The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Victoria v Taylor
[2025] VSC 120
•20 March 2025
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
GENERAL LIST
S CI 2024 01229
| Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Victoria | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| Julian Taylor | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | Quigley J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 6 March 2025 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 20 March 2025 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Victoria v Taylor |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSC 120 |
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VEXATIOUS LITIGANT — Court’s own motion application for general litigation restraint order (‘GLRO’) — Multiplicity of proceedings without merit — Findings of ‘persistent’ vexatious behaviour — Long history of proceedings instituted or continued, which were dismissed as abuse of process, pursued without reasonable grounds, or conducted in a way to harass, or annoy, or achieve, another wrongful purpose — Conduct of the respondent in hearing demonstrated persistent intention to pursue unmeritorious litigation — GLRO made for indefinite period — Power to grant leave restricted to the Supreme Court only — Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic) ss 1, 3, 29, 30, 33, 45.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Adjournment sought without reasonable basis — Adjournment refused — Recusal application refused.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr J. Bayly | Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office |
| For the Defendant | In person |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
Preliminary matters
Application for adjournment
Recusal application
General litigation restraint order principles
Power to make an order
‘Vexatious’
‘Persistently and without reasonable grounds’
Evidence required to establish ‘vexatious’ proceedings
Background to relevant litigation history
Proceedings since July 2019
Proceedings impugning the cancellation of the VIT teaching registration
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (Review and Regulation) [2020] VCAT 1359
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (No 1 – The Judicial Review Proceeding) [2022] VSC 184
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (No 2 – The VCAT Appeal Proceeding) [2022] VSC 185
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching [2023] VSCA 119
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching [2023] HCASL 187
Collateral challenges to the VIT decision
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching et al (Human Rights) [2020] VCAT 911
Taylor v Minister for Education [2021] VSC 23
Taylor v Merlino [2022] VSCA 37
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (Human Rights) [2022] VCAT 1367
Taylor v Tang and Gysslink (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, H399/2021, commenced 2 December 2021)
Taylor v Tang & Anor [2023] VSC 373
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (Review and Regulation) [2023] VCAT 980
Taylor v Cricciola (Human Rights) [2023] VCAT 163
Taylor v Mooney (Human Rights) [2023] VCAT 164
Petitions for mercy and attempted second appeal
Taylor v Attorney‑General for Victoria (Supreme Court of Victoria, S ECI 2020 03016, commenced 14 July 2020)
Taylor v The Queen [2021] VSCA 131
Taylor v Attorney‑General for Victoria (Supreme Court of Victoria, S ECI 2020 04291, commenced 2 November 2020)
Taylor v Attorney‑General for Victoria [2023] VSC 358
Access to school reports
CZZ v Department of Education and Training (Human Rights) [2021] VCAT 1146
Taylor v State of Victoria [2023] VSC 320
CZZ v Jim Bailey (Supreme Court of Victoria, S ECI 2021 04357, commenced 21 October 2021)
Satisfaction of the criteria in section 29 of the Act
Exercise of discretion
Conclusion
HER HONOUR:
INTRODUCTION
This is an application under section 29 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic) (‘the Act’), brought on the Court’s own motion. The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Victoria (‘the Prothonotary’) seeks a general litigation restraint order (‘GLRO’) against Julian Taylor. The application is brought pursuant to the directions made by her Honour Richards J on 6 July 2023.[1]
[1]Taylor v State of Victoria [2023] VSC 320, [76]–[78].
A GLRO is sought against Mr Taylor to prevent him from continuing or commencing proceedings in any Victorian Court, or Tribunal, without leave. The order is sought for an unlimited duration.
The Prothonotary relies on two affidavits in support of the application. The first is that of Jack Tonner made on 18 March 2024. Mr Tonner is employed by the Prothonotary as a Senior Registry Officer and as the Deputy Prothonotary. His affidavit deposed the searches he conducted for all the civil proceedings commenced by Mr Taylor since January 1990 in the Supreme Court of Victoria, the Victorian Court of Appeal, the Federal Court of Australia, the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia, the High Court of Australia, and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘VCAT’) (‘the Tonner affidavit’).[2]
[2] Affidavit of Jack Tonner (filed 18 March 2024 in S ECI 2024 01229, Supreme Court of Victoria).
The second affidavit is that of Rod Ratcliffe made on 2 August 2024. Mr Ratcliffe is employed as the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Victoria. His affidavit supplemented the affidavit of Mr Tonner, and provided further detail of the searches for the civil proceedings referred to in Mr Tonner’s affidavit. Mr Ratcliffe’s affidavit also included additional searches of proceedings commenced by Mr Taylor in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria, the County Court of Victoria, and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Ratcliffe affidavit’).[3]
[3]Affidavit of Rod Ratcliffe (filed on 2 August 2024 in S ECI 2024 01229, Supreme Court of Victoria).
A summary table of the relevant proceedings to be relied upon was provided to the Court in addition to the written submissions on behalf of the Prothonotary.
In support of the application, the Prothonotary relies on the litigation history of the proceedings commenced or conducted by Mr Taylor. These proceedings can be divided into the following categories:
(a) Since late 2019, Mr Taylor has engaged in a campaign of litigation in VCAT, the Supreme Court of Victoria, the Victorian Court of Appeal, and the High Court of Australia, in relation to the decision of the Victorian Institute of Teaching (‘the VIT’) to cancel his registration as a teacher on 31 August 2015. Mr Taylor refuses to accept the lawfulness or correctness of the VIT decision, or of any decision that does not result in the quashing or setting aside of the VIT decision.
(b) Mr Taylor has repeatedly litigated his ability to access school reports regarding his daughter.
(c) Mr Taylor has sought to pursue individual Tribunal Members personally for perceived discrimination, contrary to the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic).
(d) Mr Taylor has made unmeritorious judicial review applications concerning a petition for mercy that he submitted to the Attorney‑General in 2019, in relation to dishonesty offences for which he was convicted in the County Court of Victoria in 2018.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
As Mr Taylor is located in the United Kingdom, he participated in the hearing via Zoom.
Mr Taylor had indicated that he wished to seek an adjournment of the hearing. He filed a summons which was made returnable on the day of the trial.
In the course of making his oral application for adjournment of the hearing, Mr Taylor submitted that given his complaints against several Tribunal Members, it would be inappropriate for me to hear this proceeding given my previous position as President of the Tribunal. He then requested that I recuse myself.
The Prothonotary opposed both the adjournment and the recusal applications.
Application for adjournment
Part of Mr Taylor’s justification for an adjournment of this hearing was based on his allegation that he had employed a private investigator who he alleged had found evidence of conflicts‑of‑interest, inappropriate association between Members of the Tribunal and the VIT or the education sector, and that one of the Tribunal Members did not have the qualification or resume that he claimed to have.
Mr Taylor submitted that he only recently was able to fund a solicitor to investigate all of the previous litigation he had been involved in. Accordingly, he claimed that he needed time for this work to be complete, and for him to make an assessment as to whether this legal practitioner and/or the advice would be sufficient to found further action.
When questioned as to the estimated timeframe, he suggested that he required three months for this to occur. Additionally, he said that he was part way through a training course that he had been waiting to participate in for some time.
He argued that there was no prejudice to the applicant if the adjournment was granted.
I note that the trial date had been confirmed by Judicial Registrar Conidi at the directions hearing on 16 December 2024, at which Mr Taylor appeared. He has had sufficient time to prepare for the hearing.
There was no guarantee that by providing a further three months, this would ensure that the matter would not be met by a further adjournment request.
The allegations he made in his affidavit against the Members of the Tribunal are scandalous and without foundation. As I explained to him, appointment to the Tribunal is by the Governor‑in‑Council, after a Cabinet recommendation supported by the Attorney‑General of Victoria, after a rigorous background checking process. His allegations of inconsistency in a Tribunal Member’s resume based on his social media profile is far from compelling evidence of misrepresentation or any other basis of disqualification. Any alleged conflict and conspiracy he alleges between Tribunal Members based on social media connections is specious and utterly unconvincing.
Insofar as he was engaged in a training program, in my view, this did not affect his ability to participate in the hearing as scheduled, as the time difference between his location and Melbourne court hours did not conflict.
His comments at the hearing only further demonstrated to me that his actions in bringing proceedings against a range of entities and people involved in the decision or reviews of his VIT deregistration continues to be unremitting. He is on a misguided and malicious mission and he will not be held back by persuasion or adverse findings.
I refused Mr Taylor’s application for adjournment.
Recusal application
In respect of the recusal application, the Prothonotary submitted that there was no basis upon which a reasonable person might form the view that the Judge might not bring an open mind to the matter. To accede to recusal on the basis that the Judge had been the President of the Tribunal, a role held by a sitting Supreme Court Judge, would effectively prevent any Judge of the Supreme Court from hearing the proceeding.
The apprehended bias basis for recusal was misconceived and without foundation. Mr Taylor seemed to be of the belief that I held the current position of President of the Tribunal, a role which I relinquished in July 2022. Further, he was unable to indicate any matter which I had previously dealt with his proceedings adversely or otherwise.
Mr Taylor’s allegations of conspiracies and improper connections are without basis or merit. Consequently, there is no foundation upon which a reasonable person might form the view that there is a sound basis for apprehension of bias.[4]
[4]Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, [11]; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, [6].
I refused the recusal application.
GENERAL LITIGATION RESTRAINT ORDER PRINCIPLES
Power to make an order
The Court’s power to make a GLRO is conferred by section 29 of the Act which relevantly provides:[5]
[5]Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic) s 29.
29 Supreme Court may make general litigation restraint order
(1) The Supreme Court constituted by a Judge of the Court may make a general litigation restraint order against a person if the Court is satisfied that the person has persistently and without reasonable grounds commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings.
(2) In determining whether it is satisfied of the matters specified in subsection (1), the Supreme Court may take into account any matter it considers relevant, including but not limited to any of the following—
(a) any proceeding commenced or conducted by the person, or an entity controlled by the person, in any Australian Court or Tribunal;
(b) the existence of any order made by an Australian Court or Tribunal against the person, or an entity controlled by the person, including—
(i) a litigation restraint order; or
(ii) an acting in concert order; or
(iii) a vexatious proceeding order;
(c) any other matter relating to the way in which the person conducts or has conducted litigation.
(3) The Supreme Court may take into account a matter referred to in subsection (2) that relates to a proceeding commenced or conducted before, on or after the commencement of this section.
(4) The Supreme Court may make a general litigation restraint order—
(a) on its own motion; or
(b) on application under section 28.
Section 30 of the Act provides that:[6]
[6]Ibid s 30.
30 General litigation restraint order
(1) A general litigation restraint order made against a person may direct that the person must not do either or both of the following for the period specified by the Supreme Court—
(a) continue any proceeding in a Victorian court or tribunal without leave of—
(i) the Supreme Court; or
(ii) the Victorian Court or Tribunal in which the proceeding is being heard;
(b) commence any proceeding in a Victorian Court or Tribunal without leave of—
(i) the Supreme Court; or
(ii) the Victorian Court or Tribunal in which the proceeding is to be commenced.
(2) A general litigation restraint order may include any other direction or order that the Supreme Court considers appropriate.
(3) Without limiting subsection (2), the Supreme Court may direct that the person who is subject to the general litigation restraint order may commence or continue a specified proceeding in a Victorian Court or Tribunal.
Section 33 of the Act provides that a GLRO remains in force for the period specified in the order and that the Supreme Court may specify an order remains in force indefinitely.
Section 45 of the Act provides that the Court cannot make a GLRO without giving Mr Taylor a reasonable opportunity to be heard.[7]
[7]Ibid s 45.
A GLRO may direct that a person must not continue or commence any proceeding in a Victorian Court or Tribunal without leave. Such an order is by its nature exceptional and serious, and is not to be made lightly.[8] An order does not shut out a litigant from access to Victorian Courts and Tribunals for meritorious claims, given the mechanism for obtaining leave to proceed is under the Act.[9] It was observed by the Full Federal Court in Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceeding Order) (‘Storry’),[10] that the consequences of a vexatious proceedings order is not to impose an insuperable barrier to litigation by a vexatious litigant entirely, but to control it by imposing a requirement for leave.[11]
[8]Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100, [18].
[9]Part 8 of the Act sets out the process for seeking leave; Attorney‑General (Vic) v Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [2] (Ginnane J).
[10][2024] FCAFC 100.
[11] Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100, [18].
In section 1(a) of the Act, it expressly contemplates that litigation restraint orders involve balancing individual rights of access to the Courts with the public interest in an efficient and effective justice system.[12]
[12]Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic) s 1(a).
I endorse the observation made recently by the Full Federal Court in Storry (in the context of an equivalent scheme in the Federal Court), that ‘the extent of increasing disruption to the efficient management of the Courts business caused by allowing vexatious proceedings to be instituted and maintained without check, is also a serious matter’.[13] Vexatious proceedings legislation provides a mechanism to protect scarce Court resources so that they are available to other litigants and to avoid loss caused to those who have to face proceedings that lack substance.[14]
[13]Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100, [18].
[14]Ibid [19], [74].
‘Vexatious’
The phrase ‘vexatious proceeding’,[15] is defined inclusively in section 3 of the Act, which states that:
[15]Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic) s 3 (definition of ‘vexatious proceeding’).
3 Definitions
…
vexatious proceeding includes the following—
(a) a proceeding that is an abuse of the process of a Court or Tribunal;
(b) a proceeding commenced to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose;
(c) a proceeding commenced or pursued without reasonable grounds;
(d) a proceeding conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose …
Section 3 defines a ‘proceeding’ as ‘any matter in an Australian Court or Tribunal, whether civil or criminal’.[16] An interlocutory application made in the course of a proceeding is itself a proceeding for the purposes of the Act.[17]
[16]Ibid s 3 (definition of ‘proceeding’).
[17]Ibid s 3 (definition of ‘proceeding’ para (b)).
The term ‘vexatious proceeding’ is not necessarily limited to the matters in sub‑paragraphs (a)–(d) of the definition. The authorities in considering the predecessor power which was found in (the now repealed) section 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic),[18] and the litigation restraint schemes in other jurisdictions are also relevant. Accordingly, in addition to the factors expressly identified, a proceeding may also be characterised as ‘vexatious’ where:
[18]Repealed by Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic) s 102.
(a) the litigant brings proceedings in order to restore the wrongs of a perceived conspiracy against them,[19] or otherwise to gain retribution against those who had committed perceived wrongs;[20] or
(b) the proceedings involve ‘outlandish allegations’ and seek ‘forms of relief that the Courts do not grant’, even if it were possible for the Court to identify an arguable cause of action;[21] or
(c) the proceedings are an attempt to relitigate matters that have been decided previously, or should have been raised previously.[22]
[19]Attorney‑General (Vic) v Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [2] (Ginnane J).
[20]Ibid [105], [107] (Ginnane J).
[21]Attorney‑General (WA) v Michael [1999] WASCA 181, [126], quoted with approval in Attorney‑General (Vic) v Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [106] (Ginnane J).
[22]Fokas v Mansfield as trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30, [39] (Wheelahan J).
‘Persistently and without reasonable grounds’
The Court’s power to make a GLRO is enlivened if the litigant has ‘persistently’ and ‘without reasonable grounds’ commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings. Proceedings are brought ‘without reasonable grounds’ where they have been brought without a proper basis.[23]
[23]Attorney‑General (Vic) v Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [147].
The term ‘persistently’ means ‘continually and repeatedly’,[24] and suggests a ‘determination continuing in the face of difficulty or opposition, with a degree of stubbornness’.[25]
[24]Ibid.
[25]Attorney General (Vic) v Horvath, Senior [2001] VSC 269, [6].
Although the term ‘persistently‘ is intended to represent a higher threshold than the term ‘frequently‘, there is no quantitative threshold.[26] The threshold may be met by pursuing a small number of proceedings that seek to relitigate already decided issues.
[26]Explanatory Memorandum, Vexatious Proceedings Bill 2014 (Vic), cl 29.
The requirement of persistence does not require every proceeding commenced or conducted by the litigant to meet the definition of ‘vexatious proceeding’. The reasonableness of the actions taken within a proceeding as well as the issuing of a proceeding can be considered in determining to make a litigation restraint order.
Evidence required to establish ‘vexatious’ proceedings
In determining whether proceedings are vexatious, it is necessary to have regard to their nature and substance. The Court is not concerned with a minute individual examination of each proceeding, but rather the overall impression created by the number of proceedings, general character, and their results.[27]
[27]Attorney‑General (Vic) v Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [148]; Donohue v Attorney‑General for Victoria (Vexatious Proceedings) [2024] VSC 564, [61] (Keogh J).
Where reasons for judgment have been given, the reasons will normally be sufficient to understand the character of the proceeding. If a proceeding has been dismissed or struck out on the ground that it is vexatious, or an abuse of process, it is usually unnecessary to look behind that order.[28]
[28]Attorney‑General (Vic) v Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [126]; Kay v Attorney‑General (2000) 2 VR 436, 437–438 (Ormiston JA); Attorney General (Vic) v Garrett (2017) 51 VR 777, 780–781 [8]–[10].
Previous judgments and orders are not relied upon to prove a fact in issue in those proceedings. However, section 29(2) of the Act authorises the Court to take into account the outcome of the proceedings, the course those proceedings had taken, and the record of the person’s conduct in those proceedings, for the statutory purpose of characterisation as vexatious proceedings.[29]
[29]Attorney‑General (Vic) v Garrett (2017) 51 VR 777, 782–787 [14]–[27], Fokas v Mansfield as trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30, [41]–[66], (Wheelahan J) referred to with approval in Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100, [21].
BACKGROUND TO RELEVANT LITIGATION HISTORY
In 1965, Mr Taylor was born in England.
In 1969, Mr Taylor arrived in Australia.
In 1990, he obtained an Australian passport under the name Stephen Robert Barr, and has since registered multiple name changes over subsequent years.[30]
[30]Taylor v The Queen (2019) 59 VR 163, [7]; Affidavit of Rod Ratcliffe (filed on 2 August 2024 in S ECI 2024 01229, Supreme Court of Victoria) 409.
Between 1991 and February 1998, Mr Taylor was convicted of offences under various names both in Victoria, and in Queensland. These included convictions for dishonesty offences for obtaining property by deception, forgery, theft, obtaining financial advantage by deception, defrauding or attempting to defraud the Commonwealth, and breach of a restraining order dated 1 November 2005.
On 6 February 1998, Mr Taylor received a sentence of eight years imprisonment with a non‑parole period of six years in the County Court of Victoria.[31]
[31]DPP v Taylor [2018] VCC 2271, [33]–[35].
On 1 November 2005, Mr Taylor applied to the VIT for registration as a teacher. In his initial application to the VIT, numerous other subsequent official forms, and statutory declarations, he misrepresented his identity and did not disclose his previous names or criminal history. Mr Taylor was provisionally registered as a teacher with the VIT on 25 January 2006, and granted full registration on 12 January 2012.
In June 2015, the VIT was notified of concerns about Mr Taylor’s identity and investigated whether he had obtained his registration by fraud and misrepresentation.
On 31 August 2015, the VIT found that Mr Taylor’s registration in 2005, 2008, and 2012 had been obtained by misrepresentation and decided to cancel his registration as a teacher.[32]
[32]Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (No 1 – The Judicial Review Proceeding) [2022] VSC 184, [3]; Affidavit of Rod Ratcliffe (filed on 2 August 2024 in S ECI 2024 01229, Supreme Court of Victoria) 257–259.
Further criminal charges were brought against Mr Taylor regarding his conduct in obtaining registration and employment as a teacher. In August 2018, he was convicted in the County Court of four charges of using a copy of a false document, one charge of perjury, seven charges of obtaining financial advantage by deception, and one charge of making, using or supplying identification information. He was sentenced on 20 November 2018, for a term of imprisonment of two years and eleven months with a non‑parole period of two years and two months.[33]
[33]DPP v Taylor [2018] VCC 2271, [1], [90]–[91], [110]; Affidavit of Rod Ratcliffe (filed on 2 August 2024 in S ECI 2024 01229, Supreme Court of Victoria) 179.
On 5 July 2019, Mr Taylor’s application for leave to appeal from his conviction and sentence was refused.[34]
[34]Taylor v The Queen (2019) 59 VR 163; Affidavit of Rod Ratcliffe (filed on 2 August 2024 in S ECI 2024 01229, Supreme Court of Victoria) 407.
PROCEEDINGS SINCE JULY 2019
The procedural history, subject matter, and outcome of the proceedings on which the Prothonotary relies have been categorised under the following groupings:
(a) proceedings impugning the cancellation of his registration as a teacher;
(b) collateral challenges to the VIT decision;
(c) petition for mercy and attempted second appeal in relation to conviction; and
(d) access to his daughter’s school reports.
I have set out a short description of each of the proceedings and any relevant matter raised by it.
Proceedings impugning the cancellation of the VIT teaching registration
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (Review and Regulation) [2020] VCAT 1359
This proceeding was an application before VCAT to review the VIT decision to cancel his registration as a teacher.
The application for review was made approximately three and a half years out of time (the time limit to bring the review was three months). The Tribunal refused Mr Taylor’s application for an extension of time and struck out his application for review.[35]
[35]The Tribunal comprised of Presiding Member Tang and Member Gysslink.
The Tribunal found that there was no acceptable explanation for the delay of three and a half years. Notably, the Tribunal found that the application lacked merit and that this was the strongest factor against granting an extension of time.
The Tribunal found that there was simply no credible evidence before the Tribunal to support Mr Taylor’s accusations of ‘conspiracy, incompetence, perjury, and more by staff of the VIT, the police, the Courts, and others’.[36] The Tribunal also recorded with concern Mr Taylor’s submission that ‘[t]his will never end for me and I will pursue every opportunity available to hold Williams [the staff member who undertook the investigation against Mr Taylor] and the VIT to account for their actions’.[37]
[36] Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (Review and Regulation) [2020] VCAT 1359, [71]–[72].
[37]Ibid [73].
This proceeding is the genesis of much of the litigation which follows directly or indirectly.
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (No 1 – The Judicial Review Proceeding) [2022] VSC 184
On 25 June 2020, Mr Taylor commenced a proceeding seeking judicial review of the VIT decision.
The application was brought nine months after Mr Taylor had commenced the proceeding in the Tribunal, seeking review of the VIT decision set out immediately above. The judicial review proceeding was four and a half years out of time.
On 14 April 2022, Ginnane J refused an extension of time and dismissed the proceeding. His Honour was not persuaded that Mr Taylor had provided an adequate explanation for the delay and, moreover, concluded he did not have any real prospect of success in the proceeding if granted an extension of time.[38]
[38]Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (No 1 – The Judicial Review Proceeding) [2022] VSC 184, [21], [49].
An application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused in Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching [2023] VSCA 119.
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (No 2 – The VCAT Appeal Proceeding) [2022] VSC 185
On 26 December 2020, Mr Taylor brought a proceeding seeking leave to appeal from the Tribunal’s orders made on 3 December 2020 in Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (Review and Regulation) [2020] VCAT 1359. His proposed appeal involved what were described as 11 questions of law and 102 proposed grounds of appeal.
Ginnane J considered that most of Mr Taylor’s arguments were misguided and irrelevant because they misunderstood the Tribunal’s role in its review function. He dismissed the application for leave to appeal on 14 April 2022, and held that there was no real prospect of any of Mr Taylor’s questions of law and associated grounds succeeding.[39]
[39]Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (No 2 – The VCAT Appeal Proceeding) [2022] VSC 185, [35].
This decision was also subject to an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching [2023] VSCA 119.
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching [2023] VSCA 119
Mr Taylor applied for leave to appeal from the two judgments of Ginnane J described above. On 18 May 2023, leave to appeal was refused by Kaye JA. His Honour considered Mr Taylor’s proposed grounds of appeal and refused leave on the basis that the appeal was repetitive, without substance, and without merit.[40]
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching [2023] HCASL 187
[40] Talyor v Victorian Institute of Teaching [2023] VSCA 119, [41], [51], [54]–[60].
Mr Taylor applied for an extension of time to seek special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia for the judgment made in Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching [2023] VSCA 119.
On 7 December 2023, the High Court refused special leave. The High Court determined that the proposed grounds of appeal had no prospect of success and, accordingly, any extension of time would be futile.[41]
[41]Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching [2023] HCASL 187, [1]–[2] (Edelman and Jagot JJ).
Collateral challenges to the VIT decision
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching et al (Human Rights) [2020] VCAT 911
On 18 February 2020, Mr Taylor filed proceedings in VCAT against the VIT, and its current and former employees, alleging they unlawfully discriminated against him contrary to the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic).
On 25 August 2020, the Tribunal summarily dismissed the proceeding on the basis that the proceeding was misconceived or fundamentally misconceived.[42]
Taylor v Minister for Education [2021] VSC 23
[42]Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching et al (Human Rights) [2020] VCAT 911, [34], [41] (SM Steele); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 75(1)(a).
In this proceeding, Mr Taylor sought orders either compelling the Minister for Education to conduct various investigations, or alternatively, a direction that the Minister give reasons for not conducting those investigations. Mr Taylor sought to compel the Minister to investigate: whether his former wife was fit to teach; his claims of discrimination and victimisation against her; and his claims of discrimination and victimisation against Mr Williams, a compliance officer with the VIT.
On 1 February 2021, the proceeding was summarily dismissed by her Honour Richards J, on the basis that Mr Taylor had no real prospect of obtaining the orders he sought against the Minister. Mr Taylor had not identified any statutory powers, duties, or functions, conferred on the Minister that could form the basis of the orders sought by him.[43]
Taylor v Merlino [2022] VSCA 37
[43] Taylor v Minister for Education [2021] VSC 23, [5], [8], [22], [29] (Richards J).
Mr Taylor applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal the decision of Richards J in Taylor v Minister for Education [2021] VSC 23. On the day of the hearing, Mr Taylor sought an adjournment which was refused. Mr Taylor then withdrew his application for leave to appeal.[44]
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (Human Rights) [2022] VCAT 1367
[44]Taylor v Merlino [2022] VSCA 37, [3]–[4], [26]–[27], [48]–[49].
In March and April 2021, Mr Taylor lodged two applications to the Tribunal pursuant to the Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic), claiming breaches of the Information Privacy Principles by the VIT.
On 1 December 2022, certain allegations were struck out under section 75 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) (‘VCAT Act’). However, other allegations remained on foot. The allegations struck out in December 2022 included allegations concerning the process followed by the VIT in August 2015, leading to the decision to cancel Mr Taylor’s registration and the merits of that decision.[45]
Taylor v Tang and Gysslink (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, H399/2021, commenced 2 December 2021)
[45]Order of Member R. Phillips in Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, H90/2021, H137/2021, 13 December 2021) [48], [54], [60], [62]–[64] and the Appendix – The Allegations.
Mr Taylor made an application to VCAT alleging that Tribunal Members Tang and Gysslink had engaged in victimisation, contrary to the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic). He claimed that this victimisation occurred in the course of the review of his application against the initial VIT decision to cancel his teaching registration.[46]
[46]Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (Review and Regulation) [2020] VCAT 1359, [43], [71]–[72], [74], [97].
On 13 December 2021, Deputy President Nihill made orders indicating that the Tribunal proposed to dismiss the application under section 75 of the VCAT Act. Deputy President Nihill stated that it was outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider an application under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) to review an order made by the Tribunal. The orders indicated that the Tribunal intended to conduct the proceeding on the papers unless Mr Taylor objected on a reasonable basis by 7 January 2022.
On 1 August 2022, Deputy President Nihill made orders dismissing the application under section 75 of the VCAT Act on the basis that it was misconceived.
The orders noted that Mr Taylor had made no objection to the proceeding being conducted on the papers.
Taylor v Tang & Anor [2023] VSC 373
Mr Taylor sought leave to appeal from the orders of Deputy President Nihill made 1 August 2022 whereby she dismissed Mr Taylor’s application pursuant to section 75 of the VCAT Act.
During the course of this proceeding, Mr Taylor filed a summons applying for summary dismissal of the defence on the grounds that the respondent’s defence had no real prospect of success. He also filed a summons disputing the respondent’s arrangements for legal representation. He filed a third summons seeking orders that the court summarily dismissed the respondent’s defence on the ground that the VIT ‘is a legal fiction and is thus unable to conduct legal proceedings’.
At the hearing, which was conducted by Zoom, Mr Taylor applied for Matthews J to recuse herself on the basis of actual bias. Mr Taylor peremptorily left the Zoom hearing. Matthews J did not recuse herself.
Matthews J determined that there was no real prospect of success on the appeal. The application to the Tribunal was misconceived. In any event, statutory immunity of the Tribunal Members applied and the application was bound to fail on that basis. The proceeding was dismissed and the outstanding summonses fell away.
Her Honour recorded in her Honour’s judgment that, on 14 June 2023, after the hearing, Mr Taylor sent an email to her chambers ‘couched in scandalous and disrespectful terms and considered that the email may well constitute contempt of [the] Court’, and would have directed the Prothonotary to apply by summons for punishment of the contempt, if Mr Taylor remained in Australia.[47]
Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (Review and Regulation) [2023] VCAT 980
[47]Taylor v Tang & Anor [2023] VSC 373, [113].
On 9 July 2023, Mr Taylor lodged an application with the Tribunal concerning the VIT decision. He contended that the decision was null and void, and must be dismissed because the VIT was a ‘fictitious body’ and does not exist.
On 11 July 2023, a delegate of the Tribunal’s Registrar rejected the application for filing under section 71 of the VCAT Act. Mr Taylor sought a review of that rejection by the Tribunal.
On 18 August 2023, by telephone at the hearing of the application, Deputy President Proctor sought submissions as to whether there was an enabling enactment giving the Tribunal jurisdiction. The Tribunal’s reasons recorded that Mr Taylor decided to leave the hearing alleging that the Tribunal had already decided to reject his application.
The Deputy President reserved his decision, and on 24 August 2023 confirmed the rejection of Mr Taylor’s application on the basis that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to determine the application. Further, regarding Mr Taylor’s submission that the VIT does not exist, the Tribunal commented that, on the face of that, the application appeared doomed to fail.[48]
Taylor v Cricciola (Human Rights) [2023] VCAT 163
[48] Taylor v Victorian Institute of Teaching (Review and Regulation) [2023] VCAT 980, [18]–[19], [23].
On 7 December 2021, Mr Taylor made an application to VCAT under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) against Mr Damien Cricciola, whom he described as ’counsel assisting the VIT panel for the purpose of the VIT decision’. This proceeding is presently ongoing. The Prothonotary submitted that the conduct of Mr Taylor in this proceeding to date is relevant.
On 20 September 2022, orders made by a Senior Member of the Tribunal records that Mr Taylor asked the Tribunal Member to recuse herself and, when the Member indicated there was no reason to do so, Mr Taylor abruptly terminated his participation in the teleconference. The Senior Member then made procedural orders that were sent to the parties. After the procedural orders were sent to the parties, Mr Taylor emailed the Tribunal on 10 October 2022, referring to the Senior Member, and stating ‘Surely you do not expect me to complete an Order she has issued if I have made complaints against her and wish to have her removed. This will only give her a chance to cover up her prejudice and bias against me’.[49]
[49] Taylor v Cricciola (Human Rights) [2023] VCAT 163, [4].
On 2 October 2022, Mr Taylor filed an application seeking to prevent the Senior Member from conducting any hearing in any proceeding he was involved in. The application was treated as an application for reconstitution under section 108 of the VCAT Act. Deputy President Nihill dismissed the application on 20 February 2023, on the basis that section 108 of the VCAT Act may only be exercised when there is an actual hearing of the proceeding on foot, and there was no hearing on foot or scheduled at the time. The power in section 108 did not allow a person to direct the Tribunal as to who should or should not conduct future hearings. Mr Taylor’s application was considered misconceived.[50]
[50]Ibid [11].
On 6 July 2023, despite the dismissal of his reconstitution application, Mr Taylor wrote to the Tribunal seeking an order that a particular Member not be allocated to hear the matter. Deputy President Nihill reiterated the explanation given of the reconstitution power in her earlier reasons, and ordered the application be considered withdrawn unless Mr Taylor provided a submission in support of his application, including why he believes the Tribunal should consider his application given no Member has been allocated.[51]
Taylor v Mooney (Human Rights) [2023] VCAT 164
[51]Order of Deputy President G. Nihill in Taylor v Cricciola (Human Rights) (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, H403/2021, 23 November 2023).
Also on 7 December 2021, Mr Taylor made an application at VCAT under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) against the members of the VIT panel that made the VIT decision. This proceeding is presently ongoing.
On 20 September 2022, Mr Taylor did not attend the directions hearing.
On 26 September 2022, Mr Taylor wrote to the Tribunal alleging the Senior Member was biased and prejudiced against him and demanded she not hear his matter.
On 2 October 2022, Mr Taylor filed an application seeking orders to prevent the Senior Member from conducting any hearing in any proceeding he was involved in. The application was treated as an application for reconstitution under section 108 of the VCAT Act and, similar to the disposition of the application in Taylor v Cricciola(Human Rights) [2023] VCAT 163, Deputy President Nihill dismissed the application on 20 February 2023.
Notwithstanding the dismissal of his reconstitution application on 18 August 2023, Mr Taylor wrote to the Tribunal seeking reconstitution of the Tribunal and, specifically, that a particular Member not be allocated to hear the matter. Deputy President Nihill made orders regarding the further application on 23 November 2023 in the same terms as the orders made in Taylor v Cricciola(Human Rights) [2023] VCAT 163.
Petitions for mercy and attempted second appeal
Mr Taylor initially lodged a petition for mercy in November 2019. He supplemented the petition with 20 letters between 29 April to 1 June 2020. The petition was made in respect of Mr Taylor’s convictions in the County Court (in respect of his dishonesty conduct in obtaining registration and employment as a teacher).
Taylor v Attorney‑General for Victoria (Supreme Court of Victoria, S ECI 2020 03016, commenced 14 July 2020)
On 14 July 2020, Mr Taylor sought orders compelling the Attorney‑General to make a decision regarding his petition for mercy. The originating motion identified 42 points of law. The proceeding was discontinued by consent on 29 September 2020.
I note that this proceeding is not one which is relied upon by the Prothonotary. I have included it for completeness of the litigation timeline.
Taylor v The Queen [2021] VSCA 131
On 14 April 2021, Mr Taylor attempted to file an application for leave to appeal against the convictions under section 326A of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), which permits a second or subsequent appeal where there is fresh and compelling evidence that is in the interests of justice.
The Registrar of the Court of Appeal refuse to seal and accept Mr Taylor’s application for filing, on the basis that it would amount to an abuse of process. Mr Taylor objected to that decision and the matter was referred to the Court of Appeal for review.
The Court of Appeal concluded that it was clear that the Registrar was right to refuse to seal the documents and the application was ‘plainly an abuse of process’. The Court said there was no apparent evidence that could realistically be called ‘compelling’ within the meaning of section 326C of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), and the application had ‘no prospects of success whatsoever’ and was ‘totally without merit’.[52]
Taylor v Attorney‑General for Victoria (Supreme Court of Victoria, S ECI 2020 04291, commenced 2 November 2020)
[52] Taylor v The Queen [2021] VSCA 131, [12]–[15].
On 2 November 2020, Mr Taylor again sought orders compelling the Attorney‑General to make a decision regarding his petition for mercy.
Timetabling orders were made on 4 March 2021, for a trial on a date not before 2 August 2021. The orders required Mr Taylor to file and serve a notice of trial by 2 August 2021.
On 30 April 2021, the Attorney‑General decided not to exercise her power under section 327 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) to refer Mr Taylor’s case to the Court of Appeal for its opinion.
On 8 October 2021, the Attorney‑General filed a summons seeking the proceeding be dismissed for want of prosecution or, alternatively, be summarily dismissed.
On 27 January 2022, the proceeding was summarily dismissed by Matthews AsJ on the basis that it had no real prospect of success.[53]
Taylor v Attorney‑General for Victoria [2023] VSC 358
[53]Orders of Matthews AsJ in Taylor v Attorney‑General for Victoria (Supreme Cout of Victoria, S ECI 2020 04291, 27 January 2022).
On 6 April 2022, Mr Taylor sought judicial review of the Attorney‑General’s decision on 30 April 2021 to refuse his petition for mercy or, alternatively, orders that the Attorney‑General give detailed reasons for that refusal. The proceeding was commenced nine months out of time. Mr Taylor’s application for an extension of time was listed for hearing on 21 June 2023. On the evening of 16 June 2023, Mr Taylor sought an adjournment by email without any supporting evidence.
Irving AsJ refused to adjourn the hearing and refused the application for an extension of time. He determined that ‘none of Mr Taylor’s proposed grounds of appeal have any arguable prospect of success’ and had ‘been determined by a judge of appeal to be totally without merit’.[54] Accordingly, it would be futile to grant an extension of time. Further, Irving AsJ was not satisfied that Mr Taylor demonstrated adequate reasons for the delay in commencing the litigation nor that any special circumstances existed to warrant an extension of time. The proceeding was dismissed with costs.[55]
[54]Taylor v Attorney‑General for Victoria [2023] VSC 358, [43] (Kaye JA).
[55]Ibid [3]–[5], [8], [11], [42]–[43], [55]–[59], [64].
Access to school reports
CZZ v Department of Education and Training (Human Rights) [2021] VCAT 1146
In August 2018, Mr Taylor brought an application in VCAT under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic), alleging that his daughter’s primary school had discriminated against him by refusing to provide him with her school reports.
The respondents to the claim were the Department of Education and Training, the Acting Principal of the school, and two departmental employees in the southwest regional office.
On 5 October 2021, the application was dismissed after a hearing on the merits.
The Prothonotary did not submit that the proceeding was vexatious within the meaning of the Act. However, the Prothonotary submitted that Mr Taylor subsequently sought to revisit and relitigate this matter in proceedings that were by their nature vexatious.
Taylor v State of Victoria [2023] VSC 320
Mr Taylor sought leave to appeal from the Tribunal’s orders made on 5 October 2021, dismissing his application under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic).
Mr Taylor had been deported to the United Kingdom in March 2023, and informally requested an adjournment of the hearing scheduled for 25 May 2023. After the adjournment was refused, arrangements were made by the Court for a Zoom hearing. Mr Taylor refused to attend the Zoom hearing, stating:
As I have stated previously —due to the unlawful and illegal actions of the Australian government —I am not able to attend this hearing.
Forcing the matter to occur will just result in an appeal on discrimination and racial grounds.[56]
[56]Taylor v State of Victoria [2023] VSC 320, [5]–[7].
The hearing proceeded in Mr Taylor’s absence before Richards J. Her Honour determined that none of the proposed questions of law in the notice of appeal had any real prospect of success. None of Mr Taylor’s claims even arguably fell within the provisions of part 4 or part 7 of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) and, accordingly, there could be no contravention of those provisions. Her Honour dismissed the application for leave to appeal on 21 June 2023.[57]
CZZ v Jim Bailey (Supreme Court of Victoria, S ECI 2021 04357, commenced 21 October 2021)
[57] Ibid [52], [66]–[70] (Richards J).
In Taylor v State of Victoria [2023] VSC 320 (immediately above), Richards J described the facts in this proceeding as ‘strikingly similar’ to those that her Honour considered in that matter.
In October 2021, the Tribunal had summarily dismissed an application under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) by Mr Taylor claiming discrimination against him as a father of a student because he had been refused a copy of his daughter’s school report.
On 9 December 2022, Mr Taylor’s application for leave to appeal the Tribunal’s decision was summarily dismissed by Matthews AsJ.[58]
[58]Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 2018 (Vic) r 4.08(8); Orders of Matthews AsJ in CZZ v Jim Bailey (Supreme Court of Victoria, S ECI 2021 04357, 9 December 2022).
On 22 December 2022, Mr Taylor appealed the judgment of Matthews AsJ.
On 28 September 2023, Forbes J dismissed the appeal. The orders of Forbes J recorded that, before Matthews AsJ, Mr Taylor ‘accepted that his complaint before the Tribunal did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) in the area of education’. Her Honour considered that, particularly in light of these concessions made to the Associate Judge, there was no error demonstrated in her Honour’s conclusion.
These proceedings are not the sum total of proceedings and applications brought by Mr Taylor, but are those relied upon by the Prothonotary.
SATISFACTION OF THE CRITERIA IN SECTION 29 OF THE ACT
Given the history of the litigation brought by Mr Taylor, I have no doubt that the criteria in section 29 of the Act are satisfied. Even a cursory review of the proceedings, referred to above, demonstrate a lengthy course of conduct in bringing unmeritorious proceedings which are dismissed for lacking substance or an abuse of process. There are a large number of the proceedings which are aimed at harassing or intimidating officers of the VIT, or those associated with the actions and decisions taken by the VIT, or the administration of teaching, including Tribunal Members personally.
By reference to the summary table and the description of matters set out above, the proceedings commenced and conducted by Mr Taylor:
(a) have been found to be misconceived or have no real prospect of success in 17 matters;[59]
[59]Summary Table of Relevant Vexatious Proceedings (filed in S ECI 2024 01229, Supreme Court of Victoria) items 9–11, 13–15, 17, 22–28, 32, 34–36.
(b) have involved attempts to relitigate issues that have already been determined, whether those matters were in issue in the proceedings or not;[60]
(c) have represented attempts to right the wrongs of the perceived conspiracy against him; and
(d) have pursued individuals involved with the VIT decision of subsequent litigation without a proper basis.
[60]Ibid 10, 14–15, 17–19, 22, 28–29.
In this regard, I accept that those proceedings are properly classified as proceedings which do not have a proper basis, or do not have a proper purpose, or were commenced to harass, or annoy, or to cause detriment.
I reject the affidavit filed by Mr Taylor in this proceeding as providing any countervailing evidence. I accept that the affidavit demonstrates Mr Taylor’s persistent desire to continue to impugn the VIT decision and his belief in a grander conspiracy. This sentiment was made very clear at the hearing before me.[61]
[61]Transcript of Proceedings, The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Victoria v Taylor (S ECI 2024 01229, Quigley J, 6 March 2025) 9–10, 19–20.
EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
Once the Court is satisfied that Mr Taylor has commenced or continued litigation persistently and without reasonable grounds, the Court retains a discretion as to whether or not to make the order.
The discretion must be exercised by reference to the subject matter and purpose of the Act. The purpose of the Act is to reform and consolidate the law relating to vexatious proceedings in a way that balances individual rights of access to the Courts with the public interest of an efficient and effective justice system, and promotes uniformity with other jurisdictions in the management and prevention of vexatious behaviour.
Litigation restraint orders have been described as serving a general protective purpose to shield both the public, whose individual members might be molested by vexatious proceedings, and the Court itself, whose limited resources needs must be carefully managed and protected from the expense, burden, and inconvenience of repetitious suits.[62]
[62]Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No2) [2009] FCA 398, [3].
Given this protective purpose where a person lacks insight into their litigious history or otherwise acted in a way that suggests the commencement of further vexatious proceedings is likely, those factors will weigh in favour of a GLRO. Ultimately, the Court must assess the person’s conduct as a whole to determine whether a GLRO should be made.[63] Unless there is good reason to believe a person’s established pattern of vexatious litigation will not continue into the future, it will ordinarily be appropriate for the Court to make a GLRO where the criteria in section 29 are satisfied.
[63]Attorney‑General for the State of Victoria v Velissaris [2017] VSC 161, [159] (Ginnane J).
I am confident that section 29 of the Act is satisfied and it is appropriate to make a GLRO. I have no confidence that Mr Taylor has insight into his conduct and that he intends to abstain from commencing or conducting vexatious proceedings in the future. Rather, he made it extremely plain that he will never give up. I am satisfied that Mr Taylor should be subject to a GLRO from continuing or commencing without leave any proceeding in any Victorian Court or Tribunal. I am also satisfied that the order should be for an unlimited duration.
Apart from the litigation which has been the subject of my earlier survey, I accept that it is open to the Court to take into account evidence of Mr Taylor’s attempts to lodge proceedings that have been rejected for filing. A list of proceedings received by the Prothonotary from the Tribunal shows that since 2019, there have been 17 occasions on which the Registrar of the Tribunal has rejected an application lodged by Mr Taylor under section 71 of the VCAT Act.
This factor adds to the overall impression that Mr Taylor is an inexhaustible litigant, and it is appropriate, for the protection of the Court and Tribunal resources, that his access to Victorian Courts and Tribunals be regulated by a requirement of leave.
As I have already noted in his submissions to me at the commencement of the hearing in relation to the adjournment application, Mr Taylor made it clear that he will never stop his pursuit of the VIT and any litigation or target which supports that endeavour.
I am satisfied that the variety of parties and subject matter involved in proceedings commenced and conducted by Mr Taylor, are such that an extended litigation restraint order would not be effective to prevent him from continuing to pursue vexatious proceedings in Victorian Courts and Tribunals. A GLRO under section 30 of the Act to restrain him continuing or commencing any proceeding for an indefinite period without leave of the Supreme Court, is entirely appropriate.
I am satisfied that the GLRO should be made in terms which require leave to be sought from the Supreme Court in all instances. The number of applications issued or sought to be issued in the past demonstrates to me that it would be a more efficient use of Victorian Court and Tribunal resources that a single point to seek leave be identified. As such, a more coordinated and informed institutional approach can be managed to the benefit of the legal system overall.
CONCLUSION
The resources of the judicial system in Victoria, and the impact that unrelenting and unmeritorious applications and proceedings take on public and private resources, cannot be condoned. The objectives of the Act clearly support a decision of the Court to exercise its discretion to make the GLRO against Mr Taylor. Based on the litigation history set out above, it is appropriate to make the order on an ongoing basis with any application for leave being required to be made to the Supreme Court.
Pursuant to section 30 of the Act, I will make a GLRO on an ongoing basis, with leave being required to be granted by the Supreme Court of Victoria, to commence or continue any proceeding in a Victorian Court or Tribunal, effective forthwith.
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