Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 1)
SCVG & Estate of KLD (No 5) [2022] FedCFamC1F 818
File number(s): SYC 4380 of 2008
SYC 5956 of 2016Judgment of: GILL J Date of judgment: 26 October 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – ORIGINAL JURISDICTION – Where the Court has inherent jurisdiction to set aside its own judgment at first instance on the basis of fraud – Principles of finality – Where the applicant had burden to prove actual fraud – Where the fraud must be a meditated and intentional contrivance – Not established – Where the fraud must be material – Not established – Where the claim cannot be a relitigation of the case at first instance, but requires cogent fresh or newly discovered evidence – No fresh evidence – Where repeated challenges constitute an abuse of process. Legislation: Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) Part 7, ss 111, 118
Child Support (Registration and Collection Act) 1988 (Cth) s 110B
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 102QB, 117
Legislation Act 2003 (Cth)
Cases cited: Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130
Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571
Charles Bright & Co Ltd v Sellar [1904] 1 KB 6
Hip Foong Hong v Neotia & Co [1918] AC 888
McDonald v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529
Paris King Investments Pty Ltd & 1 Ors v Michael Norman Rayhill & 2 Ors [2006] NSWSC 578
Patch v Ward (1867) LR 3 Ch App 203
R v Forbes; ex parte Bevan (1972) 127 CLR 1
SCVG v Estate of KLD (Dec’d) (No 3) [2020] FamCA 176
SCVG & KLD [2018] FamCA 27
Taylor v Taylor (1979) 5 FamLR 289
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 162 Date of hearing: 8–10 February 2022 Place: Canberra Solicitor for the Applicant: Litigant in person Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Cox, SC Counsel for the Respondents: Ms Seric Solicitor for the Respondents: Macphillamy’s ORDERS
SYC 4380 of 2008
SYC 5956 of 2016FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR SCVG
Applicant
AND: THE ESTATE OF KLD
First Respondent
CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR
Second Respondent
order made by:
GILL J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 OCTOBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Mr SCVG’s application to set aside orders of Justice Cronin of 20 August 2015 is dismissed.
2.Mr SCVG’s application to set aside orders of Judge Scarlett of 15 April 2015 is dismissed.
3.The application for leave to vary child support payable for the period 15 July 2011 to 3 December 2015 is dismissed.
4.The application to set aside the judgment of 14 September 2017 dismissing the applications for review of costs assessments made by Registrar Payget on 27 July 2017, (amended 31 August 2017), Registrar McNamara on 15 May 2017, and Registrar McNamara on 25 June 2017 is…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read SCVG & Estate of KLD (No 5) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC1F 818
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues that the court had to address included the requirement for material fraud to set aside a judgment, the role of newly discovered evidence in proving fraud, and the circumstances under which a court may set aside a judgment based on a party's misrepresentations. The court had to determine if SCVG's evidence of misrepresentations by KLD was sufficient to establish material fraud and whether the misrepresentations were material to the judgment made by Cronin J. Additionally, the court had to consider the obligations of a solicitor to advise the court of contact from a party and whether the failure to do so constituted fraud.
The court found that SCVG had not provided sufficient evidence to establish material fraud, as the judgment did not rely on the notion that the family companies were of nil value or that the payment of legal fees was a loan rather than a gift. The court also concluded that the failure of the solicitor to advise the court of SCVG's contact did not amount to fraud or malpractice that was material to the outcome. The court emphasised that SCVG's non-attendance and failure to secure an adjournment or permission to appear by telephone were the primary reasons for the dismissal of his application.
The application to set aside the costs order made by Cronin J was dismissed. The court found that even if SCVG's claims about the misrepresentations by KLD were accepted, they were not material to the judgment made by Cronin J, who had found that KLD was in a strong financial position and capable of meeting her legal fees. The court also noted that the issue of the payment of legal fees by KLD's mother was not fresh and that pursuing it a second time constituted an abuse of process.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The extent of the obligation imposed upon the solicitor to advise the court of Mr SCVG’s contact with him must be answered in the context of a solicitor’s paramount duty to the court and the administration of justice. That duty required, in the particular circumstances where the court had asserted no knowledge of contact from Mr SCVG, and where the court was being asked to act on the basis of the non-appearance of Mr SCVG, the solicitor to advise of the receipt of the application to appear by telephone that he had received the previous day. The solicitor has explained why that did not happen. While that explanation does not detract from the obligation to notify the court of the contact from Mr SCVG, it is sufficient to undermine a conclusion that the solicitor’s failure was a deliberate failure.Consideration However, the failure to advise the court of the correspondence from Mr SCVG does not, without more, answer the setting aside issue pursued by Mr SCVG. That claim is reliant on the proposition that a relevant fraud was perpetrated by the solicitor. The failure to advise of the correspondence received by the lawyer does not go so far. Firstly, even if such was to be characterised as a fraud, or a conscious default on the part of the solicitor, it has not been sheeted home to Ms KLD as a meditated and intentional contrivance by Ms KLD in the terms of Clone. Despite Ms KLD being bound by the conduct of her solicitor, the conduct was not demonstrated to be at her instigation, nor was it demonstrated to be a part of an effort to effect a meditated and intentional contrivance upon the court by Ms KLD. Secondly, even if the failure by the solicitor was to be characterised as malpractice, in Clone it was observed that the capacity to set aside for fraud was “never suggested to extend to malpractice not amounting to fraud in the course of proceedings.”[34][34] Clone at [54]. Thirdly, as seen in the refusal of the court to set aside the judgments on Mr SCVG’s previous application to do so, the underlying issue is that Mr SCVG chose, contrary to directions, not to attend to conduct the proceedings that had been set down to meet his convenience. By the time of the dismissal Mr SCVG was acutely aware that he had neither secured an adjournment, nor had he secured permission to appear by telephone. His evidence was that he chose, as a matter of preference, to not attend, despite having secured neither dispensation. The dismissal of Mr SCVG’s application was caused by the non-attendance of Mr SCVG. That non-attendance, later seen to be in the absence of adequate explanation, formed the material basis for the dismissal of the reviews. That is, the solicitor’s failure has not been demonstrated to have been material to the outcome. This aspect is further emphasised by the next point. Fourthly, the previous attempt to set aside, relied upon the same factual premise of the solicitor’s failure to advise. That attempt was unsuccessful, predominantly on the basis that Mr SCVG’s failure to attend was not sufficiently justified.