SDAE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SDAE v Minister For Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

[2002] FCA 1583

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2), 65(1), 476(1)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 – applied
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 – referred to
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 – referred to
Ahvazi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 279 – discussed
Paramanthan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 94 FCR 28 – referred to
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 – discussed
Kola v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 265 – referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 – discussed
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 – referred to
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 – referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 – referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam [2002] HCA 32 – referred to
Raza v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 350 – referred to
Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 - discussed

SDAE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

S 65 of 2001

MANSFIELD J
20 DECEMBER 2002
ADELAIDE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S.65 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

SDAE
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 DECEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application is dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S.65 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

SDAE
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

20 DECEMBER 2002

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant is a young man from Iran.  He arrived in Australia on 31 December 2000.  On 13 February 2001 he applied for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). A delegate of the respondent refused that application on 16 March 2001. The decision was reviewed by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Following a hearing on 30 April 2001, the Tribunal on 15 May 2001 affirmed the decision of the delegate of the respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa under the Act.

  2. This application is to review the decision of the Tribunal.  It was instituted prior to the commencement of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth), so the provisions of the Act as in force prior to that amendment are those applicable to its consideration. In particular, the grounds of review previously available under s 476(1) of the Act are those to which the…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1583
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SDAE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant contested the decision of the Tribunal to refuse his application for a protection visa, arguing that the Tribunal had failed to consider his claims collectively and assess whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had erred in failing to consider the applicant's claims collectively and whether it had failed to address a specific claim of sexual abuse as a reason for his fear of persecution.

The court found that the Tribunal had not committed a reviewable error in its decision-making process. It had considered the applicant's claims in the context of his overall circumstances and had evaluated the possibility that his past experiences could lead to an anti-regime perception about him. The court also determined that the applicant had not previously raised a claim of sexual abuse as a reason for his fear of persecution, and thus, the Tribunal was not obliged to address it. Consequently, the court concluded that the Tribunal had properly considered the applicant's claims and had not erred in its decision that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.

As the court found no reviewable error in the Tribunal's decision, the application was dismissed. The court ordered that the application be dismissed and no further orders were made.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
Finally, the applicant complained that the Tribunal failed to consider collectively, that is by reference to all his claims about what he had experienced in the past, or at least those which the Tribunal accepted as having occurred or as having possibly occurred, whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. It is of course necessary for the Tribunal to consider each of the (accepted) claims in the context of the applicant’s overall circumstances. To do otherwise might mean the Tribunal has failed to address the question posited by Art 1A(2) of the Convention. However, my consideration of the Tribunal’s reasons does not indicate that it fell into any such error. It has borne in mind, for example, the possibility that the applicant’s family history might be a factor in his treatment either in the past or prospectively. It has considered the possibility that the combination of his past experiences might lead to an anti-regime perception about him even though each past experience, if isolated and taken only individually, might not do so. Consequently, in my judgment, the Tribunal has not failed to consider collectively the applicant’s claims and his past experience in its decision that it was not satisfied that he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason.CONCLUSION As I have concluded that the Tribunal did not commit reviewable error under s 476(1) of the Act, in the making of its decision, the application must be dismissed. I so order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

Finally, the applicant through counsel then embarked upon a detailed dissection of the Tribunal’s findings, and the reasons for its findings, on each feature of the applicant’s claims with a view to demonstrating reviewable error on its part.CONSIDERATION(a) Failure to consider the claim of sexual abuse The foundation for this claim is that the Tribunal should have addressed a claim made by the applicant that he had a well-founded fear of persecution, by reason of his membership of the social group described in [20], namely persecution by serious sexual abuse. The submission focussed upon the social group described as “vulnerable/good looking young conscripts/detainees/prisoners.” The respondent accepts that, if such a claim was made, the Tribunal was obliged to address it and would have erred in law if it failed to do so. The respondent contends, however, that no such claim was made by the applicant. The applicant contends that he expressed that claim to the Tribunal in his statement submitted with his application for a protection visa dated 9 February 2001. It was submitted under the letterhead of his solicitors then acting as his migration agent. It included the following passage:“During my military service I was angry at the treatment I got. Two other Soldiers and myself from my city were sexually harassed at night by military officers. I got into a fight with one of the officers and I became angry and I set fire to one of the stores. I escaped and went to … and stayed with my aunt.”The anger referred to may be by reason of having to undertake military service, or by reason of the applicant having previously been imprisoned following the demonstrations (an event which the Tribunal did not accept). It is also noteworthy that that statement refers to the applicant having been imprisoned following the demonstration and having been tortured during that period of imprisonment, but makes no reference to any sexual harassment at that time or indeed at the time of his earlier imprisonment for striking an army officer. I do not consider that the expression of the claim as now made in the affidavit is a refinement of a claim previously made to the Tribunal and which it was required to deal with. In my view, the Tribunal correctly identified the nature of the applicant’s claims and it addressed them. At the time of his protection visa application, the same statement of the applicant recorded that he feared mistreatment if he were to return to Iran:“Because I was involved in the demonstrations and because I damaged government property during my military service.”He did not then make any claim of fearing persecution because of being a member of a particular social group of the type now under consideration. The claim now made was also not a feature of the applicant’s application to the Tribunal. Again, his lengthy submission from his migration agent sent to the Tribunal on 27 April 2001 was to the same effect, namely that he feared persecution because he had been involved in the demonstration and because he had damaged government property during his military service. It was that he claimed persecution due to perceived political opinion. There was nothing identified in that lengthy submission to put the Tribunal on notice that the applicant claimed also to fear persecution by reason of being a member of a social group now described. Under the heading “Is the harm or mistreatment feared by the applicant on return for reason of one or more grounds recognised in the Refugees Convention?” the submission is made that the applicant’s fear of harm or mistreatment on release to Iran is “for reasons of his political opinion”. The submission was the document upon which the Tribunal was entitled to consider its review, as the application to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision did not identify any particular claims, and no other document after the making of the application to the Tribunal until the Tribunal’s hearing did so. Then, at the hearing, the thrust of the applicant’s claims was to the same effect. The Tribunal also records accurately his claim to have been harassed whilst doing military service, and that the applicant had learnt that he was to be the target of sexual abuse. It dealt with that claim in the “Findings and Reasons” section of its decision in the terms in which it was made. It was not satisfied the applicant was targeted for any Convention reason.