA 240; (2001) 25 WAR 209

NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 1; (2004) 134 FCR 85

Oil Basins Ltd v BHP Billiton Ltd [2007] VSCA 255; (2007) 18 VR 346

P v Q [2017] EWHC 194 (Comm)

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355

Rylands Brothers (Australia) Ltd v Morgan (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 161

Sea Containers Ltd v ICT Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 134

Sullivan v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd [2017] FCAFC 153

MARTIN CJ: 

Summary

  1. Structural Monitoring Systems Ltd (SMS) applies for orders pursuant to s 42 and s 44 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA) (the Act)[1] setting aside an award made by arbitrators Peter John Hannan and Philip George Clifford on the ground of misconduct, and removing arbitrators Peter John Hannan, Philip George Clifford and Kelvin Lord on the same ground.

    [1] The Act applies to these proceedings because the arbitration was commenced prior to the commencement of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 (WA) - see s 43(2) of that Act.

  2. The misconduct is said to be constituted by:

    (a)denial of procedural…

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Details
Case
[2017] WASC 379
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Structural Monitoring Systems Ltd brought an application against Tulip Bay Pty Ltd seeking to set aside an arbitral award made by the arbitrators. The dispute arose out of a contract for the installation of a structural monitoring system at the Goldfields Mill in Western Australia. The primary issue before the court was whether the arbitral award should be set aside on the grounds of misconduct, specifically whether there was a denial of procedural fairness, excessive delay in the delivery of the award, and whether the matter was heard and determined by two arbitrators where three arbitrators had been appointed. The court had to determine if the alleged misconduct was sufficient to set aside the arbitral award.

The court considered whether the delay in the delivery of the award could support the conclusion that procedural fairness had been denied. It was noted that while excessive delay may suggest a denial of procedural fairness, it is not a necessary inference. The court also examined whether the decision was made by the correct number of arbitrators. In this case, the court found that the delay did not result in a denial of procedural fairness as the decision did not turn on the demeanour of the parties involved. Furthermore, the court held that the decision was valid as it was made by the two arbitrators appointed, even though a third arbitrator had been initially appointed.

Based on the findings, the court dismissed the application to set aside the arbitral award. The delay in the delivery of the award did not amount to a denial of procedural fairness, and the decision was valid as it was made by the appointed arbitrators. The court held that the application was without merit, and the arbitral award stood as made.

The court dismissed the application and made no orders for costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[11] Marshall J accepted[12] that excessive delay may support the conclusion that procedural fairness had been denied in a case in which a tribunalreflect[s], in an adverse way, upon the demeanour of an applicant in its reasons for decision in circumstances where the evidence was given so long ago that it could not reasonably remember the demeanour in question.However, because in that case the decision of the relevant tribunal did not turn on any question involving the demeanour of the applicant, the excessive delay did not result in the denial of procedural fairness.[11] NAIS v Minister for Immigrationand Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 1; (2004) 134 FCR 85 (NAIS).[12] NAIS [37]. Hill J gave consideration to the question of whether excessive delay could, of itself, support the conclusion that the decision‑maker had not performed his or her function. In that context he observed:[13]I do not think that it is a necessary inference just from the delay itself that the Tribunal member was unable as a result of that delay to fulfil his function of reviewing the decision[.]In that case, the delay was in excess of five years. In Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission[14] there was a delay of almost two and a half years between the completion of a very long and complex hearing relating to the valuation of resumed land and the publication of reasons for decision. The reasons published were brief and bore no appropriate relationship to the breadth and complexity of the issues ventilated during the hearing. Conclusions were expressed with respect to the credibility of witnesses based on demeanour without analysis in any depth of the reasons why the evidence given by one witness was preferred to that given by another. In those circumstances, the lengthy delay, coupled with the inadequacy of the reasons published led the appellate court to conclude that the judge at first instance had failed to engage with the issues which he had to determine. Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd[15] was a very similar case to Mount Lawley. Following a complex hearing relating to alleged misrepresentation with respect to the sale of some shopping centres, after almost two years after the witnesses gave their evidence, and after reserving his decision for 17 months, the trial judge published relatively brief reasons in which he expressed, in a conclusionary way, his acceptance of the evidence of some witnesses and his rejection of the evidence of others without detailed supporting analysis, and failed to deal with a number of the causes of action advanced by the applicant. Because the case turned critically upon the evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses giving competing evidence, the appellate court concluded that the delay had weakened the trial judge's advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses - an advantage which was essentially lost by the time he came to publish his reasons.