Attorney-General v Reid

[2012] NZHC 2119

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY

CIV 2011-454-254 [2012] NZHC 2119

IN THE MATTER OF     an application under section 88B of the

Judicature Act 1908

BETWEEN  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW ZEALAND

Applicant

ANDJAMES ROBERT REID Respondent

Hearing:         7 - 10 May 2012

Court:Keane J Woodhouse J

Appearances: D N Soper for Applicant

Respondent in person
F M R Cooke QC as Amicus Curiae

Judgment:      21 August 2012

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

This judgment was delivered by  on 21 August 2012 at 4pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/ Deputy Registrar

Date:

Solicitors:

Crown Law Office, Wellington: [email protected]

Copy to:
J R Reid, 2 Vogel Street, Woodville: [email protected]

F M R Cooke QC: [email protected]

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW ZEALAND V JAMES ROBERT REID HC PMN CIV 2011-454-254 [21 August 2012]

[1]      In the years since 1984 James Reid has instituted 77 cases before the Courts and before Tribunals, including four appeals to this Court and 10 appeals to the Court of Appeal, most of which have been struck out, dismissed or not pursued.1

[2]      Mr Reid was first engaged in the Family Court in questions of custody, access and maintenance concerning his first son J; and then access to, and an issue as to the accuracy of the birth certificate of, his second son S. In those cases he set out as well to vindicate the rights of fathers.

[3]      Mr Reid also began a series of cases against the New Zealand Fire Service, of which  he was  then  an  officer,  and  the New  Zealand  Fire Service Commission, concerning not just his own employment terms and eventual dismissal, but the Service's management and restructuring.

[4]      In 1998 the Attorney-General applied to this Court for an order prohibiting Mr Reid from beginning or continuing cases without leave,2 contending that he had brought and persisted in cases that plainly lacked merit. In February 2002 the Attorney-General elected to discontinue, then accepting that Mr Reid had become more restrained. Mr Reid opposed that happening. He wanted that first application dismissed. Even the fact of it, he contends still, carries a taint. He was unsuccessful.

[5]      Mr  Reid  then  resumed  his  existing  cases,  and  began  new  ones,  and  he revisited  issues  decided  against  him.  He  wanted  especially  to  get  access  to documents already denied him judicially, held by the Commission's solicitors under privilege, setting out why he had been dismissed from the Fire Service. He set out to find out what had led Attorney-General to apply to have him declared vexatious.

[6]      In more recent years Mr Reid has assumed the role of 'community advocate'. He has brought cases challenging the policies and decisions of the Tararua District Council, and related decisions of the Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council. He has become involved, even to the extent of becoming a party, in the cases of others

whom he considers have suffered injustice.

1      Annexure Two to this decision sets out those proceedings.

2      Judicature Act 1908, s 88A, as it then was.

[7]      In April 2011 the Attorney-General applied a second time for an order that Mr Reid only be able to bring or to continue civil proceedings with leave and it is that application with which we are concerned in this decision. We are grateful to Mr Reid for his courtesy and his candour, and to counsel for their full and helpful submissions.

ISSUES

[8]      The primary issue to which the Attorney-General's application gives rise is, obviously enough, whether Mr Reid has proved to be a vexatious litigant in the sense envisaged by s 88B of the Judicature Act 1908. The Attorney-General contends that he has: that he has brought and persisted with meritless cases undeterred by adverse decisions. Mr Reid contends that he has not: that in the main his cases have involved arguable questions of individual or community interest.

[9]      In contending that Mr Reid's cases demonstrate that he has been and is still vexatious, the Attorney-General points first to their sheer number, and then their invariable hallmarks.  Mr Reid's  arguments,  the Attorney-General  contends,  have often  been  baseless,  extravagant  and  scandalous.  He  has  made  serious  and unfounded allegations against judicial officers and counsel. He has refused or been constantly unable to pay filing fees and security for costs. He has not complied with timetabling orders. He has allowed claims to lie dormant or abandoned them.

[10]     By contrast, Mr Reid contends, even where he has not succeeded, he has often achieved worthwhile changes of policy or practice, especially more recently. Moreover, he contends, the reason why he has not pursued cases, often on appeal, is because he has been frustrated judicially. Filing fees have not been waived, security for costs has been imposed and he has suffered adverse costs awards. He has been stopped short. To the extent that he has been intemperate, as he accepts he sometimes has, that is the reason why.

[11]     Mr Reid wishes to continue to pursue his present cases and others in the future, as a matter of ordinary right. As well as opposing the Attorney-General's second application, just as he opposed the first, he seeks to have it struck out or

stayed as an abuse of process.

[12]     The Attorney-General, he contends, has acted at the behest of the two local authorities,  whose  policies  and  decisions  he  has  challenged;  and  is  intent,  he contends, on fettering his ability to hold them to account, and also his ability to conduct other litigation. He has sought discovery from the Crown Law Office to verify what he believes to have been the abusive origin of the Attorney-General's application.

[13]     Mr Reid also seeks a stay, if not a strike out, contending that this case was not, when we elected to hear it, in a state fit to be heard. In its early directions, he contends, this Court had fettered him unjustifiably. We cannot agree. We set out in annexure one the directions given before the case came to us, which are entirely usual. He complains also about those for which we are responsible, to which we now refer.

OUR PRELIMINARY DIRECTIONS

[14]     On 3 April 2012, at our first case conference, we found that the fixture for the hearing of the Attorney-General's application, beginning on 7 May 2012, remained complicated by Mr Reid's discovery and his stay or strike out applications, which he wished  heard and  resolved  before the Attorney-General's  substantive application went to hearing.

[15]     There was also, however, a measure of common ground. Mr Reid had not at that point filed an amended statement of defence. There was no change of substance in the Attorney-General's second amended statement of claim and Mr Reid did not wish to pay a further filing fee. We accepted that Mr Reid's original statement of defence would serve and that was not opposed by the Attorney-General.

[16]     Mr Reid also confirmed that, if he did not succeed on his stay or strike out application, he did not intend to support his statement of defence with any affidavit evidence of his own. The issue was, he accepted, whether those of his cases pleaded by the Attorney-General in the second amended statement of claim, when assessed on the record relating to each, justified a s 88B order. He contended that they did not.

We timetabled the filing of submissions on that issue, requiring the Attorney-General to file submissions a week in advance of the substantive fixture.

[17]     On 17 April 2010 we decided in principle, in broad agreement with the submissions made by Mr Cooke QC, that there was a narrow category of documents that the Attorney-General should discover to Mr Reid, which might be relevant and was not privileged. Within that category, we envisaged, were any complaints about Mr Reid made to the Attorney-General, or to the Crown Law Office, that prompted the Attorney-General's application. We did not consider Mr Reid entitled to any wider discovery.

[18]     We confirmed also that we would determine, on the first day of the five day hearing allocated, certainly in principle, Mr Reid's stay or strike out application; and, as to that also, we required the Attorney-General to file submissions seven days before the fixture.

[19]     On 3 May 2012 we issued one further minute recording that we had received Mr Reid's notice of appeal and application for injunction, filed in the Court of Appeal on 27 April 2012, in which he continued to seek full discovery and to have his strike out application heard first and discretely. We said that we would adhere to our directions unless and until the Court of Appeal set them aside.

[20]     In a decision, dated 4 May 2012, the Court of Appeal deferred setting down Mr Reid's appeal until we had resolved his stay or strike out application and, perhaps also, the Attorney-General's substantive application. The Court made it clear that we had to resolve Mr Reid's stay or strike out application first, but that we could do so at the fixture given and could reserve our reasons. If, then, we dismissed the stay or strike-out application, we were free to turn immediately to the Attorney-General's application.

[21]     On the first day of the fixture we adhered to that process. We heard and dismissed Mr Reid's stay or strike out application but reserved our reasons. We then began to hear the Attorney-General's application. In this decision we will return to our reasons for our decisions concerning discovery and Mr Reid's stay or strike out

application. We begin with s 88B itself.

SECTION 88B

[22]     Section 88B(1) of the Judicature Act 1908 grants this Court the power to make an order, on the Attorney-General's application, prohibiting a litigant from beginning or continuing civil proceedings in any Court, without the leave of this Court, if satisfied that the litigant has:

persistently and without reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior Court, and whether against the same person or against different persons.

[23]     Once such an order is made the litigant restrained may not bring or continue any proceeding unless this Court is satisfied under s 88B(2) that it is 'not an abuse of the process of the Court and that there is prima facie ground for' it. If this Court does grant leave that may be subject to any conditions the Court thinks fit.3 The decision itself, whether to grant or refuse leave, is final. There is no right of appeal.4

Underlying policy

[24]     In the earliest case brought under this provision as it first was, Wiseman,5

Woodhouse J described it as 'designed to enlarge the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to control vexatious procedures'. In that case, and in the very few since, the invariable issue has been whether a litigant has so abused their ordinary right of access to the Courts, to the detriment of others, and to the public detriment, that it must be curtailed.

[25]     A litigant's ordinary right of access to the Courts, the Court of Appeal said in Brogden,6 is of 'fundamental constitutional importance', but is not absolute. To be set against it has to be 'the desirability of freeing defendants from the very considerable burden of groundless litigation'. Also, as has been said elsewhere, the need to protect

the resources of the judicial system, which are 'barely sufficient to afford justice

3      Section 88B(2).

4      Section 88B(3).

5      Attorney-General v Wiseman SC Auckland M672-67, 20 February 1968.

6      Brogden v Attorney-General [2001] NZAR 809 at [20].

without unreasonable delay to those who do have genuine grievances'.7  So too, sometimes, the need to protect from themselves, the litigants whose conduct is said to be vexatious.

[26]     In the balance to be struck, the Court of Appeal said in Brogden, this Court may only make an order if that is called for after:

an appropriate assessment of the whole course of the respondent's conduct of the litigation in question, including the manner in which and apparent purpose for which each proceeding has been conducted, including resort to the appeal process where that has been done without any realistic prospect of success ...

[27]     The issue, the Court said, is not merely whether 'the litigant is found to have had an improper purpose in commencing proceedings', and in that way to have been vexatious.  It is whether 'the various proceedings have been conducted by the litigant in a manner which properly attracts that epithet'.8 An objective analysis is called for.

[28]     Once an order is made, the Court continued to say, this Court becomes a 'gate keeper or supervisor to ensure that the processes of the Courts are not abused'. In its capacity to grant or refuse leave this Court is able to impose conditions:9

which may be a means of ensuring that the litigant pursues the proceeding in a proper manner. The interests of the litigant and the intended defendant, and the public interest in the proper administration of justice can, by way of these  controls,  be  appropriately  balanced.  Repetition  of  the  litigant's vexatious use of legal proceedings can be prevented.

[29]     Thus, the Court said, the litigant is not denied access to the Courts and thus, the Court was confident, the 'rights guaranteed to a litigant under s 27 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990, can by this means be weighed and accommodated'.

Judicial review secured right

[30]     Especially in issue in this case is the right secured by s 27(2) NZBORA to apply for redress by way of application for judicial review. It is that remedy that Mr

7      Attorney-General v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859 (CA), at 865; Attorney-General v Hill (1993) 7

PRNZ 20 (HC), 26 - 27.

8      At 22.

9      At 23.

Reid has most frequently applied for. Section 27(2) expresses that right in this way:

Every person whose rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law have been affected by a determination of any tribunal or other public authority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, for judicial review of that determination.

[31]     This right, conferred by s 4(1) of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, is not an absolute right. It is not available to everyone and on any basis. It can only be exercised 'in accordance with law'; and, as Blanchard J said in the Quarantine Waste case:10

relief  can  be  granted  under  the  Judicature Amendment  Act  only  to  an applicant whose rights have been decided, prescribed or affected by (inter alia) the exercise of a statutory power of decision.

[32]     In  that case,  a resource management  case,  Blanchard J  defined  'affected' liberally and that has been so in other such cases and more widely.11  In one, Elias J held that any issue as to standing will normally be left to be resolved in the exercise of the Court's discretion whether to grant relief. 12 But, where the litigant's interest in the issue to be resolved is obviously remote,  an application may be  struck out immediately.13

[33]     Despite the fact, however, that the s 27(2) right is itself less than absolute, and a s 88B(1) order can be mitigated by the power to grant leave under s 88B(2), s 88B(1) does impinge on s 27(2); and the Supreme Court in R v Hansen14 has, since Brogden was decided, required that where there is such a collision, a close inquiry is called for to avoid or reduce its impact.

[34]     First, s 88B's meaning must be established 'from its text and in the light of its

10     Quarantine Waste (NZ) Ltd v Waste Resources Ltd [1994] NZRMA 529 at 535.

11     Environmental Defence Society Inc v South Pacific Aluminium Ltd (No 3) [1981] 1 NZLR 216 (CA); Hallett v AG [1989] 2 NZLR 87 (HC); O'Neill v Otago Area Health Board CA167/92, 30

May 1994; Society for the Protection of Auckland City & Waterfront Inc v Auckland City Council

[2001] NZRMA 209.

12     Murray v Whakatane District Council (1997) NZRMA 433; [1999] 3 NZLR 276.

13     Easton v Human Rights Commission & Ors HC Wellington CIV 2009-485-726, 13 July 2009.

14     R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1.

purpose'.15   Section  88B,  so  understood,  must  then  be  contrasted  with  the  right secured under s 27(2). If they conflict the issue whether s 88B,  so understood, constitutes a justifiable limit on s 27(2) must be assessed under s 5 NZBORA. If it is a justifiable limit, so understood, it prevails. If it is not, it must be reappraised under s 6 NZBORA to identify any other meaning more 'consistent or less inconsistent with the relevant right or freedom'.16 If there is none then, and only then, may the ordinary meaning of s 88B prevail.

[35]     The issue under s 5 NZBORA, according to Tipping J's analysis in Hansen, is whether s  88B,  on  its ordinary meaning,  serves  'a justified end  ...  achieved  by proportionate means'. That first involves these two questions. How important is s

88B's purpose? How rationally connected is s 88B to that purpose? Then these. Is the impediment that s 88B creates to the s 27(2) right greater than reasonably necessary? Is the limit s 88B imposes on s 27(2) duly proportionate to the importance of its own purpose?

[36]     As to s 6 NZBORA, McGrath J said in Hansen,17  it creates a 'presumption that legislation is to be interpreted in accordance with fundamental rights, as part of the statutory reassertion of the importance of New Zealand's commitment to human rights'. And thus, as he then said:

Section 6 accordingly adds to, but does not displace, the primacy of s 5 of the Interpretation Act ... and it does not justify the Court taking up a meaning that is in conflict with s 5 ... To qualify as a meaning that can be given under s 6 what emerges must always be viable, in the sense of being a reasonably available meaning on that orthodox approach to interpretation.

Effect in this case

[37]     There is no need for us, we consider, to undertake that full phased analysis. Brogden  establishes that,  even  interpreted broadly having regard to  its  purpose, s 88B does constitute a justifiable limit on the s 27 rights, including that to judicial

review. Hansen does, however, require us to have close regard to how s 88B(1) is

15     Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1).

16     R v Hansen at [92], step five.

17 At [149].

expressed, as well as its purpose. Even when a secured right is not in issue, as the

Court of Appeal recently said in the last of the Heenan cases:18

Everyone has a right of access to the Courts, including the appellate courts. Any statutory restriction on such right of access must be clear and, in the event of doubt, must be read down.

[38]     If there is a basis for an order, s 88B requires us, as Hansen effectively emphasises, to assess first whether an order is called for. The Courts have a range of lesser ways of controlling the conduct of cases. If an order is called for, we must also consider whether it ought to be general or limited to any class of case. Even the need to obtain leave to pursue a case is a real limit on the ordinary right of access to justice.

Statutory prescription

[39]     The prescribed basis for a s 88B order, that the person, the subject of the application, 'has persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious proceedings, ... in the High Court or in any inferior Court' has a 'seeming simplicity' that ceases immediately one separates out its elements and how they interact.19

[40]     First  these  questions  arise.  What  does  'legal  proceedings'  mean?  How exhaustive are the categories 'in the High Court or in any inferior Court'? What does it take to 'institute' proceedings? Then these. What makes proceedings 'vexatious'? What do the words 'without any reasonable ground' add? What does 'persistently' connote?

Legal proceedings

[41]     Section 88B first speaks of proceedings in its title, there describing them as

'vexatious actions'. Then, a second time, when it prescribes in subs (1) the basis for an order, where it speaks of 'vexatious legal proceedings'. Then, a third time, when it

prescribes in subs (1) the order that may be made, where it confines that order to

18     Heenan v Official Assignee [2010] NZCA 135 at [12].

19     Michael Taggart and Jenny Klosser 'Controlling Persistently Vexatious Litigants' in Matthew

Groves Law and Government in Australia (The Federation Press, NSW, 2005) 272 at 282.

'civil proceedings'.

[42]     The two categories that count are those in subs (1) itself. The title is merely descriptive.   In   ordinary  speech   'civil   proceedings'   are   a   category  of   'legal proceedings', which encompass proceedings in every form. The threshold issue is rather whether the 'legal proceedings' that found the Court's ability to make an order lie 'in the High Court or in any inferior Court'; as to the latter, that is to say, 'any Court of judicature within New Zealand of inferior jurisdiction to the High Court'.20

[43]     Legal proceedings in the District Court clearly qualify. So too do those in the Disputes Tribunal.21  It is a division of the District Court and is included in the definition of 'inferior Court' in the Inferior Courts Procedure Act 1909. So too those in the Employment Court and the Employment Tribunal.22  So too those before the Human Rights Review Tribunal.23

[44]     Those before the Environment Court, we consider, qualify equally. It is a court of record.24   Though it has lay members, it is presided over by District Court Judges, who have the same immunity as a Judge of the High Court.25 The Court sits in public.26  While it may proceed without procedural formality, it must be fair.27  It has a wide power to receive evidence.28 Witnesses and counsel have the same privileges and immunities as in a District Court.29 It may make a range of orders, and may punish for contempt and award costs.30

[45]     The Real Estate Agents' Disciplinary Committee, analysed in the same way, seems to us also to have the characteristics of an 'inferior Court'; a body 'having

judicial  characteristics  and  exercising  judicial  functions  by  means  of  judicial

20     Judicature Act 1908, s 2.

21     Attorney-General v Hill (1993) 7 PRNZ 20 (HC) at 23.

22     Attorney-General v Reid [2000] 2 NZLR 377 (HC).

23     Attorney-General v O'Neill [2008] NZAR 93 (HC).

24 Resource Management Act 1991, s 247.

25     Section 261.

26     Section 297.

27     Section 269.

28     Section 267(1).

29     Section 288.

30     Sections 282(2), 286.

procedures'.31

[46]     Finally, Mr Reid's three private prosecutions in the District Court constitute relevant 'legal proceedings'; a term that encompasses criminal as well as civil proceedings. In this we agree with the decision in Attorney-General v Palmer,32 where such prosecutions were taken into account as a source of jurisdiction.

Instituted proceedings

[47]     To be a relevant 'legal proceeding', a case must be also be one that the litigant has 'instituted'.  As to that there are two issues. The more straight forward is whether he or she has to have done so wholly personally. The other is whether this qualifying act is confined to bringing a case, or extends to bringing each distinct phase of the case, most obviously by bringing an appeal.

[48]     As to the first issue, the answer is this. In order to qualify a case does not have to have been instituted by the litigant in an exclusively personal sense. In Heenan v Attorney-General33  the Court of Appeal agreed that 'proceedings in a representative  or  fiduciary  capacity'  also  count.    Where  there  are  two  or  more trustees, the issue will become whether the person said to be vexatious has the other trustees under his or her 'effective control or direction'.34

[49]     As to the second, there is no issue that if the litigant is a defendant, or third party, the case does not count, though a litigant who brings a counterclaim may, to that extent, institute a qualifying case.35 An interlocutory application does not qualify

either  though  it  may  be  relevant  to  the  Court's  overall  analysis.36   Whether  the

bringing of an appeal qualifies, whether to this Court and certainly whether to the

Court of Appeal, has proved more vexed.

31     Re Ewing [2002] All ER(D) 350; see also Peach Grey & Co v Summers [1996] ICR 549.

32     Attorney-General v Palmer HC Auckland CIV 2003-404-588, 16 July 2004 at [63], [66].

33     Heenan v Attorney-General [2011] NZAR 200 at [23].

34     Attorney-General v Heenan (2009) NZAR 763 (HC) at [37].

35     At [31], [102].

36     Attorney-General v Collier [2001] NZAR 137 at [31]; Attorney-General v CF Vernazza [1960] AC 965 (HL).

[50]     In a case under a different statutory regime, an appeal has been held to be a separate proceeding.37  The practical reality is, moreover, that an appeal, like an application for judicial review, does mark a new and distinct phase in a case. As has been said in an Australian case:38

Where a final decision has been given, any attempt, whether by way of appeal or application to set it aside, or to set aside proceedings taken to enforce such decision, which is in substance an attempt to re-litigate what has already been decided, is the institution of legal proceedings.

[51]     Appeals  can  also  be  distinctly  important  where  a  litigant  may  not  have instituted the case but seeks to appeal the decision given. An example is Mr Reid's appeal from the Environment Court against a decision it was obliged to give, concerning a proposal by the local authority to stop a road, to which Mr Reid was not a party, but which he had triggered by his objection to the Council's proposal.

[52]     In Wiseman,39  furthermore, the Court of Appeal was prepared to treat 'not only the writs but also the different appeals to this Court as involving the institution of proceedings'. In Hill this Court also thought that an appeal arguably counted.40 In Collier, however, having regard to s 27 NZBORA, this Court, while not expressing any final view, held back from including appeals within 'legal proceedings'.41

[53]     We do not need to express any final view as to the status of appeals either. Mr Reid has instituted enough cases with the necessary hallmarks to found, in a prima facie sense certainly, the Attorney-General's application. But, despite the arguments to the contrary, we are sympathetic to the Collier perspective. An appeal, whether as of right or by leave, may on one view constitute a new beginning. On another it is no more than a further phase in an existing case. And, though it is not immediately in point, appeals to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court cannot be the subject of

a s 88B order.42

37     Haylock v Patek [2009] 3 NZLR 559 (HC) at [50].

38     Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedlar [1976] 1 NSWLR 478 at 488.

39     Wiseman v Attorney-General CA10/68, 28 May 1969.

40     Attorney-General v Hill (1993) 7 PRNZ 20 at 23.

41     Attorney-General v Collier [2001] NZAR 137 at [32].

42     Heenan v Attorney-General [2010] NZCA 135.

[54]     Having regard to Hansen, we consider that it is inappropriate to treat Mr Reid's appeals as 'legal proceedings' that he has 'instituted'. We are nevertheless able to take them into account in our overall assessment and will do so.43

Compound ultimate issue

[55]     Where there are qualifying 'legal proceedings' under s 88B, the issue becomes whether they have the characteristics to found an order; and that issue may be re- expressed in this way. Has the litigant in question 'instituted' proceedings that are

'vexatious', both 'persistently and without any reasonable ground'?

[56]     Expressed  in  that  way,  the  question  could  be  understood  to  raise  three questions. When these proceedings were instituted, were they 'vexatious'? Were they instituted 'without any reasonable ground'? Has their initiator instituted enough such proceedings, or pursued them so tenaciously, to have done so 'persistently'? The Court of Appeal in Brogden, however, asked rather a single compound question only able to be answered by assessing each proceeding, and all proceedings together, from beginning to end.

[57]     The focus of the Court in Brogden was on the extent to which the litigant had

'instituted' such proceedings 'persistently' because, as it said, 'the jurisdiction to make an order ... exists only when multiple proceedings have been commenced'.44 As to that the Court said this:

What  constitutes  institution  of  such  proceedings  'persistently'  will  not depend merely on the number of them but, just as importantly, on their character, their lack of any reasonable ground and the way in which they have been conducted.

The Court went on to say, therefore, that what matters is not so much how many cases the litigant has brought, but how tenaciously and how reasonably or unreasonably the litigant has pursued them:

A litigant may be said to be persisting ... though the number of separate proceedings  ...  is  quite  small  if  those  proceedings  clearly  represent  an

43     Heenan v Attorney-General [2011] NZCA 9, [2011] NZ AR 200 at [22](c), [25](a).

44     Brogden v Attorney-General NZAR [2001] 809 at [21].

attempt to re-litigate an issue already conclusively determined ... particularly if this is accompanied by extravagant or scandalous allegations which the litigant has not prospect of substantiating or justifying.

An entrenched and widening pattern of cases, the Court concluded, is also highly relevant:

... the development of a pattern of behaviour involving a failure to accept an inability in law to further challenge decisions in respect of which the appeal process has been exhausted, or attacking a range of defendants drawn into the widening circle of litigation solely because ... a prior proceeding has failed.

[58]     It is not decisive, the Court said, that a case has been struck out, though that might suggest it was vexatious. Conversely, a case may well be vexatious, even if it does give rise to possible causes of action and there is the germ of a legitimate grievance.45 A litigant may pursue a case sincerely believing it to be worthwhile. But it may still be vexatious when set against its context, and the litigant's other cases.46

An objective assessment is called for, though not one requiring the merit of decisions taken to be revisited where they have not been appealed, or appealed successfully.47

[59]     A further factor that may point towards vexation, which figures in this case, is where a litigant begins a case only to allow it to lie dormant.48 A related issue that we consider is whether it is vexatious to begin, or take a further step in, a case without ever being able or willing to pay the filing fees or give security for costs. Where a litigant lacks means, or where a case has been brought in the public interest, fees may be waived. But where a litigant brings a series of cases, always depending on a

waiver, the grounds for waiver become less plausible, especially when all previous applications have been refused.

[60]     It is on that wide basis that we must resolve, finally as a matter of discretion, whether to grant the Attorney-General's application. But we must first state our reasons for allowing Mr Reid limited discovery and for denying his stay or strike out

45     Attorney-General v Hill [1993] 7 PRNZ 20 (HC) at 23; Attorney-General v Heenan (2009) NZAR 763 (HC) at [22].

46     Brodgen (HC) at [66].

47     Attorney General v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859 (CA).

48     Hill at [26], [27].

application.

DISCOVERY APPLICATION

[61]     Mr Reid sought discovery of 'all documents held by the Crown Law Office pertaining  to  the  institution  and  conduct  of  these  proceedings',  principally  to establish that the Attorney-General had, in abuse of this Court's process, brought the application to protect the Councils of two local bodies.

[62]     In contending that Mr Reid was not entitled to discovery, Mr Soper first submitted for the Attorney-General that the documents Mr Reid wanted were simply not relevant. Mr Reid already had all the documents that were relevant. He had the record of each of his own cases. Any documents in which the Councils invited the making of the s 88B application, Mr Soper contended, were not just immaterial, they had to be innocuous. They could not demonstrate that the Attorney's application involved any abuse of process. The whole purpose of an application is to protect those caught up in a vexatious web.

[63]   As well, Mr Soper relied on Reid v Crown Law Office & Privacy Commissioner,49 in which Dobson J held that, in declining to release to Mr Reid any documents relating to the genesis of the first s 88B application, by then discontinued, the Attorney-General  was  entitled  still  to  rely  on  a  claim  of  legal  professional privilege. The documents held by the Crown Law Office, including any exchanges between that office and third parties like the Fire Service, concerned litigation to

which the Attorney-General had been party.

[64]     In his submissions to us, Mr Cooke QC questioned whether any request or complaint prompting the Attorney-General's second s 88B application, with which we are concerned, could fall within the purpose or scope of either legal advice privilege or litigation privilege. We agreed with that submission, and to that very limited extent perhaps  differed from Dobson J, though he was never invited to

resolve this point.

49     Reid v Crown Law Office & Privacy Commissioner HC Wellington CIV 2008-485-1203, 21

April 2009.

[65]     We directed the Attorney-General to discover to Mr Reid any request or complaint that might have prompted the Attorney-General to make the second s 88B application. As a result, Mr Reid obtained letters from the solicitors for the two Councils, summarising the cases he had brought against each, and their cost, and inviting the Attorney-General to make the s 88B application.

Legal professional privilege

[66]     Material to our decision was the Court of Appeal's decision to grant Mr Reid special leave to appeal Dobson J's decision on the single question of law: 'does litigation privilege come to an end when the proceeding that gave rise to it and any related proceedings are complete?'50 That issue did not arise on this application, but the reason why the Court granted leave was, we considered, nevertheless, material.

[67]     In granting leave, the Court distinguished between legal advice privilege and litigation privilege, 'two different, sometimes overlapping, privileges', and said this:51

It  is  clear  that  Dobson  J  was  proceeding  on  an  assumption  of  'once privileged, ... always privileged', relying on the Privy Council's judgment in B v Auckland District Law Society. But in that case the Privy Council was concerned with legal advice privilege. Most of the documents Mr Reid wants will be (or will have been) protected by litigation privilege, not legal advice privilege.

[68]     Dobson  J  had  not,  the  Court  said,  been  referred  to  the  decision  of  the Supreme Court of Canada,  Minister of  Justice  v Blank,52  holding that litigation privilege, in contrast to legal advice privilege, has 'a limited life span', and ends when the litigation that justifies it ends. That issue had yet to be considered in New Zealand by the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court. Hence the grant of leave.

[69]     For our own part, we agreed with Dobson J's account of the reasons for litigation privilege and its ordinary compass. Once the Attorney-General did come to consider, and to take advice about, whether to apply under s 88B, we agreed, all

Crown  Law  Office  documents  relating  to  that  decision  and  the  conduct  of  the

50     Reid v New Zealand Fire Service Commission & Crown Law Office & Privacy Commissioner

[2010] NZCA 133.

51 At [8].

52     Minister of Justice v Blank [2006] 2 SCR 319.

application,  once  made,  including  any between  the  Crown  Law  Office  and  the

Councils or any other complainant, had to be privileged.

[70]     We concluded, however, that any unsolicited complaints or requests made to the Attorney-General that prompted the s 88B application could not fall within the scope or purpose of litigation privilege as these are explained in Blank:53

Litigation privilege ... contemplates ... communications between a solicitor and third parties or, in the case of an unrepresented litigant, between the litigant and third parties. Its object is to ensure the efficacy of the adversarial process and not to promote the solicitor-client relationship. And to achieve this purpose, parties to litigation, represented or not, must be left to prepare their contending positions in private, without adversarial interference and without fear of premature disclosure.

An open public process

[71]     In contrast to ordinary cases, in respect of which litigation privilege quite naturally has its place, we concluded, an application under s 88B is in two senses a public process. The Attorney-General, the senior law officer, brings such an application as a matter of duty in the public interest. And a s 88B application has a self evident public character. It can only rest on the record of existing cases that are already in the public domain.

[72]     Though   litigation   privilege   must   apply,    we   concluded,   once   the Attorney-General took advice from the Crown Law Office as to whether to make a s 88B application and how to conduct it, even that advice had an equally self evident character that immediately became explicit once the application was made. In that sense, it seemed to us, the policy underlying litigation privilege does not apply to s

88B cases with the same strength as it does to ordinary civil litigation.

[73]     In the same way, we concluded, the likely source of any complaint or request to  the Attorney-General  prompting  an  application will  normally be  no  less  self evident. Involuntary parties to cases a litigant has instituted, who consider those cases to be vexatious, can be anticipated to urge the Attorney-General to act; and the

nature of their complaints is just as predictable. They will point to the cases in which

53 At [27].

they are caught up.

[74]     Those  complainants,  we  considered,  could  not  in  any  sense  be  the Attorney-General's clients. They are simply members of the public that have invited the Attorney-General to apply. Nor are they, at this initial point, third parties with whom the Attorney-General is communicating when deciding whether to apply or on what basis. Their complaints or requests to the Solicitor General are unsolicited. In neither of these usual ways, we considered, could their complaints or requests naturally attract litigation privilege.

[75]     The only issue that there could be, we considered, is not strictly a litigation privilege issue. It is whether complainants might be deterred from approaching the Attorney-General for fear that this would soon be known to the litigant. That did not seem to us to be a real issue. The litigant has already singled them out and what was more likely to concern them is bringing the cases against them to a halt.

[76]     In then requiring the Attorney-General to discover any such complaints to Mr Reid, we also took into account that the Attorney-General is discharging a public duty that can have the effect of curtailing a litigant's ordinary right of access to the Courts. That process, it seemed to us, should be as open as is consistent with the proper invocation of litigation privilege, if only to dispel any allegation that the Attorney-General has acted improperly.

Relevance

[77]     In this, we did not ignore Mr  Soper's point for the Attorney General that the s 88B applications stand or fall on the record of existing cases and nothing more but we also agreed with Mr Cooke QC that such documents could be 'marginally relevant'. They might  reveal,  for instance,  that  a complainant  has  some  ulterior motive for wanting to shut the litigant down. Such possibilities as these might have some relevance in the final discretionary analysis.

STAY OR STRIKE OUT APPLICATION

[78]     In dismissing Mr Reid's stay or strike out application, before hearing the

Attorney-General's application, we found no substance in any of the grounds that he advanced.

[79]     We did not accept, as we said at the beginning of this decision, that in this Court's first case conferences the Attorney-General's application was so mismanaged as to cause Mr Reid injustice. The directions that were then given, as we have said, were entirely usual. To the extent that there was then an issue, it arose from Mr Reid's inability or unwillingness to pay a filing fee. Our own later directions were endorsed in principle by the Court of Appeal.

[80]     Nor  did  we  accept   Mr  Reid's   complaint  that  the  Attorney-General's application had been inadequately pleaded. As to that we need only say that the second amended statement of claim occupies some 65 pages and contains an explicit profile of each of the cases the Attorney-General contends to be vexatious and the reasons why.

[81]     Nor  did  we  see  that  Mr  Reid  needed  to  know  definitively  before  the substantive hearing the precise ambit of the order sought by the Attorney-General, or to have clarified precisely what courts and tribunals are 'inferior Courts' for the purpose of s 88B. Those issues, we considered, were naturally to be resolved on the hearing of the application itself.

[82]     We found no substance in Mr Reid's most fundamental complaint: that the Attorney-General had brought the application in abuse of this Court's process to protect the two Councils. As the discovered letters show, all that they did was to urge the Attorney-General to apply under s 88B. There is nothing improper in that. Nor is there anything improper in the Attorney-General then electing to make the application.

[83]    The issue that then remained was that raised by the Attorney-General's application: whether in the many cases Mr Reid has brought he has been vexatious in the compound sense s 88B requires. We have summarised the nature and outcome of those  cases  in  annexure  two  to  this  decision.  We  now  express  our  general conclusions.

CONCLUSIONS

[84]     In the years since 1984, as we said at the outset, Mr Reid has embarked on four categories of case and has by degrees, we consider, become increasingly vexatious.

[85]     In the first category of case - those concerning his two sons - Mr Reid had a legitimate interest to pursue. Those cases were not inherently vexatious and the fact the he used them to vindicate the rights of fathers did not make them so either. In the last of them, in 1989, he was partly successful. But in even those cases Mr Reid was found to have pursued 'academic issues unrelated to his true concern'. He attempted to revisit adverse decisions by recourse to review instead of appeal.

[86]     In the second case category, the Fire Service cases, which Mr Reid also began in 1984, and which were in full spate when in 1998 the Attorney-General made the first s 88B application, his vexatious tendencies had become more plain. Mr Reid did have some legitimate interests of his own to pursue. He was not a union member and he was entitled to vindicate his terms of employment. When he was disciplined and eventually dismissed he was equally entitled to have recourse to law. But Mr Reid ranged much more widely.

[87]     Mr Reid was as much concerned with the terms and conditions of fire officers generally and with the way in which the Fire Service was managed and restructured. That in itself did not make his cases vexatious. What did make them vexatious, principally, was that he had not merely failed in those cases, he brought them in ways that were found to be misconceived and he refused to accept adverse decisions. He persisted in attempting to revisit them collaterally.

[88]     Of concern also is that, once the Attorney-General brought the first s 88B application, Mr Reid apparently held back, but immediately that application was discontinued, he resumed where he had left off, after opposing discontinuance in an effort to be vindicated completely. The last of those cases was in 2003 and his pursuit of them was characterised by a Judge of this Court as obsessive.

[89]     In 2004, Mr Reid entered on his third category of case; his various challenges to the policies and decisions of the Tararua District Council and, insofar as it had a part to play, the Regional Council. In the first he had a reasonable interest. He contended the Council had deprived him of a commercial opportunity. Once again, however, he set out to challenge the Council on a variety of fronts. His attack widened to Council members and then to Court and judicial officers. Each case he brought multiplied, whether in further phases of the case or into other cases, or in both those ways.

[90]     In 2010, Mr Reid became involved in his fourth case category, two cases in which he had no direct interest, each of which had an extensive history and had already been effectively determined. In each he obtained standing by becoming a trustee in an existing trust. He then took charge, setting out to challenge the decisions already given. As in the other categories of case, each of these two cases soon had offshoots, not all of which are completely resolved. Of concern has to be that in one Mr Reid was allowed to take his expenses out of trust money.

[91]     Standing back, what is first striking about Mr Reid's cases is their sheer number; he has begun 63 cases since 1984, excluding his 14 appeals to this Court or the Court of Appeal. What is equally striking is Mr Reid's almost complete lack of success. Of those 77 cases, including appeals, five have been in some sense determined in his favour and three as at the date of this decision are still extant. But

54 have been determined against him and three stayed, four have been discontinued or abandoned, three deemed abandoned and five not pursued.

[92]     Equally significant is that 28 of these cases have been described by those who decided them as untenable, and have attracted such descriptions as 'hopeless', an

'exercise in self delusion', 'bound to fail', 'misconceived', having 'no merit at all',

'should not have been pursued', raising 'no case to answer', having 'no basis'.

[93]     There are other matters of concern. Seven proceedings have been considered by the Court to be attempts to relitigate issues already conclusively determined. Eleven have involved  attacks on a widening circle of defendants, including the courts or tribunals involved, and the law officers and Ministers of the Crown and the

Governor-General. Eighteen have involved extravagant or scandalous allegations, often in attempts to disqualify Judges who have ruled against Mr Reid.

[94]     Mr Reid may contend that the merit of many of his cases has never been assessed judicially because he has been unable to advance them to hearing, lacking the means to do so. But that is another cause for concern.

[95]     Mr Reid has pursued cases in which he has shown no ability or willingness to meet the costs involved. He has applied unsuccessfully 17 times for fee waivers. He has twice unsuccessfully applied to defer costs orders. He has failed nine times to pay costs, including security for costs. He shows no appreciation of the cost of litigation to the Court system or to those whom he gathers into his net, and they include those whom he thinks he is helping.

[96]     Mr Reid told us candidly, furthermore, that unless he is constrained by a s 88B order, he will continue to bring cases in his role as a 'community advocate'. He even saw some advantage in being declared vexatious because then, he considered, he could have a Judge of this Court assess the merit of his cases at the outset, before he ever became liable to pay a filing fee or meet security for costs.

ORDER

[97]     In sum, we conclude, that whether one looks at the first two categories of case in which Mr Reid began with some reasonable personal interest, or those more recent categories in which he has taken up causes as a 'community advocate', he displays all the classic attributes of a vexatious litigant. The fact, moreover, that Mr Reid now sees himself as a 'community advocate' means that there is no way to define presently where he will find such causes in the future. We see no alternative but to accede to the Attorney-General's application for a general order.

[98]     We make an order prohibiting Mr Reid from instituting any civil proceeding in this Court, or in any Court or Tribunal that we have accepted to be an 'inferior Court', whether himself in his personal capacity , or in any representative capacity, or by any agent, without the leave of this Court. He will remain entitled, however, to

pursue any appeal to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court.

[99]    We decline to make the further order the Attorney-General applies for, prohibiting Mr Reid  from  continuing,  either personally  or in  any representative capacity, or by any agent, any civil proceedings he has already instituted. Those instituted in this Court or any 'inferior Court' are now better seen to their own natural

conclusions.

P.J. Keane J

P.F.A. Woodhouse J

ANNEXURE ONE

Case management decisions

[100]   In issue at the first case conference, on 3 June 2011, before Gendall AJ was whether the Attorney-General was entitled to rely in this present application on the affidavit evidence filed on the earlier application containing the record of the cases between 1984 - 1998. Mr Reid contended those cases were irrelevant. The Associate Judge took the view, however, that those earlier affidavits were potentially relevant and therefore admissible.

[101]   The Associate Judge allocated four days for the hearing of the case, having regard to the fact that Mr Reid wished an amicus curiae to be appointed and was likely to  wish  to  cross  examine the Court  officers, producing the relevant  case records. The Associate Judge also required the Attorney-General to file and serve an amended statement of claim and any supporting affidavits by 8 July 2011.

[102]   On 8 July 2011 Miller J appointed Mr Cooke QC amicus curiae and directed that Mr Reid file an amended statement of defence within 30 days. He recorded that discovery was not then required, although Mr Reid had said that he might seek discovery. The Judge said that there was to be a further conference once Mr Reid had filed his  statement  of defence and  Mr Cooke  QC  had  been  able to  review the pleadings.

[103]   On 5 August 2011 Mr Reid filed an application to strike out the Attorney- General's application. He did not then pay the filing fee or pursue a fee waiver. He did not file an amended statement of defence or any evidence. On 13 September

2011 Mr Reid told Miller J in the telephone conference that day that he wished to have his strike out application heard and determined first and discretely.

[104]   Miller J allowed Mr Reid four weeks to pursue a fee waiver. He said that if Mr Reid did not do so, the substantive proceeding would be set down at the next telephone conference; and that is what happened. On 8 November 2011 Miller J allocated a five day fixture in 2012 for the Attorney-General's application; a fixture

that assumed Mr Reid would file a statement of defence.

[105]   Miller J recorded in his minute that Mr Reid's application for a fee waiver had been declined and that he had neither paid the fee nor applied for a review. Miller  J  also  said  that  he  was  not  prepared  to  await  such  an  application.  The question, he said, whether Mr Reid was acting in the public interest or was a vexatious litigant, was the very issue to be decided. Filing fees, he said, could be dealt with as part of an order for costs at the end of the proceeding. Miller J also recorded that Mr Reid looked to the Attorney-General for discovery.

[106]   Mr Reid had on 10 October 2011 filed a notice given to the Attorney-General requiring discovery of all documents held by the Crown Law Office relating to the institution and conduct of the application. The Attorney-General had admitted, he said, to sending a copy of the statement of claim to the Tararua District Council's solicitors. The Council itself had published the statement of claim in its minutes for

28 September 2011. The Council was in contempt of Court, he said, and discovery was called for to decide whether the Attorney-General was acting in the public interest or at the Council's behest.

[107]   Miller J said that, on the face of it, discovery was not warranted because it must have been made in the cases that are the subject of the Attorney-General's application and need not be repeated. To obtain discovery, Miller J said, Mr Reid would have to apply and pay the fee due.

[108]   In  a  minute,  dated  28  November  2011,  Miller  J  dismissed  Mr  Reid's application for a review of the Registrar's refusal to waive the filing fee on the strike out application for the reasons he had earlier given. On 9 January 2012 Mr Reid paid the filing fee and became entitled to have that application heard.

ANNEXURE TWO

CHILD CASES

The child J cases

Reid v B FC Wellington FP 379/79, 22 August 1986

[109]   This case concerned custody and access and maintenance as these related to one of R's54 children J, whose mother was B. R did not succeed in the Family Court and by judicial review in the High Court sought orders restraining the Family Court from exercising jurisdiction. Complaining of the conduct of counsel for J, he sought

$10,000 damages for legal fees, loss of profit from sale of property, stress and suffering.

[110]   Heron J struck out the child counsel aspect, holding that the Family Court could not be vicariously liable, holding that these issues had been subsumed in a consent order. He commented that R was seeking to raise:

academic issues unrelated to his true concern ... the welfare of his sons. The use of the Court's procedures for academic inquiries, once the main object of the litigation has been dealt with is not to be countenanced.

Reid v Inglis, The Wellington Family Court and Attorney General HC Wellington CP 530/87,

25 March 1988

[111]   R again applied for judicial review of further issues in J's case. He wanted a shared custody agreement varied or rescinded. He challenged the issue of a warrant by Judge Inglis QC obliging him to allow B to share J's care and an interim order prohibiting her from enforcing her right to access. He wanted to join the Minister of Police because the police had failed to produce the warrant when enforcing access. He wanted to join two Family Court Judges and sought a declaration that they not hear any further related matter. He applied to reopen an issue as to B's failure to pay

child support.

54     In this annexure we call Mr Reid R.

[112]   Greig J denied an interim order because B was not then a party. Shortly after Heron J joined her as a party, refused to join one Family Court Judge but joined the other and the Commissioner of Police. He noted:

The plaintiff has received an adverse decision. The grounds for his concern are mixed questions of law and fact. They are not appropriately brought within these proceedings which are applications for review. They are matters that pertain to an appeal. I informed the plaintiff he had no reason (other than cost saving) for bringing the proceeding in this way. In my view it is quite inappropriate that proceedings of this kind should be brought by way of review.

The Child S cases

Reid v C HC Wellington M63/85, 16 December 1985

[113]   R applied for wardship, custody and access orders as to S, a second child of his, whose mother was C. Jeffries J declined to make a wardship order. He adjourned R's custody application and granted him limited and conditional access. He noted that R appeared 'obsessive' but had 'conducted his proceedings with skill and, on the whole reasonably'.

[114]   R made a second such application in 1987 which Greig J also dismissed and ordered that he have no access. He too considered that R had pursued his case with

'such unswerving perseverance that it could accurately be described as obsessional', but had 'conducted himself as a litigant in person with good sense and sensibility'.

Reid v C CA29/88, 26 June 1989

[115]   On  appeal  from  Greig  J's  decision  R  contended  that  it  rested  on  a

'constitutionally discredited concept': the right of the mother to S had been preferred to his right as a father. Greig J had discriminated against him on the basis of sex when   describing   him   as   psychologically   disturbed.   The   Court   of   Appeal unanimously  dismissed   the   appeal   (placing   weight   on   a   report   of   clinical psychologist who was emphatically of the view that R should not have access), and stated that the case ought to be brought to an end as soon as possible.

The stolen photograph cases

Reid v C DC Wellington CRN 9331-2/85, 26 June 1985

[116]   R brought a private prosecution against C in the District Court, charging her with a false representation about him and with theft of a photograph of their son. Judge Willy dismissed the former charge. He found the latter proved but discharged C without conviction and deprecated R having 'brought all the weight of the law' on to C in their domestic dispute.

Reid v C HC Wellington M1614/85, 2 April 1987

[117]   R appealed to the High Court on the basis that Judge Willy had applied the burden of proof, as to the false allegation charge, over-stringently. Davison CJ dismissed the appeal.

The legal aid case

Reid v Legal Aid Board HC Wellington CP32/86, 29 September 1986

[118]   R applied for an order for certiorari quashing a decision of the Legal Aid Board refusing to review a grant of legal aid to C in the S case, made by the Wellington District Legal Aid Committee. R alleged that the Board had misappropriated public monies by granting legal aid to:

a person who consistently refuses to cooperate with arrangements made by the Court, who disregards the directions of a Judge and who refuses to comply with the orders of a Judge.

[119]   Heron J struck out the claim on the basis that R, deliberately and not by mistake, had named the wrong defendant. It was the Committee that had made the decision. In awarding costs against R, he stated:

The action brought against the Board is misconceived. The plaintiff is a litigant frustrated by a lack of cooperation from the mother of his child, and by what he regards as contumacious conduct on her part. If there is merit in those allegations there are conventional ways of dealing with them. In my view this is but a poorly disguised attempt to embarrass C financially and otherwise, whilst she is the beneficiary of legal aid ...

The birth registration case

Reid v C HC Wellington A461/85, 17 October 1986

[120]   R  applied  for  a  declaration  against  the  Registrar  of  Births,  Deaths  and Marriages that S's birth had been incorrectly registered. C had entered 'N/A' in the father's space and he had succeeded in having his name included. At issue was whether S's surname could be C's maiden and married surnames hyphenated. R could not prove C had given false information to the Registrar. Quilliam ACJ found that there were slight deviations from the prescribed form but that the registration remained valid. He declined the declaration and awarded costs against R.

Reid v C CA6/87, 15 February 1989

[121]   On appeal R was partly successful. In dismissing the appeal the majority of the Court of Appeal held that the Registrar had exceeded his power in accepting the hyphenated surname, but agreed that did not invalidate the registration. Cooke P described this aspect of his case as 'seriously arguable'. Somers J said that R had

'made good some part of his case'.

FIRE SERVICE CASES

The wages protection case

Reid v Varley DC Wellington CRN 408-502-1944, 13 November 1984

[122]   R brought a private prosecution complaining that $10.70 had been deducted from his wage without his written consent, in breach of the Wages Protection Act. Judge Gilbert dismissed the prosecution, finding that no offence had been made out in fact or law. He noted that R's real complaint was against the decision of the Fire Service not to employ him any longer as a driver and to stop his driving allowance.

The driving hours case

Reid v Secretary of Transport, Fire Service Commission, New Zealand Professional Fire

Services Union & Land Transport Safety Authority HC Wellington CP435/89, 28 March

1990

[123] R applied for orders by way of judicial review invalidating the decision to extend s 24 of the Transport Amendment Act 1987 to include the Fire Service. Alleging breach of contract and invasion of privacy, he sought damages.

[124]   R's concern was that the 1987 amendment prevented firemen, who were drivers, from paid work within 10 hours of starting a shift and sometimes within 10 hours after, even if they had not driven. He considered this an unwarranted intrusion.

[125]   On 25 July 1989 McGechan J struck out the Union on the basis that R did not seek any relief from it. On 28 March 1990 Eichelbaum CJ struck out the balance in all but two respects and directed that R file an amended statement of claim, stating of the pleadings as they were:

Frankly, there would in any event be little point in endeavouring to make a summary  because  the  amended  statement  of  claim  is  a  disorganised, defective, and at times incomprehensible document.

And:

...in the course of argument it emerged that the plaintiff’s real complaint was

against Parliament for the terms of that provision.

[126]   This claim remained inactive until R was given leave to revive it in 1994. He then amended his statement of claim, seeking declarations as to decisions made by the Secretary for Transport, and an order that the Fire Service Commission was in contempt of Court, in each instance seeking $100,000 exemplary damages. He applied to join the Fire Service Advisory Board and to obtain discovery.

[127]   On 30 May 1995 Master Thompson set the case down against R's objection. On 3 March 1995 Neazor J declined R's applications to join the Advisory Board and for discovery. On 13 December 1995 Robertson J struck out R's later application for judicial review and dismissed an application for interim judgment. On 26 May 1997

McGechan J declined R's still later application for further discovery. R applied for leave to appeal that last decision, but he did not pursue it.

The management systems case

Reid v NZFSC & Graham James Wrigley HC Wellington CP258/94, 3 March 1995

[128]   R applied to the High Court by way of review for declarations striking down all secondary legislation under the Fire Services Act 1975. His concern was the Fire Service system of management and the orders promulgated by the Chief Fire Officer.

[129]   On 3 March 1995 Master Thompson held the proceeding to be untenable and on 2 July 1995 Neazor J held that, though there was no jurisdiction to strike out a judicial review application, this proceeding would be stayed for want of a reasonable cause of action.

The collective bargaining case

Reid v NZFSC, State Services Commission & Land Transport Safety Authority EmpC Wellington W122/94, 28 April 1995

[130]   In this case R applied to the Employment Court by way of review seeking three injunctions:

(a)      To halt negotiations between the Fire Service and the Union relating to the collective employment contract, and any related briefings. R, a non-union  member,  had  not  been  invited  to  the  briefing  where contract proposals were discussed.

(b)To halt appointments of Fire Service managers until the Court could be  satisfied  that  all  officers  would  be  indemnified  against  the negligent or incompetent acts of their superior officers. This arose from his concern about mismanagement.

(c)      To halt the grant of any exemption from s 70B (driving hours) of the Transport Act 9162. His concern was the fire engine drivers were required to be available for a period of time that was unsafe.

[131]   On  10  November  Judge  Palmer  dismissed  R's  application  for  interim equivalent relief as unarguable and as contrary to the balance of convenience and to overall justice.

[132]   On 28 April 1998 Chief Judge Goddard struck out R's claims against the first, second and third defendants. He held that the steps taken by R against the second defendant were 'quite unwarranted' and as to the third concluded:

The solitary cause of action against the third defendant must be struck out. It cannot be taken seriously and thus does qualify as frivolous. Mr Reid ought never have dragged the third defendant before the Court. He must have known that the third defendant is not his employer or in any way connected with his employer, but an independent body which has acted quite independently.

[133]   Finally, the Chief Judge said this:

Lord Denning once remarked that a good layman is better than a bad lawyer and that is my view as well, but even that acknowledgement does not overcome the criticism that Mr Reid must accept on this occasion for putting busy people to trouble and expense with a proceeding that was utterly inappropriate. Hence the cost orders.

[134]   On  18  July  1995  the  Chief  Judge  issued  a  supplementary  judgment concerning outstanding cost issues and said this:

...  Mr Reid is not in a strong position to seek mercy when he was far from charitable in the conduct of his case and imputed to some of his recently appointed superiors such shortcomings of competence and weaknesses of character as to encourage him to say to the Court that it would be warranted in preventing them from entering upon their offices and, when it was too late to do so, in tipping them out.

[135]   The Chief Judge noted the following features of the case that had a bearing on costs:

-Mr Reid has caused the first defendant (and others) needlessly to go to a lot of expense;

-         He has taken technical points entirely devoid of merit;

-He was warned well in advance of the possible consequences for him if he persisted;

-He should have known that at least in some respects his case had no prospects of success;

-His application failed at the first hurdle twice, on an application for interim injunction and on application to strike it out;

-        His ability to pay is limited.

The first personal grievance case

Reid v NZFSC Employment Tribunal Wellington WT89/95 & WET27/95, 21 August 1995

[136]   On 16 January 1995 R took to the Employment Tribunal a personal grievance against the Fire Service Commission, concerned that it had failed to respond to his personal grievance claim alleging a work place assault and discrimination because he was not a union member. He sought compensatory and exemplary damages.

[137]   On 21 August 1995 the Tribunal ordered that he pay security for costs of

$1,200, noting that his position was that he would decide whether to meet any costs award. R wanted to appeal direct to the Court of Appeal and sought a certificate under s 68 of the Judicature Act 1908, which the Tribunal declined to issue as beyond its jurisdiction.

[138]   On 15 July 2002 the Employment Tribunal dismissed R's claim on the basis that there was no case to answer. R's claims, it held, were 'frivolous and unrealistic and not capable of being prosecuted in a meaningful way'.

Reid v NZFSC EmpC Wellington W87/95, 3 May 1995

[139]   On 3 May 1996 the Full court of the Employment Court allowed R's appeal, holding that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to order security for costs. He then applied for punitive and exemplary costs which on 18 December 1995 the Court dismissed, stating that R was aware that such costs could not be awarded and that his claims were 'almost vexatious'. He was granted costs in respect of his disbursements.

The voluntary staffing case

Reid v NZFSC & Attorney General HC Wellington CP173/95, 13 December 1995

[140]   By way of review, R sought a declaration striking down standards of conduct issued by the Commission under s 73 of the Fire Services Act 1975, preventing him and other officers, on pain of instant dismissal, from standing by vehicles that were to be destaffed in July 1995. The Fire Service was then being restructured and R feared that the loss of 60 jobs and the staffing of  the vehicles, could be detrimental to public safety.

[141]   On 27 July 1995 Neazor J stayed the proceeding as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.  On 31 July 1995 Doogue J dismissed R's application for an interim order  to  prevent  the  Commission  from  taking  action  against  any  employee, describing it as 'quite hopeless' and commenting:

The whole of his case is an exercise in self-delusion in suggesting that, because there are standards of conduct which require the firemen to act in a manner that is for the benefit of the public as well as for their employer, there is some basis upon which firemen have an overriding obligation to act contrary to the directions of the first defendant because of what they see as the obligation vis-a-vis the public. That is totally delusory.

[142]   On 13 December 1995 Robertson J dismissed R's later application by way of review for an order setting aside Doogue J's decision. He noted that R had been treated with a degree of mercy. He warned him that if he persisted, having been told his case was misconceived, he could be at risk of more than scale costs. He was ordered to pay $1,300 costs.

The second personal grievance case

Reid v NZFSC EmpC Wellington W132/95, 21 December 1995

[143]   In December 1995 R's employment was terminated by the Fire Service on the basis that there was an unacceptable degree of conflict between him and its staff and management. He sought an injunction in the Employment Court and applied to be reinstated.

[144]   On 21 December 1995 Chief Judge Goddard granted R an interim injunction, reinstating him but on terms that he not return to work or complete any duties, until his personal grievance was heard. Later the Chief Judge issued seven interlocutory or supervisory decisions relating to R's various applications.

[145]   R succeeded in obtaining an order that the psychologist on whose assessment the Fire Service had relied when dismissing him, be available for cross examination. He did not succeed in obtaining discovery of information on which the psychologist had relied, held not by the Fire Service but by the firm of solicitors acting on its behalf.

[146]   The  Chief  Judge  issued  three  decisions  concerning  R's  right  to  a  salary pending the outcome of his complaint. The Chief Judge denied R costs. R claimed that he was represented by a company in which he had an interest but the Chief Judge held he was acting for himself.

[147]   On 30 July 1999 the Chief Judge ordered R to pay $12,500 costs, stating:

... Mr Reid has escalated the costs in a way that cannot be explained or excused by reference to the circumstance that, in his perception, he had an unrequited grievance or grievances against the Commission.

.. the Court of Appeal’s conclusion on the final personal grievance appeal (was)  that  the  Commission  bent  over  backwards  to  be  fair  to  Mr  Reid without reciprocation. This is a finding of fact and not a conclusion of law and is therefore not binding on me. I have to make my own assessment. That assessment is, however, much the same, not in relation to Mr Reid’s conduct generally—for that is not a matter with which I am concerned today—but in relation to his conduct of the proceedings, all initiated by him.

Reid v NZFSC Employment Tribunal Wellington WET7/96, 30 August 1996

[148]   On  3  January  1996  R  brought  a  personal  grievance  to  the  Employment Tribunal, claiming unjustifiable dismissal and discrimination and seeking reinstatement. He sought to summon as a witness the Commission's counsel, Mr McBride, contending that he was in reality the Commission's 'investigating officer' as to whom the Commission had no legal professional privilege.

[149]   In decisions on 4 and 9 April 1996 the Tribunal declined that application and also  others  seeking  a  rehearing  before  the  decision  had  been  issued,  discovery, joinder of a separate personal grievance, and for witnesses to be summoned and for access to an audiotape recording of the hearing.

[150]   On 2 May 1996 the Tribunal refused R's application for a transcript and on 28

May 1996 declined to summons Mr McBride as a witness. R was permitted to call limited rebuttal evidence. On 30 August 1996 the Commission upheld R's claim that he had been unjustifiably dismissed and reinstated him. It declined his application for exemplary and punitive damages and for costs, some $11,000. He was awarded a

$35 filing fee.

Reid v NZFSC EmpC Wellington W41/96, 16 May 1996

[151]   On 16 May 1996 Chief Judge Goddard dismissed R's appeal against the

Tribunal's decision not to provide a transcript.

Reid v NZFSC EmpC Wellington W42/96, 30 May 1996

[152]  On 30 May 1996 Chief Judge Goddard declined R's appeal against the Tribunal's refusal to allow him to cross-examine Mr McBride. R's concern was that he not been given access before he closed his case to four documents, including a file held by Mr McBride's firm titled 'Reid - History' and a typewritten note as to his state of mind.

Reid v NZFSC EmpC Wellington W4/96, 24 January 1996

[153]   R applied to the Employment Court for review of the Tribunal's refusal to grant  him  the  hearing  tape  recording.  Also  for  an  order  allowing  his  own stenographer to transcribe the hearing. Because he appeared for himself, he was unable to take a note, complicating his ability to cross examine. On 24 January 1996

Chief Judge Goddard dismissed this application but expressed 'considerable sympathy' for R.

Reid v Secretary of the Employment Tribunal & NZFSC CA16/96, 24 January 1996 [154]   R appealed that decision to the Court of Appeal but did not pursue it. Reid v NZFSC EmpC Wellington W95/96, 27 September 1996

[155] R then challenged the Commission's decision to transfer him from the Northland to the Brooklyn Fire Station, contending that this was a breach of his reinstatement order. He applied for an interim injunction. While on 27 September

1996 Chief Judge Goddard dismissed that application, he noted 'I think Mr Reid's application is understandable and I do not accept that it is frivolous or vexatious.'

Reid v NZFSC Employment Tribunal WET1032/96, 10 October 1996

[156]   R also applied to the Employment Tribunal for a compliance order requiring the Commission to reinstate him to Northland. After restructuring the 'old guard' had been replaced by community safety team members. On 10 October 1996 the Tribunal declined   this   order,   holding   that   the   Commission   had   complied   with   the reinstatement order and denied R costs.

Reid v NZFSC EmpC W110/96, 17 December 1996

[157]   On 17 December 1996 Chief Judge Goddard granted R's appeal against the Tribunal's decision. R did not succeed in consolidating that application with another, or in introducing new facts. His appeal was adjourned to be heard at the same time as that  against  the Tribunal's  finding  that  he  had  been  unjustifiably dismissed.  He obtained his disbursements and expenses.

[158] In October 1996 R filed an application for review and appeal in the Employment Court challenging the Employment Court's decision to hear his application for a compliance order on the papers only. On 14 November 1996 the Chief  Judge  adjourned  this  application  until  after  the  related  appeal  had  been resolved.

Reid v NZFSC EmpC W97/96, 31 March 1998

[159]   R appealed to the Employment Court against the Tribunal's decision that he had been unjustifiably dismissed, because it had declined to resolve his wider claims in discrimination, duress and procedure. The Commission appealed the Tribunal's decision that he had been unjustifiably dismissed.

[160]   On 21 February 1997 Judge Palmer granted in part R's application to call evidence on the appeal. He dismissed R's further attempt to call Mr McBride as a witness. He denied R's attempt to lead evidence on the costs that he had incurred on the personal grievance hearing.

[161]   Judge Palmer noted that Mr McBride had twice been excused by the Tribunal from  having  to  give  evidence  and  that  this  had  been  upheld  on  appeal  by the Employment Court. He said this:

The present renewed application to call Mr McBride as a witness in a new evidence setting seems to me a vexatious application.

[162]   To appeal this decision to the Court of Appeal R applied for an adjournment of his substantive appeal. Also, and unsuccessfully, he applied to have the passport of a  previous  Commission  employee,  then  a  Consulate  Manager  in  the  USA, suspended. He said also that he intended seeking:

a review of the administration of the proceedings in relation to the drafting in of  a Judge  who, it appears from preliminary research conducted  by the appellant, lacks impartiality and the confidence of his peers.

[163]   On   26   January   1998   Judge   Palmer   struck   out   R's   applications   for abridgement of time and to adjourn the hearing of the appeal and stated that R's comments about his partiality were both scandalous and in contempt. To pursue his judicial review application R again applied to adjourn his substantive appeal, without success.

[164]   On 21 March 1998 Judge Colgan set aside the Tribunal's decision that R had been  unjustifiably  dismissed,  holding  that  there  had  been   an  irreconcilable

breakdown of trust and  confidence in the employment relationship and that R's dismissal had been effected reasonably and fairly. In this, he said:

Another difficulty in the case is to balance Mr Reid’s right as a citizen to bring and maintain legal challenges to events or decisions with which he disagrees, with the rights of others, including his employer and its other employees, not to be subjected to the oppression of legal proceedings that are without merit. I am able to so classify those proceedings because, with the exception of the personal grievance the subject of this appeal and associated interlocutory matters, Mr Reid’s other cases have, in most instances, been dismissed as misconceived or otherwise on their merits.

[165]   In a later decision on 25 May 1999 Judge Colgan ordered R to pay $12,000 costs and described his conduct of the case in this way:

His cross-examination of Commission witnesses was excessive, unnecessary, and  inappropriate  and  Mr  Reid  introduced  a  large  number  of  irrelevant issues, a substantial volume of largely irrelevant documentary material and called witnesses largely unbriefed; some of whom had little or no knowledge of events and many of whom gave evidence that was favourable to the Commission.

Reid v NZFSC CA 34/97, 12 June 1997

[166]   On 12 June 1997 the Court of Appeal dismissed R's  appeal from Judge Palmer's decision, dated 21 February 1997, declining him leave to introduce new issues in evidence, in which he claimed that the Employment Court and Tribunal had acted in breach of its contract to provide adjudication services and that Judge Palmer

'had displayed an inability to adopt the approach required by the Legislature and can be categorised as a judicial pedant and reactionary.' The Court said this:

In the circumstances, now to seek to have the evidence introduced on appeal is inappropriate.  Mr Reid’s affidavit indicates an unwillingness to accept the decision already given.

[167]   On 18 June 1997 R wrote to the Governor General alleging that the Court of Appeal had 'allowed themselves to be infected by the clamour of criticism of the Employment Court and become biased against working people'. He asked the Governor General to investigate this allegation of bias.

[225]   R also alleged that the Crown had conspired with the Tararua District Council to stop unformed roads illegally and sell them, and road reserves, under the Public Works Act 1981, circumventing Schedule 10 of the Local Government Act 1974. He sought an injunction preventing the Crown from stopping any unformed road anywhere in New Zealand for any purpose other than realignment.

[226]   In a minute issued on 31 March 2008 Mackenzie J declined R's application for an amicus curiae to be appointed and for a full Court and for a direction that the parties bear their own costs. The Judge did not accept that this was a test case on a public interest point justifying any of those orders.

[227]   On 21 May 2008, Miller J refused to strike out R's claim entirely, but did remove the Crown as a party and struck out the claims relating to it, which rested on a conspiracy allegation  without  basis.  He declined  the  Council's  application  for security for costs. He did order R to pay the Crown's costs, noting that had the Crown ‘sought costs on an indemnity basis, they would have been granted’.

[228]   On 27 July 2011 Associate Judge Gendall issued a minute directing R to file an amended statement of claim, given Miller J's decision removing the Crown as a party.

[229]   R filed two amended statements of claim, in the first of which he substituted references to the ‘NZ Government’. When on 27 September 2011 the Associate Judge held  that  this  amendment  did  not  comply with  his  order,  R  in  a second amended   statement   of   claim   replaced   references   to   'NZ   Government'   with

‘CENSORED’.

[230]   The Council sought to have the proceeding struck out unless R produced an amended claim which fully complied with Miller J’s orders.  By a minute dated 9

February  2012,  Associate  Judge  Gendall  declined  to  make  ‘unless  orders’ and

recommended that R file an amended pleading. This matter remains live.

[231]   R appealed to the Court of Appeal Miller J's decision, dated 21 May 2008, removing the Crown as a party and against Mackenzie J’s minute, dated 31 March

2008, declining R's applications for an amicus curiae, a full Court and for parties to bear   their   own   costs.   He   contended   that   the   Crown   was   responsible   for

'administering' public lands and that it had used the Public Works Act 1981 to cut out the Environment Court.

[232]   R also applied for an interim injunction to prevent the Council selling the land; in effect appealing Miller J's refusal to grant him an interim injunction. The Council's undertaking not to sell the land had later been revoked. The Court of Appeal dismissed this application on the Council's undertaking to tell R if it did decide to sell the land so that he could then claim any remedy he thought he had.

[233]   On the appeal itself the Registrar fixed security for costs at $9,480 and R

applied for a waiver.  The Registrar declined the waiver but did reduce the amount to

$4,740.  R sought a review of the Registrar’s decision, which the Court dismissed on

9 June 2009.  On 16 February 2010 the Court granted R an extension of time to pay the amount of the security for costs and awarded costs, including indemnity costs, for the defendants.

[234]   When R did not pay security for costs by the date specified the Court struck out his appeal and said that it was unfortunate that R had not raised his concerns with the Council and had chosen instead to apply to the Court with attendant expense.

The Districts Visions cases

Reid v Woodville Districts Visions Incorporated Society, Nattrass, Hirschberg, Johanson, Wilton, Broom, Bonser, Morris & Losch CIV 208-010-17 DC Dannevirke, 24 November

2008, DC Napier, 26 February 2010

[235]   R  claimed  damages  against  the  committee  members  of  the  society  for defaming him, and against the society for excluding him from community meetings. He sought declarations that the society had entered into tax avoidance arrangements and was in breach of its statutory duties and had breached his right to freedom of expression.

[236]   Judge Rea struck out the causes of action seeking solely declaratory relief on the basis that the District Court had no jurisdiction to grant  declarations. In an amended statement of claim R applied instead for a judicial opinion which was also struck  out.  The  defamation  cause  of  action  had  been  left  out  of  the  amended statement of claim. Thus the entire proceeding was struck out.

Reid v Woodville Districts Visions Incorporated Society, Nattrass, Hirschberg, Johanson, Wilton, Broom, Bonser, Morris & Losch HC Palmerston North CIV454-258, 26 May 2010

[237]   R appealed that last decision to the High Court alleging that, apart from error of law, there had been an abuse of statutory authority, a breach of the principles of natural justice, and judicial bias. He applied to have his defamation claim reinstated and a fee waiver on the basis that the appeal was of public importance.

[238]   The  Registrar  declined  the  fee  waiver  application  and  on  review  Simon France J held that the case was well below the public interest threshold necessary for a fee waiver, as a result of which R abandoned the appeal.

Reid v Deputy Registrar at Palmerston North CA409/2010, 3 August 2010

[239]   R then appealed the decision of Simon France J to the Court of Appeal. He invited  the  Court  to  define  'public  interest'.  He  applied  for  waiver  of  fees  and security for costs payable in the Court of Appeal. These applications were unsuccessful and the Court commented that the substantive appeal had no prospect of success. As a result of R's inaction this appeal was later deemed abandoned.

The water supply cases

Reid v Tararua District Council and Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council EnvC ENV

2008-WLG-020, 5 May 2008

[240]   In February 2008, concerned that the Woodville town water supply was being unfairly restricted, R applied to the Environment Court for a declaration that the Tararua District Council was in breach of the resource consent granted it by the Manawatu Wanganui Regional Council. He applied to search the Court file and to make submissions in the District Court in litigation between the two Councils.

[241]   The  Environment  Court  struck  out  the  case,  ruling  that  there  was  no reasonable or arguable basis for it.  The Court observed that the pleadings were of poor quality ‘to the extent that the application is incomprehensible, it plainly should not proceed’.

Canterbury Regional Council v Attorney General HC Wellington CIV-2008-2652, 25 March

2009

[242]   R  applied  to  be  joined  to  this  case  concerning  the  lawfulness  of  the Canterbury Regional Council's proposed procedure to hear and consider submissions on  changes  to  the  Canterbury Regional  Policy  Statement.  His  interest  was  that similar proposals were contemplated in Woodville.

[243]   On 25 March 2009 Dobson J declined R's application on the basis that he did not have a sufficient interest and that it would set a bad precedent to allow a lay litigant to become party to a proceeding about which they felt strongly but in which they had no more immediate interest. Dobson J remarked of R:

Virtually all the Wellington-based Judges of the High Court are familiar with his conduct as a litigant in person, and he  is not without skills in both presenting argument and responding to questions in Court.

Reid v Canterbury Regional Council CA183/209, 11 December 2009

[244]   R appealed this decision on grounds of abuse of process, manipulation of statute, judicial collusion, professional protectionism and the public interest. The

Registrar fixed security for costs for the appeal at $4,470.   When he did not pay security for costs the Council applied to have his appeal struck out.

[245]   On  11  December  2009  the  Court  of  Appeal  adjourned  the  strike  out application because R was in hospital but said that if he wanted to pursue the appeal, he would have to apply for an extension of time and a hearing date.  On 6 January

2010 the appeal expired and was deemed abandoned.

Proposed District Plan cases

Reid v Tararua District Council HC Palmerston North CIV 2009-454-255, 19 June 2009

[246]   R applied for an order by way of judicial review setting aside the delegation the Tararua District Council had made to a Hearing Committee to hear submissions on the proposed District Plan. His ground was that committee members suffered from a conflict of interest. He also applied for an interim injunction to stop the Council going ahead until the Canterbury Regional Council case had been decided. He wanted fees waived.

[247]   The Registrar accepted that this case might have public importance but, to decide whether to grant R a fee waiver, asked for his financial circumstances, and when not satisfied with what R supplied, declined his application. Hugh Williams J upheld the Registrar's decision on appeal.

[248]  On 19 June 2009 Miller J, on the Council's application, struck out the proceedings  as  lacking  any sufficient  specified  basis  and  as  having  no  obvious prospect of success. Miller J concluded that R was more concerned with the process adopted by the Council than the questions he raised about the committee. Miller J also said:

I  am also  aware  that  this  is  only  the  latest  in  a  series  of  unsuccessful proceedings that Mr Reid has brought in his self styled capacity as a “community advocate”. Mr Reid believes that he serves the public interest. The Council, I have no doubt, thinks otherwise.

Reid v Tararua District Council & Palmerston North High Court CA452/09, 27 July 2010

[249]   R appealed the judgments of Hugh Williams J refusing waiver of the filing fee and of Miller J striking out his claim. The Council applied to strike out the appeal on the ground that he refused to pay security for costs. The Court struck out the appeal  on  that  basis,  more  especially  because  R  made  it  plain  that  he  had  no intention of paying security for costs or the filing fee.

The road stopping cases

Reid v Tararua District Council HC Palmerston North CIV 2009-454-790, 3 December 2009

[250]   R objected to the Tararua District Council's proposal to stop parts of River Road, and Akitio and Arthur Streets, Woodville.   The Council did not accept his objection and the proposals were referred to the Environment Court.   The Environment Court confirmed the Council’s decision and saw no merit in R’s objections.

[251]   R appealed that decision and sought review of the Registrar's refusal to waive the  filing  fee.  On  review,  Associate  Judge  Gendall  upheld  the  Registrar.  He confirmed that R had to state his financial situation so that the Registrar could assess whether the case was 'unlikely to be commenced or continued, unless the fee was waived'. R refused to pay the filing fee and abandoned the appeal.

Reid v Tararua District Council & Palmerston North High Court CA 799/09, 27 July

2010

[252]   On 18 December 2009 R appealed Associate Judge Gendall's decision.  He sought a waiver of all fees, and a declaration that ‘inability to pay’ is not a factor under s 100A(1)(d)(ii) Judicature Act 1908. He also wanted each party to bear their own costs.

[253]   The Registrar notified R that he was required to pay $4,740 security for costs on the appeal. The Council applied to strike out the appeal. On 27 July 2010 the Court of Appeal did so on the basis that R had not paid the security ordered. It

awarded indemnity costs against him, concluding that he had no basis on which to oppose the strike out.

The water permit cases

Reid v Manawata-Wanganui Regional Council EnvC ENV 2009-WLG-076, 12 August 2009

[254]   R appealed the decision of the Hearing Committee of the Regional Council to grant the Tararua District Council's application to vary the resource consent under which it took water from the Mangapapa Stream. He applied for waiver of the filing fee. On 12 August 2009 the Court struck out the appeal on the basis that it did not have jurisdiction. Judge Dwyer said:

... I consider that Mr Reid’s notice of appeal seeks relief which the Court has no jurisdiction to grant and that accordingly it is frivolous or vexatious, discloses no reasonable or relevant case and that it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow the appeal to be taken any further.

Reid v Governor General of New Zealand, Her Majesty’s New Zealand Government, the

Environment Court & Manawatu Wanganui Regional Council HC Wellington CIV 2009-

485-1633, 4 May 2010

[255]   By  way  of  judicial  review,  R  sought  to  review  Judge  Dwyer’s  decision striking out his appeal in the Environment Court.  He wanted declarations that the Judge was wrong to have struck out his application for leave to appeal, contending that the Governor General and the government had breached their constitutional duties in appointing an incompetent Judge to judicial office.

[256]   R again applied for a fee waiver which was refused by the Registrar and that was upheld by Mallon J on 24 September 2009. The Judge said that this was not a proceeding 'of national or public importance or otherwise in the public interest'.

[257]   On 14 April 2010 Ronald Young J gave notice to R that the Court was considering striking out the proceeding as ‘an abuse of Court process’.  R did not appear at the ensuing hearing and on 4 May Ronald Young J struck out his claim and ordered that he pay costs.

Reid v Manawatau - Wanganui Regional Council HC Wellington CIV 2009-485-1817, 4

May 2010

[258]   R appealed from the decision of the Environment Court, striking out his case against the Regional Council. R refused to pay filing fees after his application for waiver was denied.  On 4 May 2010 Ronald Young J struck out this appeal and the related judicial review (proceeding CIV 2009-485-1633), because R did not pay the filing fees.

The District Plan case

Reid v Tararua District Council EnvC ENV-2009-WLG 222, 27 January 2010

[259]   R applied to the Environment Court seeking the cancellation of all decisions made by Tararua District Council relating to the proposed district scheme concerning corner splays, signs, the definition of 'restaurant' and zoning of a parcel of land he owned.

[260]   R wanted the filing fee waived on the basis that the case was in the public interest. The Registrar declined R’s request for a waiver of fee and R applied to have that decision reviewed.

[261]   On 27 January 2010 Judge Dwyer held that the public interest R asserted related to issues beyond the Environment Court's jurisdiction, and he confirmed the Registrar’s decision.  Following this decision, R has not pursued the appeal. It has not thus far been struck out.

The private prosecutions

Reid v Natrass DC Dannevirke CRI-2009-010-066, 10 May 2010

[262]   On 10 December 2008 R charged Mr Natrass with perjury in the Woodville District Vision case, but relied on the section of the Crimes Act which concerns the making of a false oath.

[263]   On 5 May 2009 Judge Ross asked for submissions as to the Crimes Act section on which R relied and to know what evidence R had. He invited submissions as to whether R was a disinterested prosecutor.

[264]   On 30 July 2009 Judge Adeane held that the case was not ready for hearing. He declined to hear R's argument that Judge Ross had issued his directions without jurisdiction. He entered an interim stay.

[265]   R later applied for an adjournment on the basis that he had applied to have the decisions of those two Judges set aside by the High Court by way of judicial review. Mr Natrass' counsel objected and applied for a stay.

[266]   That application did not proceed. A notice for the defended hearing was issued and on 18 May 2010 Judge Lynch declined R's application for an adjournment and dismissed the charge, stating that R had not prosecuted it diligently.

Reid v Governor General, Her Majesty's New Zealand Government, Dannevirke District

Court & Natrass HC Wellington CIV 2009-485-1643, 4 May 2010

[267]   By application for judicial review, R alleged that two of these Judges were

'incompetent Judges'. He sought declarations that they had prevented him from fairly prosecuting Mr Natrass. Also that the Governor General and the Government had failed in their constitutional duty by appointing incompetent Judges.

[268]   R again sought a fee waiver which was refused by the Registrar and that was upheld by McKenzie J on 1 October 2009. On 3 May 2010, when R failed to appear at the hearing, Ronald Young J struck out the proceeding and awarded costs against him, noting that he had failed to pay the filing fee though he had ample time to do so. R's proceeding had 'become an abuse of the Court's process'.

Reid v Governor-General, Her Majesty’s New Zealand Government, Dannevirke District

Court and Natrass CA 367/10, 3 March 2011

[269]   R appealed this last decision to the Court of Appeal, only to allow it to expire such that it was deemed abandoned.

Reid v Natrass HC Palmerston North CIV 2010-454-448, 25 August 2010

[270]   R appealed Judge Lynch's decision, dismissing his private prosecution. When the Registrar refused to waive the filing fee he sought a review. On 25 August 2010

Miller J upheld the Registrar and on 9 October 2010 R abandoned his appeal.

Reid v King DC Dannevirke CRI-2009-010-301, 1 October 2009

[271]    On 26 August 2009 R also prosecuted Mr King for perjury in his affidavit in proceedings before the Court of Appeal regarding the Woodville Public Reserve sale proceeds. On 1 October 2009 Judge Fraser noted that this proceeding replicated the Natrass private prosecution. He directed that it not proceed until the Natrass issues, identified by Judge Ross, had been resolved. R has not pursued this case.

OTHER PEOPLES' CASES

Reid and Hale (as trustees) v Carterton Auto Court Ltd, Masterton District Court HC Masterton CIV-2010-435-120, 15 September 2010

[272]   In an application for judicial review, R and Mr Hale (as trustees) applied to the High Court for declarations that Carterton Auto Court had obtained by fraud judgment by default against the trust and a writ of sale to sell trust property. Also that the Masterson District and High Courts had breached their statutory duties. They sought damages and compensation and transfer to the Palmerston North High Court.

[273]   On 15 September 2010 Ronald Young J held that R had no standing. He was not a trustee, a beneficiary or a lawyer. He declined to transfer the proceedings and stated:

The proceedings raise serious allegations of fraud. Before such allegations are made careful analysis of facts and law should be undertaken. Mr Reid does not have either the necessary skill or knowledge to do so.

[274]   R became a trustee of the trust 29 April 2011 and on 1 December 2011

Mallon J added him as an applicant to the proceeding but directed that the trust pay security for costs. The Masterton District and High Courts applied to strike out the

proceeding as it related to them and for security for costs. This application is still to be decided.

Reid & Barber v Cottle & Cooper Rapley HC Palmerston North CIV-2010-454-582, 17 May

2011

[275]   R and Ms Barber as co-applicants claimed by way of application for judicial review against Ms Cottle, a real estate agent, and Cooper Rapley, a law firm, for breaches of statutory and fiduciary duty, extortion and fraud. They sought declarations, an account of profits and damages.

[276]   On a strike out application Joseph Williams J was prepared to accept that R had standing as a trustee of a trust associated with Ms Barber but on 17 May 2011 struck  out  the  application  as  an  attempt  to  relitigate  issues  already  decided  as between Ms Barber and Ms Cottle by Mallon J on 13 March 2008.

[277]   On 13 June 2011 Joseph Williams J declined the defendants’ application for indemnity costs, as he was ‘not satisfied that the commencement of the new proceeding was vexatious, frivolous, improper, or unnecessary.’ He did award the defendants  costs  against  R  but  allowed  R  to  recover  his  expenses  out  of  trust property.

Reid v Cottle & Cooper Rapley CA263/2011, 6 March 2012

[278]   R appealed Joseph Williams J’s strike-out decision. The Registrar refused to waive security for costs and on review on 6 March 2012 Arnold J held that R had not shown any exceptional circumstance, adding that 'although this must be a tentative view, the appeal appears to have little prospect of success'.   He questioned R’s standing, because R was not listed as a trustee on the Companies Office’s record.

Reid v Complaints Assessment Committee & Cottle READT 057/10, 27 May 2011

[279]   R appealed the decision of the Complaints Assessment Committee not to inquire into his complaint, on behalf of Ms Barber against Ms Cottle, to the Real Estate Agents Disciplinary Tribunal. The Committee had decided not to because the

1998 conduct complained of could not be investigated further and everything had

been  resolved  by  the  High  Court.  On  27  May  2011  the  Real  Estate  Agents

Disciplinary Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the basis that it had no merit.

Reid v Burt HC Palmerston North CIV-2011-454-336, 9 December 2011

[280]   In 2011 R appealed a District Court restraining order made against him to prevent him from referring to Burt in the Woodville Bulletin, R's broadsheet, for abuse of statutory authority and of process, and for error of law and judicial bias. He applied for an extension of time for failing and paying security of costs.

[281] On 26 October 2011 Joseph Williams J ordered him to pay costs and disbursements on the interlocutory application. These were not paid. On 9 December

2011 Associate Judge Gendall stayed the appeal until they were. It remains stayed.