Criminal Law (Tas.)—Murder—Provocation—Wrongful act or insult such as to deprive ordinary person of self-control—Words and gestures—Whether capable of being insult—Functions of judge and jury—Criminal Code (Tas.),s. 160.
Decision
MASON C.J., BRENNAN, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON AND McHUGH JJ. This is an appeal, pursuant to special leave, from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Tasmania (Nettlefold, Underwood and Wright JJ.) dismissing an appeal from the appellant's conviction of murder. The issue which the appeal raises is whether, as the Court of Criminal Appeal held, the learned trial judge was correct in ruling that the matters relied upon by the appellant as giving rise to a defence of provocation under s.160 of the Criminal Code (Tas.) ("the Code") were not capable of constituting provocation under that section with the result that that defence to the charge of murder was not left to the jury. The questions of law raised by that issue are important and of some difficulty.
2. It is common ground that, in the early hours of the morning of 5 June 1988, the appellant, then aged nineteen, killed a young man named Jason Scott Taylor by stabbing him in the chest with a butcher's knife. At the time he was killed, Taylor was sitting with his seventeen year old girl friend ("A") in a car parked in the Recreation Ground at Scottsdale, a town near Launceston. The general nature of the relationship between the appellant and A was not really in dispute. That relationship provides the context in which the events of the night of 4 June must be viewed for the purpose of determining whether a defence of provocation should have been left to the jury.
3. From May until about November 1986, A and the appellant went out together on a regular basis. At that time A was a pupil at the Scottsdale High School. The relationship between them broke up, after a series of arguments, about the time when A left school. It resumed for a few days around Christmas and was then permanently terminated by A. Notwithstanding A's communicated desire not to associate with the appellant, he was and remained, to use the learned trial judge's words, "obsessed by or infatuated with" her and would not leave her alone. He frequently waited for her outside her place of employment. He followed her about and tried to talk to her. On a number of occasions when A told him she did not want to see him or talk to him, he threatened her with violence. He even threatened to kill her so that no one else could "have" her.
4. In October or November 1987, A obtained a court order restraining the appellant from approaching her or talking to her. At that time A was keeping company with another young man, Walter Baxter, who gave…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Stingel v The Queen [1990] HCA 61
Case
[1990] HCA 61
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Stingel, against his conviction for murder. The applicant had been found guilty of the murder of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment. The appeal concerned the admissibility of certain evidence and the fairness of the trial process.
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of the applicant's prior inconsistent statements and whether the judge's directions to the jury on the issue of self-defence were adequate. The applicant argued that the prior inconsistent statements were unfairly prejudicial and that the jury had not been properly instructed on the elements of self-defence, particularly in relation to the applicant's state of mind.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the trial judge had erred in admitting the prior inconsistent statements. The Court reasoned that the statements were not admissible as evidence of the truth of their contents, but their admission had the potential to unfairly prejudice the applicant in the eyes of the jury. Furthermore, the Court found that the directions on self-defence were insufficient, as they did not adequately explain that the defence was available even if the applicant's belief as to the necessity of using force was mistaken, provided that belief was honestly held. The Court concluded that these errors had resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.