STKB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

STKB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 251

MIGRATION – Jurisdictional error – English ‘variable standard’ of unreasonableness – fresh evidence

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 27

SHJB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 502 referred to
SHJB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 303 referred to
Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 referred to
R v Home Security; Ex parte Rahman [1998] QB 136 referred to
Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 referred to
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1984) 6 FCR 155 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Singh (1997) 74 FCR 553 referred to
R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board; Ex parte A [1999] 2 AC 330 referred to
NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24 applied

STKB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

S 111 of 2004

RYAN, JACOBSON & LANDER JJ
8 SEPTEMBER 2004
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 111 of 2004

On appeal from a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

STKB
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

RYAN, JACOBSON AND LANDER JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 SEPTEMBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs in the proceedings.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 111 of  2004

On appeal from a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

STKB
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

RYAN, JACOBSON AND LANDER JJ

DATE:

8 SEPTEMBER 2004

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of a judge of the Court (Selway J) dismissing an application for a writ of certiorari to quash a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”) given on 25 August 2003.  The RRT affirmed a decision of the Minister made on 2 June 2003 refusing to grant the appellant a protection visa.

  2. The proceedings have a long and detailed background.  The primary judge did not consider that it was necessary to repeat it.  He observed that the evidence and the issues before the RRT were broadly the same as those which had been considered in an earlier application.  In the earlier application the appellant sought judicial review of a decision of the RRT to affirm the cancellation of a temporary protection visa.  The application was dismissed; see SHJB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 502 (“SHJB”).  His Honour’s decision was affirmed by a Full Court; see SHJBvMinister for Immigration and Multicultural…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCAFC 251
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of STKB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the appellant, an individual whose claim for refugee status had been rejected by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT), sought to appeal the decision of the primary judge who upheld the RRT's decision. The appellant contended that the primary judge erred in his assessment of the evidence and the application of legal principles, specifically regarding the standard of unreasonableness and the admission of fresh evidence. The High Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the primary judge's decision was legally sound and whether the RRT's findings were supported by the evidence presented.

The central legal issues in this case revolved around the correct interpretation and application of Australian administrative law principles, particularly concerning the standard of unreasonableness in reviewing decisions made by the RRT and the admissibility of fresh evidence. The appellant argued that the primary judge misapplied Australian case law by relying on English authorities that were inconsistent with established Australian jurisprudence. Additionally, the appellant contended that the primary judge should have admitted fresh evidence that could potentially alter the outcome of the decision.

The court meticulously reviewed the evidence and legal precedents to assess the appellant's claims. It concluded that the primary judge correctly adhered to Australian legal principles and did not err in rejecting the appellant's grounds of appeal. The court found that the RRT's decision was adequately supported by the evidence, and the primary judge's refusal to admit fresh evidence was consistent with Australian legal standards. The court highlighted that the RRT's findings were based on a thorough consideration of the available evidence, including newspaper articles and documents from the Pakistan National Database Registration Authority, which were deemed more reliable than the appellant's submissions.

In light of the court's findings, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs in the proceedings. The court's decision underscored the importance of adhering to established legal principles and the limited circumstances under which fresh evidence can be admitted in appeals against RRT decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs in the proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

Both of the grounds were rejected by his Honour because the English authorities relied upon by the appellant were contrary to the position established by case law in Australia including High Court authority. Indeed, the variable standard of unreasonableness was rejected by the Full Court in SHJB and it was one of the grounds of the unsuccessful application for special leave. Notwithstanding this, the appellant pursues both of the grounds on which he failed before the primary judge.The factual background and the RRT’s findings The primary judge did not refer to the evidence in any detail. He observed at [5] that the appellant claimed that he was from Afghanistan but, as in SHJB, the RRT was faced with a dispute as to the appellant’s nationality. There was a large amount of material, some of it obtained by newspaper journalists, alleging that the appellant was a citizen of Pakistan. The RRT had before it the whole of the file relating to the cancellation of the temporary visa. The RRT referred to the material at some length. It is unnecessary to refer to all of the material. It included competing linguistic analyses tending to establish that the appellant was either a Pakistani or an Afghan national, letters apparently provided by the appellant from two people who purported to confirm that he was from Afghanistan and documents obtained by the Australian High Commission from the Pakistan National Database Registration Authority. The appellant gave oral evidence before the RRT. He was unrepresented at the hearing. The contents of the newspaper articles were put to him. He said the stories were fabricated and unreliable. The documents obtained from the Pakistan National Database Registration Authority were also put to the appellant. The presiding member noted that the details in the documents “fitted perfectly” with the information obtained by journalists indicating that the appellant was from Quetta in Pakistan where he had conducted a plumbing business. Having considered all of the evidence, the RRT put to one side certain evidence on which it placed no weight. It gave reasons why it did so. The evidence on which the RRT placed no weight included all of the competing linguistic analyses and the letters purporting to corroborate the appellant’s claim. The RRT accepted a submission by the appellant that it was difficult to make anyone understand the remote areas of Afghanistan where he said he lived. But it was for that reason that the RRT placed great weight on newspaper articles concerning enquiries by reporters who actually went to the area and attempted to identify the village in which the appellant claimed to have lived. The RRT also gave great weight to the article published by a reporter who went to Quetta and had no difficulty in finding people who identified the appellant as a resident of that city. The RRT noted that it was not bound by the rules of evidence and that it was appropriate to give due weight to the accounts given by reporters of their enquiries.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Rahman is not authority for the proposition that there is a duty on the decision-maker to make enquiries in an applicant’s claimed country of origin. The case has no application to the present proceedings.The “Fresh Evidence” ground The primary judge stated at [13] that the second ground of alleged jurisdictional error was that the RRT did not have before it some documentary material which was sought to be placed before the Court. The material consists of signed documents from various people, apparently in Afghanistan. Some of the documents purport to be official. They state that the appellant is who he claims to be and that he is from Afghanistan. The documents have been put before us to support the submission that his Honour was in error in refusing to admit them. His Honour was of the view that the English authority R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board; Ex parte A [1999] 2 AC 330 (Ex parte ‘A’) does not reflect the law in Australia; see at [19]. He stated at [20] that the law in Australia is, as stated by Brennan J in Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 77-78, namely that an appellant cannot supplement the record of the proceeding before the decision-maker merely to demonstrate an error of fact. His Honour observed at [21] – [22] that there are some qualifications to this general principle. However, he did not consider that the present case fell within the exceptions. The central plank upon which the appellant sought to make good the submission that the primary judge was in error was the interference with the appellant’s human rights. Accordingly, the rejection of the first ground of appeal must carry with it the dismissal of this ground. The applicable law was stated recently by a Full Court (Beaumont, Lindgren and Tamberlin JJ) in NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24 at [54] as follows:-“In our opinion, certiorari does not lie where no more appears than that ‘fresh evidence is discovered which could not have been found with due diligence before the trial, where it is apparently credible and would have an important influence on the result’ (West Sussex at 36 per Lord Denning MR). It follows that the fresh evidence here (the existence of the Summons and of the Notice), is irrelevant to any ground on which certiorari could properly have been granted by his Honour in respect of the decision of the RRT, and that if the appellant had sought to lead that evidence before his Honour, his Honour would have been bound to reject it.” This would be sufficient to dispose of the second ground of appeal. However, there are two further reasons why it must fail. First, the appellant argued that, by analogy to the principles which govern the reception of fresh evidence under s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the evidence ought to have been admitted because it could not have been obtained by him and it would have produced an opposite result in the RRT.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established