Stern v National Australia Bank Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 46 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stern v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] FCA 294

TRADE PRACTICES – misleading or deceptive conduct – whether finding by primary judge that conduct of banker not misleading and deceptive could be challenged on ground that matters were not put to witnesses – whether representations actually made by bank were false – whether contrary to public policy that bank enforce judgment obtained in the United States.

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 5, 52, 82, 87

Browne v Dunn [1894] 6 R 67 discussed

Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 referred to
Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 considered
In the marriage of L C and T C (1998) 23 Fam LR 75 at 82-83 referred to
Thomas v van den Yssel (1976) 14 SASR 205 cited
Flower & Hart (a firm)  v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134 cited
All State Life Insurance Co v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No. 33) (1996) 64 FCR 79 cited
United States Trust Co of New York v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 131 cited
Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association v de la Cuesta 458 US 141 (1982) referred to
Western Sling and Cable Co Inc v Hamilton 545 So 2d 29 (Ala 1989) referred to
House v The King (1936) 53 CLR 499 cited
Dart Industries Inc v Decor Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 179 CLR 101 cited
Re Wilcox;  ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 727 cited
Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 cited

ILANA ELENKA STERN AND OTHERS v
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED

N 1393 of 1999

HILL, O’CONNOR AND MOORE JJ
27 MARCH 2000
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1393 OF 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT

BETWEEN:

ILANA ELENKA STERN
FIRST APPELLANT/FIRST CROSS-RESPONDENT

JOSEPH POLLAK
SECOND APPELLANT/SECOND CROSS-RESPONDENT

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT

JUDGE:

HILL, O'CONNOR AND MOORE JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

27 MARCH 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed with costs.

2.        The cross-appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1393 OF 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT

BETWEEN:

ILANA ELENKA STERN
FIRST APPELLANT/FIRST CROSS-RESPONDENT

JOSEPH POLLAK
SECOND APPELLANT/SECOND CROSS-RESPONDENT

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENT/CROSS-RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HILL, O'CONNOR AND MOORE JJ

DATE:

27 MARCH 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. The appellants, Mrs Ilana Stern and Dr Joseph Pollak, appeal against the judgment of a judge of this Court (Tamberlin J) dismissing proceedings brought by them under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (“the Act”) alleging that the respondent, the National Australia Bank Limited (“the Bank”), had engaged in conduct…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Stern v National Australia Bank Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2000] FCA 294
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Stern v National Australia Bank Ltd is a case involving the appellants, Mrs Stern and Dr Pollak, who sought damages for deceit against the National Australia Bank (the Bank). The appellants claimed that the Bank made false representations regarding the enforceability of a "due on sale" clause in a loan agreement secured by property in Van Nuys, Los Angeles. The primary judge dismissed the appellants' claims, finding that the alleged conversation with the Bank's representative, Mr Kirschbaum, did not occur. The Bank cross-appealed against the refusal to order that its costs be paid on an indemnity basis.

The legal issues before the court involved the existence and effect of the alleged conversation between Dr Pollak and Mr Kirschbaum and the enforceability of the "due on sale" clause in the mortgage agreement. The court had to determine whether the Bank made the representations claimed by the appellants and, if so, whether those representations constituted deceit. Additionally, the court had to assess the appropriateness of the costs order.

The court's reasoning focused on the lack of evidence supporting the existence of the alleged conversation. The primary judge highlighted the absence of any records or correspondence confirming the conversation, the implausibility of the Bank's representative advising that the assumption agreements would extinguish the appellants' liabilities, and the failure of the appellants to raise the conversation in subsequent dealings with the Bank and in court proceedings. The judge concluded that the conversation did not occur and dismissed the appeal. The cross-appeal regarding the costs order was also dismissed.

In conclusion, the court upheld the primary judge's decision, dismissing both the appeal and the cross-appeal with costs. The court found no merit in the appellants' claims of deceit and rejected the Bank's argument for an indemnity costs order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

2. The cross-appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Finally, the Bank cross-appeals against so much of his Honour’s judgment as concerned his Honour’s refusal to order that the Bank’s costs be paid on an indemnity basis.The background to the dispute The following recitation of facts is taken largely from the Bank’s documents which were not the subject of attack in the proceedings. The Bank carries on business not only within Australia but also in the United States of America. On 17 September 1986 it made an interest only loan to Mrs Fani Pollak (an Australian resident and the mother of the appellants) of $3 million repayable on 31 July 1993 or in the event of the application of what the parties referred to as a “due on sale” clause and at the discretion of the Bank at an earlier date. The loan in question was secured by a mortgage over office and residential buildings in the Los Angeles suburb of Van Nuys. The property given as security was held by Mrs Pollak partly in her own right and partly as executrix of the estate of her late husband. The loan was secured by a promissory note which Mrs Pollak gave to the Bank and which bore the date 17 September 1986 and a deed of trust of the same date which gave to the Bank a security interest. The promissory note and trust deed were drafted by attorneys acting for the Bank and were the subject of negotiations between those attorneys and attorneys for Mrs Pollak. Some changes were made to the original draft before execution. No change was made or indeed suggested as a result of these negotiations to the due on sale clause which is clause 2.26 of the trust deed. However a side letter dated 22 September 1986, signed by the Bank and addressed to Mrs Pollak confirmed the Bank’s agreement that a distribution or other transfer of the Van Nuys property from Mrs Pollak as executor to Mrs Pollak as widow would not constitute a transfer falling within clause 2.26. Clause 2.26 was in the following terms:“In the event that the interest of Trustor in the Property, or any part thereof, or any interest therein is sold, agreed to be sold, encumbered, conveyed, alienated or otherwise transferred by the Trustor, whether by operation of law or otherwise, the Note, irrespective of the maturity dates expressed therein, at the option of the Beneficiary [the Bank], and without demand or notice, shall immediately become due and payable.” Mrs Pollak died on 18 November 1987. Her will appointed Mrs Stern executrix of the estate and left the residue of her property to her two children, Mrs Stern and Dr Pollak. A memorandum of the Los Angeles branch of the Bank addressed to its New York branch noted that the family did not intend to sell the Van Nuys building at that time and prepayment of the loan was not expected. Probate of Mrs Pollak’s will was granted by the Superior Court of California on 29 March 1988. Under Californian law, creditors had a period of four months within which to make claims against the estate from the date letters testamentary were filed on 8 April 1988.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There were other representations claimed to have been made and said to be false including a representation that Mrs Stern and Dr Pollak would have no personal liability under the assumption agreements. All matters concerning representations were found against the appellants although the additional representations to which reference has but briefly been made were not the subject of the current appeals. It should be said that the case as pleaded in respect of the additional representations appears to have been very weak and the resolution of them adversely to Mrs Stern and Dr Pollak was largely on the basis of findings which were to their credit.The affidavit evidence of Dr Pollak On 22 February 1996 Dr Pollak filed an affidavit in the proceedings. That affidavit dealt with the conversation alleged to have taken place between Dr Pollak and Mr Kirschbaum between January and March 1988. Dr Pollak said in his affidavit:“At some time between January and March 1988 I had a telephone conversation with an officer of the Bank’s Los Angeles office, Mr Steven Kirschbaum, to the following effect:Kirschbaum: ‘I am sorry to hear of your mother’s death. As can be seen from the documents, the Bank is empowered to call the loan due and payable on the death of the borrower. The Bank has decided not to call the loan due provided you and Ilana sign personal guarantees and assumption agreements. When you sign the assumption agreements that will distinguish your liabilities. Unless you both agree to this we will call the loan due.’I do not recall the exact words spoken during the remainder of the conversation but I do recall that based on what Mr Kirschbaum told me during the conversation, I thereafter believed that the Bank was entitled to call the loan due at any time and that my sister and I had no alternative but to agree to what the Bank had requested in respect of the personal guarantees and the execution of the Assumption Agreements since we were unable to sell the property and were unable to pay the debt.”The Bank’s defence In its amended defence relating to the representation said to have been made in the conversation with Mr Kirschbaum the Bank said that it was entitled to demand immediate repayment of the Van Nuys loan as a consequence of the death of Mrs Pollak but otherwise did not admit the allegations. Other representations said to have been made on behalf of the Bank to found a claim for relief were denied. It is necessary here to note that Mr Kirschbaum died before the proceedings and approximately one year after they were commenced and was unavailable to give evidence of the conversation alleged to have taken place with Dr Pollak. Dr Pollak was the subject of extensive cross-examination concerning this conversation. In that cross-examination he was taken through the documentary evidence of the Bank to which reference has already been made. To a large extent the cross-examination was directed at demonstrating the absurdity of the suggestion in its affidavit that in some way Mr Kirschbaum had advised Dr Pollak that execution of the assumption agreement would extinguish all the liabilities of Mrs Stern and Dr Pollak when the obvious intention of the assumption agreement would have to have been that Mrs Stern and Dr Pollak became liable for the amounts that previously had been due by the estate of their mother. The claim that liability was in fact extinguished as a result of the conversation was not mentioned at the hearing.The decision appealed from

Decision

Reasons for decision

Dr Pollak was the subject of extensive cross-examination concerning this conversation. In that cross-examination he was taken through the documentary evidence of the Bank to which reference has already been made. To a large extent the cross-examination was directed at demonstrating the absurdity of the suggestion in its affidavit that in some way Mr Kirschbaum had advised Dr Pollak that execution of the assumption agreement would extinguish all the liabilities of Mrs Stern and Dr Pollak when the obvious intention of the assumption agreement would have to have been that Mrs Stern and Dr Pollak became liable for the amounts that previously had been due by the estate of their mother. The claim that liability was in fact extinguished as a result of the conversation was not mentioned at the hearing.The decision appealed from The learned primary judge held that the conversation alleged with Mr Kirschbaum did not take place. His Honour’s specific reasons for so concluding were as follows:“Dr Pollak does not give evidence as to any part of the conversation with Mr Kirschbaum other than is pleaded as misrepresentation. There are no notes of it by either party and no other records or correspondence were produced in evidence that any such conversation occurred. The absence of any record is surprising given the important assurances attributed to the Bank as to assertion of its entitlement and the indications as to the contents of the Assumption Agreement which, of course, was not drafted until later in the year. This latter circumstance attributes a degree of prescience to Mr Kirschbaum as to the form and contents of legal documents to be drawn up in the future. The Bank’s later internal documents indicate lack of certainty in the Bank’s understanding as to the form and wording of such documents. During this period Dr Pollak retained Gibson as his Attorney. They had acted in relation to the estate of Fani Pollak. There is no evidence as to advice being sought by the applicants from Gibson as a consequence of the alleged threat made by Mr Kirschbaum to call up the loan. At that time Dr Pollak was a qualified medical practitioner and also a law student, and was certainly not naive in commercial matters. Indeed, his evidence and conduct during 1988 and later years indicates considerable commercial astuteness. He was admitted to the Bar of New South Wales in August 1990.A particularly curious aspect of the alleged statements by Mr Kirschbaum is the assertion that the assumption agreements would extinguish the liabilities of the applicants. One basic purpose of the assumption agreements in terms, as indeed their name suggests, was to ensure that the applicants would assume liability for the debts in their own right.There is no indication that Dr Pollak made any inquiries as to the provisions of any guarantee or assumption agreement of the type allegedly foreshadowed by Mr Kirschbaum at this time. The suggestion that Mr Kirschbaum gave an assurance that any personal liability would be extinguished or that Dr Pollak so understood anything said by Mr Kirschbaum is not accepted. The alleged conversation took place over ten years ago and without the assistance of any record it is clearly difficult to recall the precise terms used. To a large extent the evidence of Mrs Stern was to the effect that she did not recall a number of the matters because they were so long ago and said she relied on her brother. It is apparent from the reference to an “assumption agreement” that the applicants would be obliged to assume liability as borrowers under the loan. This is supported by the fact that Mr Connelly of the Double Bay branch recorded in his Memorandum of 11 July 1989 that the applicants had requested that on the winding up of the estate of Fani Pollak the two loans (Van Nuys and Burbank) be transferred into their names. This record is consistent with an understanding on the Bank’s part that there would be an assumption of liability by the applicants. Further, there is a marked failure on the part of Dr Pollak or Mrs Stern to raise any specific assertion about conversations with Mr Kirschbaum and his “assurances” in subsequent dealings with the Bank, and with the lawyers, and in proceedings before the Californian Court. The applicants submit that the Kirschbaum conversation should be accepted insofar as it alleges that he claimed that the Bank was empowered to sell on the basis that the contrary was not expressly put in cross-examination. However, the whole conversation was put in issue in the pleadings and it was apparent that both the occurrence and context of that conversation were in issue. The conversation was only particularised in the pleadings with respect to an allegation that the Bank would not enforce the “due on sale” provision of the mortgage. What Mr Kirschbaum is alleged to have said is not consistent with the express terms of the assumption agreements later signed by them. Further, the applicants in submissions do not seek to rely on the alleged statement that the liability would be extinguished. This is consistent with a conclusion that such a statement by Mr Kirschbaum was highly unlikely, which in turn suggests that the conversation did not take place. Accordingly, it is understandable why the cross-examination was not directed to that part of the alleged conversation which referred to the “due on sale” provision becoming enforceable. In my view, there is no procedural unfairness on this aspect of the matter: cf Browne v Dunn [1894] 6 R 67 at 79; Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 236 per Mahoney JA; Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1; and In the marriage of L C and T C (1998) 23 Fam LR 75 at 82-83.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.