SCVG & Estate of KLD (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 65 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SCVG & Estate of KLD (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC1A 105

Appeal from: SCVG & Estate of KLD (No 5) [2022] FedCFamC1F 818
Appeal number(s): NAA 258 of 2022
File number(s): SYC 4380 of 2008
SYC 5956 of 2016
Judgment of: RIETHMULLER, CAMPTON & CURRAN JJ
Date of judgment: 4 July 2023
Catchwords:

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – LEAVE TO APPEAL – Appeal from orders dismissing the appellant husband’s applications to set aside three judgments on the basis of fraud and for leave to seek a variation in a child support assessment out of time – Where the wife is deceased and her estate is the first respondent to the appeal – Whether leave to appeal is required – Primary judge exercised jurisdiction pursuant to s 111 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) – An order dismissing application to set aside a judgment is interlocutory – Leave to appeal required – Appellant failed to demonstrate the wife’s representations of her assets were fraudulent – Materiality of the fraud to the decision – Appellant failed to demonstrate sufficient doubt and substantial injustice – Leave to appeal refused – Appeal dismissed – Appellant to pay the first and second respondents’ costs in fixed sum

FAMILY LAW – APPLICATIONS IN AN APPEAL – Adduce further evidence – Written and oral applications advanced – Where the evidence would not have affected the outcome of the appeal – Majority of evidence available at trial – No new cogent evidence – Applications dismissed

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) Pt 7, ss 4, 111, 112, 117, 159

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 38

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 102QB, 117

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 28, 35

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 55GZ

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 10.13

Federal Court and Federal Circuit and Family Court Regulations 2012 (Cth) reg 4.02

Cases cited:

Ascot Investments v Harper (1981) 148 CLR 337; [1981] HCA 1

Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) FLC 93-124; [2003] HCA 7

Branir Pty Ltd and Ors v Owston Nominees (No2) Pty Ltd

and Anor (2001) 117 FCR 424; [2001] FCA 1835

Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246; [1981] HCA 20

CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172; [1998] HCA 67

Clone Pty Ltd Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2018) 264 CLR 165; [2018] HCA 12

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1; [1986] HCA 33

Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296; [1971] HCA 54

Fierro & Fierro (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1F 344

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22

Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513; [1979] HCA 63

Hip Foong Hong v H Neotia & Co [1918] AC 888; [1918] UKPC 65

Hsiao v…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SCVG & Estate of KLD (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC1A 105
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in SCVG & Estate of KLD (No 2) involved the husband, who sought to set aside two separate judgments made by Cronin J and Judge Scarlett. The first judgment, issued by Cronin J on 20 August 2015, mandated that the husband contribute a portion of the wife's costs in a parenting case. The second judgment, rendered by Judge Scarlett on 15 April 2015, dismissed an appeal regarding a child support assessment. The husband's appeal against these judgments was ultimately dismissed by the Family Court of Australia.

The central legal issues the court had to address included whether the husband could successfully argue that the judgments should be set aside due to fraud or misrepresentation by the wife. Specifically, the husband alleged that the wife had committed fraud by misrepresenting the value of her shares in family companies to both Cronin J and the Social Security Assessment Tribunal (SSAT). The court had to determine if these misrepresentations were material enough to warrant setting aside the judgments.

In dismissing the appeal, the court found that the husband had not established that the wife's representations amounted to fraud. The court emphasized that Cronin J was not required to conduct a detailed examination of the wife's financial circumstances, as the costs order was largely based on the husband's conduct. Similarly, regarding the child support assessment, the court concluded that the husband could not demonstrate that the wife's representations to the SSAT were fraudulent. The court also noted that the SSAT decision was not subject to a judicial review application based on fraud, further solidifying its decision.

The court ordered that the husband pay the costs of both the first and second respondents, effectively dismissing the husband's application for leave to appeal and the Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 21 February 2023.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the oral application for leave to appeal is refused, the Amended Notice of Appeal filed 21 February 2023 is dismissed, and the husband is ordered to pay the costs of both the first respondent and the second respondent.BACKGROUND The first judgment that the husband sought to have set aside in the proceedings being the subject of this appeal was that of Cronin J on 20 August 2015 (SCVG & KLD (No 2) [2015] FamCA 687), where Cronin J ordered that the husband pay a proportion of the wife’s costs in a parenting proceeding. The wife filed a Financial Statement on 16 March 2015 which listed three family companies in which she held shares. The value of the shares held in two of those proprietary limited companies, in which other family members also held shares, was described by the wife as “nominal”, while the value of the four shares she held jointly with two other family members in the third proprietary limited company was noted as “nil”. In her Financial Statement, the wife also deposed that she had debts of “$650,000+”, about which she said at paragraph 4 of her affidavit of the same date:My mother... has paid in excess of $650,000 on my behalf in legal fees to enable me primarily to defend proceedings commenced by [the husband] since 2005. I currently owe my counsel and my solicitor $200,000 in respect of the substantive proceedings which I will also need to borrow from my mother. I intend repaying my mother these amounts over time and as my financial circumstances improve. When making the costs order, Cronin J had regard to the wife’s Financial Statement, which his Honour described as requiring “[the wife] to subjectively set out [her finances] as she saw things”: at [39]. Cronin J also noted that the evidence “d[id] no more than indicate what [his Honour] consider[ed] to be an equivocal position about who was covering [the wife’s] costs”: at [87]. Cronin J proceeded on the basis that neither party was impecunious and that both parties could contribute to their costs, saying “even if [the wife] had significantly greater financial resources than [the husband], that alone is not a basis not to make a costs order” (at [27]), noting that the husband had “unnecessarily incurred costs” in circumstances where:43.… the pursuit of orders in the terms sought by [the husband] entitled the Court to say that there are doubts about his bona fides. The way in which he went about the proceedings accusing [the wife] of alienating the children without any foundation in the context of ten years of litigation enables me to find that [the husband] intended to pursue what he wanted having not obtained that outcome in the previous proceedings. That persistence, caused [the wife] significant costs by having to participate in proceedings which were really about why the children had adopted a position of reticence to have a relationship with [the husband]. The husband’s appeal against the costs orders made by Cronin J was dismissed: see SCVG & KLD and Anor [2017] FamCAFC 95. The Full Court, in dismissing that appeal, confirmed that Cronin J “was not obliged to undertake [a] close examination of [the wife’s] circumstances” (at [77]), with May J noting that “it was the husband’s conduct that largely formed the basis of making a costs order, and not the financial circumstances of either party”: at [184].

Decision

Reasons for decision

Thus, the primary judge was not persuaded that the conduct of the wife amounted to fraud, nor that it was sufficiently material to the costs decision of Cronin J to justify setting aside the costs orders. Indeed, these representations appear to be in the category described by Cairns LJ in Patch v Ward (1867) 3 Ch App 203, where his Lordship said (at 207) that:… the insisting upon rights which, upon a due investigation of those rights, might be found to be overstated or overestimated, is not the kind of fraud which will authorize the Court to set aside a … decision.The judgment of Judge Scarlett On 7 March 2013, the SSAT made a decision increasing the husband’s child support assessment payable to the wife. The husband appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it was then known), which appeal was dismissed by Judge Scarlett on 15 April 2015: see Victor & Duncan & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2015] FCCA 1073. An appeal from that decision of Judge Scarlett was dismissed by the Full Court on 24 May 2017: see SCVG & KLD and Anor [2017] FamCAFC 95. Neither of the appeals alleged fraud but were pursued, relevantly to these proceedings, on the basis that the SSAT had failed to make enquiries into the wife’s affairs. In the proceedings before the primary judge, the husband did not allege that the wife perpetrated a fraud before Judge Scarlett, rather, she had misled the SSAT. The representations that the wife made to the SSAT, which were relied upon by the husband as the basis of the fraud claim, were in similar terms to those made in the wife’s Financial Statement before Cronin J (that her shareholdings in family companies had a nominal or nil value). The husband failed to establish that the wife’s representations to the SSAT were a fraud for the same reasons as those with respect to the Cronin J matter: at [113]–[114]. The SSAT decision was not the subject of an application for judicial review before the primary judge based upon claims of fraud. The primary judge noted at [98] that the wife had not made any representations directly to Judge Scarlett (as those proceedings were an appeal on points of law which did not receive evidence from the wife directly). As a result, the primary judge concluded that the husband could not succeed on the application to set aside the judgment of Judge Scarlett for fraud: at [108].The child support application Pursuant to Pt 7 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) (“CSA Act”), the husband sought leave to bring a departure application with respect to the child support assessments made for the period of 15 July 2011 to 3 December 2015. The child support assessments for the period 15 July 2011 to 31 December 2014 were altered by the SSAT decision of 7 March 2013, which was the subject of the appeal heard by Judge Scarlett referred to above. There were a number of child support assessments in this period, although the later assessments were quite low (from 1 January 2015 to 13 May 2015, the assessment was $32.43 per week and from 14 May 2015 to 3 December 2015, it was $36.03 per week).