Strong Wise Limited v Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 74 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Strong Wise Limited v Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd

[2010] FCA 240

Citation: Strong Wise Limited v Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 240
Parties: STRONG WISE LIMITED v ESSO AUSTRALIA RESOURCES PTY LTD (ACN 091 829 819), BHP BILLITON PETROLEUM (BASS STRAIT) PTY LTD (ACN 004 228 004) and PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE A CLAIM WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 2 OF CONVENTION ON LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR MARITIME CLAIMS 1976 (AS AMENDED BY THE 1996 PROTOCOL TO AMEND CONVENTION OF LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR MARITIME CLAIMS 1976) AS GIVEN FORCE OF LAW BY THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR MARITIME CLAIMS ACT (1989) (AS AMENDED) IN RESPECT OF LOSS SUFFERED OR DAMAGE CAUSED BY AN ANCHOR OR ANCHOR CABLE OF THE VESSEL "APL SYDNEY" IN PORT PHILLIP BAY, VICTORIA ON OR ABOUT 13 DECEMBER 2008
File number: VID 1060 of 2008
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 18 March 2010
Date of Corrigendum: 18 May 2010
Catchwords:

ADMIRALTY – LIMITATION OF LIABILITY – application under s 25 of the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) by shipowner to limit liability under Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth) and the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 as affected by the 1996 Protocol to amend that Convention – meaning of “claims arising on any distinct occasion” in Arts 2(1)(a) and 6(1) of the Convention – Arts 6(1)(b) and 11 of the Convention permitting shipowner to apply to limit liability for all claims arising on a distinct occasion – maritime liens –  multiple claims alleged to arise from ship’s anchor fouling submarine gas pipeline, ship then going astern, ship later moving ahead, pipeline then fractured, later ship moving astern and further bending pipeline – claims by pipeline’s owners for repairs, loss of gas and economic loss – consumers of gas claiming economic losses – longer repair period because of further bending – whether the different events causing damage to the pipeline on one or more distinct occasions

ADMIRALTY – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – construction of international convention given force of law by an Act of the Parliament – construction of Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 as affected by the 1996 Protocol to amend that Convention  – construction of international conventions – application of principles in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 – purpose of limitation Convention to protect shipowner from financial ruin, encourage investment in shipbuilding, international trade and commerce and provide for limited and certain insurable risks – unbreakable limitation – purpose only to limit the liability of shipowner for each separate act, neglect or default from which claims arise – history of limitation of maritime claims laws and conventions – use of domestic law precedents

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – EVIDENCE – concurrent evidence – direction that experts in each relevant discipline confer together, without the parties or their lawyers to prepare joint report setting out issues on which they agree and disagree, giving brief reasons…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Strong Wise Limited v Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2010] FCA 240
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Strong Wise Limited, the owner of the ship “MV Strong Leader,” sought to limit its liability under the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 as affected by the 1996 Protocol, and the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth), in the Federal Court of Australia. Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd, the owner of a submarine gas pipeline, and consumers of gas, sought damages for economic losses allegedly caused by the ship’s anchor fouling the pipeline, leading to fractures and extended repair periods. The central issue was whether the multiple claims arising from the ship’s interactions with the pipeline constituted distinct occasions under the Convention, permitting the shipowner to limit its liability.

The court considered whether the claims arose on distinct occasions, focusing on the language and purpose of the Convention. It determined that the phrase “distinct occasion” should be interpreted broadly to reflect the Convention’s purpose of providing a cap on shipowner liability for each identifiable act, neglect, or default. The court rejected the proposition that domestic judicial decisions should govern the interpretation of the Convention, emphasizing the importance of examining the Convention’s text and structure. It held that claims arose on two distinct occasions, allowing the shipowner to limit liability for each occasion separately. This interpretation aligned with the Convention’s objective to provide a globally enforceable limitation of liability, ensuring that the shipowner could not be held liable beyond the agreed cap for each distinct incident.

The court’s decision underscored the importance of interpreting the Convention in light of its purpose and the international context in which it operates. It highlighted the need for a flexible approach to the term “distinct occasion,” recognising that the Convention’s intent is to prevent financial ruin for shipowners while ensuring a balance between the interests of claimants and the shipping industry. The court’s reasoning provided clarity on the application of the Convention’s limitation provisions, guiding future cases involving multiple claims arising from maritime incidents.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Plaintiff file and serve an outline of submissions and any statements of evidence by 4.00pm on 16 April 2010.

2. The First and Second Defendants file and serve an outline of submissions in reply and any statements of evidence in reply by 4.00pm on 3 May 2010.

3. The Plaintiff file and serve an outline of submissions in reply and any statements of evidence in reply by 4.00pm on 10 May 2010.

4. The proceedings be listed for further hearing on 13 and 14 May 2010.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Convention ensures that a globally recognised and enforceable cap will be placed on the liability to which a shipowner is exposed in respect of all claims arising “on any distinct occasion”. The critical question is, what is a “distinct occasion” or “occurrence”? (The French text uses only one noun, “l’êvenment”, for the English text’s use of two, namely “occasion” and “occurrence”. This, too, suggests that the differing expressions in the English text should be read cognately.) The language of the Convention connotes that an occasion is where some act, neglect or default, of the shipowner, or a person for whom the shipowner is responsible, gives rise to the claims.The use of Judicial Decisions on other Legislation in construing the Convention The parties in these proceedings urged that the meaning of “distinct occasion” in the Convention should be treated as if it were governed by judicial decisions, principally in the United Kingdom, based on the use of that expression in that nation’s domestic legislation, such as the Imperial Merchant Shipping Acts of the 19th Century. While those decisions may assist in cases where there is ambiguity or be illustrative of the circumstances in which there may be a separation between different acts, neglects or default giving rise to different maritime claims, I am of opinion that that the meaning of the Convention must be arrived at from an examination of its text and structure: cf LK v Director-General, Department of Community Services (2009) 237 CLR 582 at 596 [36] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ: see too Foots v Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd (2007) 234 CLR 52 at 75 [62]-[64] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ. Each of the 1924, 1957 and present Conventions has used a different form of expression to address the aggregation of claims and a particular factual circumstance. The Convention uses the concepts of an individual “distinct occasion” (Arts 6(1), 7(1), 9(1)), “occurrence” (Art 5), “occurrence giving rise to the liability” (see Art 11(1)) and an “act, neglect or default” of a person for whom a shipowner is responsible (Art 9(1)(a), (c)). The expressions “claims arising on any distinct occasion” (see e.g. Art 9(1)), “the same occurrence” (Art 5), and “the occurrence giving rise to the liability” (Art 11(1)) focus on a particular act, neglect or default of the shipowner or person for whom the shipowner is responsible. I am of opinion that the natural and ordinary meaning of those expressions as used in the Convention is substantially the same. Although these are different expressions, their use in an international convention, should not be construed narrowly as in a domestic statute. The purpose of the Convention is clear. It is to allow the shipowner to limit his liability for claims arising out of a particular, identifiable act, neglect or default that gives rise to claims of the kind described in Art 2(1). Such claims will often have attached to the ship as maritime liens at the moment they arose; e.g. on a collision (Art 2(1)(a)). If the shipowner’s conduct involves more than one act, neglect or default, each of which would entitle a person to bring a separate claim under Art 2(1), the shipowner cannot limit his liability in one fund for all the claims arising from the second or subsequent act, neglect or default. The shipowner must constitute, if he wishes to limit his liability under the Convention, separate funds for each such individual act, neglect or default.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the negotiations for the Convention, the delegates realised that the level and availability of insurance were related to the degree to which the ability of claimants to “break” limitation, could be constrained beyond the relative freedom they had had under the Brussels Convention. Hence, the Convention used the severe restriction in Art 4 to create a virtually “unbreakable” limit of liability on any distinct occasion. Insurers (including P&I clubs – although they are not technically insurers) could then provide higher levels of protection based on the notional value of a ship fixed in accordance with the valuation rules in the Convention. Insurers, of course, insure against casualties, or events or “distinct occasions”. The Convention and its predecessors had used the concept of claims arising on a distinct occasion, drawn from the British system. That usage did not import the British jurisprudence, however instructive it may have been to common lawyers. But the States Party understood that the use of the concepts from the British system involved employing a theoretical pre-incident valuation of the ship and having that valuation as the basis for establishing limitation for each and every occasion on which claims arose.Policy considerations The Minister said in the second reading speech when introducing into the House of Representatives the Bill for what became the Limitation of Liability of Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Hansard, 12 April 1989 at pp 1482-1483):“As a trade-off for the vastly increased amounts of compensation available, the Convention provides for a virtually unbreakable system of limiting liability. It declares that a person will be deprived of his ability to limit liability only if it is proved that the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such a loss or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result.” (emphasis added) This was cited with approval by Gummow J in Victrawl Pty Ltd v AOTC Limited (1993) 45 FCR 302 at 306, Lockhart and Cooper JJ agreeing; see also Barde AS v ABB Power Sytems (1995) 69 FCR 277 at 290E per Sheppard J; Griggs, Williams and Farr Limitation of Liability from Maritime Claims 4th ed; (2005) at pp 1-2). The concept of the “virtually unbreakable” system is reflected in the provisions of Art 4. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR appositely, in my opinion, referred to the “very heavy burden” that Art 4 imposed, namely, identifying an act or omission of the shipowner committed with the intent to cause the loss complained of or recklessly with knowledge that such a loss would probably result: The Leerort [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 291 at 294 [10]-[13] Henry and Brooke LJJ agreed: see too Hare op cit at 147 and The ‘Saint Jacques II’ [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 203 at 207-209 [16] per Gross J. That burden is similar to the one imposed by Art 25 of the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague 1955 with respect to the right of an air carrier to limit its liability (cp: Civil Aviation (Carriers Liability) Act 1959 and SS Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Qantas Airways [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 288 at 290-291 per Gleeson CJ and Handley JA.The construction of the Convention