SCVG & Estate of KLD (No 5)

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Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia

(DIVISION 1)

SCVG & Estate of KLD (No 5) [2022] FedCFamC1F 818

File number(s): SYC 4380 of 2008
SYC 5956 of 2016
Judgment of: GILL J
Date of judgment: 26 October 2022 
Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – ORIGINAL JURISDICTION – Where the Court has inherent jurisdiction to set aside its own judgment at first instance on the basis of fraud – Principles of finality – Where the applicant had burden to prove actual fraud – Where the fraud must be a meditated and intentional contrivance – Not established – Where the fraud must be material – Not established – Where the claim cannot be a relitigation of the case at first instance, but requires cogent fresh or newly discovered evidence –  No fresh evidence – Where repeated challenges constitute an abuse of process.
Legislation:

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) Part 7, ss 111, 118

Child Support (Registration and Collection Act) 1988 (Cth) s 110B

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 102QB, 117

Legislation Act 2003 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130

Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571

Charles Bright & Co Ltd v Sellar [1904] 1 KB 6

Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liq)(Receivers and Managers Appointed) and Ors (2018) 264 CLR 165

Hip Foong Hong v Neotia & Co [1918] AC 888

Jonesco v Beard [1930] AC 298

McDonald v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529

Paris King Investments Pty Ltd & 1 Ors v Michael Norman Rayhill & 2 Ors [2006] NSWSC 578

Patch v Ward (1867) LR 3 Ch App 203

R v Forbes; ex parte Bevan (1972) 127 CLR 1

SCVG v Estate of KLD (Dec’d) (No 3) [2020] FamCA 176

SCVG & KLD [2018] FamCA 27

Taylor v Taylor (1979) 5 FamLR 289

Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534

Division: Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs: 162
Date of hearing: 8–10 February 2022
Place: Canberra
Solicitor for the Applicant: Litigant in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Cox, SC
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms Seric
Solicitor for the Respondents: Macphillamy’s

ORDERS

SYC 4380 of 2008
SYC 5956 of 2016

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:

MR SCVG

Applicant

AND:

THE ESTATE OF KLD

First Respondent

CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR

Second Respondent

order made by:

GILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 OCTOBER 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Mr SCVG’s application to set aside orders of Justice Cronin of 20 August 2015 is dismissed.

2.Mr SCVG’s application to set aside orders of Judge Scarlett of 15 April 2015 is dismissed.

3.The application for leave to vary child support payable for the period 15 July 2011 to 3 December 2015 is dismissed.

4.The application to set aside the judgment of 14 September 2017 dismissing the applications for review of costs assessments made by Registrar Payget on 27 July 2017, (amended 31 August 2017), Registrar McNamara on 15 May 2017, and Registrar McNamara on 25 June 2017 is…

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Details
Case
[2022] FedCFamC1F 818
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SCVG & Estate of KLD (No 5) involved a dispute between the parties regarding the setting aside of a previous judgment. SCVG sought to set aside the costs order made by Cronin J, claiming that KLD had made misrepresentations about her financial circumstances and the value of her interests in various family companies. The case was heard by the Federal Circuit Court, which had to decide whether the misrepresentations were material to the original judgment and if the setting aside of the judgment was justified. The court had to consider whether the evidence presented by SCVG was sufficient to prove the material fraud required to set aside the judgment.

The key legal issues that the court had to address included the requirement for material fraud to set aside a judgment, the role of newly discovered evidence in proving fraud, and the circumstances under which a court may set aside a judgment based on a party's misrepresentations. The court had to determine if SCVG's evidence of misrepresentations by KLD was sufficient to establish material fraud and whether the misrepresentations were material to the judgment made by Cronin J. Additionally, the court had to consider the obligations of a solicitor to advise the court of contact from a party and whether the failure to do so constituted fraud.

The court found that SCVG had not provided sufficient evidence to establish material fraud, as the judgment did not rely on the notion that the family companies were of nil value or that the payment of legal fees was a loan rather than a gift. The court also concluded that the failure of the solicitor to advise the court of SCVG's contact did not amount to fraud or malpractice that was material to the outcome. The court emphasised that SCVG's non-attendance and failure to secure an adjournment or permission to appear by telephone were the primary reasons for the dismissal of his application.

The application to set aside the costs order made by Cronin J was dismissed. The court found that even if SCVG's claims about the misrepresentations by KLD were accepted, they were not material to the judgment made by Cronin J, who had found that KLD was in a strong financial position and capable of meeting her legal fees. The court also noted that the issue of the payment of legal fees by KLD's mother was not fresh and that pursuing it a second time constituted an abuse of process.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The power, exercisable at first instance, requires that a material fraud, being an intentional contrivance to deceive the court and parties, be established by the party seeking the setting aside of the judgement. Such a fraud is not provable by a relitigation of the case previously run between the parties, but requires cogent fresh or newly discovered evidence to be led to establish the fraud as material to the original judgment such as to justify the setting aside of the judgment despite considerations as to the importance of finality in litigation.The evidence In relation to the Justice Cronin matter, Judge Scarlett matter and the CSA matter, Mr SCVG relied upon a common underlying set of factual contentions. Other considerations featured in the email fraud and will be dealt with under that part of the judgment. The first of the contentions was whether, contrary to her representations, Ms KLD’s interests in various family companies were of more than nil or nominal value, and whether or not Ms KLD believed that to be the case. The second issue was whether, contrary to her representations, there was no debt owing to Ms KLD’s mother for monies paid in respect of Ms KLD’s legal fees, and whether Ms KLD and her mother believed that to be the situation in respect of those monies. The extent to which these factual contentions have application in relation to the grounds will be examined later in reference to the grounds. It is convenient at this stage to set out how Mr SCVG seeks to make good these factual contentions given the fundamental role he assigned to them in the proceedings, and the manner in which they were answered by the respondent.The first contention The first contention relied upon it being established firstly that Ms KLD’s interests in the various family related entities was more than nil or nominal, and that Ms KLD knew this to be so when relying on various financial statements (see for example [32] Cronin J pleadings). To the extent that the financial statements were identified they were a Financial Statement filed in the Family Court of Australia, as it was then known, for the proceedings before Cronin J on 16 March 2015,[30] and a Financial Statement tendered in the SSAT proceedings and signed by Ms KLD on 12 December 2012.[31] [30] Exhibit E6, p.12.[31] Exhibit E6, p.3. Those various entities, each held largely if not solely by Ms KLD and her family, were:(a)K Pty Ltd;(b)N Pty Ltd;(c)L Pty Ltd; It should be noted that complaint is not made that Ms KLD failed to identify that she held interests (other than those where she as the trustee held a bare legal interest). Nor is it contended that Ms KLD failed to disclose income received from any of the entities, nor that she failed to disclose distributions made to her. The complaint is as to an under representation of value of the interests held. In advance of the trial of these matters the respondent conceded that the individual entities themselves were not of nil or nominal value. However, there was no concession that Ms KLD’s interests were other than of nil or nominal value for the reasons set out below. There was also no concession that Ms KLD considered that the interests that she held were other than of nil or nominal value.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Even if Mr SCVG had been successful in relation to the facts, he falls short on the issue of materiality as the judgment reflects no reliance upon the notion that the family companies were of nil value to Ms KLD, and no reliance upon the legal fees being a loan rather than a gift.Conclusion The application to set aside the costs order made by Cronin J fails. Even if Mr SCVG’s case is taken at its highest in respect of Ms KLD knowingly making false representations as to the value of the companies in which she held an interest, or as to whether the payment of legal fees by her mother was a gift or a loan, neither was material to the determination made by Cronin J, he having found factually, in favour of Mr SCVG that Ms KLD had the capacity to meet her legal fees, and rather than being impecunious, was “in a strong financial position.” Further, insofar as the application relied upon the issue of the payment of the legal fees by Ms KLD’s mother, this is a matter that is not fresh in the sense contemplated by Wentworth. The attempt to pursue this issue a second time constitutes an abuse of process.The Scarlett matterThe nature of the jurisdiction exercised by Judge Scarlett The impugned judgment concerned an appeal from a decision of the SSAT made in March 2013. The appeal was dealt with by judgment of Judge Scarlett delivered on 30 April 2015. The pleadings assert that the SSAT required the parties to file financial statements with financial circumstances truthfully and fully disclosed. Mr SCVG asserted, initially in general terms, that Ms KLD had made misrepresentations as to her financial circumstances to various tribunals and courts (apparently via her financial statement and oral evidence before the SSAT) causing unfair, excessive child support obligations, and the dismissal of his appeals of that decision. Mr SCVG contends that Ms KLD relied upon the purported misrepresentations before the SSAT again before Judge Scarlett to induce him to unjustly dismiss the appeal of the SSAT decision. Mr SCVG does not contend that the representations were made directly to Judge Scarlett. Careful attention needs to be given to the nature of the proceedings before, and the decision made by Judge Scarlett. The decision under appeal was as to whether in the special circumstances of the case a departure from the administrative formula for the determination of child support obligation could occur. Having determined that there were such circumstances, the SSAT then considered Ms KLD’s “earning capacity and financial resources, noting ([Mr SCVG’s]) “demand” that the Tribunal should investigate her income and her family company holdings.” The Tribunal declined to compel Ms KLD to provide documents related to companies owned by her family, Mr SCVG telling the SSAT that he had no real evidence about Ms KLD’s resources, and that his contention was based upon speculation and forecasts. The determination set Mr SCVG’s adjusted taxable income at $360,000 per annum for the period 15 July 2011 to 31 December 2014, and for the same period for Ms KLD at $130,000 per annum.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The extent of the obligation imposed upon the solicitor to advise the court of Mr SCVG’s contact with him must be answered in the context of a solicitor’s paramount duty to the court and the administration of justice. That duty required, in the particular circumstances where the court had asserted no knowledge of contact from Mr SCVG, and where the court was being asked to act on the basis of the non-appearance of Mr SCVG, the solicitor to advise of the receipt of the application to appear by telephone that he had received the previous day. The solicitor has explained why that did not happen. While that explanation does not detract from the obligation to notify the court of the contact from Mr SCVG, it is sufficient to undermine a conclusion that the solicitor’s failure was a deliberate failure.Consideration However, the failure to advise the court of the correspondence from Mr SCVG does not, without more, answer the setting aside issue pursued by Mr SCVG. That claim is reliant on the proposition that a relevant fraud was perpetrated by the solicitor. The failure to advise of the correspondence received by the lawyer does not go so far. Firstly, even if such was to be characterised as a fraud, or a conscious default on the part of the solicitor, it has not been sheeted home to Ms KLD as a meditated and intentional contrivance by Ms KLD in the terms of Clone. Despite Ms KLD being bound by the conduct of her solicitor, the conduct was not demonstrated to be at her instigation, nor was it demonstrated to be a part of an effort to effect a meditated and intentional contrivance upon the court by Ms KLD. Secondly, even if the failure by the solicitor was to be characterised as malpractice, in Clone it was observed that the capacity to set aside for fraud was “never suggested to extend to malpractice not amounting to fraud in the course of proceedings.”[34][34] Clone at [54]. Thirdly, as seen in the refusal of the court to set aside the judgments on Mr SCVG’s previous application to do so, the underlying issue is that Mr SCVG chose, contrary to directions, not to attend to conduct the proceedings that had been set down to meet his convenience. By the time of the dismissal Mr SCVG was acutely aware that he had neither secured an adjournment, nor had he secured permission to appear by telephone. His evidence was that he chose, as a matter of preference, to not attend, despite having secured neither dispensation. The dismissal of Mr SCVG’s application was caused by the non-attendance of Mr SCVG. That non-attendance, later seen to be in the absence of adequate explanation, formed the material basis for the dismissal of the reviews. That is, the solicitor’s failure has not been demonstrated to have been material to the outcome. This aspect is further emphasised by the next point. Fourthly, the previous attempt to set aside, relied upon the same factual premise of the solicitor’s failure to advise. That attempt was unsuccessful, predominantly on the basis that Mr SCVG’s failure to attend was not sufficiently justified.