Seles v State Transit Authority of NSW

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DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION: Seles v State Transit Authority of NSW [2020] NSWWCCPD 55
APPELLANT: Jaclyn Seles
RESPONDENT: State Transit Authority of NSW
INSURER: Transport for NSW
FILE NUMBER: A1-6797/19
SENIOR ARBITRATOR: Ms J Bamber
DATE OF SENIOR ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: 7 April 2020
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: 27 August 2020
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: Findings of fact – Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; 214 CLR 118; Whiteley Muir & Zwanenberg Ltd v Kerr (1966) 39 ALJR 505; Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer v Hill [2020] NSWCA 54; Northern NSW Local Health Network v Heggie [2013] NSWCA 255; 12 DDCR 95; Raulston v Toll Pty Ltd [2011] NSWWCCPD 25; 10 DDCR 156 applied; adequacy of reasons – Roncevich v Repatriation Commission [2005] HCA 40; 222 CLR 115; Beale v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1997) 48 NSWLR 430; Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110 applied; acceptance of and weight to be afforded to the evidence – Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611; 84 ALJR 369; 266 ALR 367 applied
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: Deputy President Elizabeth Wood
HEARING: On the papers
REPRESENTATION: Appellant:
Mr H Halligan, counsel
Beilby Poulden Costello
Respondent:
Mr R Hanrahan, counsel
Gair Legal
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:

1.     The name of the respondent wherever it appears is amended to read State Transit Authority of NSW

2.     Senior Arbitrator’s Certificate of Determination dated 7 April 2020 is confirmed.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

  1. Ms Jaclyn Seles (the appellant) was employed by the State Transit Authority of New South Wales (the respondent) as a personal assistant. On 22 May 2012, as she was preparing to leave work for the day, the appellant tripped and fell down two steps, suffering an undisplaced fracture of the right radial head of the elbow joint. The appellant claimed compensation and the claim was accepted. The appellant returned to work three weeks later and continued to work, until she took maternity leave in about early 2014. The appellant thereafter remained at home as a full-time carer of her two children.

  2. On 1 March 2018, the appellant was lifting her daughter into a low chair when her arm locked. When she let go of her daughter, the arm unlocked, and at the same time she experienced pain and a strange numbness. The appellant asserted that she had previously felt the symptoms of numbness but attributed them to holding her sleeping children.

  3. The appellant claimed compensation, alleging that the symptoms resulted from the work-related injury that had occurred in 2012. The respondent ultimately declined liability, denying that there was a causal connection between the injury on 22 May 2012 and the incident on 1 March 2018.

  4. The matter proceeded to arbitration before Senior Arbitrator Bamber. In a Certificate of Determination dated 7 April 2020, the Senior Arbitrator found that she was not satisfied that there was a causal…

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Details
Case
[2020] NSWWCCPD 55
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Seles v State Transit Authority of NSW involved a dispute regarding workers' compensation claims. The case was heard in the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. The primary issue before the court was whether the Senior Arbitrator erred in her findings on the causal connection between a 2012 work-related injury and the appellant's symptoms in 2018. Additionally, the court examined whether the Senior Arbitrator adequately explained her preference for the opinion of Dr O'Sullivan over other medical opinions.

The court examined the Senior Arbitrator's consideration of the evidence, particularly the opinions of various medical experts. The court found that the Senior Arbitrator correctly considered Dr Granot's opinion but rejected it due to inconsistencies with the provided history. The court also considered the absence of a report from Professor Stoodley, noting that while it was not critical, it was unhelpful in determining causation. The court further evaluated the adequacy of reasons provided by the Senior Arbitrator in preferring Dr O'Sullivan's opinion. It held that the reasons were sufficient to make the parties aware of the basis for her decision, fulfilling the statutory and procedural obligations for providing reasons.

The Senior Arbitrator's decision was upheld, finding no error in her conclusions regarding causation. The court confirmed that the Senior Arbitrator appropriately weighed the evidence and provided adequate reasons for her decision. The appeal was dismissed, and the Senior Arbitrator's Certificate of Determination dated 7 April 2020 was confirmed. The court also amended the name of the respondent to State Transit Authority of NSW.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the respondent wherever it appears is amended to read State Transit Authority of NSW

2. Senior Arbitrator’s Certificate of Determination dated 7 April 2020 is confirmed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Senior Arbitrator also addressed the appellant’s assertion that her symptoms persisted after 2012. The Senior Arbitrator looked to the evidence and noted:(a) the history of symptoms prior to 2018 provided to Dr Granot was that of rare hand numbness and occasional locking, with no reference to medial elbow pain;[56](b) the history recorded by Dr Teo was that there was a near complete resolution of the appellant’s symptoms after the 2012 injury;[57](c) there was an absence of evidence of any history provided to Dr Presgrave;[58](d) in the appellant’s email dated 20 July 2018 directed to Mr Rabbit, the appellant described her pre-2018 symptoms as “just little niggles” and her symptoms after the incident as pain and numbness,[59] and(e) consistent with the description provided to Mr Rabbitt, the history recorded by Dr O’Sullivan was that, when the appellant returned to work in 2013, she felt occasional niggling pain in her right elbow.[60] [56] Reasons, [58].[57] Reasons, [61].[58] Reasons, [53].[59] Reasons, [59].[60] Reasons, [59]. The Senior Arbitrator considered the opinion of Dr Granot that, on the basis of intermittent hand numbness and persisting medial elbow pain between the time of the injury and the event in 2018, there had been some trauma to the ulnar nerve in the original injury. The Senior Arbitrator rejected that opinion because persisting medial pain was not part of the history initially provided to Dr Granot.[61][61] Reasons, [58]. The appellant asserts that the absence of a report from Prof Stoodley was of no significance and it was apparent that Prof Stoodley had considered a diagnosis of CRPS. The significance of the absence of a report from Prof Stoodley was made clear by the Senior Arbitrator. The Senior Arbitrator observed that:“However, no report from Professor Stoodley is before the Commission. Dr Gronot [sic] states in his report dated 30 November 2018 that Professor Stoodley seemingly did not find any ulnar issues either and raised the question of CRPS. Given that the diagnosis of Ms Seles symptoms have proved difficult, the failure to provide a copy of the report from Professor Stoodley is not helpful. It cannot be gleaned from Dr Gronot’s [sic] report whether Professor Stoodley believed there was causal link with the 2012 injury and the development of any CRPS.”[62][62] Reasons, [57]. It is apparent that the Senior Arbitrator did not consider the absence of an opinion from Prof Stoodley was critical, she simply remarked that it was not helpful. This was in the context of her evaluation of all of the medical evidence addressing the question of causation, which she was required to determine. The Senior Arbitrator gave reasons for rejecting the opinions of Dr Presgrave and Dr Granot and noted that Dr Teo did not provide an opinion on causation. It was reasonable for the Senior Arbitrator to look for other evidence which might have assisted the appellant’s case and conclude that it was unhelpful that there was an absence of such evidence. It is immaterial that Prof Stoodley may have shared the same diagnosis as Dr Granot where there was an absence of reasoned opinion from Prof Stoodley as to whether there was a causal connection between that diagnosis and the 2012 injury.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Senior Arbitrator correctly observed that in one of his reports, Dr Granot did not express a view on causation. That does not lead to a conclusion that the Senior Arbitrator erred when she:(a) clearly took into account Dr Granot’s opinion expressed in the report dated 24 September 2018 [sic 2019];(b) gave it consideration, and (c) concluded that she could afford it little or no weight because it was based on an assumption that there had been persistent medial pain since the 2012 injury, which was not made out on the evidence. The appellant has failed to establish error on the part of the Senior Arbitrator in respect of her determination that she was not persuaded on the balance of probabilities that there was a causal connection between the symptoms arising from 1 March 2018 and the work-related injury on 22 May 2012. It follows that Ground One of the appeal fails. Ground Two of the appeal alleges that the Senior Arbitrator erred in failing to provide any or any adequate reasons for preferring the medico-legal opinion of Dr O’Sullivan over those of the numerous opinions expressed by the appellant’s treating doctors. An analysis of whether there has been a failure to provide adequate reasons requires a number of considerations to be taken into account. Section 294 of the 1998 Act imposes a statutory obligation on an arbitrator to provide reasons for his or her decision. Rule 15.6 of the Rules also requires an arbitrator to give reasons for his or her decision. It provides:“15.6 Certificates of determination(1) A statement of the Commission’s reasons referred to in section 294(2) of the 1998 Act is to include:(a)the Commission’s findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based, and(b)the Commission’s understanding of the applicable law, and(c)the reasoning processes that led the Commission to the conclusions it made.(2) Without limiting subrule (1), the reasons set out in a statement referred to in subrule (1) are to be stated sufficiently (in the opinion of the Commission) to make the parties aware of the Commission’s view of the case made by each of them.” A useful summary of the principles enunciated in various authorities as to the adequacy of reasons was provided by McColl JA (with Ipp JA and Bryson AJA agreeing) in Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd,[65] in which her Honour said as follows (citations omitted):“The Court is conscious of not picking over an ex tempore judgment and, too, of giving due allowance for the pressures under which judges of the District Court are placed by the volume of cases coming before them. However a trial judge’s reasons must, ‘as a minimum ... be adequate for the exercise of a facility of appeal’. A superior court, ‘considering the decision of an inferior tribunal, should not be left to speculate from collateral observations as to the basis of a particular finding’. The giving of adequate reasons lies at the heart of the judicial process. Failure to provide sufficient reasons promotes ‘a sense of grievance’ and denies ‘both the fact and the appearance of justice having been done’, thus working a miscarriage of justice.The extent and content of reasons will depend upon the particular case under consideration and the matters in issue. While a judge is not obliged to spell out every detail of the process of reasoning to a finding, it is essential to expose the reasons for resolving a point critical to the contest between the parties.The reasons must do justice to the issues posed by the parties’ cases. Discharge of this obligation is necessary to enable the parties to identify the basis of the judge’s decision and the extent to which their arguments had been understood and accepted … it is necessary that the primary judge ‘enter into’ the issues canvassed and explain why one case is preferred over another.”[66] [65] [2009] NSWCA 110 (Pollard).[66] Pollard, [56]–[59].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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