Snezana Angeleska v Victorian Legal Admissions Board

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCI 2022 0016

SNEZANA ANGELESKA	Applicant
v
VICTORIAN LEGAL ADMISSIONS BOARD	Respondent

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JUDGES:	Ferguson CJ, Niall and Walker JJA
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	25 July 2023
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	12 September 2023
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2023] VSCA 220
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:	[2021] VSC 829 (Justice Forbes)

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LEGAL PROFESSION – Appeal – Refusal of certificate of compliance – Whether judge erred in finding that the applicant was not a fit and proper person – Applicant engaged in inappropriate conduct in litigation before and after being legally qualified – Inadequate disclosure of past conduct – Lack of insight into past conduct – No error identified – Leave to appeal refused.

Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014, s 4, sch 1; Legal Profession Uniform Law ss 16, 17, 19, 26, 421; Legal Profession Uniform Admission Rules 2015 (NSW) r 17.

Slaveski v State of Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Slaveski v State of Victoria (Victorian Court of Appeal, Neave JA and Vickery AJA, 1 February 2013), Slaveska v State of Victoria [2015] VSCA 140, Petsinis v Victorian Legal Services Board [2016] VSC 389 discussed.

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Counsel
Applicant:	Mr W F Gillies
Respondent:	Ms N Hassan
Solicitors
Applicant:
Respondent:	Ms J Butler, Victorian Legal Admissions Board

FERGUSON CJ
NIALL JA
WALKER JA:

The applicant, Snezana Angeleska, wishes to be admitted to practice as a member of the legal profession. Under the Legal Profession Uniform Law (the ‘Uniform Law’),[1] a requirement for admission is that she has a compliance certificate from the Victorian Legal Admissions Board (the ‘Board’). The applicant applied for a compliance certificate, but on 1 June 2021 the Victorian Legal Admissions Committee (the ‘Committee’), as the delegate of the Board, refused her application. Its reason for doing so was that it concluded that she had not demonstrated that she was a fit and proper person to be admitted to the legal profession.
[1]The Uniform Law is sch 1 to the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014. Section 4 of that Act applies the Uniform Law as a law of Victoria, as if it were an Act.
The applicant then exercised her right to appeal the refusal pursuant to s 26(1) of the Uniform Law. That appeal was dismissed by a judge of the trial division.[2] The judge concluded that she was not satisfied that the applicant was a fit and proper person to be admitted as a legal practitioner.[3] The applicant now seeks leave to appeal from the judge’s decision.[4]
[2]Angeleska v Victorian Legal Admissions Board [2021] VSC 829 (‘Reasons’).
[3]Reasons, [98].
[4]The trial judge’s decision was made in November 2021. Although the applicant attempted to seek leave to appeal within the applicable time period, her application for leave to appeal was not made in a proper form until 5 December 2022. Nonetheless, no party contended that she required an extension of time, and we have proceeded on the basis that her application was filed within time.
The Board is the named respondent to the application. Before the trial judge the Board had appeared as contradictor to assist the Court, by cross-examining the applicant and by making submissions as to the matters relevant to the Court’s decision. It did not oppose the applicant’s appeal before the trial judge and made no submissions as to the ultimate question of whether the applicant is a fit and proper person. The Board has taken the same position before this Court in relation to the application for leave to appeal. In taking this position the Board relies upon this Court’s approach to the role of Board of Examiners under previous legislation as set out in Board of Examiners v XY.[5] There is no complaint about the Board’s role on this appeal.
[5][2006] VSCA 190, [18]–[22] (Chernov, Nettle and Neave JJA).
The Hardiman principle — namely, that where a decision may be remitted to a decision-maker, the decision-maker takes no part in the proceeding for review or appeal — is often applied in cases involving review of decisions by administrative bodies.[6] Although there is no complaint about the Board’s role on this appeal, we note that while the Board did not formally oppose the application for leave to appeal, its submissions in substance took an oppositional position to that of the applicant. In future, some consideration could be given by the Board to whether the Hardiman principle applies in circumstances where the appeal to the trial division is by way of a hearing de novo. If the Board takes the view that it is inappropriate for it to defend its own decision, the Board could consider funding a contradictor to appear as amicus to assist the Court, rather than appearing and making submissions that, in substance, have the effect of defending its decision.
[6]See R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13, 35–6 (the Court); Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Romsey Hotel Pty Ltd (2008) 19 VR 422, 432–3 [34]–[37]; [2008] VSCA 45 (Warren CJ, Maxwell P and Osborn AJA).
For the reasons that follow, we would refuse leave to appeal.

Relevant statutory provisions

Part 2.2 of the Uniform Law deals with admission to the Australian legal profession.[7] The objective of the part is set out in s 15, relevantly as follows:
The objective of this Part is to protect the administration of justice and the clients of law practices by providing a system under which persons are eligible for admission to the Australian legal profession only if—
(a)they have appropriate academic qualifications and practical legal training, whether obtained in Australia or elsewhere; and
[7]At the time that Ms Angeleska made her application, it was to be made to the Board of Examiners pursuant to the Legal Profession Act 2004. On 1 July 2015, the Uniform Law came into force with respect to admission to the legal profession. From that date, her application has been treated as one seeking a compliance certificate under s 19 of the Uniform Law.
(b) they are fit and proper persons to be admitted.
Notes
1Admission does not of itself entitle a person to engage in legal practice, but is a prerequisite for being able to apply in this jurisdiction for an Australian practising certificate, which entitles the holder to engage in legal practice.
Section 16 provides that the Supreme Court of Victoria may admit a person to the Australian legal profession if certain requirements are met. The first of these requirements is that the designated local regulatory authority has provided the Court with a compliance certificate in respect of the person, and the certificate is still in force.[8] In Victoria, the designated local regulatory authority is the Board.[9]
[8]The Uniform Law, s 16(1)(a).
[9]Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014, s 10.
Section 17(1) of the Uniform Law sets out the prerequisites for the issue of a compliance certificate. They are that the person:
(a)has attained the academic qualifications specified under the Admission Rules for the purposes of this section (the specified academic qualifications prerequisite); and
(b)has satisfactorily completed the practical legal training requirements specified in the Admission Rules for the purposes of this section (the specified practical legal training prerequisite); and
(c)is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Australian legal profession.
Section 17(2) further provides that, in considering whether a person is a fit and proper person to be admitted, the designated local regulatory authority:
(a)may have regard to any matter relevant to the person’s eligibility for admission, however the matter comes to its attention; and
(b)must have regard to the matters specified in the Legal Profession Uniform Admission Rules (the ‘Admission Rules’).[10]
[10]The Admission Rules are provisions contained in the Legal Profession Uniform Rules made by the Legal Services Council under s 419 of the Uniform Law and published in accordance with s 431.
Section 19(1) permits a person to apply to the designated local regulatory authority for a compliance certificate. Section 19(2) provides for the designated local regulatory authority to request that an applicant provide it with further information within a specified period of time. Section 19(3) provides that the designated local regulatory authority may issue a compliance certificate.
Section 26 of the Uniform Law provides a right of appeal in relation to compliance certificates, relevantly as follows:
(1)An applicant for a compliance certificate may appeal to the Supreme Court against the refusal of the designated local regulatory authority to issue a compliance certificate.
…
(4)The Supreme Court may make any order it considers appropriate on an appeal under this section.
(5)If the Supreme Court decides that an appeal under subsection (1) should be granted, the order may include a direction that the order has the same effect as a compliance certificate provided to the Court by the designated local regulatory authority.
Section 28(1) provides that an appeal under s 26 is to be by way of rehearing, and that further evidence, in addition to or in substitution for, the evidence before the designated local regulatory authority may be given on the appeal. Section 28(2) makes provision for orders as to the costs of an appeal.
We note for completeness that the judge held that, notwithstanding the reference in s 26 to the appeal being one ‘by way of rehearing’, an appeal under s 26 is properly to be understood as an appeal by way of a hearing de novo.[11] There is no challenge to that aspect of her Honour’s decision, which we regard as correct.
[11]Reasons, [7]–[14].
Section 421(3) of the Uniform Law provides that the Admission Rules may require the disclosure of matters that may affect consideration of the question whether the applicant is a fit and proper person to be admitted. Rule 17 of the Admission Rules relevantly provides as follows:
(1)An application for a compliance certificate must include a statutory declaration by the applicant disclosing any matter to which a reasonable applicant would consider that the Board might regard as not being favourable to the applicant when considering whether the applicant is currently of good fame and character and a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Australian legal profession.
(2)It is the duty of every applicant to make a full and complete disclosure of every matter referred to in subrule (1).
(3)Any application including a statutory declaration under subrule (1) must also include original or certified copies of any available documentary evidence relating to any matter disclosed.

Factual background

The applicant commenced her studies in law in 2012 and completed her law degree in 2014.[12] She graduated in 2015 and completed her practical legal training between January and June 2015.[13] She thus satisfied ss 17(1)(a) and (b) of the Uniform Law. The fundamental question for the Board and the trial judge was whether she satisfied s 17(1)(c) — that is, was she a fit and proper person for admission to the Australian legal profession?
[12]Reasons, [82], [85].
[13]Reasons, [1].
As the trial judge observed, the applicant’s circumstances are unusual in that she has had a quite complicated involvement as a participant in various litigation over a lengthy period of time.[14] The way that she conducted herself in that litigation is relevant to the question of whether she is now a fit and proper person to be admitted to legal practice. Thus it is necessary to summarise the various proceedings in which the applicant has had an involvement,[15] as well as her disclosure in relation to each of those proceedings. As will become apparent, it is also important to note what steps in the various proceedings were taken after the applicant had completed her law degree and her practical training in June 2015.

Litigation involving Mr Slaveski

[14]Reasons, [24].

[15]Reasons, [24]. In many of the proceedings the applicant is referred to as Mrs Slaveski or Mrs Slaveska. For consistency we will refer to her as ‘the applicant’ throughout the judgment, other than when quoting from earlier proceedings.

The first proceeding — the ‘Slaveski proceeding’ — was commenced by the applicant’s husband, Mr Slaveski, in September 2007, claiming damages against Victoria Police.[16] Thirteen incidents were alleged, the first on 8 September 2000 and the last on 7 May 2007. The defendants were the State of Victoria and 23 individual police officers. The trial occupied 115 sitting days. Mr Slaveski, who suffered from several mental illnesses, initially represented himself, and the applicant assisted him as a ‘Mackenzie friend’.[17] The applicant was also a witness in the proceeding. During the course of the proceeding, the applicant was appointed as litigation guardian for Mr Slaveski and acted as a lay advocate.[18] Mr Slaveski was partially successful in that proceeding, in relation to claims of trespass concerning one of the incidents.[19] He was awarded damages of $28,300.[20]
[16]Slaveski v State of Victoria [2010] VSC 441, [1], [518] (Kyrou J) (‘Slaveski Trial’).
[17]Slaveski Trial [2010] VSC 441, [52].
[18]Slaveski Trial [2010] VSC 441, [52].
[19]Slaveski Trial [2010] VSC 441, [5], [1457]–[1459].
[20]Slaveski Trial [2010] VSC 441, [5].
In his reasons for judgment, Kyrou J made various observations about the applicant’s conduct as litigation guardian and lay advocate. First, he said this:
By any measure, acting as Mr Slaveski’s litigation guardian without legal representation was always going to be a difficult task for Mrs Slaveska. She had to conduct a large and complex trial over several months virtually on her own. She had to read a large number of documents; to prepare detailed questions for 17 of her own witnesses as well as for 40 defence witnesses, which included 34 experienced police officers and three experts; to learn the rules of evidence and trial procedures; and to perform her task in the face of constant outbursts from Mr Slaveski. It is likely that most lay people would have found the burden too onerous and would have given up. To her credit, Mrs Slaveska had the courage to persevere and she worked tirelessly in the pursuit of Mr Slaveski’s claims. I have no doubt that no other lay advocate could have done a better job in presenting his case.[21]
[21]Slaveski Trial [2010] VSC 441, [76].
However, his Honour also made a number of criticisms of her conduct of the case, including that she:
(a)asked questions of witnesses that were aimed at embarrassing witnesses or which contained ‘not-so-subtle threats’ that a witness would be sued;[22]
(b)put matters to witnesses without any factual foundation and irresponsibly accused all but four of the 40 witnesses she cross-examined of lying to the Court;[23]
(c)became argumentative on occasion and continued to be so despite an explanation as to why the conduct was improper and a warning not to continue;[24] and
(d)failed to observed time limits set by the judge for examination of witnesses;[25]
(e)caused delays by her conduct or late advised non-attendance at court;[26] and
(f)made speeches ‘for the record’ on occasion.[27]
[22]Slaveski Trial [2010] VSC 441, [78].
[23]Slaveski Trial [2010] VSC 441, [78].
[24]Slaveski Trial [2010] VSC 441, [79].
[25]Slaveski Trial [2010] VSC 441, [80].
[26]Slaveski Trial [2010] VSC 441, [81].
[27]Slaveski Trial [2010] VSC 441, [83].
In relation to the applicant’s evidence in the Slaveksi proceeding, Kyrou J said as follows:
Mrs Slaveska had a genuine recollection of some of the key events and made some concessions. I have therefore accepted some aspects of her evidence. Most of her evidence, however, was rehearsed, self-serving, selective and exaggerated. Some parts were improvised, while others were simply fanciful.
In cross-examination, Mrs Slaveska was sometimes argumentative. She was also reluctant to change her evidence, even when it was directly contradicted by contemporaneous documents that were put to her.
Overall, Mrs Slaveska was an unreliable witness and I have rejected significant portions of her evidence.[28]
[28]Slaveski Trial [2010] VSC 441, [372]–[374] (emphasis added).
As litigation guardian, the applicant filed an appeal from Kyrou J’s decision.[29] The appeal was stayed pending the payment of security for costs.[30] Security for costs was not provided,[31] although in 2012 Mr Slaveksi sent cheques directly to various judicial officers ‘for [his] case to be heard’.[32] On 31 January 2013 the applicant swore an affidavit in which she stated that she had been ‘sacked’ as litigation guardian by Mr Slaveski.[33] That affidavit also dealt with the sending of the cheques to the judges. In that regard, this Court observed as follows:
In her affidavit of 31 January 2013, Mrs Slaveska deposes that Mr Slaveski told her that he had sent the cheques to the judges because he was sure that the money was safe and could not trust the Supreme Court registry. She says she ‘did not think anything of that because they were legit cheques and for a ‘legit’ reason’.
…
There is no acceptable explanation as to why the six cheques were sent. This flagrantly disregarded the terms of the order, which very clearly specified the Court officers who were to be the recipients and custodians of the security. We do not accept that Mrs Slaveska did not understand that the orders required the money to be paid to the Prothonotary or the Senior Master. … Further, the conduct demonstrated the obvious incapacity of both Mr Slaveski and Mrs Slaveska to comply with the orders of the Court.[34]
[29]Slaveski v State of Victoria (Victorian Court of Appeal, Neave JA and Vickery AJA, 1 February 2013) (‘Slaveski Appeal’).
[30]Slaveski Appeal (Victorian Court of Appeal, Neave JA and Vickery AJA, 1 February 2013), [4], [7].
[31]Slaveski Appeal (Victorian Court of Appeal, Neave JA and Vickery AJA, 1 February 2013), [9].
[32]Slaveski Appeal (Victorian Court of Appeal, Neave JA and Vickery AJA, 1 February 2013), [11].
[33]Slaveski Appeal (Victorian Court of Appeal, Neave JA and Vickery AJA, 1 February 2013), [12]. As their Honours pointed out at [13], that purported ‘sacking’ was ineffective, because it is for the Court to determine whether a litigation guardian appointed by the Court should be removed.
[34]Slaveski Appeal (Victorian Court of Appeal, Neave JA and Vickery AJA, 1 February 2013), [19], [21].
This Court made a costs order against the applicant (as litigation guardian) and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.[35] An application for special leave to the High Court was refused.[36] The costs order was a general order for costs, which have never been quantified, taxed, demanded or paid.
[35]Slaveski Appeal (Victorian Court of Appeal, Neave JA and Vickery AJA, 1 February 2013), [24]–[25].
[36]Slaveski v State of Victoria [2013] HCASL 84 (Kiefel and Keane JJ).
The next proceeding — the ‘first contempt proceeding’ against Mr Slaveski — arose out of events that occurred on 2 June 2010 in the Slaveski proceeding, where Mr Slaveski had ‘an extraordinary and protracted outburst of anger and abuse’.[37] The applicant was involved in that proceeding as a witness.[38]
[37]R v Slaveski [2011] VSC 643 (Whelan J), [4]–[5].
[38]R v Slaveski [2011] VSC 643 (Whelan J), [83].
The third proceeding was an application in 2012 by the Attorney-General to have Mr Slaveski declared a vexatious litigant.[39] Mr Slaveski appeared in person. The applicant was present throughout the trial and assisted with the preparation of the case. Part way through the trial, the applicant was appointed litigation guardian due to Mr Slaveski’s mental health issues. Mr Glick KC informed the Court that he would appear for Mr Slaveski through the Bar’s pro bono scheme and would take instructions from the applicant. The matter was then adjourned to permit the preparation of material. After it resumed, there was an altercation between Mr Slaveski and court officers, after which the applicant dismissed Mr Glick KC and she and Mr Slaveski failed to attend the remainder of the hearing. Mr Glick KC then appeared as amicus curiae in support of Mr Slaveski. The judge hearing that application made the declaration sought by the Attorney-General.
[39]Attorney-General v Slaveski [2014] VSC 48 (Williams J).

The applicant attempted to file a notice of appeal and a summons seeking extension of time to apply for leave to appeal against the vexatious litigant declaration, naming Mr Slaveski as appellant in his own right. Amended relief sought the appointment of the applicant as litigation guardian in the proceeding. The Court of Appeal refused the application to be appointed litigation guardian and, given Mr Slaveski remained absent from Australia, dismissed the summons seeking an extension of time and leave to appeal without adjudication on the merits.[40]
[40]Slaveski v Attorney General (Vic) [2015] VSCA 31, [1].
The next proceeding — the ‘second contempt proceeding’ — was commenced by the Attorney-General alleging contempt by Mr Slaveski in relation to the sending of the cheques to judges and in relation to threatening or intimidatory contact with judicial officers and solicitors.[41] The applicant appeared at various interlocutory hearings in this proceeding, because Mr Slaveski was not in Australia. King J convicted Mr Slaveski on 12 August 2015. The applicant made submissions on sentence on 15 August 2015. An appeal against conviction and sentence was attempted. It appears that the applicant filed the appeal documents because Mr Slaveski remained absent from Australia. The appeal was dismissed without adjudication of the merits by reasons of Mr Slaveski’s absence from and refusal to submit to jurisdiction.[42] This Court noted that there was ‘scandalous content’ in the proposed grounds that the applicant was ‘convicted in conspiracy’.[43] Leave to appeal was refused.

The applicant’s own proceeding

[41]The Queen v Slaveski [2015] VSC 400.

[42]Slaveski v The Queen [2015] VSCA 264 (Priest JA and Croucher AJA).

[43]Slaveski v The Queen [2015] VSCA 264, [3] (Priest JA and Croucher AJA).

The applicant commenced a proceeding in the Supreme Court on 24 November 2011, seeking damages against the State of Victoria and 24 other defendants, concerning 17 alleged incidents (the ‘Angeleska proceeding’). The proceeding included a large number of incidents and defendants in common with the Slaveski proceeding in which Kyrou J had given judgment on 1 October 2010. The Angeleska proceeding was largely summarily dismissed by Lansdowne AsJ on 1 November 2013. However, two incidents were struck out with leave to replead and one incident survived.
The applicant appealed Lansdowne AsJ’s orders.[44] On 10 June 2015 this Court concluded that although her claims for damages for personal injury were time barred, some claims survived.[45] However, the Court held that the surviving claims were an abuse of process.[46] There was two reasons for this conclusion:
(a)first, the writ was issued over a year after the delivery of reasons by Kyrou J and no satisfactory explanation for the delay had been offered; and
(b)secondly, the claims attempted to relitigate controversies that had been resolved in Mr Slaveski’s proceeding in which, although not a party, the applicant was intimately involved, such that re-litigation would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.[47]
This Court ordered that the costs of the appeal be paid by the applicant. Her application for special leave was refused by the High Court.
[44]Slaveska v State of Victoria [2015] VSCA 140 (Warren CJ, Tate JA and Ginnane AJA).
[45]Slaveska v State of Victoria [2015] VSCA 140, [229] (Warren CJ, Tate JA and Ginnane AJA).
[46]Slaveska v State of Victoria [2015] VSCA 140, [229] (Warren CJ, Tate JA and Ginnane AJA).
[47]Slaveska v State of Victoria [2015] VSCA 140, [175]–[176] (Warren CJ, Tate JA and Ginnane AJA).
The outcome of those appellate processes was that after 10 June 2015 the applicant’s claims in relation to three alleged incidents remained on foot. The proceeding was adjourned on various occasions to permit amendments to her statement of claim to be prepared and considered.
In 2016 the applicant sought to amend her statement of claim. The defendants sought a stay of the Angeleska proceeding pending the payment of gross costs. On 18 November 2016 Lansdowne AsJ refused the amendments to the statement of claim, ordered that the applicant pay an interlocutory costs order made against her of $19,000, and stayed the proceeding pending the payment of those costs.[48] In her reasons concerning the grant of the stay, her Honour said this:
At least a significant reason for the plaintiff continuing to press paragraphs to which the defendants had taken legitimate objection was the plaintiff’s desire to use it as a negotiating tool in her quest to be relieved of her costs liability arising from her husband’s proceeding. It is not illegitimate for parties to seek to negotiate all matters in dispute, including multiple proceedings, between them collectively. However, where the reason for occasioning unnecessary cost and delay to the other party in one proceeding is to secure the release of an obligation owed to that party in another proceeding, the conduct verges on abuse of process. That is my view of the plaintiff’s conduct in refusing to withdraw the contested paragraphs. It is a serious reason for the exercise of the power to grant a stay, and conduct that justifies the defendants seeking that the plaintiff pay at least some of her existing cost liability to them in this proceeding, before being permitted to continue it.[49]
[48]Her Honour’s reasons for judgment were delivered on 21 September 2016 (see Angeleska v State of Victoria (No 3) [2016] VSC 568), and orders giving effect to those reasons were made on 18 November 2016.
[49]Angeleska v State of Victoria (No 3) [2016] VSC 568, [153] (emphasis added).
The applicant appealed Lansdowne AsJ’s orders. On 1 May 2017 J Forrest JA dismissed the appeal and ordered that the Angeleska proceeding be summarily dismissed if the applicant did not pay the $19,000 costs order within three months.[50] His Honour stated that the reasons given by Lansdowne AsJ in relation to the applicant’s ‘conduct of the case and her motivation for its continuation support the making of such an order.’[51] The costs were not paid, and as a consequence the Angeleska proceeding was summarily dismissed.

The applicant’s New South Wales litigation

[50]Angeleska v State of Victoria (No 5) [2017] VSC 238, [53]–[54].

[51]Angeleska v State of Victoria (No 5) [2017] VSC 238, [51].

In 2010 the applicant was involved in an altercation with police in Sydney, which resulted in criminal charges against her for assault occasioning actual bodily harm in the company or others and common assault.[52] The charges were ultimately withdrawn. The applicant had commenced two judicial review proceedings in the New South Wales Supreme Court in relation to those charges.
(a)The first, commenced in April 2011, sought an order transferring the committal proceeding from one local court to another local court, based on a claim of unfair treatment by three magistrates who had dealt with the matter. That application was dismissed in August 2011.[53]
(b)The second, commenced in September 2011, sought judicial review of an order made by a magistrate refusing an application to have the police witnesses give oral evidence at the committal proceeding.[54] However, by February 2012 a number of charges had been withdrawn or amended, so that only summary charges remained.[55] There would thus be no committal hearing.[56] Nonetheless the applicant sought to proceed with her judicial review application. The application was dismissed as being frivolous.[57]

The Elenchevski proceeding

[52]Slaveski v Connell [2012] NSWSC 810, [3] (Beech-Jones J).

[53]Slaveski v Longley LCM [2011] NSWSC 933 (Fullerton J).

[54]Slaveski v Connell [2012] NSWSC 810, [5], [8] (Beech-Jones J).

[55]Slaveski v Connell [2012] NSWSC 810, [10] (Beech-Jones J).

[56]Slaveski v Connell [2012] NSWSC 810, [13] (Beech-Jones J).

[57]Slaveski v Connell [2012] NSWSC 810, [24] (Beech-Jones J).

In or around 2010 the applicant assisted her mother-in-law in a County Court proceeding relating to a property in Macedonia sold to her mother-in-law by the defendant, Mr Elenchevski. In an affidavit filed in that proceeding in June 2010 the applicant deposed to her belief that her mother-in-law’s previous solicitor had conspired with the defendant’s solicitor so that her mother-in-law would be unrepresented at trial ‘so they can get costs against her’.[58] She sought leave to represent her mother-in-law in that proceeding, but leave was refused on 8 October 2010.[59]

The Rotstein proceeding

[58]Slaveska v Elenchevski [2010] VCC 1383, [17] (Judge Anderson).

[59]Slaveska v Elenchevski [2010] VCC 1383 (Judge Anderson).

In 2012 John Dixon J heard an appeal from the Magistrates’ Court order for payment of outstanding legal fees to Rotstein & Associates associated with acting in proceedings brought against Mr Slaveski by the Commonwealth Bank.[60] The applicant sought to have his Honour disqualify himself on the ground of apprehended bias if he held any Commonwealth Bank shares.[61] The application alleged a conspiracy between the Commonwealth Bank’s lawyers and Rotstein & Associates acting for Mr Slaveski, which John Dixon J described as ‘scurrilous’ and ‘unsupported by evidence’.[62]

The applicant’s disclosure in relation to her application for a compliance certificate

[60]Slaveski v Rotstein & Associates [2012] VSC 435.

[61]Slaveski v Rotstein & Associates [2012] VSC 435, [7] (John Dixon J).

[62]Slaveski v Rotstein & Associates [2012] VSC 435, [13] (John Dixon J).

On 19 March 2015 the applicant filed a notice of intention to apply for admission, pursuant to the admissions procedures in the then applicable Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2008. In support of her application she swore an affidavit of disclosure (the ‘first disclosure affidavit’) on 3 June 2015. She swore nine subsequent affidavits making further disclosures. Many of the subsequent affidavits responded to requests for further information made by the Board. Some of the affidavits updated information concerning previously disclosed matters, and some disclosed new events. Seven of them were substantive in nature, whereas two (the fourth and the fifth affidavits) corrected administrative errors in the attachment of exhibits.
In the first disclosure affidavit the applicant disclosed her involvement as litigation guardian in the Slaveski proceeding, as follows:
11.On or about January 2010, I was appointed a litigation guardian by his Honour Kyrou J of the Supreme Court of Victoria in relation to a civil case that my husband had (Slaveski v State of Victoria). It was a case against 23 serving and former police members. I was appointed his litigation guardian and was also his lay advocate for conducting the matter. His Honour Kyrou J was the hearing judge in the case. I spent considerable time during this trial in the Supreme Court. I was also called and known as Mrs Slaveska. The evidence was finalised on 22 June 2010, and his Honour adjourned the case until August 2010 for submissions. A decision/judgment was made on 1 October 2010.
12.On or about 10 December 2010, there was a further hearing in relation to costs. I was ordered to pay part cost of the defendants on the basis that I was the litigation guardian for the plaintiff.
However, she did not expressly refer to her involvement in the two contempt proceedings against Mr Slaveski or her involvement in the vexatious litigant proceeding.
The applicant disclosed the Angeleska proceeding in her first disclosure affidavit as follows:
13.I also have my own civil proceeding in which I am seeking damages and am currently awaiting an outcome from the Court of Appeal. I was represented by [counsel] both assisting me via the Duty Barristers’ Scheme.
She disclosed the Elenchevski proceeding as follows:
14.I have also been in the County Court and Supreme Court of Appeal assisting a family member (my mother-in-law) but only with leave of the Court.
She disclosed the New South Wales criminal charges, relevantly as follows:
15.On or about July 2010, my family and I went to Sydney NSW to visit my husband who was in Sydney. The first night we arrived there we were pulled up by two police officers allegedly for a seatbelt matter.
16.My husband got out of the car at the request of the two police officers and showed them that the children do have seatbelts. While they were discussing I overheard the police officers ask him to surrender his mobile phones. My husband refused to give away his mobiles as he had recordings/evidence in relation to some police officers in Melbourne as his Trial had just finished with the evidence but it was adjourned until August 2010 for submissions.
17.As a result there was a slight scuffle which escalated when more police officers attended. ...
18.We were all arrested including the children (aged then 16, 15, and 13) and put in cells for three and a half hours and then released with no charges except for my husband.
19.1immediately notified the Supreme Court of Victoria (Justice Kyrou) as he was the trial Judge and I was the Litigation Guardian and a lay advocate, for my husband, as I believed it had something to do with some of the defendants. The trial was a law suit against 23 serving police members of Victoria. …
20.However, I filed a complaint to the Police Chief Commissioner … . Instead of the Commissioner investigating the matter, they filed charges on or about November 2010 (five months later) against me and my three young children that allegedly we assaulted all the police officers.
…
22.My charges were withdrawn / dismissed in Burwood Local Court by the request of the Prosecution after several attendances to the Burwood Court NSW.
The applicant exhibited to her affidavit a copy of the order from the Burwood Local Court. However, the applicant did not disclose her judicial review proceedings in the New South Wales Supreme Court.
In her first disclosure affidavit the applicant also disclosed:
(a)her receipt of payments from Centrelink to which she was not entitled, in 2013, and the fact that she was then repaying that money;
(b)a fine she received for travelling on public transport without sufficient funds on her Myki, in November 2014; and
(c)a copy of a ‘Demerit Point Extract’ from VicRoads showing her speeding fines for the past five years, showing speeding fines in 2011, 2012 and 2014.
In her first disclosure affidavit the applicant did not disclose her involvement in the Rotstein proceeding. Nor did she disclose the fact that she had been the subject of a finding of academic misconduct by LaTrobe University in relation to assessment submitted in fulfilment of her Bachelor of Arts degree, in 2010.
A week after she had sworn the first disclosure affidavit, the applicant met with representatives of the Board.[63] She was asked about a document that had been sent by LaTrobe University to the Board that recorded a finding of academic misconduct against her. The finding related to the submission of work with substantially copied content.
[63]Reasons, [48].
On 6 July 2015, following that meeting, the applicant swore her second disclosure affidavit, explaining her failure to disclose the academic misconduct finding. Her explanation was that she understood the document would be sent directly to the Board by the University and she thought that that was part of her disclosure. She thus did not think that she needed to disclose this matter in her first disclosure affidavit. She stated that she had no excuse for copying material from the internet, and that she was embarrassed and ashamed of herself. She said that she did not understand why she appealed against the decision, and that she accepted that it was wrong for her to appeal and question her mark.
The applicant’s second disclosure affidavit also provided some updated information concerning her application for leave to appeal in the Angeleska proceeding.
On 27 July 2015, following receipt of the second disclosure affidavit, the Board wrote to the applicant seeking further particulars in relation to her involvement in the Slaveski proceeding and seeking her response to various comments made by Kyrou J in his Honour’s judgment. The letter also sought further information in relation to the various matters disclosed in her first disclosure affidavit, namely:
(a)the situation regarding the costs orders made against her;
(b)further details of the Angeleska proceeding;
(c)further details of assistance provided to her mother-in-law in the County Court proceeding;
(d)details of the complaint filed with the New South Wales Police Chief Commissioner; and
(e)further particulars of the Centrelink overpayments.
The letter also raised a number of matters that had not to date been the subject of disclosure.
(a)The Board referred to certain observations about the applicant made by Whelan J in the first contempt proceeding against Mr Slaveski in 2011 and requested she respond to those observations.
(b)The Board also sought information in relation to the Rotstein proceeding in 2012, where she had been given limited leave to appear on behalf of Mr Slaveski, and had made an application that John Dixon J disqualify himself on the ground of apprehended bias.
(c)The Board also requested comment in relation to a Court of Appeal observation about an affidavit sworn by the applicant on 21 July 2014 in the appeal in the vexatious litigant proceeding. The Court of Appeal described her affidavit and the transcript it exhibited as ‘incomplete’ and as ‘distorting the hearing’ before King J (the hearing being that in the second contempt proceeding, arising from the sending of the cheques to judges and other conduct).
On 23 September 2015, following receipt of the Board’s letter, the applicant swore a third disclosure affidavit, responding to the matters raised in the letter. In particular:
(a)In relation to the remarks made by Kyrou J concerning her role as litigation guardian and lay advocate for her husband, the applicant deposed as follows:
I was a lay advocate acting for Mr Slaveski (who had a mental illness, as was not capable to run his own trial). I was my self a natural person, who had not studied law. At that time I was in the middle of my Arts degree. Yes I do agree that some questions were embarrassing, and that I had put questions to the witnesses without any factual foundation, but I was not legally trained. I was trying to prove a case in which I was a victim also. As a person back then I could not tell the difference between what is right to ask witnesses and what is wrong. I am a human being and I might have made mistakes, but everything I said or done, I believed at the time was right. Sometimes I would ask questions as I was told by Mr Slaveski as it was his case and I thought it was right at the time. I did the best I could.
She did not accept that she had threatened any witness with being sued. She also maintained that her initial disclosure of her involvement in the Slaveski proceeding was disclosure of ‘the whole judgment’, even though she had not expressly referred to particular paragraphs in the judgment where Kyrou J was critical of her. She also drew the Board’s attention to positive statements his Honour made about her conduct of the proceeding, and provided copies of transcript, including her apology to Kyrou J.
(b)In relation to costs orders made against her, the applicant deposed that in relation to the order made in the Slaveski proceeding, no quantum had been provided, nor had any demand for payment been made. In relation to the order made in the Angeleska proceeding, she disclosed that an adverse costs order had been made on 13 August 2015, after her earlier affidavits, and that she had sought special leave to appeal those orders.
(c)In relation to the Rotstein proceeding before John Dixon J, the applicant stated that she made submissions on behalf of Mr Slaveski, and that he told her to ask the judge to disqualify himself. She stated that she was sorry that she had done so and now knew that it was wrong to do so. She stated ‘I am legally trained now and understand the rules of the Court and the duty to the Court’.

The applicant also disclosed two new matters:
(a)First, she disclosed a matter which occurred on 12 August 2015, when she was present in court when King J delivered judgment in relation to the second contempt proceeding concerning Mr Slaveski. She stated that King J asked her if she wished to say something or put any submissions or doctors’ reports in relation to sentencing. She informed the Court that she did not wish to say anything, but that she would file some written submissions. She produced a copy of those submissions.
(b)Secondly, she disclosed that she had been served a summons by the RSPCA for animal cruelty, and she produced a copy of the summons. She set out the circumstances leading to the summons. She stated that she denied the charges and would appear in court to defend them.
On 24 September the applicant swore a fourth disclosure affidavit, in which she corrected a mistake to an exhibit.
On 28 September 2015 the applicant swore a fifth disclosure affidavit, in which she produced documents she had received from New South Wales police following her application under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW). Those documents included her criminal history, an ‘event summary’, court attendance notices, a ‘facts sheet’ and a ‘court results printout’. These documents did not include any information concerning the applicant’s judicial review proceedings in New South Wales. The applicant also deposed that she disputed the police summary of the charges, that she had entered a plea of not guilty and that the charges were ultimately withdrawn.
By this point it was apparent that a special hearing was likely to be required in relation to the applicant’s application for a compliance certificate. On 13 November 2015, in response to a query by the applicant as to whether any further clarification was required, the Board sent a further letter setting out six matters that were likely to be raised during her evidence, as follows:
(a)whether her disclosure about the proceeding before Kyrou J was adequate;
(b)whether she fully understood the serious nature of allegations she made at the trial before Kyrou J that witnesses were corrupt, participated in conspiracies and fabricated evidence;
(c)the extent to which she has accepted the decision of Kyrou J in light of her subsequent behaviour, including steps taken to appeal that decision, allegations made in the statement of claim the Angeleska proceeding and the submissions made in that proceeding;
(d)having given sworn evidence as to a conspiracy on the part of Victoria Police, whether she still holds that belief, and if so on what basis;
(e)the risk of insolvency should the adverse costs orders be enforced; and
(f)any explanation for her appeal against the academic misconduct finding.
On 22 December 2015 the applicant swore a sixth disclosure affidavit responding to those six matters.
(a)She deposed that disclosing her involvement in the Slaveski proceeding in her earlier affidavit was her ‘full[] disclosure’, and she had disclosed ‘the whole of the case’. She stated that she respected and accepted Kyrou J’s decision. She pointed out that at that time she had no legal training and did not understand the proper procedure, but said that she now did understood. She stated that she did not lie when she gave evidence in the Slaveski proceeding, that she must respect Kyrou J’s ‘view’ and that she could not ‘argue with a Judge’, but reiterated that she believed she was telling the truth.
(b)She deposed that she now understands that ‘unless you have 100% evidence you should not allege anything at Court, but back in 2010 [she] was not aware of that’.
(c)She deposed that she appealed Kyrou J’s decision, but that the appeal was ‘dismissed due to non payment of security for costs, so the Appeal was never heard’. As to the allegations made in the Angeleska proceeding, she stated that her submissions to the Associate Judge were that she is ‘a different plaintiff and not the same as Mr Slaveski’, and that ‘different decisions will be made’. She produced a copy of an order made by the Associate Judge on 14 December 2015 and a copy of her then current proposed statement of claim.
(d)In relation to the Board’s question concerning a conspiracy, she deposed as follows:
The Board further is asking whether I believe there is still such a conspiracy. My answer to that is that : yes in 2010 I believed there was conspiracy, but having said there was and proving that it is two different issues, and ·I accept His Honours decision.
(e)In relation to the costs orders, she deposed that there has been no demand to pay those orders, and nor had they been taxed.
(f)In relation to the academic misconduct, she stated that she believed that she had been truthful with the Board. She stated that the reason she appealed the decision was that she was not happy with her mark, which was a fail. She could not remember the grounds for her appeal. She stated that she had had plagiarism explained to her and understands it is wrong.
On 28 August 2018 the applicant swore her seventh disclosure affidavit, in which she updated matters since February 2016, when a directions hearing had occurred. She disclosed the outcome of the RSPCA charge, namely a diversion order. She disclosed a further traffic offence. She also deposed to her negotiations with Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office (‘VGSO’) regarding her costs liabilities. In relation to the order that she pay $19,000 in costs in the Angeleska proceeding, she stated as follows:
I was ordered I pay a sum or $19,000 to VGS [sic] if I want my case to continue further, and if I don’t pay that sum my Statement of Claim will be discontinued / dismissed. As I did not want to proceed with any claims I just did not pay the sum I was ordered and my claim was dismissed.
She also produced correspondence between her and the VGSO in relation to her costs liability in the Angeleska proceeding. In an email she sent to the VGSO, she said as follows:
I did not pay those cost as I didn’t want to go ahead with any proceedings anymore as I have advised [the VGSO] including the Court as I wanted to settle and finish it, but as you didn't wanted to settle with me that is the reason I didn't pay those $19,000 as I knew my case will be dismissed if I don't pay.
I don't believe you are fair to ask for any costs now as I really reached out on numerous occasions to settle but was rejected. Also a Barrister … spoke to [the VGSO] in the past (on or about February – March 2017) and [the VGSO] reassured us that we will settle but nothing was done .
…
However, finally even if you wanted me to pay those funds I can not afford to pay you anything as I do not work, but unless you want to give me/ offer me a job then I can repay you weekly from my wages.
But please NOTE that I didn't go a head as I didn't wanted to proceed any further with no claims and I wanted to finalise it once and for all.
In relation to the costs of the Slaveski proceeding, she deposed that she has ‘not heard from VGS or Victoria Police’ asking for any costs.
In March 2019 the Board sought an update from the applicant in relation to the costs orders and she swore her eighth disclosure affidavit on 13 May 2019, to the effect that the costs orders remained outstanding. The Board then wrote to the VGSO about the costs orders, and in response were informed that the VGSO was awaiting instructions regarding enforcement. The Board informed the applicant that it regarded her payment of costs owed to Victoria Police to be a ‘threshold matter’ and that her application would not be considered until the costs issue was resolved. The applicant then swore a ninth disclosure affidavit on 21 July 2020, in which she described the resolution of the costs issue in the Angeleska proceeding, by which the parties agreed she would pay $10,000 in satisfaction of her costs debt in relation to the Angeleska proceeding (which was comprised of $19,000 pursuant to the interlocutory costs order, together with the costs of her appeal and application for leave to appeal in this Court, and the costs of her appeal before J Forrest JA). That resolution did not include the costs debt owed in relation to the Slaveski proceeding.
On 28 September 2020, following the eighth disclosure affidavit, the Board sought information (including the production of documents) regarding:
(a)the outstanding costs in the Slaveski proceeding;
(b)information about other costs issues, including whether she had made a statement of intent not to comply with costs orders in 2010, and why she had not disclosed the costs order made against her by the New South Wales Supreme Court;
(c)the criminal proceeding and the judicial review litigation in New South Wales, and an explanation of why she had not expressly disclosed the judicial review litigation; and
(d)the affidavit sworn by her in the Elenchevski proceeding in which she alleged conspiracy by a solicitor; and
(e)various other matters arising from the litigation in which the applicant had been involved.
The Board also requested two character statements from persons who could attest ‘to any changes in [her] character since [she had] completed [her] legal studies and ceased being engaged in litigation’.
On 25 November 2020, following receipt of the Board’s letter, the applicant swore her tenth disclosure affidavit. In relation to the various requests for documents, the applicant stated that she no longer had any relevant documents. In relation to the specific questions from the Board concerning her costs liabilities, she deposed as follows:
1.No agreement has been reached with the costs orders in Slaveski v Victoria. It is now over 10 years old and I am told that those costs are statute barred.
2.No arrangements have been made in whole or in part in any relation to the costs order made by the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 23 February 2001.
3.At present, I have resolved all outstanding cost orders against me.
4.I believed I had referred to [the NSW Supreme Court costs order] on 3 June 2015 in my affidavit when I advised the Board of the Sydney matter. I was unaware that these matters were in some way different and believe them to be all part of the one proceeding.
In relation to the New South Wales judicial review proceedings, she deposed that she had no documents from those proceedings, and again stated that she had referred to these matters in her affidavit of 3 June 2015, because she was ‘unaware that these matters were in some way different’ and she believed them ‘to be all part of the one proceeding’.
As the trial judge observed, the applicant’s tenth disclosure affidavit ‘was a literal response to the request, which mostly asked for documentary evidence relevant to particular issues. It did not attempt to provide further explanation in relation to the issues of concern that were identified’.[64]
[64]Reasons, [63].
The Board then delegated its powers to the Committee, which conducted a hearing on 19 April 2021. The applicant gave oral evidence at the hearing and was represented by counsel. On 1 June 2021 the Committee refused to grant the applicant a compliance certificate and provided reasons for its decision. It is not necessary for the purposes of the present application to set out those reasons in any detail. In short, the Committee found that it was not satisfied that the applicant was then a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Australian legal profession.

The trial judge’s decision

As already observed, the applicant exercised her right of appeal under s 26 of the Uniform Law. Her appeal was heard as a de novo appeal by the trial judge on 14 October 2021. The applicant gave oral evidence and was cross-examined.
The trial judge, in comprehensive and careful reasons, first set out the principles applicable to the determination of whether a person is a fit and proper person to be admitted as a legal practitioner, observing that the purpose of the requirement is protective: it ‘serves to protect the public in their dealings with and representation by lawyers, and it protects the public interest in the proper administration of justice’.[65] Her Honour also observed that the disclosure requirement itself is relevant to the question whether a person is fit and proper.[66] She said as follows:
A non-disclosure may be deliberate, going to the heart of the need for candour. Where not deliberate, it may amount to an error of judgment, or an oversight. In such circumstances the non-disclosure is a matter of weight. In attributing weight, at least the following are relevant; the nature of the information, whether and in what circumstances it was brought to the attention of the Board and ultimately disclosed, and whether what is eventually disclosed is capable of leading to a finding of unfitness for admission.[67]
[65]Reasons, [16] citing Wentworth v NSW Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 239, 250–1 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey & Gaudron JJ).
[66]Reasons, [20].
[67]Reasons, [22] (citations omitted).
The trial judge next set out in detail the litigation in which the applicant had been involved and her disclosure in relation to that litigation.[68] She then set out the reasons of the Committee, and a brief summary of the evidence the applicant gave before the Committee, including the following:
[The applicant] explained that by disclosing the fact of her role as litigation guardian in the Slaveski proceeding she believed all other matters were covered by that disclosure because the judgments were publicly available. In 2015 when making the disclosure, having completed her law degree, she confirmed that she did what she thought was right in 2010 as someone without any legal training, and in 2015 she simply disclosed that which she thought was right at the time. As to her conduct in the Slaveski proceeding, she said she agreed it was wrong, was embarrassed now by what she had done, was regretful of it and apologised at the conclusion of the trial to Kyrou J. When asked not about the conduct itself, but about her disclosure of that conduct, she said she now understood that she should have given more details. She repeated a number of times an assurance that the behaviour, now seen to be wrong, will not be repeated. She said had not disclosed the NSW litigation or its details, as she had forgotten them.
There was no explanation given as to what she now understood about her conduct, or why she no longer thought her actions were right. She was asked about the Court of Appeal not accepting her affidavit evidence that she did not know where the costs were to be sent in compliance with the order for payment of security for costs. She said ‘I did what I thought was right at the time, but it will not happen. Now I know how to deal with an order’. She found it difficult to answer how, as a legal practitioner, she would go about evaluating whether or not a client was saying something upon which she should act. She was asked about instituting appeals, in circumstances where she has previously instituted appeals both with prospects of success and with no reasonable prospect of success and agreed that there was a need for a legal practitioner to show discernment when advising on appeals.
In relation to costs, she accepted she was wrong as to the costs recovery being statute barred. She was asked to reconcile the fact of an outstanding costs order against her with being admitted and becoming an officer of the Court. Her answer was that, not having been asked to pay, she said rhetorically ‘how am I going to pay?’
In relation to the finding of Lansdowne AsJ [that the applicant refused offers to settle in relation to costs to obtain leverage to help reduce or avoid costs in the Slaveski proceeding], she was asked why this wasn’t mentioned in her subsequent affidavits and only referred to in the tenth affidavit, only to say the matters were finalised and settled. She said ‘obviously in your view I’m wrong and I accept that’.
She confirmed that it remains her view that she gave truthful evidence before Kyrou J but she accepts that the judge did not believe her. Of her own case she described the ultimate outcome as having settled it. She said that she had honestly produced everything asked of her to the best of her ability and that she wants to put the past behind her and get on with her life.[69]
[68]Reasons, [24]–[44].
[69]Reasons, [67]–[71] (citations omitted).
The trial judge also summarised the evidence the applicant gave in the instant proceeding, as follows:
As to [the applicant’s] questioning of witnesses in the Slaveski proceeding she described the experience as being thrown into the fire and she apologised saying she did not know then, but knew now that an accusation of lying without a proper basis should not be made. If asked now to make similar allegations against a witness, she said she would get advice from her senior principal or from a barrister before acting on such instructions. She described herself as a ‘changed person’. She described attempts to obtain paralegal work, to have an opportunity to demonstrate those changes. She described being punished for something she did ten years ago in not being admitted.
When I asked the applicant what caused that change in her, she described being older, wiser and legally trained, saying ‘what happened before the trial before Justice Kyrou, that will never ever happen again, never, I can promise you that, I’ve learned a lot from my mistakes’.
On the question of outstanding costs, she was asked about negotiations with Victorian Government Solicitors Office shortly prior to the hearing before Lansdowne AsJ in January 2016. She had made two alternate offers, one that she would withdraw the disputed paragraphs in her amended statement of claim and they withdraw their application for costs, or the other that she withdraw her claim entirely and they agree not to pursue costs in her own proceeding or the Slaveski proceeding. She described the negotiating position she took in this email as one where, having assisted everyone by agreeing to be litigation guardian in the Slaveski proceeding, she did ‘not believe I deserve to be liable for any costs.’ She told me that she no longer held that view and when she said, it was ‘not fair for [them] not to negotiate and …I just wanted to have everything clean for my future’, that it was a figure of speech in the negotiation. The Victorian Government Solicitors Office had offered to each walk away from the Angeleska proceeding and would agree to deal in good faith separately over the costs in the Slaveski proceeding. Ms Angeleska wanted everything to be negotiated at once.[70]
[70]Reasons, [73]–[75] (citations omitted).
The trial judge then turned to her consideration of the appeal. Her Honour put to one side the disclosure as to the Myki charge, the Centrelink debt and the RSPCA charge, because they had been disclosed and would not, by themselves, lead to a finding that the applicant was not a fit and proper person. The judge also put to one side the applicant’s academic misconduct, because although the applicant had not disclosed it initially, the judge accepted the applicant’s explanation that the relevant transcript was to be (and in fact was) forwarded to the Board directly. The judge accepted that this was a ‘misunderstanding of the need to disclose matters on oath’, and said that, ‘without more these matters would not … provide a basis to find that [the applicant] is not a fit and proper person’.[71]
[71]Reasons, [77].
The trial judge then turned to the applicant’s disclosure of her involvement in litigation. In relation to the Slaveski proceeding, the judge accepted that the role of litigation guardian was a difficult one for a person without legal qualifications.[72] She said that had the issues arising in the applicant’s application for admission ‘been confined to events now over a decade ago and disclosed with candour’, she could consider ‘whether by conduct, learning or insight, [the applicant’s] outlook has changed since that time’.[73] For the same reason, the judge placed less weight on the affidavit sworn in the Elenchevski proceeding in 2010 because her Honour accepted that ‘with a legal education the inappropriate nature of such accusations may become apparent’.[74]
[72]Reasons, [78].
[73]Reasons, [78].
[74]Reasons, [78].

However, the trial judge had difficulty in accepting that the applicant had a changed outlook when regard was had to the applicant’s later conduct, both during her law degree and even after she had lodged the request for a compliance certificate.[75] In that regard Her Honour considered four matters, in particular.
[75]Reasons, [79].
First, the trial judge noted that the applicant had maintained the Angeleska proceeding throughout the period of her law degree.[76] By the time of the hearing of her appeal, in November 2014, she had completed her degree.[77] The judge observed that the applicant was represented by counsel at the appeal and thus had an opportunity to benefit from legal advice as to her prospects of success and more broadly as to the conduct of her litigation.[78] Nonetheless, she sought special leave to appeal in the High Court in relation to the dismissal of her appeal and the consequential adverse costs order. She then also took a position that delayed the resolution of the surviving claims for an improper purpose. She then launched an appeal against the orders made by Lansdowne AsJ. On that appeal J Forrest J noted the tactical purpose behind her conduct: to try to negotiate a settlement of her costs liability in the Slaveski proceeding. He quoted Lansdowne AsJ’s comment that the applicant’s conduct was verging on ‘an abuse of process’. The trial judge also observed that the applicant’s conduct was inconsistent with the aims of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic).[79]
[76]Reasons, [80].
[77]Reasons, [82].
[78]Reasons, [82].
[79]Reasons, [82].
The trial judge then observed as follows:
To my mind the manner in which Ms Angeleska has conducted herself in her own proceeding, particularly following the Court of Appeal judgment of 10 June 2015 is of greater significance than the conduct that preceded the commencement of her legal training. The conduct of her own litigation and the findings as to the tactical purpose behind the way in which it was conducted demonstrates that despite attaining the formal qualifications she has continued to conduct litigation in a way inconsistent with the obligations of an officer of the court until faced with an ultimatum by the order of J Forrest J – observe the costs order or the proceeding stands dismissed.[80]
[80]Reasons, [83].
The trial judge also recorded that she was troubled by the following statement in the applicant’s seventh disclosure affidavit (which bears repeating):[81]
I was ordered to pay a sum of $19,000 to VGS if I want to continue further, and if I don’t pay that sum my Statement of Claim will be discontinued / dismissed. As I did not want to proceed with any claims I just did not pay the sum I was ordered and my claim was dismissed.
[81]Reasons, [84].
The trial judge observed that this statement misapprehended the nature of the order. It was not an order for security for costs, but an order to pay costs already incurred, and it was simply ignored. While the judge appreciated the difficulty in finalising outstanding costs orders in circumstances where the State did not identify the quantum of costs payable, no such difficulty arose in relation to the costs order in the sum of $19,000. Yet the applicant saw no difference between the two kinds of orders in her negotiation of her costs liabilities: her approach was to negotiate a financially beneficial outcome less than the value of the court orders.[82]
[82]Reasons, [84].
The second matter that the judge considered significant concerned the applicant’s affidavit before the Court of Appeal sworn on 31 January 2013 explaining her response when she learned that Mr Slaveski had sent cheques to individual judges, in circumstances where the order for the payment of security for costs specified that payment be made to the Senior Master of the Prothonotary .[83] The judge said as follows:
The applicant described hearing a conversation between Mr Slaveski and a person at the Supreme Court Registry where Mr Slaveski told the person that he would send cheques to Judges because he did not trust the Prothonotary. She said in evidence before me that she did not think he would act on his words. After the cheques had been sent she deposed asking him why and he said he ‘had dealings with those Judges and was sure the money would be safe’. In this context she concluded she ‘did not think anything of it, if anything he was obeying a Court Order’. The affidavit goes on to describe dealings with the Court in August and October 2012, consistent with a belief that in sending the cheques Mr Slaveski had met Ms Angeleska’s obligation to provide security for costs in the Slaveski appeal. Even allowing that at that time Ms Angeleska was undertaking only the first year of a law degree, she has maintained that belief in
the legitimacy of the actions. Before the Committee her evidence focused only on the fact that she had no knowledge of the cheques being sent until after the event. I have reservations about Ms Slaveska’s insight and awareness of the importance of compliance with Court orders, and perhaps as importantly, what is to be done in order to comply.[84]
[83]Reasons, [85].
[84]Reasons, [85].
The third matter that the trial judge considered significant was the applicant’s actions as litigation guardian in subsequent matters. The judge observed as follows:
In the proceeding before Williams J to have Mr Slaveski declared a vexatious litigant she had agreed to provide instructions to Mr Glick QC as litigation guardian. She left court on 16 September 2013 with Mr Slaveski who on that day she described as being at breaking point when guns were drawn on him in her presence. While it may be understandable that she leave court that day in concern for her husband’s wellbeing, as Mr Slaveski’s legal representative her failure to participate in the balance of the hearing and her dismissal, or acquiescence in Mr Slaveski’s dismissal of Counsel on that day, demonstrates an inability to appreciate the difference between her support of her husband and the role of a litigation guardian. Despite not participating in the balance of the proceeding Ms Angeleska attempted to file an appeal against the order on behalf of Mr Slaveski while he was out of the country and attempted to further the appeal by being appointed his litigation guardian.
As litigation guardian her role was to provide considered instructions in response to legal advice on behalf of a person unable to do so on their own account. I accept Mr Glick QC’s evidence that on other occasions, in conferences with him, she was able to maintain a calming and more dispassionate influence. However, in the conduct and initiation of proceedings on his behalf until 2017 (which brought all avenues for litigation to an end save for outstanding costs negotiations) she has not displayed a degree of judgment or restraint that I would expect from someone who had insight into errors of judgment which might earlier have been explained by ignorance. This causes me to be apprehensive at her ability to provide clients with legal advice that may be measured and dispassionate.[85]
[85]Reasons, [86]–[87].
The fourth matter that the trial judge considered significant was the adequacy and candour of the applicant’s disclosure. In that regard, the judge observed as follows:
Clearly the appellant thought it relevant to disclose the fact of her involvement in the Slaveski proceeding. What is not so clear is why at that time she thought it was relevant. The subsequent detail responded to requests for further information and at times made admission that she now knew that particular conduct was wrong. The subsequent affidavits failed to shed light on why the appellant now understood those things to have been wrong. Rather, the explanation seemed to simply accept that she ‘cannot dispute’ what various judges have written. She maintains her evidence before Kyrou J was truthful in the face of the judge’s strong criticism of parts of its veracity. She has not explained why she now understands that the lodgement of indiscriminate appeals and reviews from adverse outcomes and the manner in which she in which she as a self-represented litigant conducted litigation reflect poorly on a person seeking admission as a legal practitioner. To say that she thought it right at the time does not address the fundamental question for disclosure – the present understanding of why it was not right or acceptable.[86]
[86]Reasons, [88].
The judge concluded that, having heard directly from the applicant, there was little that could be pointed to since 2015 in support of the applicant’s evidence that she has changed and now understands what conduct is required of a legal practitioner.[87]
[87]Reasons, [89].
The trial judge then considered the applicant’s submission that she could be subject to strict conditions upon admission, and said as follows:
These are matters for the local regulatory authority to consider upon admission. Section 47 of the Uniform Law sets out the conditions that the Board may place on a practicing certificate, including that the holder is not authorised to receive trust money or must be subject to supervised legal practice. Section 53 of the Uniform Law provides that the local regulatory authority may impose other discretionary conditions on a practicing certificate, subject to being ‘reasonable and relevant’.
At this stage the local regulatory authority has not been satisfied of a threshold requirement for admission. While the Court’s discretion is wide in regard to making any order it considers appropriate on the appeal,80 this power exists in the context of a refusal to issue a compliance certificate. Therefore, any condition ordered in this proceeding would necessarily have the effect of qualifying the threshold provision of finding the appellant to be a fit and proper person. Given the protective nature of the requirement that only persons who are fit and proper be admitted to practice, it would in my view be inappropriate to qualify that requirement in the exercise of the Court’s discretion. No case was identified to support such an approach. The question of conditions on the applicant’s practicing certificate would be appropriately left for the local regulatory authority to consider at the relevant juncture, where she meets the prerequisites for admission.[88]
[88]Reasons, [91]–[92].
The trial judge also rejected a submission that the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction would be ‘strong’ because ‘it is most unlikely that any judicial officer dealing with her would not know who she was’.[89] Her Honour observed that, even if that were true in the Supreme Court, the same could not be said of all Victorian courts. The judge said this:
But more fundamentally the submission ignores the interests of clients she might represent; persons who would be entitled to ask her to advise them and speak on their behalf on the basis that the Court has admitted her as someone appropriate to do so. It is vital that clients and the Court are entitled to take her at her word.[90]
[89]Reasons, [93].
[90]Reasons, [93].
To the extent that the applicant relied upon supervision, the judge observed as follows:
I accept that as a newly admitted practitioner any person will gain experience with time and will be subject to oversight and supervision by more experienced practitioners. But even a newly appointed practitioner is expected to exercise their duties as an independent and competent practitioner, within the limitations of their experience. It is no answer to say that every exercise of judgment will be informed by the advice of a principal or senior barrister. Judgment is also about knowing when it is necessary to seek such guidance. In this I am not holding Ms Angeleska to any different standard and I am not seeking to punish her in any way for past conduct. I am concerned with the question of whether her disclosure of that conduct demonstrates insight into why her actions were not appropriate. Whether I can be confident in her assurance that such errors would not be repeated depends on my accepting that she has an appreciation of why the conduct was not appropriate in the first place.
When asked about whether, after receiving letters in 2015 requesting further information and matters canvassed at the directions hearing in 2019, she still understood that simply disclosing the fact of the Slaveski proceeding was sufficient, she said that it was what she thought at the time. She said it was at the hearing before the Board (in April 2021) that she understood it was relevant to disclose the way the litigation was conducted saying ‘specifically, my understanding is like to see whether, how I conducted myself during the hearing, if I have done something wrong, and what the – look, it’s for your judgment to decide whether I’m a good and fit and proper person, yes, I understand your requirements now, but I didn’t understand it back then. I just thought its enough to disclose the case’.
I find that the manner of disclosure demonstrates an ongoing serious error of judgment. She proceeded on the basis that comments of judges as to her own conduct (both critical and praiseworthy) were not matters requiring disclosure on oath because they were matters in the public domain about which the Board could inform itself. Without going to honesty, the evident need for disclosure of such matters bears upon her knowledge and her ability: equally important aspects of an inquiry into whether she is a fit and proper person.[91]
[91]Reasons, [94]–[96].
The judge observed that some of the applicant’s conduct in litigation occurred in a substantial period of time, from mid-2015, when she had received all the necessary academic and practical professional training. The judge said as follows:
Despite this, I really struggle to see that, before 2017, the applicant understood the failings demonstrated by the way in which she continued to conduct litigation, and that since that time has had some ‘light bulb’ moment or realisation about the course of her conduct. She is unable to articulate why it reflects poorly on her being a fit and proper person. Nor was there suitably informed character evidence that might illuminate the question of changed appreciation and insight.[92]
[92]Reasons, [97].
Her Honour thus concluded that she was not presently satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person.[93]
[93]Reasons, [98].

The application for leave to appeal

The applicant has now sought leave to appeal the trial judge’s decision to this Court. Her proposed grounds of appeal[94] are as follows:
[94]For convenience, we will refer to the proposed grounds of appeal simply as ‘grounds of appeal’.
(i) Her Honour erred in her discretion in finding that the appellant failed to take into account or give sufficient weight to the fact that the appellant –
(a)The appellant did not seek to be appointed litigation guardian but, rather, she become litigation guardian as no other person was prepared to take on the role;
(b)the appellant is a person of rare intelligence who has achieved against considerable disadvantages a law degree;
(c)the appellant has insight into what has occurred and limited knowledge of the legal process;
(d)the duty of disclosure as it stood at the time that the appellant made her application she would not understood on the face of it to provide the information requested in the Slaveski proceedings;
(e)the appellant commenced making part payments for outstanding costs and is still making part payments for the outstanding costs in the Angeleska proceedings.
(ii) Her Honour erred in fact and law in finding that the appellant had failed to satisfy the burden of proof that she was a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Australian legal profession.
(a)Her Honour failed to take into consideration that the appellant was a person of rare intelligence in a difficult position who had never had a finding made against her of dishonesty and having done the best she could with her limited knowledge of the legal process.
(b)Her Honour erred in finding that the appellant had not demonstrated an understanding of voluntary compliance with a duty of disclosure.
(c)Her Honour erred in finding the Slaveski proceedings have not been properly resolved.
(d)Her Honour erred in finding that were she admitted to practice for the first two years of practice, she would be required to be supervised by a supervising lawyer for two years.
(e)Her Honour erred in finding that the court’s supervisory jurisdiction would not be adequate.
(f)Her Honour erred in not taking into account the appellant would accept any condition the court would think was appropriate.
(g)Her Honour erred in finding there was no answer to say that every exercise of judgment will be informed by the advice of a principal or senior barrister.
(iii) Her Honour erred in finding that the appellant was required to appreciate why her conduct was not appropriate in the first place. Her Honour erred in finding it was necessary for Her Honour to be confident in the assurance of the appellant that such error would not be repeated.
Pursuant to s 14B of the Supreme Court Act 1986, this Court may grant leave only if it is satisfied that the appeal has a real prospect of success. For the reasons that follow, we do not consider that the applicant’s appeal has a real prospect of success.

The parties’ submissions

In her written submissions the applicant submitted that leave ought to be granted because her appeal has ‘strong prospects of success’. However, her written submissions did not address the errors asserted in the application for leave to appeal. Rather, her written submissions addressed certain underlying factual matters, by repeating submissions made and evidence given to the Committee and at trial.
We note that in her written submissions the applicant stated that ‘in each of the proceedings’ she had ‘satisfied each of the costs orders’. This proposition does not appear to be consistent with her later submission that she had ‘done [her] best to resolve the costs orders’ in the Slaveski proceeding. Further, it appeared from that material that the costs payable by the applicant in the Slaveski proceeding have never been paid. In oral submissions, counsel for the applicant confirmed that the applicant had ‘been unable to get a resolution’ of the Slaveski proceeding.
At the hearing of the application for leave to appeal the applicant was assisted by counsel. He addressed the four matters relied upon by the trial judge, set out above.
(a)In relation to the applicant’s conduct of the Angeleska proceeding, counsel submitted that much of that occurred while she was a law student, and that she misunderstood her position. She had pressed that proceeding until the $19,000 costs order was made, but she was unaware of the real import of the costs order; namely that it was not an order for security for costs, but an order for the payment of costs that had to be complied with, regardless of whether she wished to continue her proceeding. He submitted that she had eventually discharged the costs order, after negotiating a settlement with the VGSO. He observed that she would not be the first litigant to have ‘tried to do a deal’ on costs, and that this alone was not a matter that would lead to her not being admitted.
(b)In relation to the sending of the cheques to judges of the Supreme Court, counsel submitted that this was not the applicant’s doing, and that at the time that occurred, and at the time she expressed her view that ‘if anything, he was obeying a court order’, she was not legally trained.
(c)In relation to the applicant’s conduct as litigation guardian for Mr Slaveski, counsel pointed to the evidence given by Mr Glick KC, to the effect that the applicant had been able to provide a calming and measured influence on Mr Slaveski.
(d)In relation to the matters raised by the trial judge concerning the applicant’s disclosure of relevant matters to the Board, counsel submitted that there was no allegation of dishonesty, and that the applicant had disclosed the principal issues that were relevant. He submitted that there were no clear instructions to applicants for admission to the effect that they must disclose adverse comments made by judges, and he pointed out that Kyrou J had made both positive and negative comments about the applicant in the Slaveski proceeding. He submitted that in those circumstances, it was difficult to know ‘what the Board needed to hear’ and that the applicant believed the Board was aware of the proceeding and thought that was sufficient. She disclosed the fact of the proceeding, having been informed by the CEO of the Leo Cussen Centre for Law, where she undertook her practical legal training.

Counsel submitted that the judge erred in taking these four matters into account and in concluding that the applicant was not a fit and proper person.
Counsel further submitted that the trial judge erred in failing properly to consider the fact that the applicant would be supervised for the first two years of practice, and that she would be subject to the Court’s supervision when appearing in court.
The Board made both written and oral submissions in response to the applicant’s submission, which it is not necessary to set out in detail. In particular, the Board emphasised that what was significant in the determination of the issue by the trial judge was the applicant’s understanding of her prior behaviour, and her duty of disclosure, at the time she gave evidence before the trial judge. That is, it was not simply the applicant’s inappropriate conduct, or her inadequate disclosure, that was the gravamen of the judge’s decision, but the applicant’s lack of understanding of and insight into that conduct and that disclosure.
In its written submissions the Board grouped the grounds of appeal by subject matter, and we have adopted the same grouping. However, the submission made in oral argument that the judge erred in taking the four identified matters into account and in concluding that the applicant was not a fit and proper person, as set out above, did not fit neatly into the grounds of appeal as set out in the amended application for leave to appeal. We will thus deal with that submission separately, after we have dealt with the express grounds of appeal.

Consideration of ground (iii)

It is convenient to commence with ground (iii), which is that the trial judge erred in finding that the applicant ‘was required to appreciate why her conduct was not appropriate in the first place’ and in finding that it was necessary for her Honour ‘to be confident in the assurance of the appellant that such error would not be repeated’.
This ground of appeal has no prospects of success. It is inconsistent with the authorities concerning the standard of fitness for admission as a lawyer, and with the protective purpose that underpins the requirement that an applicant be a fit and proper person. As Moffit P observed in Re B, in a passage quoted by the judge:
A person can only be judged by what he has done and what he has professed in the past and, properly judged, what he claims of himself when he makes an application for admission… Character does not change readily and an application for admission or readmission may have some difficulty in persuading a court that his past character or a past outlook manifested by conduct or the profession of ideas which were incompatible with being a barrister, have changed.[95]
[95][1981] 2 NSWLR 372, 381 (Moffit P).
Similarly, in Frugtniet v Board of Examiners, Gillard J observed that
To overcome the presumption based on past conduct the appellant has to show that he has learnt from his past, has pursued a blameless career and life and is a person who is honest and trustworthy.[96]
[96][2005] VSC 32, [18].
The protective purpose of the requirement that a person be a fit and proper person requires that both the courts and the public can place trust and confidence in a legal practitioner. As Pagone J explained in Frugtniet v Board of Examiners:
The requirement for admission to practise law that the applicant be a fit and proper person, means that the applicant must have personal qualities of character which are necessary to discharge the important and grave responsibilities of being a barrister and solicitor. A legal practitioner, upon being admitted to practice, assumes duties to the courts, to fellow practitioners as well as to clients. At the heart of all those duties is a commitment to honesty and, in those circumstances when it is required, to open candour and frankness, irrespective of self-interest or embarrassment. The entire administration of justice in any community which is governed by law depends upon the honest working of legal practitioners who can be relied upon to meet high standards of honesty and ethical behaviour. It is the legal practitioner who is effectively the daily minister and executor in the administration of justice when advising clients, acting for clients, certifying documents, and making presentations to courts, governments, other professionals, and so on. The level and extent of trust placed in what legal practitioners say or do is necessarily high and the need for honesty is self-evident and essential.[97]
[97][2002] VSC 140, [10].
As the trial judge correctly observed, trust and confidence in a legal practitioner goes beyond honesty, and relies partly on the ability of the practitioner to exercise judgement, and to have an insight into the effect and consequences of the manner in which they undertake their legal duties.[98] If a person has engaged in inappropriate behaviour in the course of legal proceedings in the past, it will be necessary for them to persuade the admitting body, not simply that they accept that their earlier behaviour was inappropriate, but that they understand why that was so. Otherwise, there remains a real risk that the person will continue to engage in inappropriate behaviour after being admitted to practice. To certify such a person as a fit and proper person would be to undermine the protective purpose of the Uniform Law.

Consideration of grounds (i)(a), (i)(c) and (ii)(a)

[98]Reasons, [19].

Grounds (i)(a), (i)(c) and (ii)(a) are directed to the fact that the applicant did not seek to take on the role of litigation guardian in the Slaveski proceeding, her conduct in that role, and the fact that she had ‘done the best she could with her limited knowledge of the legal process’. The judge, it is said, failed to take these matters into account or give them sufficient weight.
The contention that the trial judge failed to take these matters into account is plainly untenable in light of her Honour’s reasons. In so far as the complaint is that the judge failed to give these matters sufficient weight, that too is untenable. As the Board submitted, the trial judge’s conclusion that the applicant is not a fit and proper person was not based upon the applicant’s appointment as litigation guardian, or her conduct of the Slaveski proceeding at a time when she had limited knowledge of the legal process. Rather, it was based on the applicant’s continued inappropriate conduct of that and other proceedings during and after her legal studies, and even after her application for admission as an Australian lawyer, and her failure to appreciate the reasons why her conduct was inappropriate at the hearing before the judge in 2021.

Consideration of ground (i)(b)

Ground (1)(b) is that the judge failed to take into account, or give sufficient weight to, the fact that the applicant is ‘a person of rare intelligence who has achieved against considerable disadvantages a career in law’. Again, the proposition that the judge failed to take into account the applicant’s personal characteristics and her completion of her legal studies notwithstanding her disadvantages is untenable in light of the judge’s reasons: her Honour stated that, given the applicant’s background, it was ‘a significant achievement to have completed her academic and practical legal qualifications.[99] We consider that in so far as this ground is directed to weight, it is also untenable. We accept the Board’s submission that, bearing in mind that the role of the Court in admitting a legal practitioner is protective and not punitive, ‘appreciation for Ms Angeleska’s achievements in surmounting significant obstacles in her life to gain a law degree is not a reason to lower the standard required of a fit and proper person’. This matter was one that was of little weight in the resolution of whether the applicant was a fit and proper person.

Consideration of grounds (i)(d) and (ii)(b)

[99]Reasons, [89].

Ground (i)(d) is that the judge failed to take into account, or give sufficient weight to, the fact that at the time she made her application to the Board, she would not have understood that she was required to provide the information later requested in relation to the Slaveski proceeding. Ground (ii)(b) held that the judge erred in finding that the applicant had not demonstrated an understanding of voluntary compliance with the duty of disclosure.
The Board identified the gravamen of the applicant’s submissions on these grounds as being that she had provided information requested, did not conceal anything, and never purposefully failed to disclose information. In response, the Board submitted that the judge accepted that no allegation of dishonesty or deliberate concealment had been made. Rather, the judge found that the manner of the applicant’s disclosure demonstrated an ‘ongoing serious error of judgment’.[100]
[100]Reasons, [96].
We note that in her first disclosure affidavit the applicant stated that she had ‘read and understood the Disclosure Guidelines for Applicants for Admission to the Legal Profession’, and that she was aware of and understood her duty of disclosure. The Disclosure Guidelines, as published in 2015, were not initially before this Court and had not been admitted into evidence before the trial judge. They were provided to this Court after the hearing, but we have not found it necessary to have regard to them.[101]
[101]We note that the Board currently publishes Disclosure Requirements for Applicants for Admission to the Legal Profession, which do not expressly require an applicant for admission to disclose either litigation in which they have been involved (whether as a party or a witness or some other capacity), or adverse comments made about them by judicial officers. Disclosure of involvement in litigation may not be immediately obvious as being relevant to a person not yet admitted to practice. If it has not already done so, some consideration could be given by the Board to the provision of express guidance in this regard, including non-exhaustive examples of the types of litigation that should be disclosed and the necessity to disclose all adverse comments made about an applicant in a litigation context.
The clear requirement, set out in r 17 of the Admission Rules, is that an applicant must disclose any matter to which a reasonable applicant would consider that the Board might regard as not being favourable to the applicant. That would include any matter which does or might reflect negatively on the person’s honesty, candour, respect for the law or ability to meet professional standards. Rule 17 makes clear that a full account of any such matter, including a description of the conduct and relevant documents, ought to be provided.
The judge was, in our view, plainly correct in relation to the applicant’s understanding of, and compliance with, her duty of disclosure. We note that the judge did not impose an overly onerous standard on the applicant. Her Honour accepted that the applicant had an explanation for her failure to disclose the academic misconduct finding, even though the explanation displayed a misunderstanding of the need to disclose matters on oath. That misunderstanding, she held, would not have been sufficient to find that the applicant was not a fit and proper person.[102]
[102]Reasons, [77].
However, in relation to the applicant’s disclosure of her involvement in litigation, the judge considered that, although the applicant responded to the Board’s requests for information, and at times admitted that she now knew that her earlier conduct was wrong, she never explained why she understood her conduct to have been wrong. As the judge correctly pointed out,[103] to admit wrongdoing, and to say that she thought it right at the time, does not address what became the fundamental question for disclosure in the applicant’s case: her present understanding of why her conduct was not right or acceptable. That was the real gravamen of the judge’s concern in relation to disclosure.
[103]Reasons, [88].
Furthermore, while the requirement in r 17 would not necessarily require disclosure of all litigation in which a person had been involved, in our view adverse remarks made by a judge about a person’s conduct in litigation plainly fall within its scope. In addition, the applicant understood that she was required to disclose litigation in which she had been involved, having been told that by the CEO of the Leo Cussen Centre for Law, where she undertook her practical legal training. Further, it is apparent that the applicant was put on notice by the Board in the course of the application process that it expected the applicant to disclose all legal proceedings in which she had been involved, that it was not sufficient disclosure simply to mention or describe the proceeding, that she had to acknowledge and address adverse comments by judicial officers and that she had to acknowledge and obey orders made against her by courts. Notwithstanding this, the applicant failed to disclose the following matters until requested to do so by the Board:
(a)her involvement in the first contempt proceeding;
(b)her involvement in the Rotstein proceeding and her application that John Dixon J disqualify himself; and
(c)her involvement in the vexatious litigant proceeding, and the Court of Appeal’s observation about an affidavit she had sworn in that proceeding.
As noted above, the applicant accepted that she was required to disclose litigation in which she had been involved, having been told that by the CEO of the Leo Cussen Centre for Law, where she undertook her practical legal training. It was for that reason that she disclosed in her first disclosure affidavit her involvement in the Slaveski proceeding, the costs order in that proceeding, the Elenchevski proceeding and the New South Wales criminal charges. But she gave no explanation for failing at that time to disclose the additional matters identified above. These matters were not disclosed by her until she swore her third disclosure affidavit.
Nor did she disclose the judicial review proceedings in New South Wales until these matters were raised by the Board; she then disclosed them in her tenth disclosure affidavit. In that affidavit she stated that she believed that she had referred to the New South Wales Supreme Court costs order in her first disclosure affidavit when she informed the Board of the ‘Sydney matter’ and that she was unaware that these matters were in some way different. This evidenced the same misunderstanding of what she was required to disclose that had already arisen in relation to the Slaveski proceeding, where she had claimed that she had disclosed all the matters concerning Mr Slaveski by informing the Board of the Slaveski proceeding, because she believed they were all part of the same proceeding. That is, even after all of the communications with the Board that ought to have revealed to her the required nature and scope of disclosure, she nonetheless still failed to grasp what was required of her. As the judge observed, her tenth affidavit was a ‘literal response’ to the Board’s letter and did not attempt to provide further explanation of the issues of concern the Board had raised.[104]
[104]Reasons, [63].
Thus in our opinion grounds (i)(d) and (ii)(b) have no prospects of success.

Consideration of ground (i)(e)

Ground (i)(e) is that the judge failed to take into account, or give sufficient weight to, the fact that the applicant has commenced making part payments for outstanding costs and is still making part payments for the outstanding costs in the Angeleska proceeding. At the time of the hearing before this Court, we were informed by the applicant’s counsel that the costs in the Angeleska proceeding were now fully resolved.
An initial observation is necessary in relation to this ground. It is capable of conveying the proposition that the applicant commenced making payments in relation to the several costs orders made against her, and that she is continuing payments only for the outstanding costs in the Angeleska proceeding, the implication being that the other costs orders have been paid in full. That interpretation of this ground would be contrary to the facts as they appeared from the material before this Court; as noted above, no payments have to date been made in relation to the costs order made against the applicant in the Slaveski proceeding; and the status of the costs order made by the New South Wales Supreme Court is unclear. However, the ground is also capable of conveying the proposition that the applicant commenced making payments in relation to the costs orders made against her in the Angeleska proceeding only, and is continuing to make such payments. Rather than inferring that the ground is drafted in a misleading manner, we will assume it is intended to convey the second proposition.
The trial judge was plainly aware of this matter, having referred to it in her judgment.[105] The proposition that her Honour failed to take it into account is untenable. In so far as this ground is directed to weight, it is also untenable. The judge’s concern was not with whether the applicant had or had not, as a matter of fact, paid or commenced to pay the outstanding costs of the Angeleska proceeding. Rather, the judge’s concern was that the order was ‘simply ignored’,[106] at least until the VGSO agreed to accept a lesser sum in satisfaction. In these circumstances the applicant’s part payment of the costs order in the Angeleska proceeding deserved little weight, and the judge did not err.

Consideration of grounds (ii)(d), (ii)(e), (ii)(f) and (ii)(g)

[105]Reasons, [58].

[106]Reasons, [84].

Grounds (ii)(d), (ii)(e), (ii)(f) and (ii)(g), are directed to the trial judge’s rejection of the applicant’s submissions that:
(a)she would be subject to supervision for two years of practice;
(b)the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction would be strong;
(c)she was willing to be subject to strict conditions; and
(d)it was ‘no answer’ to say that every exercise of judgment would be informed by the advice of a principal or senior barrister.
In our opinion, none of these grounds have any prospects of success.
The trial judge approached these issues by observing that conditions on practice are a matter for the local regulatory authority to consider on admission; her Honour considered that any condition she might order ‘would necessarily have the effect of qualifying the threshold finding’ that the applicant is a fit and proper person. In its submissions the Board supported her Honour’s reasoning. It accepted that a person who is fit and proper can be admitted as lawyer subject to conditions, referring to Petsinis v Victorian Legal Services Board, where Mr Petsinis was found to be fit and proper, and then conditions were placed on his admission to practice.[107] The Board contended, however, that the ability of a person to satisfactorily carry out the inherent requirements of practice is an essential characteristic of fitness, and that a condition that a person not practice unsupervised would be tantamount to the Court acknowledging that it is not satisfied the person has that ability. That, it submitted, is fundamentally inconsistent with being satisfied that the person is fit and proper.
[107][2016] VSC 389, [95]–[97] (Warren CJ, Ashley and Weinberg JJA).
We consider that the judge was correct in her approach to the question whether the applicant is a fit and proper person. The ability for an admitting authority to impose conditions on admission arises only once the person has been found to be fit and proper. It is not a basis for a conclusion that a person is fit and proper.
Furthermore, we consider that the judge was correct in her approach to the fact that the applicant would be supervised, the nature of the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction and the applicant’s submission that she would inform ‘every exercise of judgment’ by the advice of a principal or senior barrister.[108] The latter would be inherently impractical and, as the Board submitted, is inconsistent with the applicant possessing the necessary insight and judgment to be regarded as a fit and proper person to be admitted as a lawyer. The fact that all newly admitted lawyers are supervised for two years is not to the point, because all lawyers must exercise a degree of judgment as an independent and competent practitioner, as the judge observed.[109] As for the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, this assumes too much. The Court does not and cannot actively supervise practitioners in such a way as to monitor their practice. As but one example, much of the work of solicitors is never seen by judicial officers. This includes work that solicitors undertake in litigious matters, but is even more so in non-litigious matters. Nor, as the judge pointed out,[110] is it correct that every Victorian judicial officer would know who the applicant is, if and when she appeared in court. Still less would that be true if the applicant used her admission to practice to appear or work in jurisdictions other than Victoria.

The submissions made in oral argument

[108]Reasons, [94].

[109]Reasons, [94].

[110]Reasons, [93].

As set out above, counsel for the applicant submitted that the judge should not have taken into account the four matters identified above, namely:
(a)the applicant’s conduct of her own proceeding, including her failure to comply with the $19,000 costs order;
(b)the applicant’s views about Mr Slaveski sending cheques directly to judges;
(c)the applicant’s conduct as a litigation guardian; and
(d)the applicant’s attitude to disclosure.
This submission is untenable. Each of these four matters were plainly relevant to the question which fell to be answered by the judge, namely: was the applicant a fit and proper person?
In so far as this submission was directed to the content of the judge’s conclusions in relation to these matters, we discern no error in her Honour’s conclusions, or in her overarching conclusion that the applicant had not satisfied the Court that she is a fit and proper person. We have considered the transcript of the evidence the applicant gave before the trial judge, and before the Board, and in our opinion it was well open for the judge to conclude that the applicant had not explained her understanding of why the manner in which she had conducted litigation in the past reflected poorly on her, and that there was little since 2015 to support her evidence that she has changed and now understands what conduct is required of a legal practitioner.[111]
[111]Reasons, [89].
It is plain that, in her oral evidence, the applicant was able to state that she had made mistakes, that she had changed, and that she would not make such mistakes again. But she was unable to articulate clearly her current understanding of why her previous conduct was inappropriate, or what she would do differently in future. By way of example, when asked what she would do differently in relation to her application to amend her statement of claim in the Angeleska proceeding, she said ‘I regret doing that, it’s done, the damage is done, I can’t say I should’ve done this, I should have done that’. She added that she would never again sue a police officer, even if they had ‘bash[ed] her up’, she would ‘just look the other way’. When asked again about how she would have approached her application to amend differently, she said that she would have obtained advice from an experienced barrister or lawyer and acted on that advice. Similarly, when she was asked about her conduct of the Slaveski proceeding, and why it was she said she was a changed person, her answer was vague and general in nature:
Because it’s again three, four years later, I think more, I experienced more, that knowledge to apply is, sometimes even as lawyers, you’ll say, ‘I should have done that differently’, but I'm talking now about me thinking now I should have done it differently. The minute, there was a letter, or order probably, I should have thought, ‘do I need to go further, do I need to step back’. As I said, at the time I thought it was right.
Counsel for the applicant submitted that this passage demonstrated the applicant’s insight into her past conduct. We do not accept that submission. In our view it supports the trial judge’s conclusion that the applicant was, even in 2021, unable to articulate in any concrete sense what she would have done differently.
In light of the matters that the judge canvassed, her Honour was not satisfied that, before 2017, the applicant understood the failings demonstrated by the way in which she continued to conduct litigation, or that since that time the applicant had any realisation about her conduct. The trial judge concluded that the applicant was unable to articulate why her conduct reflected poorly on her being a fit and proper person, and observed that there was no suitably informed character evidence that might have illuminated the question of changed appreciation and insight.[112] That conclusion was amply supported by the evidence the applicant gave before the judge. We note that the judge had the advantage of seeing and hearing the applicant give evidence, in circumstances likely to have been affected by her Honour’s impressions as to the applicant’s credibility and reliability. We would be slow to overturn the judge’s conclusion in those circumstances.[113] But in any event, having read the transcript ourselves, we agree with the judge’s conclusion. Thus, in so far as the applicant’s submissions on the appeal were directed to the judge’s overarching conclusion that she was not satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person, we consider that the judge did not err.
[112]Reasons, [97].
[113]Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129, 148–9 [55] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Edelman JJ); [2019] HCA 28.

Conclusion

For these reasons, we consider that the applicant’s application for leave to appeal has no real prospects of success. We would refuse leave to appeal. The Court wishes, however, to record its appreciation for the assistance given by counsel for the applicant who, we understand, appeared on a pro bono basis.
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[2023] VSCA 220

12 September 2023