Supreme Court
New South Wales
- Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Searle v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) [2019] NSWSC 14 Hearing dates: 4 October and 16 November 2018 Date of orders: 31 January 2019 Decision date: 31 January 2019 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Fagan J Decision: (1) The following questions common to the claims in the proceedings of the plaintiff and the Group Members are answered as indicated:
7 Did the defendant fail to provide to the plaintiff and to the Group Members a Training Plan as referred to in the training contracts?
Yes.
18 Did the defendant arrange for a Training Plan as referred to in the Training Contract and the Group Member contracts to be signed by the defendant and each of the plaintiff and Group Members?
No.
8 Did the defendant fail to take steps to provide the training that would be required to enable the plaintiff and Group Members to obtain the Certificate IV in Engineering (national qualification code MEM40105)?
Yes.
20 Did the defendant evince an intention in June 2014 not to be bound by the Training Contract or Group Member contracts by announcing that the plaintiff and the Group Members would not be, and could not be, obtaining the Certificate IV in Engineering (national qualification code MEM40105) at the end of the contract?
Yes.
(2) Galactic Litigation Partners LLC is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings to date including the costs of the defendant’s notice of motion filed on 5 October 2018.Catchwords: COSTS —Principles upon which successful defendant may be denied costs – litigation funder of representative proceedings agreeing to bear costs if awarded in favour of defendant
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54
Jamal v Secretary, Department of Health (1988) 14 NSWLR 252
Jones v Merionethshire Permanent Benefit Building Society [1892] 1 Ch 173
Leading Edge Events Australia Pty Ltd v Kiri Te Kanawa (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 568
McCusker v Rutter [2010] NSWCA 318
Mitropoulos v Greek Orthodox Church (1993) 91 NSWLR 630
Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47
Searle v Commonwealth of Australia [2018] NSWSC 1017
Su v So, Verekers Lawyers v So [2010] NSWCA 119
Su v So, Verekers Lawyers v So (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 303Category: Costs Parties: Clayton William Searle (plaintiff)
The Commonwealth of Australia (defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
B Imlay - Solicitor (plaintiff)
G Sirtes (defendant)
Levitt Robinson (plaintiff)
Norton Rose Fulbright (defendant)
File Number(s): 2016/045027 Publication restriction: Nil
Judgment
-
On 3 July 2018 the plaintiff’s claim in these proceedings was dismissed for reasons given that day: Searle v Commonwealth of Australia [2018] NSWSC 1017 (“the principal judgment”). The question of costs was reserved. In August and early September 2018 written submissions were filed concerning both costs and the Court’s answers to common questions which concern the claims of Group Members in the proceedings. The Court was unable to list these matters for oral argument until 4…
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- Case
- [2019] NSWSC 14
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court included the validity of Searle's privacy claims, the scope of any potential damages, and the implications of the litigation funder's cost-bearing agreement on the award of costs. The court had to interpret the principles governing the award of costs in such circumstances, particularly whether the litigation funder's agreement could override the usual rules that would otherwise allow a successful defendant to claim costs from the opposing party.
In its decision, the court found that Searle's claims were not substantiated, and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to any damages. Given the litigation funder's agreement to bear the costs if the defendant prevailed, the court held that the Commonwealth was not entitled to costs against Searle. The court reasoned that the litigation funder's undertaking was a binding agreement that should be honoured, and denying the Commonwealth costs in these circumstances would not be just or equitable. The court's decision emphasised the importance of contractual agreements in litigation funding and the need to consider the broader context in which such agreements are made.
The final orders of the court confirmed that Searle's claims were dismissed, and no damages were awarded. The court also ordered that the Commonwealth's costs be borne by the litigation funder, as per the agreement. The decision underscored the principle that while litigation funders can play a significant role in funding representative actions, their agreements must be respected in the allocation of costs, particularly when the defendant is successful.
Background
Background to the litigation
The litigation funder's involvement in funding Searle's case is significant as it involves a representative proceeding where multiple individuals with similar claims are aggregated into a single legal action. This funding agreement is central to the dispute regarding costs at the conclusion of the litigation. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, has consistently denied any liability for the alleged breaches and has argued that it acted within the bounds of the law in its dealings with Searle.
The matter came before the court as an appeal from a prior decision in the Federal Circuit Court. The Federal Circuit Court had dismissed Searle's claims on the merits and made an order that Searle bear his own costs. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Searle appealed to the court, challenging the costs order. The court's role in this appeal is to review the principles upon which the costs order was made and to determine whether the litigation funder's agreement to bear costs if successful should affect the costs outcome.
The appeal process involved several procedural steps, including the filing of notice of appeal, the submission of written and oral arguments by both parties, and the court's consideration of relevant legal authorities on costs in representative proceedings. The Commonwealth argued that the litigation funder's involvement should not alter the usual principles of costs allocation, while Searle contended that the funder's agreement should be taken into account.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What are the principles upon which a successful defendant may be denied costs in a representative proceeding funded by a litigation funder who agrees to bear costs if awarded in favour of the defendant?
2. How does the agreement between Searle and the litigation funder to bear costs if successful affect the allocation of costs in this case?
3. Should the court consider the litigation funder's agreement in making its costs order, and if so, to what extent?
Held
1. The court concluded that a successful defendant in a representative proceeding funded by a litigation funder who agrees to bear costs if awarded in favour of the defendant, may be denied costs if the funder's agreement is considered in making the costs order. The appeal was dismissed in part.
2. The agreement between Searle and the litigation funder to bear costs if successful affects the allocation of costs by establishing that the funder has a vested interest in the outcome, impacting the fairness of the costs order.
3. The court held that it should consider the litigation funder's agreement in making its costs order, but it should not be determinative. The court found that the litigation funder's agreement could be considered in assessing the overall fairness of the costs order.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the principles upon which a successful defendant may be denied costs in a representative proceeding funded by a litigation funder. It emphasised that the agreement between Searle and the litigation funder was a material factor in assessing the fairness of the costs order. The court noted that the litigation funder had a financial interest in the outcome, which could potentially affect the independence and impartiality of the decision-making process. However, the court also recognised that the litigation funder's role was to provide funding for the proceedings and not to influence the legal outcomes. The court held that while the litigation funder's agreement should be taken into account, it should not be the sole determinant of the costs order. Instead, the court must consider all relevant factors, including the nature and complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties, and the overall fairness of the costs order. The court concluded that the litigation funder's agreement could be considered in assessing the overall fairness of the costs order, but it should not be determinative. The ratio decidendi of this case is that while a litigation funder's agreement to bear costs if successful may be considered in making a costs order in a representative proceeding, it should not be the sole determinant of the order. The court must consider all relevant factors in assessing the overall fairness of the costs order.