JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: STRUCTURAL MONITORING SYSTEMS LTD -v- TULIP BAY PTY LTD [2019] WASCA 16
CORAM: QUINLAN CJ
MURPHY JA
MITCHELL JA
HEARD: 9 NOVEMBER 2018
DELIVERED : 29 JANUARY 2019
FILE NO/S: CACV 2 of 2018
BETWEEN: STRUCTURAL MONITORING SYSTEMS LTD
Appellant
AND
TULIP BAY PTY LTD
First Respondent
KENNETH JOHN DAVEY
Second Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: MARTIN CJ
Citation: STRUCTURAL MONITORING SYSTEMS LTD -v- TULIP BAY PTY LTD [2017] WASC 379
File Number : ARB 7 of 2016
Catchwords:
Arbitration - Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA) - Appeal against decision dismissing application to set aside arbitral award on ground of misconduct - Whether denial of procedural fairness - Whether excessive delay in delivery of award - Matter heard and determined by two arbitrators where three arbitrators had been appointed - Majority of the arbitrators heard and determined the matter
Legislation:
Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA), s 42, s 44
Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 (WA), s 43(2)
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Mr A P Rumsley |
| First Respondent | : | Ms R Young |
| Second Respondent | : | Ms R Young |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Alan Rumsley |
| First Respondent | : | Valenti Lawyers |
| Second Respondent | : | Valenti Lawyers |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Browne v Browne [2019] WASCA 1
Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v Minister for Mines and Petroleum [2017] WASCA 153; (2017) 51 WAR 425
G v O [2018] WASCA 211
Gas & Fuel Corporation of Victoria v Wood Hall Ltd [1978] VR 385
Oil Basins Ltd v BHP Billiton Ltd [2007] VSCA 255; (2007) 18 VR 346
Scaffidi v Chief Executive Officer [2017] WASCA 222; (2017) 52 WAR 368
Shirley Sloan Pty Ltd v Merril Holdings Pty Ltd t/as Airen Constructions [2000] WASC 99
Structural Monitoring Systems Pty Ltd v Tulip Bay Pty Ltd [2017] WASC 379
Westport Insurance Corporation v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2011] HCA 37; (2011) 244 CLR 239
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:
The appellant, Structural Monitoring Systems Ltd, appeals against the decision of the primary judge[1] dismissing its application to set aside an award made by arbitrators Peter John Hannan and Philip George Clifford on the grounds of misconduct, and remove arbitrators Peter John Hannan, Philip George Clifford and Kelvin Lord.
[1] Structural Monitoring Systems Ltd v Tulip Bay Pty Ltd [2017] WASC 379 (primary reasons).
The application was made pursuant to s 42 and s 44 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA) (the Act).[2]
[2] While the Act has since been repealed and replaced by the Commercial Arbitration Act2012 (WA), the repealed Act applies to arbitrations commenced prior to the commencement of the 2012 Act: see Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 (WA) s 43(2).
Before the primary judge, the appellant contended that the misconduct was constituted by:
(a)a denial of procedural fairness, by taking into account submissions from the respondents, Tulip Bay Pty Ltd (Tulip)…
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- Case
- [2019] WASCA 16
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to decide whether the alleged misconduct of the arbitrators was sufficient to warrant setting aside the award. The misconduct included the failure to follow the agreed procedure for appointing arbitrators, and the determination of the matter by two arbitrators rather than the full tribunal of three. The court also had to determine if the delay in delivering the award was unreasonable and whether there was a denial of procedural fairness. The primary judge found that the alleged misconduct did not amount to a substantial miscarriage of justice or materially prejudice SMS in a respect relevant to the outcome of the arbitration.
The court held that the alleged misconduct of the arbitrators did not amount to a substantial miscarriage of justice or materially prejudice SMS in a respect relevant to the outcome of the arbitration. The court held that the delay in delivering the award was not unreasonable and that there was no denial of procedural fairness. The court agreed with the primary judge's findings and dismissed the appeal. The court emphasised that the threshold for setting aside an arbitral award on the ground of misconduct is high and that the court will only intervene where there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice or material prejudice to a party.
The appeal was dismissed and SMS was ordered to pay Tulip Bay's costs of the appeal. The arbitral award remained in place and binding on both parties.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Similarly, in Gas & Fuel Corporation of Victoria v Wood Hall Ltd,[22] in reviewing the authorities as to the meaning of misconduct, Marks J summarised the position as follows:In general it can be said that misconduct is seen to flow from 'irregularity', and to be disassociated from any concept of moral turpitude or overtone.[22] Gas & Fuel Corporation of Victoria v Wood Hall Ltd [1978] VR 385, 391 (Marks J). We agree with these remarks. Indeed, that construction of s 42 of the Act is reinforced by the reference in that section not only to 'misconduct' but to whether the arbitrator 'has misconducted the proceedings'. The notion of the proceedings being 'misconducted' is redolent of irregularity, rather than moral turpitude. It is clear that, where misconduct has occurred, the court retains a discretion whether to set aside the award. The nature of that discretion was discussed by Steytler J in Shirley Sloan Pty Ltd v Merril Holdings Pty Ltd t/as Airen Constructions:[23]There is no question as to the proposition that breach of the rules of natural justice amounts to 'misconduct' for the purposes of s 42(1)(a) of the Act. That is the effect of the definition of that term in s 4 thereof. The real question is whether, where there is misconduct of that kind, it is such as should attract an exercise of the discretion which s 42(1) affords to the court, on the application of a party to the arbitration agreement, to set aside the award either in whole or in part. It is unlikely that a court would exercise its discretion in that way, even in the case of a denial of natural justice, unless the denial was such as (to use the words of Isaacs J in Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners v Hancock (1927) 39 CLR 570 at 588) 'has or may have unjustly prejudiced a party' in a respect material to the outcome of the arbitration (cf Doran Constructions Pty Ltd v Health Administration Corporation (NSW) (1994) 12 BCL 59 at 62 - 63 and Van Dongen v Cooper [1967] WAR 143 at 145).[23] Shirley Sloan Pty Ltd v Merril Holdings Pty Ltd t/as Airen Constructions [2000] WASC 99 [28] (Steytler J). Similarly, in Oil Basins Ltd v BHP Billiton Ltd, the Court observed:[24]Granted, not every technical irregularity is sufficient to warrant setting aside an award. Indeed, the court will not intervene at all unless it is demonstrated that the misconduct in question may have been productive of a 'substantial miscarriage of justice' (as was put by Marks J in Gas & Fuel) or 'some injustice' in the sense explained by Lord Donaldson in King v Thomas McKenna Ltd.[24] Oil Basins Ltd v BHP Billiton Ltd [79]. It is generally necessary, therefore, to determine whether any 'misconduct' established by the evidence was such as to give rise to a 'substantial miscarriage of justice' or has or may have 'unjustly prejudiced' the party seeking to have the award set aside in a respect material to the outcome of the arbitration. We turn then to the three grounds of appeal, which correspond to the three issues determined by the primary judge. We have addressed the issues in the order in which they were addressed in the primary reasons.