Singh v Minister for Immigration
[2018] FCCA 1033
•27 February 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 1033 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial review – decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – refusal of a Partner Visa – whether jurisdictional error. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5CB, 5F, 65 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cl. 801.221, reg. 1.15A(2), reg. 1.15A(3) |
| Cases cited: Ali v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 121 |
| Applicant: | ROBIN SINGH |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | PEG 166 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Kendall |
| Hearing date: | 27 February 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 27 February 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Perth |
| Delivered on: | 27 February 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr J. Raftos |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | AUM Legal |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr P. Hannan |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The application filed on 23 March 2017 and amended on 29 June 2017 is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceedings fixed in the sum of $6,200.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
PEG 166 of 2017
| ROBIN SINGH |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL Second Respondent |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Ex Tempore)
Introduction
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) dated 24 February 2017.
The Tribunal’s decision affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the “Minister”) not to grant the applicant a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) Visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”). The delegate found that the applicant did not satisfy cl.801.221 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the “Regulations”) because the relationship with his visa sponsor was not genuine.
The applicant seeks judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to s.476(1) of the Act. To obtain assistance from this court, the applicant must show jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
The court had in evidence a Court Book numbering 600 pages. The Tribunal’s written decision appears at pages 579 to 592 of the Court Book.
The Court was greatly assisted by written and oral submissions provided by counsel for both the Minister and the applicant and thanks them for the clarity of their submissions.
Background
The Court has reviewed the factual material provided by the parties and adopts the facts as outlined at paragraphs 11 to 52 and 57 to 77 in the first respondent’s written submissions dated 7 February 2018 as the procedural and factual background to these proceedings. These background facts, which were not disputed, provide, relevantly, as follows.
The applicant is a citizen of India, born in Jalandhar, Punjab.
On 20 September 2007, the applicant was granted a Student (Subclass 572) Visa. He arrived in Australia on 8 October 2007.
Before the Tribunal, the applicant contended that he first met his sponsor (who was born in Australia) in April 2008.
On 27 October 2008, the applicant’s sponsor and the applicant were married.
On 22 August 2009, the sponsor gave birth to the applicant’s child.
On 14 October 2009, on the basis of his relationship with the sponsor, the applicant made a combined application for:
a)a Partner Temporary Subclass 820 Visa (Temporary Partner Visa); and
b)a Partner Resident Visa.
On 12 March 2010, the applicant was granted a Temporary Partner Visa.
On 4 February 2013, while the applicant’s Partner Resident Visa was being processed, the applicant was convicted in the District Court at Perth of two child sex offences. He was sentenced to a total period of imprisonment of two (2) years and nine (9) months.
In May 2015, the Minister sent officers to the village of Jalandhar, Punjab in India to conduct a site visit. The applicant’s mother lived in this village. She was interviewed by the officers. During the interview, she is alleged to have said (although the applicant has disputed this):
a)the applicant had been studying in Australia but he had left his studies;
b)the applicant had married the sponsor but had done so to get permanent residency in Australia; and
c)she was aware that the applicant and the sponsor had a child but did not know the child’s date of birth.
A report was made of this visit and a copy was sent to the applicant. The applicant responded to this report by sending various emails to the department providing, amongst other things, photos and copies of Facebook posts.
As noted above, on 5 November 2015, a Ministerial Delegate made a decision not to grant the applicant a Partner Visa on the basis that the Delegate was not satisfied that the relationship between the applicant and his sponsor was “genuine” (as required by sections 5F and 5CB of the Act).
On 9 November 2015, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s decision.
Between 7 and 12 October 2016, the applicant provided the Tribunal with numerous statutory declarations, photos and documents in support of his matter before the Tribunal.
A hearing before the Tribunal was held on 19 October 2016 with the applicant, his sponsor, the sponsor’s mother and the applicant’s mother giving evidence at the hearing.
On 19 October 2016, the Tribunal directed that the applicant provide further information to the Tribunal by 21 October 2016. The applicant provided the Tribunal with a large bundle of documents and an email attaching some photos.
On 24 February 2017, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate’s decision.
The Tribunal determined that the issue for its consideration was whether the applicant’s relationship with the sponsor met the definition of “spouse” as defined in s.5F of the Act. The Tribunal concluded that it did not.
In determining that the applicant’s relationship with his sponsor did not meet the definition of “spouse”, the Tribunal made the following findings:
a)the applicant and his sponsor had lived together and had had some form of relationship since 2008;
b)the applicant and the sponsor had had a child together;
c)the applicant had some responsibility for his own child and for the sponsor’s other two children (those children being from a different relationship);
d)the applicant’s marriage to the sponsor was valid for the purposes of the Act (as required by s.5F(2)(a) of the Act) but the applicant’s motives for marrying the sponsor were not honourable;
e)the applicant was at times an unreliable witness; in particular, in relation to the sponsor’s Centrelink benefits;
f)the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant and the sponsor had a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife;
g)the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant’s sponsor did not live separately and apart on a permanent basis; and
h)the applicant did not meet cl.801.221(2)(c) of the Regulations because the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was the “spouse” of the sponsor.
On 23 March 2017, the applicant filed an application for judicial review in this Court seeking an order for the issue of constitutional writs.
On 30 June 2017, the applicant filed an amended application which relied on six grounds of review, as follows:
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) committed jurisdictional error by:
1. Failing to give any or adequate weight to a relevant consideration namely the length of the applicant’s and respondent’s (sic) relationship and period of cohabitation.
PARTICULARS
The Tribunal acknowledged the evidence demonstrated that the sponsor and applicant “have a form of relationship” and “appear” to have lived together for periods since their marriage in 2008 at paragraphs 9, 19 and 106 but failed to consider this evidence in any real or active way.
2. Failing to give any or adequate weight to a relevant consideration namely the childcare responsibilities of the applicant’s to the children of the relationship.
PARTICULARS
The Tribunal acknowledged existence of a child to the applicant and sponsor at paragraphs 10 and 107 of the decision and the childcare responsibilities of the applicant for all of the children of the applicant and respondent, see paragraph 56, but otherwise failed to consider this evidence in any real or active way.
3. Illogically and unreasonably rejected probative evidence.
PARTICULARS
The Tribunal at paragraph 76 decided to give “no weight” to 14 witness statutory declarations filed in support of the application. In doing so failed to disclose any genuine evaluation of the statutory declarations or any process of weighing the evidential value of the material.
4. Illogically and unreasonably decided the parties were not “financially committed to each other”.
PARTICULARS
The Tribunal came to such a finding at paragraph 51 notwithstanding substantial, reliable evidence to the contrary.
5. Gave excessive weight to the financial aspects of the relationship and insufficient weight to evidence concerning the:
(a) nature of the applicant’s and sponsor’s household;
(b)social aspects of the applicant’s and sponsor’s relationship; and
(c)nature of the applicant’s and sponsor’s commitment to each other in terms of regulation 1.15A (3)(d) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).
6. Gave excessive weight to allegations against an applicant’s witness.
PARTICULARS
The Tribunal at paragraph 89 unquestioningly preferred the evidence of the Department to that of the applicant’s mother without disclosing the reasoning or process in doing so.
Consideration
The applicant must demonstrate that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. The possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap. For migration decisions, they most commonly include the following categories:
a)Where the decision maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question: Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 39 ALD 193 (Craig) at [198].
b)Where the decision maker ignores relevant material: Craig at [198].
c)Where the decision maker relies on irrelevant material: Craig at [198].
d)Where the decision maker fails to follow mandatory procedures: SAAP and Another v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Another (2005) 83 ALD 545 at [207]-[208].
e)Where the decision maker fails to consider the entirely of an applicant’s claims (or “integers” of the claims) as made: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT and Another (2013) 136 ALD 41 at [111]; Salahuddin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 141 at [22].
f)Where the decision maker shows actual or apprehended bias: see SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]; AZAEY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 193 at [16]-[17].
g)Where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable: see Minister for Immigration v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 61 at [131]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18 at [26] – [28]; Minister for Immigration v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44].
In effect, the applicant has attempted to address what the Tribunal “did wrong” in the six grounds of review outlined in his amended application for judicial review.
As rightly identified by counsel for the Minister, grounds 1, 2, 5 and 6 assert that the Tribunal failed to give any weight, or otherwise failed to give appropriate weight, to relevant considerations. Accordingly, the Court will address these four grounds of review first and then analyse grounds 3 and 4.
Ground One
In relation to his first ground of review, the applicant argued that the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by failing to properly consider the length of the applicant and his sponsor’s relationship and period of cohabitation.
The applicant particularised this argument by stating:
The Tribunal acknowledged the evidence demonstrated that the Sponsor and applicant “have a form of relationship” and “appear” to have lived together for a period since their marriage in 2008, at paragraphs 9, 19 and 106, which failed to consider this evidence in any real or active way.
In relation to this argument, the Court makes the following observations:
a)As noted in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 at [47], the inference that the Tribunal failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons.
b)The weight to be attached to evidence before the Tribunal is a matter for the Tribunal as part of its fact‑finding function: Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 32 (Kostas).
c)As noted by Flick J (at paragraph 22) in Salahuddin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 141, where considerable care is exposed by part of the reasoning process, it is important not to scrutinise the balance of the reasoning process with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of legal error where none truly exists.
d)As noted by Riley J (at paragraph 13) in Ali v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 121, it is not for this Court to determine whether the Tribunal would have come to the same decision if it had understood the facts differently.
The Court notes, and it is undisputed, that the Tribunal considered the applicant’s and sponsor’s relationship and cohabitation in its reason for decision.
The Tribunal’s findings were accurately summarised by counsel for the Minister in written submissions as follows:
59.The AAT noted that it received a considerable amount of new material from the Applicant. See CB 581 [21].
60.The AAT noted that it had regard to the oral evidence of the Applicant, the Sponsor, the Applicant’s Mother and the Sponsor’s Mother. See CB 581 [22] - [23].
61.In relation to the financial aspects of the relationship, the AAT expressed concern with the lack of recent evidence provided. See CB 582 [24]. In response, the Applicant gave evidence that he had been jailed for 2.5 years and had not worked much. See CB 582 [26]. The Sponsor also gave evidence that the Applicant had not worked much, and that the Sponsor had not worked due to long term depression. See CB 583 [35] - [36].
62.The AAT also referred to documentary evidence provided by the Applicant after the hearing. See CB 583 [41] – 584 [44]. The AAT noted that the lack of bank statements for 2016 left the AAT unable to make findings in relation to whether the parties pooled their finances at the time of decision. See CB 584 [45].
63.The AAT also expressed concern at the Applicant’s evidence that the Sponsor’s Centrelink benefits had been significantly affected by the Applicant’s wage payments, but that the Sponsor’s evidence was that the Sponsor had not advised Centrelink of the Applicant’s employment. See CB 584 [46]. The AAT found that this reflected very poorly on the Applicant’s credibility and reliability as a witness. See CB 584 [46].
64.The AAT also considered that the evidence revealed that the Applicant did not voluntarily contribute to household costs. See CB 584 [48].
65.Accordingly, the AAT was not satisfied that the Applicant and the Sponsor were financially committed to each other at the time of decision. See CB 584 [51].
66.In relation to the nature of the household, the AAT had regard to the evidence from the Applicant and the Sponsor. See CB 584 [52] – 585 [69].
67.The AAT considered that the Applicant had embellished the level of his contribution towards the household chores in an attempt to enhance his application for review. See CB 586 [70].
68.The AAT noted that the evidence of the Applicant and the Sponsor was not consistent, particularly in relation to Amani’s grade at school and the events that occurred on the Saturday prior to the AAT hearing. See CB 586 [71].
69.With respect to the social aspects of the relationship, the AAT noted that 14 statutory declarations had been submitted to the AAT in support of the relationship between the Applicant and the Sponsor. See CB 586 [73].
70.The AAT put to the Applicant that all 14 declarants had failed to mention that the Applicant was incarcerated for 2.5 years. The AAT had regard to the Applicant’s response that he had been out of prison for 16 months. See CB 586 [74] - [75].
71. The AAT considered that:
(1)it was implausible that the declarants would have spent time with the Applicant and the Sponsor at their home during the 2.5 years that the Applicant was incarcerated; and
(2)the authenticity of the declarations was thus significantly reduced.
Accordingly, the AAT gave the declarations no weight. See CB 586 [76].
72.The AAT noted the evidence referred to in para 46 above (concerning whether the Applicant’s Mother suffered from typhoid) and concluded that this was another example of the Applicant’s unreliability as a witness. See CB 588 [100].
73.The AAT rejected the denial by the Applicant’s Mother that she had ever said that the Applicant had married the Sponsor to obtain permanent residency in Australia (see para 47 above) and gave weight to the report dated 12 May 2015 concerning the Site Visit conducted on 1 May 2015 (see CB 175 – 180). See CB 587 [88] & [91].
74.In relation to the nature of commitment to each other, the AAT had regard to the Applicant’s evidence that he and the Sponsor planned to buy a house together, have another child, and possibly operate a transport business. See CB 588 [99].
The Tribunal ultimately formed the view that, on the evidence as a whole, the relationship was not genuine for the purposes of the Act (see paragraph 24(d) above).
Having reviewed the Tribunal’s decision in detail, the Court concludes that this determination was entirely reasonable on the evidence before the Tribunal. The Tribunal considered the evidence in a real and active way. All findings were open to the Tribunal on the evidence. The Court considers that the Tribunal gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the issues before it, including the length of the applicant’s and his sponsor’s relationship and period of cohabitation The applicant may not agree with the Tribunal’s ultimate conclusion, but the Tribunal was certainly entitled to make it on the evidence.
No jurisdictional error occurred here. This ground is, accordingly, dismissed.
Ground Two
In relation to the second ground of review, the applicant argued that the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by failing to properly consider the childcare responsibilities of the applicant in relation to the children of the relationship.
The applicant particularised this argument by stating that:
The Tribunal acknowledged existence of a child to the applicant and Sponsor at paragraphs 10 and 107 of the decision, and the childcare responsibilities of the applicant for all of the children of the applicant and respondent, see paragraphs 56, but otherwise failed to consider this evidence in any real or active way.
The Court notes that in its reasons for decision, the Tribunal referred to the applicant’s child and the sponsor’s other two children and the evidence of the applicant in relation to the role he played in the children’s lives. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had some responsibility for the children.
The Court finds that this amounts to a proper consideration of the overall childcare responsibilities. No relevant information was overlooked or ignored and no irrelevant information was considered. As with ground one above, the Court considers that the Tribunal gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to this issue. Further, there is nothing that can be said to be illogical, irrational or unreasonable in relation to the decision and the approach adopted by the Tribunal.
No jurisdictional error occurred in relation to the issue of the applicant’s childcare obligations and responsibilities. Accordingly, this ground of review is also dismissed.
Grounds Five and Six
These grounds were articulated by the applicant as follows:
5.[The Tribunal gave] excessive weight to the financial assets of the relationship and insufficient weight to evidence concerning the:
(a) nature of the applicant’s and sponsor’s household;
(b)social aspects of the applicant’s and sponsor’s relationship, and
(c)nature of the applicant’s and sponsor’s commitment to each other in terms of Regulation 1.15A(3)(d) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).
6.[The Tribunal] gave excessive weight to allegations against an applicant’s witness.
The Court notes that the Tribunal did indeed make a number of findings in relation to reg.1.15A(3) of the Regulations. The Tribunal set out its relevant considerations with reference to reg.1.15A(2) and, importantly, disclosed its reasoning in relation to why it preferred the evidence of the Department to the applicant’s mother. This amounts to a proper consideration of the relevant Regulations.
On one level, what the applicant appears to be asking the Court to undertake is what amounts to a merits review in the hope that the Court will ultimately come to different conclusion. In effect, the applicant would like the Court to review the evidence that was before the Tribunal and ultimately give him the visa he seeks. The Court cannot undertake a review of that sort: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272.
As noted above, as per the reasoning in Kostas, matters of weight are for the Tribunal and not for this Court. The Court does not agree that the Tribunal attached too much weight to some aspects of the evidence and not enough weight to other aspects of the evidence before it. The Tribunal weighed up all of the evidence before it and ultimately rejected the applicant’s overall contentions. Its findings were open to it and cannot be described as irrational or illogical or unreasonable.
Grounds five and six as articulated do not reveal any error by the Tribunal and are, accordingly, dismissed.
Ground Three
The applicant’s third ground review is that the Tribunal illogically and unreasonably rejected probative evidence by deciding to give “no weight” to 14 witness statutory declarations filed in support of the application and, in doing so, failed to disclose any genuine evaluation of the statutory declarations or any process of weighing the evidential value of the material.
In relation to this ground of review, the Court notes the following judicial observations:
a)In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] 54 ALD 289, Gaudron and Kirby JJ explained that an unreasonable decision is one for which no logical basis can be discerned.
b)In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] 231 FCR 437, the Court identified legal unreasonableness as being outcome‑focused, where the decision has the character of a choice that is arbitrary, capricious or without common sense.
The Court notes that in its reasons for decision at paragraphs 73 to 76, the Tribunal outlined why it attached no weight to the 14 statutory declarations. These paragraphs are crucial and go to the issue of whether or not the 14 statutory declarations in question were simply dismissed without cause. The Tribunal’s analysis provides:
73.The Tribunal acknowledges 14 statutory declarations have been submitted at review. The declarations state that the parties have been known to the declarants for years, generally four to five years, or some longer. The statutory declarations were mostly very brief. Most of the declarations declared that the declarants have contact with the couple on a regular basis, mostly weekly or more, and that the relationship is a true relationship or a genuine relationship, without stating reasons for having that opinion. There is one exception, the statutory declaration from Herel Murray‑Greenwell who has provided some reasons for her opinion that the relationship is extremely true.
74.Because some of the declarations were silent on the issue, the Tribunal asked the applicant about the regularity of contact with the declarants of the 14 declarations. In relation to most of the declarants, he said he and the Sponsor had seen them at least weekly, and they had seen most of Jessie Chalmers, who is a very old friend of the Sponsor’s and has three children.
75.The Tribunal put it to the applicant that all of the 14 declarants failed to mention that he was incarcerated for two-and-a-half years. In response, he said he was released 16 months ago.
76.The Tribunal considers it not plausible that the declarants would have spent time with the couple at their home during the two-and-a-half years the applicant was incarcerated. The Tribunal considers that by withholding the information that the applicant was incarcerated for two-and-a-half years of the period they have known the parties, the authenticity of the declarations is therefore significantly reduced. The Tribunal therefore gives the 14 statutory declarations no weight.
In effect, what the Tribunal does here is determine that it cannot attach weight to the 14 statutory declarations because they lack probative value. There is arguably something in those statutory declarations that said to the Tribunal that credibility was lacking and that weight should not be attached to them. That was an approach that was open to the Tribunal. There is nothing unreasonable in that approach. Given what the statutory declarations in question did not disclose, the decision to reject them was a decision that was entirely open to the Tribunal.
It cannot be said here that the decision to reject these declarations was lacking common sense, arbitrary or capricious. The decision to do so was one that was open to the Tribunal. The Tribunal weighed up all of the evidence that it had before it, determined what was credible, and ultimately excluded some evidence because it determined that it could not attach any weight to that evidence. No error can be said to have occurred as a result of the approach taken here.
At the hearing of this matter, the Court noted that, in addition to the 14 statutory declarations referenced by the applicant in his grounds of review, five other statutory declarations appeared in the Court Book. These five declarations were not specifically referred to by the Tribunal. The applicant seemed to suggest that the Court failed to consider this otherwise relevant material because the Tribunal did not specifically exclude them and reference them (as it had with 14 other witness statements).
It is noted that these five witness statements predate the prison term discussed by the Tribunal in its decision at paragraph 76. That prison sentence is central to the Tribunal’s decision to exclude the 14 witness statements.
The Court finds no error on the part of the Tribunal for failing to specifically reference the five witness statements in question. The Tribunal specifically notes that it reviewed the delegate’s decision record. That evidence included these five statutory declarations. The Tribunal is entitled to review, as it did here, this evidence as it sees fit and throw all of it “into the mix”, as it were, in determining whether a spousal relationship exists. The fact that the Tribunal did not specifically reference each piece of evidence before it in detail does not mean that it engaged in jurisdictional error: Re The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405 (per McHugh J at [65]).
The Court has heard nothing to convince it that relevant material was ignored.
For the reasons articulated above, this ground of review does not reveal any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. It is, accordingly, dismissed.
Ground Four
In relation to ground four, the applicant argued before this Court that the Tribunal illogically and unreasonably decided that the parties were not “financially committed to each other” because it came to such a finding (at paragraph 51 in its written decision) notwithstanding substantial reliable evidence to the contrary.
In response, counsel for the Minister contended that while it this ground of review is expressed in terms of “a lack of logic” and “unreasonableness”, in substance ground four constitutes little more than a “weight attack” on the Tribunal’s decision.
The Court agrees. It is also the case that what is being asked for here constitutes merits review.
The weighting of any evidence is for the Tribunal and not for this Court. Nor can the Court engage in merits review.
There is no evidence before the Court that the Tribunal ignored relevant material or acted unreasonably or irrationally or without logic. The Tribunal simply weighed the evidence before it, preferring some evidence over other evidence. This was an approach that was open to it.
This ground of review is without merit and is also dismissed.
Decision
The applicant’s application for judicial review is dismissed.
The applicant is ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $6,200.
I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Kendall
Date: 27 April 2018
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