Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order)

Case [2024] FCAFC 100


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100

Appeal from: Storry v Parkyn [2023] FCA 1141
File number: QUD 422 of 2023
Judgment of: LEE, FEUTRILL AND JACKMAN JJ
Date of judgment: 31 July 2024
Catchwords: HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – where the Full Court proposed an order pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) that the appellant be prohibited from instituting proceedings without making an application for leave to institute proceedings – where appellant an “indefatigable litigant” – overarching purpose to civil litigation – whether appropriate to make vexatious proceedings order – orders made
Legislation:

Constitution s 51

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 58, 60(4)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 91

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB, ss 4, 14(1), 28(1)(b), 37AM(1), 37AO, 37AQ(1)(a), 37AT(4), 37M(1), 37M(3)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ss 56, 57, 58

Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) ss 7, 8, 9

Court Procedure Act 2004 (ACT) s 5A

Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) r 21

Fair Trading Inspectors Act 2014 (Qld)

Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) r 1.14

Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 3

Supreme Court Rules (NT) r 1.10

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 5

Cases cited:

Attorney-General (NSW) v Mahmoud [2015] NSWSC 899

Attorney-General v Reid [2012] NZHC 2119; [2012] 3 NZLR 630

Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] HCA 12; (2018) 264 CLR 165

Commissioner of Taxation v Rawson Finances Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 617; (2023) 116 ATR 458

Fokas v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas(No 2) [2020] FCA 30

Fuller v Toms [2015] FCAFC 91; (2015) 234 FCR 535

Jones v Skyring [1991] HCA 39; (1992) 109 ALR 303

Kadam v MiiResorts Group 1 Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 1139; (2017) 252 FCR 298

Krejci in his capacity as liquidator of ENA Development Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sebie [2023] FCA 884

Mehajer v Weston (Trustee), in the matter of Mehajer [2018] FCA 608; (2018) 16 ABC(NS) 135

Storry v Australian Financial Security Authority [2024] QCA 55

Storry v Business Licensing Authority [2022] FCA 1321

Storry v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney General [2024] QCA 22

Storry v Commissioner of Police [2018] QCA 291

Storry v Commissioner of Police [2024] QCA 66

Storry v Office of Fair Trading [2021] QCA 255

Storry v Parkyn [2024] FCAFC 67

Storry v Weir (No 2) [2022] FCA 1360

Storry v Weir [2022] FCA 794

Storry v Weir [2023] QCA 4

Storry v Business Licensing Authority (No 2) [2023] FCA 102

Teoh v Hunters Hill Council(No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125

Victorian Building Authority v Andriotis [2019] HCA 22; (2019) 268 CLR 168

The Hon M J Beazley AO, “Communicating the law: self-represented litigants in the Court of Appeal” (Speech, NCAT…

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Details
AGLC
Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100
Case
[2024] FCAFC 100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court, the appellant, Ms Venetia Louise Storry, an undischarged bankrupt, faced a vexatious proceedings order after being deemed an "indefatigable litigant." The court considered whether to prohibit her from instituting proceedings in the Federal Court without leave, given her history of numerous litigious actions that consumed significant judicial resources. The Full Court, having noted Ms Storry's extensive history of vexatious litigation, proposed an order under section 37AO(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Ms Storry was given the opportunity to be heard and requested an oral hearing to contest the proposed order. The court appointed an amicus curiae to assist, and both Ms Storry and the amicus provided written and oral submissions.

The legal issue revolved around whether it was appropriate to make a vexatious proceedings order against Ms Storry. Section 37AO of the FCA Act empowers the Court to make such orders if satisfied that a person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings. The court must not make such an order without hearing the person or giving them an opportunity to be heard. The Full Court considered Ms Storry's conduct in various proceedings, her compliance with orders, and the overall impact of her litigation on the court system. The court determined that Ms Storry had indeed frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings, justifying the imposition of a vexatious proceedings order.

The court concluded that it was appropriate to make the proposed order prohibiting Ms Storry from instituting any proceeding in the Federal Court without leave. The order was made pursuant to section 37AO(2)(b) of the FCA Act, and Ms Storry was prohibited from initiating any proceedings without first obtaining leave under section 37AR of the FCA Act. The decision was based on the extensive evidence of Ms Storry's vexatious litigation and the need to protect the court's resources from further unnecessary proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act), Ms Venetia Louise Storry be prohibited from instituting any proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia (without making an application for leave to institute a proceeding in accordance with s 37AR of the FCA Act and obtaining leave).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In Storry v Parkyn [2024] FCAFC 67 (appeal judgment) (at [36]–[43]), we noted that the appellant in this case, Ms Storry, an undischarged bankrupt, is an indefatigable litigant who has been involved in many proceedings. We further noted that the proceedings the subject of the appeal judgment and her other litigious endeavours have consumed considerable time and resources of courts and that we had come to the preliminary view that it may be the Court could be satisfied that Ms Storry has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts and tribunals, and if this was established, that a vexatious proceeding order could follow. Having reached this preliminary view, and as foreshadowed in the appeal judgment, a proposed order was made by the Full Court, on its own motion, in the following terms: Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the [FCA Act], Ms Venetia Louise Storry be prohibited from instituting proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to institute proceedings in accordance with s 37AR of the FCA Act. The orders of the Full Court also provided that, in addition to filing any material upon which Ms Storry intended to rely to oppose the proposed order, she notify the Registry in writing as to whether she wished to have an oral hearing in relation to whether the proposed order ought to be made. Ms Storry indicated she wished to avail herself of the opportunity to have an oral hearing and such a hearing was convened. Given the nature of the proceeding, the Full Court considered it appropriate that an amicus curiae be appointed, and written and oral submissions were received by both Ms Storry and the amicus. For the following reasons, we have determined that it is appropriate that a vexatious proceeding order be made against Ms Storry. B THE APPLICABLE LAW Section 37AO of the FCA Act empowers the Court to make a vexatious proceedings order against a person, including an order that the person not institute proceedings in the Court. The Court (which may be constituted by the Full Court: see s 14(1) of the FCA Act) may make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative, but must not make such an order without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity to be heard. It is worth setting out s 37AO in full:37AO Making vexatious proceedings orders(1) This section applies if the Court is satisfied:(a) a person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals; or(b) a person, acting in concert with another person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who is covered by paragraph (a), has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding in an Australian court or tribunal.(2) The Court may make any or all of the following orders:(a) an order staying or dismissing all or part of any proceedings in the Court already instituted by the person;(b) an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular type, in the Court;(c) any other order the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person.Note: Examples of an order under paragraph (c) are an order directing that the person may only file documents by mail, an order to give security for costs and an order for costs.(3)The Court may make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative or on the application of any of the following:(a) the Attorney‑General of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory;(b) the Chief Executive Officer;(c) a person against whom another person has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding;(d) a person who has a sufficient interest in the matter.(4)The Court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.(5) An order made under paragraph (2)(a) or (b) is a final order.(6) For the purposes of subsection (1), the Court may have regard to:(a) proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal; and(b) orders made by any Australian court or tribunal; and(c) the person’s overall conduct in proceedings conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including the person’s compliance with orders made by that court or tribunal);including proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted, and orders made, before the commencement of this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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