Springrange Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory

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ON APPEAL FROM THE MASTER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

No. ACTCA 6 – 2009

No. SC 777 of 2008

Judges:         Gray P, Penfold and Buchanan JJ

Court of Appeal of the Australian Capital Territory

Date:            20 August 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE   )          

)          

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY    )           No. ACTCA 6 – 2009

)           No. SC 777 of 2008

COURT OF APPEAL   )

ON APPEAL FROM THE MASTER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

BETWEEN:      SPRINGRANGE PTY LTD

Appellant

AND:                AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

First Respondent

AND:                ACT PLANNING AND LAND AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER

Judges:   Gray P, Penfold and Buchanan JJ

Date:   20 August 2010

Place:   Canberra

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The appeal be dismissed.

  2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE        )          

)          

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY    )           No. ACTCA 6 – 2009

)           No. SC  777 of 2008

COURT OF APPEAL   )

ON APPEAL FROM THE MASTER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

BETWEEN:      SPRINGRANGE PTY LTD

Appellant

AND:                AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

First Respondent

AND:                ACT PLANNING AND LAND AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

Judges:   Gray P, Penfold and Buchanan JJ

Date:   20 August 2010

Place:   Canberra

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GRAY P and PENFOLD J:

Introduction

  1. The appellant, Springrange Pty Ltd (Springrange) is the lessee, under a Crown Lease, of a block of land in Tuggeranong in the ACT.  At all relevant times, there was one building on the block, with a gross lettable area of 4,558 m².  Springrange sought a declaration from the Supreme Court about the meaning of a provision in that Crown Lease.  The interpretation of the provision is significant to the assessment of a change of use charge which would be payable if the land is redeveloped.  Springrange has now appealed against the decision of the Master to dismiss its application for the declaration that it sought.

The registered lease

  1. The Commonwealth of Australia granted a lease of the block of land to Max Profit Pty Limited on 31 May 2002 for a term of 99 years.  The lease was granted under the City Area Leases Ordinance 1936 (ACT) as applied by the National Land Ordinance 1989 (ACT). The lease was registered by the Registrar General on 12 June 2002. The lease was transferred to Springrange as lessee in October 2006.

  2. At the relevant times, the Land (Planning and Environment) Act 1991 (ACT) (now repealed) (the Planning and Environment Act) applied to the lease.  Section 187A of the Planning and Environment Act provided for the calculation of a change of use charge payable by a Crown lessee if a leased block is subdivided; the amount payable is a percentage of the change in value following the subdivision.  It was accepted by the Master that the change in value would reflect not just the subdivision, but also any change of purpose.

  3. In May 2007, Springrange lodged a development application for subdivision of the block into two parcels, including the…

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Details
Case
[2010] ACTCA 17
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Springrange Pty Ltd appealed to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Court of Appeal, against a decision that dismissed its application for a declaration concerning the interpretation of a provision within a Crown Lease. The dispute centred on whether a covenant restricting gross floor area applied to the floor area of a single building or the total floor area of all buildings on the leased land.

The court was required to determine the proper approach to interpreting a provision in a Crown Lease registered under the Torrens title system, particularly when the lease is based on a standard or template document. A key legal issue was whether extrinsic materials could be used to construe the terms of such a registered lease, and how to interpret template documents in the abstract.

The Court of Appeal held that because the lease was registered under the Torrens title system, its terms must be construed without recourse to extrinsic materials that might shed light on the original parties' intentions. The court applied the principle that registered titles under the Torrens system are intended to be clear and unambiguous on the Register itself. Furthermore, the court reasoned that template documents should be interpreted in the abstract, considering their general application rather than specific circumstances, to avoid inferring drafting flaws. The court found that the lease, even as a template document, had a clear and rational operation when interpreted in this manner.

The appeal was dismissed, and Springrange Pty Ltd was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The declaration sought by Springrange is a declaration that the provision in cl 3(b) of the Crown Lease: Because the lease is a registered lease under the Torrens titles system, its terms fall to be construed without the aid of extrinsic materials that might cast light on the intention of the original parties. In construing an easement created over Torrens title land, the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ) in Westfield Management Limited v Perpetual Trustee Company Limited (2007) 233 CLR 528 at [37] observed: The reason for this approach is explained at [39]: In Bowler v Hilda Pty Limited (in liq) (2001) 112 FCR 59, Drummond J at [10] found it difficult to accept the notion that materials extrinsic to the Register could be used to resolve ambiguities in the registered title. Gyles J at [59] would also not permit an ambiguity to be created by the use of extrinsic materials. That is, of course, not to say that reference may not be had to documents the terms of which are incorporated into the public document (see Leichhardt Municipal Council v Terminals Pty Ltd (1970) 21 LGRA 44 at 50-51, Hope J citing Slough Estates Ltd v Slough Borough Council [No. 2] [1970] 2 WLR 1187 and Ryde Municipal Council v The Royal Ryde Homes (1970) 19 LGRA 321. Nor is it to disagree with the comment of Gyles J in Bowler v Hilda at [59]: The lease in this case is, however, not only a registered lease under the Torrens title system but also, apparently, a lease based on a template document. That fact also requires a particular approach to be taken to its interpretation. While it could be thought that a lease for a property that, in 2007, was valued at roughly $15 to $18 million when fully developed might deserve some customisation, there may equally be good reasons for an administrative practice of relying on standard documents for all leases of a particular kind irrespective of the values of the properties involved. Standard or template documents are commonly used in commercial transactions, especially when a contracting party engages in many similar transactions with different parties. The fact that the standard or template document expressly addresses possibilities that are not relevant in a particular contract would not generally found an argument that the document must to that extent involve errors. It seems to us that standard or template documents must be interpreted in the abstract before any conclusion can be drawn that such a document reveals drafting flaws when it appears to operate in a particular case to produce a result that a party would prefer to avoid. The lease in this case, even approached as a standard or template document, is not an outstandingly clear or straightforward document and there are certainly provisions of the document that could be improved. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the lease, interpreted in the abstract, has a clear and rational operation. Clause 2 of the lease contains the covenants for the rent and manner of payment.