SCVG and Estate of KLD (deceased) (No 3)

[2020] FamCA 176

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SCVG & ESTATE OF KLD (DECEASED) (NO. 3) [2020] FamCA 176

FAMILY LAW – PLEADINGS – Purpose of pleadings in the Family Court of Australia – Embarrassing Pleadings – Striking out pleadings – Fraud.

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth)
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)

Gunns Ltd v Marr[2005] VSC 251
Hawking & Hawking [2018] FamCA 890
McDonald v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529
McGuirk v the University of New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 1471
Northam v Favelle Favco Holdings Pty Ltd
SCVG & KLD [2018] FamCA 27
Seidler v Carroll & O'Dea(No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1172

APPLICANT: Mr SCVG

RESPONDENT: Estate of KLD (Deceased)

FILE NUMBER:	SYC	4380	of	2008
SYC	5956	of	2016

DATE DELIVERED: 20 March 2020

PLACE DELIVERED: Canberra

PLACE HEARD: Canberra

JUDGMENT OF: Gill J

HEARING DATE: 3 March 2020

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Self-representing

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Stenhouse

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Macphillamy's

Orders

(1)The pleadings in the Cronin J Matter Statement of Claim 15 October 2018 filed by the Applicant are struck out save for [31 – 32, including 32(a)-(o)] and [35 – 38].

(2)The pleadings in the Email Fraud Matter Statement of Claim 14 January 2019 filed by the Applicant are struck out save for [18 – 35].

(3)The pleadings in the Judge Scarlett Matter Statement of Claim 18 June 2019 filed by the Applicant are struck out save for [11 – 12], [12(a) save for the reference to the Full Court], [12(c) and (d)], and [13 – 14].

(4)The pleadings in the Child Support Agency Departure Order Statement of Claim 14 January 2018 are struck out save for [41a] and [43].

(5)The allowed pleadings are identified in bold in the marked up version of the pleadings appearing annexed to this judgment and as Exhibit CC1 in the proceedings.

(6)The matter is listed for further directions in relation to the filing of defences, by telephone, on Friday 27 March 2020 at 3pm:

Please dial in as follows:

1.            Dial …

2.            Enter the Guest Passcode: … #

3.            You will hear hold music - wait until the Host enters the meeting

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym SCVG & KLD has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT CANBERRA

FILE NUMBER: SYC 4380 of 2008

SYC 255 of 2016

Mr SCVG

Applicant

And

Estate of Ms KLD (Deceased)

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This judgment relates to pleadings and particulars filed by the Applicant in relation to four applications, in which he seeks that the Family Court of Australia review, set aside or modify various orders, judgments and determinations on the basis that they were procured by fraud on the part of the now deceased Respondent.  The legal personal representatives of the late Ms KLD now appear on the actions.

2. There are four causes of action:

   a)The Cronin J matter, which relates to a costs order made by Cronin J following final contested children’s proceedings, filed 15 October 2018.

   b)The Email Fraud matter, which relates to a determination made in the absence of the Applicant on his failure to appear, filed 14 January 2019.

   c)The Scarlett matter, which relates to a determination made by Judge Scarlett, filed 18 June 2019.

   d)The Child Support Agency Departure Order, which relates to the assessment of child support for a particular period, filed 14 January 2019.

3. The Applicant was directed, on the request of Respondent, to file and serve a document particularising the claims made against the Respondent and the legal and equitable basis on which those claims are made in the form of a Statement of Claim in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.  The Respondent filed the documents in relation to each of the causes of action.

4. Objection was taken by the Respondent to what was filed, in large part because of purported irrelevance.

Principles of pleadings and particulars

1. The Family Court is not a court of pleadings.  The Court’s rules and procedures do not accommodate pleadings in the usual course.  It has long been recognised that there will, however, be cases that call for pleadings to be filed.[1]  Pleadings have been called for in proceedings before this Court because the nature of the issues to be traversed requires them as a matter of fairness and as part of the proper supervision and conduct of litigation.  A not unusual example for a direction as to pleadings is where it is claimed that there is a constructive trust to be determined.

   [1] See for example Hawking & Hawking [2018] FamCA 890 and the discussion of pleadings there.

2. In the present proceedings, given that each cause of action is grounded in fraud, it was reasonable for the Respondent to seek that pleadings be provided.

3. Similar to other courts, the purpose of the Family Court in ordering that a party file a pleading is to ensure that a basic requirement of procedural fairness is met, being that a party should have the opportunity to be properly appraised of the case against them.[2]  Closely allied to this is the importance of the Court having a clear understanding of the dispute it is being asked to resolve.

   [2]McGuirk v the University of New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 1471 [21] [29] (‘McGuirk’).

4. In McGuirk v University of NSW,  Johnston J explained at [21] the purposes of pleadings:

   The function of pleadings is to state with sufficient clarity the case that must be met by a defendant. In this way, pleadings serve to define the issues for decision and ensure the basic requirement of procedural fairness that a party should have the opportunity of meeting the case against him or her: Banque Commerciale SA En Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279 at 286 296 and 302–3

5. And further, in citing from Bongiorno J in In Gunns Ltd v Marr[2005] VSC 251:

   Not only must the pleading inform the defendants of the case they must meet now, but it must clearly set out the facts which the plaintiffs must assert to make good their claim with sufficient particularity to enable any eventual trial to be conducted fairly to all parties. Vague allegations on very significant matters may conceal claims which are merely speculative. If this be not the case, the plaintiffs must put their allegations clearly.

6. Justice Johnston then explained the characteristics of pleadings that do not fulfil their function (described as embarrassing pleadings):

   Embarrassing Pleadings

   [30]  A pleading is embarrassing where it is “unintelligible, ambiguous, vague or too general, so as to embarrass the opposite party who does not know what is alleged against him”: Meckiff v Simpson [1968] VR 62 at 70; Gunns Ltd v Marr at [14]–[15].

   [31]  In Shelton v National Roads & Motorists Assn Ltd  [2004] FCA 1393 at [18], Tamberlin J explained the concept of “embarrassment” with respect to pleadings:

   Embarrassment in this context refers to a pleading that is susceptible to various meanings, or contains inconsistent allegations, or in which alternatives are confusingly intermixed, or in which irrelevant allegations are made that tend to increase expense. This is not an exhaustive list of situations in which a pleading may be embarrassing: see Bartlett v Swan Television & Radio Broadcasters Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR 41-434.

   [32]  A pleading may be embarrassing even though it contains allegations of material facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, if the material facts alleged are couched in expressions which leave difficulties or doubts about recognising or piecing together what is referred to

7. Expanding on this last point, in Northam v Favelle Favco Holdings Pty Ltd[3], Bryson J said at 2–3:

   [3] (unreported, 7 March 1995).

   A pleading may be embarrassing even though it does contain allegations of material facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, if the material facts alleged are couched in expressions which leave difficulties or doubts about recognising or piecing together what is referred to, or if imprecise or slang words are used with unduly broad ranges of possible meanings or without clear meanings.

   …

   It is not fair to require a defendant to flesh out general expressions or indirect allusions by piecing together information in other documents such as affidavits or experts’ reports. He might get it wrong, and the greater the complexities are, the more probable it is that he will understand what is alleged in some different way to what the plaintiffs will rely on. Procedural justice can be upset just as much by opportunistic advocacy exploiting a choice among several possibilities as by an ambush from complete concealment. In the world of practicalities a defendant is unlikely to receive much protection when evidence is tendered which is an available meaning of a pleading if he has not attacked the pleading at an interlocutory stage.

8. Although in the context of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (which are not applicable to these proceedings) in Seidler v Carroll & O’Dea (No 2),[4] McCallum J set out, in a non-exhaustive manner, a number of the usual principles that govern the use of pleadings:

   [4]Seidler v Carroll & O'Dea(No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1172 (‘Seidler’).

   The principles relevant to the application of that rule were set out in a helpful summary (not intended to be exhaustive) in the written submissions for the solicitor defendants, as follows:

   a.    the position must be considered in light of the requirements of s.56 Civil ProcedureAct which obliges the court to exercise its powers to 'facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the dispute or proceedings: Gangi v Boral Resources (NSW) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 398 per Carling J at [30]; Pacanowski & Anor v Wakerman & Ors [2009] NSWCA 402 per Tobias JA at [19];

   b.   a pleading is to contain, and contain only, a statement in summary form of the material facts on which the applicant relies. The material facts are all those facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action: Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd (1936) 1 KB 697 at 712; Pinson v Lloyds and National Provincial Foreign Bank Ltd (1941) 2 KB 72 at 75; Fleet v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals [2007] NSWSC 1420 at [24]; r 14.7 UCPR;

   c.   the function of a pleading is to inform the opponent of the material facts on which the claimed relief is sought. The object of pleadings and the meaning of the rules is to define issues and thereby diminish expense and delay: Thorp v Holdsworth (1876) 3 Ch D 637 at [639] quoted in Szanto v Bainton [2011] NSWSC 985 at [122];

   d.   a pleading must state the material facts. The word "material" means necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action, and if any one "material" fact is omitted, the statement of claim is bad: Szanto at [123];

   e.    a pleading must be as brief as the nature of the case allows: McGuirk v The University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424 at [27]; r 14.8 UCPR;

   f.    the material facts must be pleaded with a sufficient degree of specificity, having regard to the subject matter, to convey to the opposite party the case it has to meet. Pleadings define the issues for decision in the litigation and thereby enable the relevance and admissibility of evidence to be determined at trial: Fleet v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals [2007] NSWSC 1420 at [24]; Ratcliffe v Evans (1892) 2 QB 524 at 532; Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 659 at [664]; Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279 at 286 - 287; Szanto at [124];

   g.    all material facts should be plainly stated in the pleading itself: Travel Compensation Fund v Blair [2003] NSWSC 720 per Einstein J at [29H30];

   h.    a pleading must plead specifically any matter that, if not pleaded specifically, may take the defendant by surprise: Fleet v Royal Society for the Prevention ofCruelty to Animals [2007] NSWSC 1420 at [24]; r. 14.14 UCPR;

   i.   a pleading is embarrassing if, in succinct fashion, it does not put the other properly on notice of the real substance of the claim made against it and to know what case it is that the other party is to meet. Thus, a pleading is embarrassing if it is unintelligible, ambiguous, or so imprecise in its identification of material factual allegations as to deprive the opposing party of proper notice of the real substance of the claim: Szanto v Bainton [2011] NSWSC 985 at [107]; Shelton v National Roads 81 Motorists Assn Ltd [2004] FCA 393at [8];

   j.   a pleading may be embarrassing even though it does contain allegations of material facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, if the material facts alleged are couched in expressions which leave difficulties or doubts about recognizing or piecing together what is referred to, or if imprecise words are used with unduly broad ranges of possible meanings or without clear meanings. What is referred to must be clearly stated showing, as appropriate, when and where an event happened, who participated, what was said, what was the relevant effect of any document and so forth: Northam v Favelle Favco Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Bryson J, 7 March 1995);

   k.    although the pleading of a conclusion may, in some circumstances constitute a material fact, nevertheless, the pleading will be embarrassing if allegations are made at such a level of generality that the defendants do not know in advance the case it/they has/have to meet: McGuirk v The University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424 at [33]; Charlie Carter Pty Limited v Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association (1987) 13 FCR 413 at 417 - 418. In such a case, the appropriate remedy is to strike out the pleading rather than to order the provision of particulars, as it is not the function of particulars to take the place of the necessary averments in a pleading: McGuirk v The University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424 at [33]; Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Australia) Pty Limited (1985) 7 FCR 109 at 112-114;

   l.   a pleading is also embarrassing where alternatives are confusingly intermixed or where irrelevant allegations are made that tend to increase expense: Shelton v National Roads & Motorists Association Limited [2004] FCA 1393 at [18];

   m.    objectionable material within a pleading that is so mingled with other matters may lead to the conclusion that the pleading as a whole would tend to embarrass the fair trial of the action and ought be struck out: National Australia Bank v Priestley [2012] NSWSC 387 at [6]; Fleet v Royal Society for the Prevention for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals NSW  & Ors [2005] NSWSC 926 at [55]; Turner v Bulletin Newspapers Co Pty Limited (1974) 131 CLR 69 at 72, 87 - 88, 97 - 98; Gunns Limited v Marr [2005] VSC 25 at [57] -[58];

   n.    a pleading must not claim an amount for unliquidated damages: r 14.13(1) UCPR;

   o.   if any documents or spoken words are referred to in a pleading, the effect of the documents or spoken words must, so far as material, be stated, and the precise terms of the documents or spoken words must not be stated, except so far as those terms are themselves material: r 14 UCPR;

   p.   where there has been a clear infringement of the rule as to stating all material facts and not merely a failure to give sufficient particulars of facts which have been pleaded, the preferable course is to strike out the offending pleading, with liberty to amend, rather than to order particulars: Szanto v Bainton [2011] NSWSC 985 at [127]; National Australia Bank v Priestley [2012] NSWSC 387 at [34];

   q.   a pleading that alleges any condition of mind must give particulars of the facts on which the party pleading relies: r 15.4(1) UCPR. Condition of mind includes any disorder or disability of mind: r 15.4(2) UCPR.

9. While a number of the above principles are reliant on the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, the Family Law Rules at rule 1.04 echoes the requirement of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) referred to in (a) above. Rules (b) through (m) and (q), although supported by the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (‘UCPR’), are not reliant on the UCPR. They are fundamental principles of pleading, and provide a useful framework within which to consider pleadings.

10. However, in considering these principles, it is necessary to bear in mind what else was said by McCallum J in Seidler at [8]:

    Access to justice is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice. The court should be vigilant to guard against the rigid application of principle at the expense of facilitating the just resolution of matters properly brought forward for judicial determination.

    The fundamental importance of facilitating equal access to justice warrants the giving of close consideration to the terms of a pleading in order to discern, with an open mind, whether there is a reasonable cause of action nestling within obscure or difficult language used by a self-represented litigant.

11. While the caution articulated by McCallum J is relevant in all family law proceedings, this caution is particularly relevant in this case given that the Applicant is a self-represented litigant.

12. Given the purposes of the pleadings, drawing fine distinctions between what is a particular and what is a pleading is not of assistance in this case.  Rather, what is required is clarity as to what fraud allegation the Respondent is to meet.

13. While the Respondent initially indicated objections to matters contained in the document that were mere recitals of evidence, pragmatically, the Respondent withdrew those complaints.

14. Despite the considerations given to an unrepresented litigant in the pursuit of the just resolution of matters, it is also important to observe that McCallum J further noted in Seidler at [10]:

    Conversely, however, a misconceived or poorly-pleaded claim imposes considerable stress on the due administration of justice and ought equally to be guarded against. The same vigilance must accordingly be exercised not to suffer the court to become a forum for the agitation of grievances which lack any juridical foundation.

15. In considering the pleadings produced by the Applicant, the above matters are to be together borne in mind, with the importance of identifying the case, and the material facts pursued by the Applicant in the pursuit of that case, at the forefront of that consideration.  While the blend of recitals of evidence, pleadings and particulars together render this a difficult exercise, insofar as they clearly identify the material facts relied upon and necessary for the actions, they do not offend against the central object of the proceedings.

16. It is necessary to deal with each of the sets of pleadings.

The Cronin J Matter Statement of Claim 15 October 2018 ^{see Annexure A}

1. The Applicant sought to set aside the costs order made by Cronin J on 20 August 2015 on the basis that it was procured by fraud.

2. Objection was taken to a number of the pleadings and particulars provided by the Applicant.

3. Paragraphs [1 – 30] traverse the marital history of the parties, a litigation history between the parties in various courts and tribunals, relating to various matters, and an allegation in respect of the associate of a judge who did not finally determine the proceedings.

1. With the exception of [15], none of these matters appear to touch upon the costs order proceedings before Cronin J.  Paragraph [15] is an assertion that the fraud alleged in the Cronin J proceedings had an ongoing effect through the appeal process, but does not touch upon the circumstances of the Cronin J costs proceedings.

2. There is no apparent connection between the matters contained in these paragraphs and the relief sought.

3. The Applicant, however, sought to establish a connection between the pleadings and the relief sought, by relying upon a reference in SCVG & KLD [2018] FamCA 27 to Windeyer J in McDonald v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529 where his Honour noted, on the issue of whether a fresh trial ought to be ordered due to fraud that:

   In fact the court has said that except in very exceptional cases perjury is not a sufficient ground for setting aside a judgment.

4. That is, the Applicant asserted that the matters contained in [1 – 30] go to the issue of exceptionality in relation to perjury.  They do not. 

5. What the exceptionality referred to by Windeyer J is directed to is the trial and the impact on the trial itself occasioned by the fraud, rather than the general circumstances between the parties or the general litigation context between the parties.  That is to say, the quality of exceptional has to be directed towards the reason for the Court’s intervention to set aside the judgment on the basis that it was procured by fraud, not some more generalised concept of exceptionality.

6. Paragraphs [1 – 30] should be struck from the pleadings as they are not relevant to the cause of action.

7. It was accepted that, but for some argumentative content, whether described as pleading, particular or evidence, the matters contained in [31 – 32, including 32(a)-(o)] were directed to the relief sought, identifying the factual matters relied upon for the relief.

8. Paragraph [33] contained an assertion by the Applicant as to the Respondent having deceived, during the substantive trial, Cronin J as to her employment status and accordingly, as to her availability to care for the parties’ children.

9. The Applicant said that this was “relevant to show how they set Cronin up so he was receptive to a fraudulent financial statement.” The reference to a fraudulent financial statement is a reference back to the matters recited at [32].

10. On the terms described by the Applicant, this matter was not relied upon as the fraud in the costs proceedings, that being the financial statement, but as a precursor with an effect that made the fraud more readily procured.

11. The Respondent also complained that [33] was an enlarging of the pleadings, it is difficult to see how this could be seen to be the case where [33] forms part of the pleadings document that has been prepared to identify the pleadings. 

12. However, [33] contained other defects. [33] employs ambiguities, such as holding in opposition  “paid employment” and “actively employed…including as a major shareholder, director and company secretary…” and holding in opposition those roles with caring for the children “on a full time basis.” Even if, despite its nomination as a precursor, [33] could be considered in a broad sense to go to the relief sought, it is embarrassing in the sense explained by McCallum J,

    a pleading may be embarrassing even though it does contain allegations of material facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, if the material facts alleged are couched in expressions which leave difficulties or doubts about recognizing or piecing together what is referred to, or if imprecise words are used with unduly broad ranges of possible meanings or without clear meanings. What is referred to must be clearly stated showing, as appropriate, when and where an event happened, who participated, what was said, what was the relevant effect of any document and so forth

13. The Respondent’s complaint of a lack of transparent connection of [33] to the relief sought is made good, particularly for the reasons identified by McCallum J.

14. Paragraph [34] alleges that Mr Macphillamy, the solicitor for the Respondent, knowingly perpetrated a fraud upon the Court, in preparing and placing before the Court the Respondent’s allegedly false financial statement.

15. This was put forward by the Applicant as relevant to the exceptionality requirement identified above in relation to perjury, on the basis that it was an officer of the Court who had participated in the fraud.

16. Fraud must be pleaded specifically and with particularity.[5]  Here what is pleaded is specific as to the conclusion of fraud that is being pursued by the Applicant.  However, as was also said in McGuirk:

    [5]McGuirk [165].

    Although the pleading of a conclusion may, in some circumstances constitute a material fact, nevertheless, the pleading will be embarrassing if allegations are made at such a level of generality that the defendant does not know in advance the case it has to meet

17. In this instance, the pleading suffers from a generality.  To support the knowing misrepresentation on the part of Mr Macphillamy, the Applicant points to the long standing retainer of Mr Macphillamy with the Respondent’s family, in the acquisition of a particular asset, in the structuring of estate and tax planning, trust structure and wills, and in the preparation and witnessing of the Respondent’s financial statement. 

18. The Respondent then is left to piece together what is being referred to above, in connection to the conclusion sought.  The particular facts to be relied upon to establish that Mr Macphillamy knew the financial statement was false are not identified.  All that is identified is more generalised assertions that, without the identification of the particular component facts, are apt to embarrass. 

19. What is also lacking, as identified by the Respondent, was the necessary connection between the fraud alleged against the Respondent and the conduct alleged against Mr Macphillamy.

20. That is, there is a failure to disclose the case that the Respondent has to meet, and a failure to provide transparent connection to the relief sought.

21. The Respondent accepted that the matters contained in [35 – 38] whether described as pleading, particular or evidence, were directed to the relief sought, identifying the factual matters relied upon for the relief.

22. At [39 – 45] the Applicant sets out a series of allegations that he describes as serial fraudulent activity, again on the basis that this is relevant to the requirement for exceptionality.  Again these are matters that are not relevant to the relief sought, and, for the reasons set out in relation to [1 – 30] should be struck out as irrelevant.

23. What remains then are [31 – 32, including 32(a)-(o)] and [35 – 38].

The Email Fraud Matter Statement of Claim 14 January 2019 ^{see Annexure B}

1. The email fraud matter relates to the Applicant’s failure to attend court on 14 September 2017, in relation to an application for the setting aside of the dismissal of the two applications to review the following costs assessments:

   a)The application of 31 May 2017 concerning the review of costs assessment orders made by Registrar McNamara on 15 May 2017 for $7,300 and $5,500.

   b)The application of 14 August 2017 concerning the review of a costs assessment order made by Registrar McNamara on 25 July 2017 for $7,837.

   c)The application of 21 August 2017 concerning the review of a costs assessment order made by Registrar Payget on 31 July 2017 for $68,747.63.  

2. On the Applicant’s failure to attend, the applications were dismissed.  The Applicant seeks that the order of dismissal be set aside on the basis that it was procured by fraud.

3. The alleged fraud rests upon an allegation that the solicitor for the Respondent, Mr Macphillamy, did not inform the Court that the Applicant was unable to attend Court on 14 September 2017.

4. Of the pleadings filed by the Applicant the Respondent objected to all, save for [29], [30a], [30c], [31 – 33].

5. Paragraphs [1 – 17] traverses a history of conflict and litigation between the parties.  They are not relevant to the cause of action and are struck out.

6. Although also reciting evidence, paragraphs [18 – 29] set out the factual matters relied upon by the Applicant to establish both that he was unable to attend court on 14 September 2017 and the awareness of Mr Macphillamy of that fact.

7. Paragraph [30b] contains an assertion of fact as to Mr Macphillamy causing a representation to be made to the Court regarding the Respondent’s non-attendance.

8. Paragraph [34] contains evidence and argument and [35] contains argument.  These are not struck out as they assist in understanding the case that is made by the Respondent.

9. The Respondent conceded that [36 – 37] were submissions and should be struck out.

10. What remains then, are [18-35].

The Judge Scarlett Matter Statement of Claim 18 June 2019 ^{see Annexure C}

1. This matter seeks the setting aside of an order by Judge Scarlett, and costs in relation to the Federal Circuit Court, Full Court and High Court.  It will be necessary for the Applicant to identify the jurisdiction in relation to these costs matters.

2. All of the purported pleadings were objected to, save for [11 – 12], [12(a)], save for the references to the Full Court, and [12(c)].

3. Paragraphs [1 – 10] again set out a background unconnected to the cause of action.

4. The Applicant asserted that [12(b)] established that the Respondent was aware at some point that particular property exceeded $1 million in value.  Such a proposition could not be drawn from the facts pleaded.

5. The Applicant asserted that [12(d)] identified a misrepresentation to the SSAT which appeared connected to the relief.

6. Paragraph [12(e)] noted that [32] was advanced as a particular.  However, [32] related to a financial statement filed in other proceedings and was not relevant to the cause of action.

7. Paragraphs [13 – 14] together appear to set out a misrepresentation to the SSAT connected to the proceedings before Judge Scarlett.

8. Paragraphs [15] and [16] are unrelated to the relief sought.

9. While [17 – 25] at times touch upon the proceedings before Judge Scarlett, they do not do so in a manner that illuminates the cause of action.

10. Paragraphs [26 – 45], apart from being confused and confusing, reveal no apparent connection to the cause of action, touching upon various complaints about other aspects of litigation between the parties and other complaints in respect of Ms KLD or her solicitor.

11. What remains then, are [11 – 12], [12(a) save for the reference to the Full Court], [12(c) and (d)], [13 – 14].

The Child Support Agency Departure Matter Statement of Claim 14 January 2018 ^{see Annexure D}

1. The Applicant sought relief in respect of Child Support arrears in relation to a period of 15 July 2011 to 2 December 2015.

2. This matter was the subject of complaint by the Respondent that the death of Ms KLD rendered the application incompetent.  This is a matter that will require revisiting.

3. As to the pleadings, the Respondent objected to all pleadings save as to [41a] as a pleading and [43] as a particular.  These aspects were directed to the alleged provision of fraudulent financial material to the AAT.  Paragraph [43] explained that the application is directed to a decision made by the AAT of 1 May 2018.  The Applicant seeks the amendment of that decision to backdate it, and further amend it, to cover a period commencing 15 July 2011, as opposed, presumably, to its application being restricted to a period commencing December 2015.

4. Otherwise, in general terms the pleadings in respect of this matter meet the description given by McCallum J in Seidler:

   The document is so confused, incomprehensible and prolix as to cause embarrassment in the conduct of the proceedings, even allowing some latitude for the position of a self-represented litigant.

5. In other words, it is impossible to identify the material facts relied upon (as opposed perhaps to matters introduced as some form of broader context), or any relationship between the matters recited and the relief sought.  For example, reference is made to a determination by the SSAT in 2012, without any other fact being identified to connect it to the relief sought in respect of the AAT.

6. The Respondent, and the Court, are thereby forced to navigate a swamp of loosely connected, or unconnected facts, and guess those which may or may not bear some relationship to the relief sought.  This unsatisfactory exercise is required to take place in the circumstance that if there is a relationship between the facts and the relief, it is a relationship that requires the mediation of other facts that are not pleaded.

7. This approach renders the pleadings embarrassing.

8. Save as for those identified by the Respondent in [41a] and [43], the pleadings in relation to this matter are struck out as embarrassing.

9. Other issues were raised in respect of this cause of action.

10. The Applicant is the subject of a vexatious proceedings order made by Cronin J on 27 February 2015 in the following terms:

    Pursuant to s 118 of the Family Law Act 1975, the father is restrained from bringing any application under the Family Law Act relating to the two children named in these orders without leave of a Judge of the Family Court of Australia.

11. The Respondent referred the Court to the provisions of s 100 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), arguing that the section deems proceedings under that Act to be proceedings under Part VII of the Family Law Act.  Part VII refers to children.

12. Section 100 relevantly provides that:

    (1)The Family Law Act 1975 (other than Part X of that Act), the standard Rules of Court and the related Federal Circuit Court Rules apply, subject to this Act and with such modifications as are prescribed by the applicable Rules of Court, to proceedings under this Act (other than proceedings under paragraph 79(a)) as if:

    (a)the proceedings were proceedings under Part VII of that Act; and

    (b)the proceedings were proceedings instituted under Part VII of that Act; and

    (c)a court having or exercising jurisdiction in the proceedings were a court having or exercising jurisdiction under Part VII of that Act; and

    (d)a decree made in the proceedings were a decree made under Part VII of that Act; and

    (e)matters arising in the proceedings were matters arising under Part VII of that Act; and

    (f)any other necessary changes were made.

13. Accordingly, the Respondent stated that by virtue of s 100(1)(b) the Applicant was required to attain leave from the Court, on the basis that the child support matter is taken to be as if it were instituted under Part VII of the Family Law Act, and thereby falls under the description “relating to the two children.”

14. However, even on the assumption that s 100 is applicable; it does not convert an application in relation to child support into an application in relation to the two children. It remains an application in relation to child support. Leave is not required on the basis of the vexatious litigant order.

I certify that the preceding eighty-one (81) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Gill delivered on 20 March 2020.

Associate: 

Date:  20 March 2020

Annexure A

Cronin J Matter Statement of Claim 15 October 2018

Relief Claimed

1. Set aside, pursuant to r 17. 02 of the Family Law Rules 2004, the costs order made by Justice Cronin on 20 August 2015 on the basis that it was procured by fraud.

2. Costs

PLEADINGS AND PARTICULARS

1. The parties married on … 2001 after executing a Binding Financial Agreement dated 11 December 2001 pursuant to s90B of the Family Law Act 1975 (BFA) at the Defendant Ms KLD's insistence.

2. When the parties commenced our relationship, Ms KLD’s family already owned and operated extensive livestock properties acquired many decades ago by free land grants, the N Pty Ltd and the K Pty Ltd farm businesses in S Town.

3. In 2001 Ms KLD's brother Mr U acquired the Suburb AA property in order to expand the farm business.

4. Our first daughter B was born in 2002. In … 2002 Mr U suffered a fatal accident in S Town and I suffered a major illness. Upon my hospital discharge Ms KLD wanted to conceive immediately and after suffering 3 miscarriages C was born in … 2004.

5. Ms KLD removed the children to S Town without my knowledge in January 2005, after consulting her solicitor Mr Macphillamy and her father told her he had only a year to live. Despite Ms KLD giving evidence of her consultation with Mr Macphillamy, he told Altobelli FM that no such meeting occurred.

6. Ms KLD denied me any access to the children until the Court ordered interim contact in May 2005.

7. Upon the passing of Mr U Ms KLD took an increasingly controlling role in the farm business and by May 2009 was its spokeswoman.

8. Our parenting case came initially before Le Poer Trench J who recused himself when Mr Macphillamy reminded the judge that he was friends with the KLD family. His Honour left the bench saying "I will find another judge to hear this case"

9. In June 2006 just before the long-promulgated shared care amendments became law, Moore J ignored their legislative intent and ordered the children live with Ms KLD on the basis of being settled in the status quo Moore J had herself created by her interim orders. I appealed through to seeking special leave of the High Court.

10. Triggered by C's near death in 2008 from undiagnosed pneumonia, another trial was granted before Altobelli FM materially increased my contact but left the children with Ms KLD again based on Moore J's status quo and denied me the meaningful time I had always sought. Again I appealed unsuccessfully.

11. The SSAT required in our 2012 child support case that we file Financial Statements with our financial circumstances truthfully and fully disclosed.

12. Ms KLD commenced to grossly misrepresent her financial circumstances in proceedings before various tribunals and courts with her Financial Statement filed in the SSA T and her oral evidence.

Particulars

(a)       On 12 December 2012 Ms KLD filed in the SSAT her financial statement valuing her shareholdings in L Pty Ltd, K Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd at nil or nominal value which values she knew were false, thereby perpetrating a fraud on the SSAT and on the Federal Magistrates Court and the Full Court of the Family Court in the resulting appeals. Ms KLD made the gross misrepresentation with the intent of causing the SSAT to assess me with unfair increased child support.

(b)       In the Binding Financial Agreement executed by the parties prior to their marriage on 11 December 2001 (BFA), Ms KLD's excluded property included, inter alia, 100 shares in J Pty Ltd and 100 shares in N Pty Ltd. In the BFA each party acknowledged that they made no contribution to the other party's excluded property nor had any entitlement to it or any accretion to it, or property acquired in substitution for it, or any income from it.

(c)       On 12 December 2012 Ms KLD knew that her shareholdings in L Pty Ltd, K Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd had a very substantial current value, exceeding millions of dollars.

(d)       During the SSAT hearing Ms KLD gave further perjured evidence in support of her filed financial statement.

(e)       Particulars in 32 below

1. As a result of the fraud perpetrated by the gross misrepresentations in Ms KLD's Financial Statement of 12 December 2012 and her oral evidence the SSAT set my adjusted income at $360,000 and Ms KLD's at $130,000,and I was assessed with materially increased and unfair child support, penalties for non-payment and suffered damage by being prevented from attending overseas holidays.

Particulars

The SSAT decision made 7 March 2013

The Child Support Assessments issued from April 2013 onwards.

Departure Prohibition Order issued on 26 February 2014.

1. I appealed the SSAT decision to the Federal Circuit Court with Scarlett J dismissing my appeal and making a costs order against me on 30 April 2015. I appealed to the Full Court in EA75/2015.

2. I was the appellant in relation to appeals EA 75 of 2015, EA 156 of 2015 and 51 of 2016 which were heard by the Full Court on 27 May 2016. The Full Court delivered its judgment on 24 May 2017, dismissing my application for leave to appeal in EA 75 of 2015, the appeal EA 156 of 2015 (re Cronin J's costs order) and my application for an extension of time file a Notice of Appeal in EA 51 of 2016 and ordered costs against me.

1. The integrity of these Full Court decisions was undermined by fraud.

2. By way background, in 2012 I applied to the Child Support Registrar ("the CSR") for a determination to depart from various child support assessments as between me and Ms KLD ("the respondent"). A decision was made, which I objected to. A new decision was made, and again objected to by me. The matter came before the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (the SSAT) on 6 February 2013. In March 2013 the SSAT recorded its decision setting the my adjusted taxable income at $360,000 per annum and the respondent's at $130,000 per annum. I appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and in 2015 Judge Scarlett affirmed the decision of the SSAT. It was this decision that was the subject of appeal EA 75 of 2015.

3. The Full Court found that leave to appeal the decision of Judge Scarlett should be refused and the application for leave was dismissed.

4. I have filed Application in an Appeal to set aside the Full Court's cost order for fraud. At the review of the registrar's decision regarding this application in an appeal on 30 January 2018 before Ainslie Wallace J, the CSR sought and was granted leave to be excused from participating further in those proceedings.

5. Heard at the same time as the child support appeal was my appeal against a costs order made by Cronin J on 20 August 2015. The costs order provided that I pay 50 per cent of the respondent's costs of the parenting proceedings before Cronin J on an indemnity basis. This appeal (EA 156 of 2015) was dismissed by the Full Court.

6. The Full Court further ordered that I pay the costs of both respondents of and incidental to the appeals.

7. I applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal the Full Court decision, but that application was dismissed.

8. On 13 July 2016 I applied for a review of a Child Support decision in the AA T which was heard on 4 March 2017 and the decision made 1 May 2018.

9. I have filed an Application in a Case in the Federal Circuit Court seeking the orders of Scarrlett J made in 2015 be set aside on the basis of fraud and this application has been transferred to the Family Court (SYC5956/2016).

10. I have filed an Application in a Case seeking the cost order of Cronin J made 20 August 2015 (underlying EA156/2015) be set aside for fraud and this matter is part heard before Gill J.

11. The second fraud:

12. Ms KLD perpetrated a second fraud on the Court by her solicitor failing to disclose a relationship his employed solicitor had with Faulks DCJ's associate in 2013 with the intent of denying me the opportunity to apply for the recusal of Faulks DCJ for apprehended bias.

Particulars

(a)       On 2 July 2013 in the parenting proceedings before Faulks DCJ, I put in issue the potential apprehended bias of Faulks DCJ by asking whether he knew Ms KLD's family and by responding to Faulk DCJ's denial and irrelevant statement that he knew a Company I partner.

(b)       Faulks DCJ warned me he was aware of my criminal charges, denied knowing Ms KLD's family and coached Ms KLD to apply for final orders to totally exclude me from the children's lives. She responded that that was not her intention but she ultimately did so apply. Mr Macphillamy was aware of, but remained silent about, his employed solicitor's relationship with Faulks DCJ's associate. Faulks DCJ ordered suspension of all physical contact on 4 July 2013.

(c)       Faulks DCJ conducted another directions hearing on 7 August 2013.

(d)       I appealed partner DCJ's orders because suspension of physical contact would facilitate Ms KLD further alienating the children by traversing with them my criminal charges before they were interviewed by the so-called experts. The children told me that their mother discussed with them my criminal charges and unsurprisingly, the children apparently told the socalled experts they were afraid to see me because of my criminal charges, which was ostensibly determinative for Cronin J in removing equal shared parental responsibility and all physical contact.

(e)        The Full Court dismissed my appeal of Faulks DCJ's orders with costs on 25 March 2014, resulting in the $19,760 costs order against me.

(f)        On 9 April 2014 Faulks DCJ disclosed that his associate's partner was employed as a solicitor by Mr Macphillamy.

(g)       On June 2014 my counsel asked Faulks DCJ to recuse himself for bias and not to be involved in any way in the appointment of a replacement judge. His Honour agreed to the request.

(h)       Faulks DCJ contacted Cronin J and effectively appointed him to hear the case.

(i)        Cronin J said that if he could not hear the case for any reason he would have to ask Faulks DCJ to find another judge to replace him.

(j)        On 2 February 2015 Faulks DCJ and Cronin J together attended the "start of the legal year'' event in Canberra immediately before Cronin J commenced the final hearing at 11 am that day.

(k)       Mr Macphillamy was aware of the relationship of his employed solicitor with Faulks DCJ's associate but remained silent, thereby denying me the opportunity to seek Faulks DCJ's recusal during the 2 and 4 July 2013 hearings and to raise apprehended bias as an appeal ground in the Full Court.

(l)        Mr Macphillamy's failure to disclose the disqualifying relationship necessitated my appeal, resulting in the Full Court's costs order of $19,760 against me.

(m)      I unsuccessfully sought an extension of time to appeal Cronin J's parenting orders made 27 February 2015 on grounds of apprehended bias and procedural unfairness related to Faulks DCJ's involvement and facilitation of Ms KLD's further alienation of the children before their interviews by the experts.

1. In 2015 I filed a Claim in the Local Court to recover the money Ms KLD had persuaded me to lend her during our marriage but was told by the Magistrate that my claim was equitable in nature and the Local Court lacked equitable jurisdiction and I also had costs awarded against me.

2. Ms KLD and her solicitor maximised their costs for the simple local court matter by apparently briefing three different barristers including a senior counsel specialising in Family Court proceedings and claimed $53,644 in costs.

3. Ms KLD tried to intimidate me into ceasing my court proceedings by bankrupting me based on the $19,760 unpaid cost order. The bankruptcy 7 proceedings were expensive with Ms KLD upgrading to a senior counsel, and were ultimately dismissed by Justice Farrell in November 2016, and I received a costs order for $3,400 which remains unpaid.

4. It was a requirement of the Court that the parties in the cost proceedings before Cronin J file a Financial Statement in which their financial circumstances were truthfully and fully disclosed.

5. In breach of that requirement Ms KLD perpetrated a third fraud on the Court by making another gross misrepresentation of her financial circumstances, with the intent of obtaining an onerous indemnity cost order against me.

Particulars

(a)       Ms KLD filed a Financial Statement and Affidavit on 16 March 2015 stating her shareholdings in L Pty Ltd, K Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd to have a nil or nominal current value and that she had a liability owing to her mother of $650,000 for legal costs paid.

(b)       Ms KLD knew that her shareholdings in L Pty Ltd, K Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd had a very substantial current value, exceeding millions of dollars, and that she had no legally enforceable liability to her mother for $650,000 of legal costs.

(c)       Ms KLD gave sworn evidence to the SSAT in the 2013 hearing that her mother paid all her legal costs as a "gift" to her.

(d)       Ms KLD together with her brother and sister at 16 March 2015 (and since 3 October 2006) held all 4 of the available ordinary shares in K Pty Ltd, which for 2015/16 had an income of approximately $6,500 and expenditure of approximately $5,500, along with assets of $970,000 and liabilities of $600,000 at 30 June 2016. Prior to 3 October 2006 Ms KLD owned 3 of the 4 ordinary shares of K Pty Ltd.

(e)       K Pty Ltd at 16 March 2015 owned the farm property at Suburb AA where 200 acres of product were initially grown and after the 2002 acquisition the second "pivot" was installed thereby doubling the acreage under cultivation. This property's value continues to increase materially due to its proximity to transport.

(f)        K Pty Ltd was in 2015/16 the trustee of the M Settlement discretionary trust in which Ms KLD was a beneficiary and which held 100% of the 1 O ordinary shares in J Pty Ltd since 27 August 2004.

(g)       The M Settlement trust disclosed for 2015/16 a net income of $1.6 million and $226,000 of carried forward losses, and a distribution to Ms KLD of $25,000.

(h)       Ms KLD is a director and company secretary of K Pty Ltd (since 26 June 2002) and a director of J Pty Ltd (since 20 June 2003).

(i)        J Pty Ltd had for 2015/16 total income of approximately $5 million, expenditure of $3 million, taxable income of $2 million, and tax of $600,000, assets of $3.6 million, liabilities of $396,000 and shareholders funds of $194,000.

(j)        Ms KLD held at 16 March 2015, 660 (67%) of the 990 ordinary shares of L Pty Ltd, being 198 shares beneficially and 462 shares as trustee for the T trust, of which she was also a beneficiary.

(k)       L Pty Ltd at 16 March 2015 owned the livestock properties at V Street W Town NSW (which also has extensive homestead and holiday facilities) and X Street S Town NSW (where Ms KLD has resided since 2007 in a 5 bedroom new house built by her family at a cost of $850,000) and the industrial property at Y St Z Town NSW, and had for 2015/16, taxable income $90,000, tax of $25,000, assets of $5. 7 million and a liability of $700,000.

(l)        Ms KLD knew that her shareholdings in L Pty Ltd had a current value materially in excess of her shareholding's percentage of the shareholders funds of L Pty Ltd as shown in the company's balance sheet because the balance sheet did not include the historical or current value of the extensive livestock properties acquired for free in a crown land grant many decades earlier.

(m)     At 16 March 2015 (and since 17 April 2012) Ms KLD held 2,765 of the 17,000 ordinary shares in N Pty Ltd and the M Settlement trust (since 26 July 2012) held 6725 ordinary shares in N Pty Ltd. N Pty Ltd for 2015/16 had a profit of $200,000, tax liability of $70,000, assets of $4.7 million (at historical cost) and liabilities of $1.7 million.

(n)       Ms KLD knew at 15 March 2015 that N Pty Ltd had for decades owned, and operated from, the property at NN St S Town NSW, which continues to increase in value due to its location in central S Town. 

(o)       Ms KLD relied on her Financial Statement and Affidavit filed 16 March 2015 in her written submissions to Justice Cronin filed on 16 March 2015.

1. Before commencing the costs Application Justice Cronin had already been deceived and persuaded by Ms KLD (with the aid of her solicitor) that "she was not engaged in any paid employment and that she cared for the children on a full time basis", rather than the truth of her being actively employed in the farm business, including as a major shareholder, director and company secretary of K Pty Ltd and J Pty Ltd and the controlling shareholder of L Pty Ltd. Ms KLD's intent was to gain an advantage over me in both the parenting orders and cost orders made by Cronin J. Cronin J did order removal of ESPR and all physical contact with me and indemnity costs.

Particulars

Justice Cronin's Reasons published 27 February 2015.

Particulars 32(a) to (o) above.

1. Ms KLD's Financial Statement and Affidavit filed on 16 March 2015 were prepared by, and affirmed before, Mr Macphillamy who through his decadeslong work as solicitor for the business and personal affairs of the KLD family knew that her statements made on 16 March 2015 were materially false, and he instructed Ms KLD's counsel to rely on those false statements in submissions to Justice Cronin.

Particulars

(a)       Mr Macphillamy had acted as the solicitor for the KLD family and their businesses for decades including in their acquisition of the land at Suburb AA in 2001, and in the structuring of the KLD family's estate planning and tax planning trust structures and wills.

(b)       Ms KLD's Financial Statement, Affidavit and Submissions filed 16 March 2015.

(c)       I seek to provide further particulars following evidence produced pursuant to subpoenas.

1. As a result, Justice Cronin at the time of making his indemnity cost order had been deceived by Ms KLD into having a grossly false understanding of Ms KLD's business activities, the relative financial circumstances of the parties and His Honour regarded those financial circumstances to be relevant pursuant to s117 of the Family Law Act.

Particulars

Justice Cronin's judgements of 27 February 2015 and 20 August 2015.

1. As a result, Justice Cronin's cost order against me was more onerous than it otherwise would have been.

2. There have been no reductions or adverse changes to Ms KLD's shareholdings in the L Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd businesses since she acquired her shareholdings in L Pty Ltd (in 2000), K Pty Ltd (in 2000) and N Pty Ltd (in 2003), and the changes and growth of the farm business since the Suburb AA land acquisition in 2002 and of the N Pty Ltd business since 2000 have increased the value of Ms KLD's shareholdings in those companies.

Particulars

(a)       The acreage under cultivation at Suburb AA has been doubled since acquisition of that property.

(b)       The value of the properties owned by the L Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd companies has increased substantially since 2000.

1. The value of Ms KLD's shareholdings in L Pty Ltd, K Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd have remained stable or increased materially since 12 December 2012.

Particulars

Particulars 32 (b) to (o) and 37 (a) and (b) above

There have been no material adverse events affecting the J Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd businesses since 2012.

1. On 24 July 2018, I took up the Magistrate's suggestion and filed a Statement of Claim for $425,000 in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of NSW for my equitable interest arising from the money Ms KLD had persuaded me to transfer to her for investment during the marriage -refer 40(d) below.

2. Ms KLD's frauds on the Court and the Commonwealth are exceptional. Her actions were part of a plan commenced during our marriage to take personal and financial advantage of me and to grossly misrepresent her financial circumstances before multiple tribunals and courts in order to unfairly gain excessive child support payments, cost orders and Family Tax Benefit, and because her solicitor knowingly participated therein.

Particulars

(a)       All particulars in 1 to 38 above.

(b)       Ms KLD consulted with Mr Macphillamy immediately before removing the children to S Town in 2005.

(c)       Despite insisting we sign a prenuptial agreement with the substantive intent to keep our financial affairs separate, Ms KLD persuaded me (contrary to the spirit and terms of our pre-nuptual agreement) to transfer $50,000 to her ( and pay the tax on it ) to invest in industrial property with her siblings in S Town and after separation refused to acknowledge my interest in the properties or pay me a money amount to liquidate my interest.

(d)       To seek relief from the fraud described in (c) above on 24 July 2018 I filed a Statement of Claim for $450,000 in the Equity division of the Supreme Court of NSW which was technically defective. A new Statement of Claim seeking relief for unjust enrichment and fraud with the following revised pleadings and particulars will be filed shortly:

(1) The parties married on … 2001 after executing a Binding Financial Agreement dated 11 December 2001 pursuant to s908 of the Family Law Act 1975 (BFA) at the Defendant Ms KLD's insistence.

(2) At all material times the parties were bound by the BFA.

(3) At all material times I was a partner of the Company I partnership and derived materially all my income and assets, and all the income and assets of the SCVG Family Trust, from that partnership interest. Particulars As for (7) below.

(4) In the BFA the parties expressed as the prime purpose of the BFA their desire to define their financial rights and obligations towards each other in the event of marriage breakdown. Particulars Recital Q of the BFA.

(5) The BFA provided that each party's excluded property includes the "assets and financial resources" in Schedule 1 and 2 respectively "and any accretion thereto or property or financial resources acquired in substitution thereof', and that the "parties shall each remain individually entitled to their respective excluded property to the exclusion of the other party".

Particulars

Recitals I, J and K of the BFA.

(6) In the BFA each party acknowledged that they made no contribution to the other party's excluded property nor had any entitlement to it or any accretion to it, or property acquired in substitution for it, or any income from it.

Particulars Recitals O and P of the BFA.

(7) My excluded property included, inter alia, my interests in Company I (Capital Account) - estimate$305,000, interest in Company I current account balance - estimate $274,127, Company LL Deferred Share proceeds - estimate $364,201, Capital account with Company I Partnership - $5,000, Loan account with SCVG Family Trust - $1, 117,000, and Interest (if any) in the property at BB St, Suburb CC then the subject of property proceedings in the Family Court. The Company LL Deferred Share proceeds was an asset distribution from my partnership interest in Company I. Particulars Schedule 1 of the BFA

(8) Ms KLD's excluded property included, inter alia, 100 shares in J Pty Ltd and 100 shares in N Pty Ltd and did not include any interest in property at DD Street or FF Street, S Town.

Particulars Schedule 2 of the BFA

(9) On the hearing I will rely on the BFA for its full terms and effect.

(10) They were express terms of the BFA that each party made no contribution to, and had no entitlement to, the other party's excluded property (as listed in Schedule 1 and 2 respectively) or any accretion to it, or property acquired in substitution for it, or any income from it.

Particulars Recitals O, P and Q and Terms 1 , 2 and 7 of the BFA

(11) It was an implied term of the BFA that the parties maintain their individual wealth and assets without access to the other's wealth, assets or income, and maintain and keep each party's financial affairs, other than normal shared household expenditures, entirely separate from the other's financial affairs, , such that any money transferred from one to the other for other than household costs would not be a beneficial transfer but in the nature of money held or invested in trust for the transferor. 13

Particulars

The term is implied by Recitals I to Rand Terms 1 to 15 of the BFA and by law.

(12) In mid 2002 Ms KLD asked me to provide the money to build a new house on the EE property owned by her family and she took me on a tour of this undeveloped livestock property in X Street S Town to show me where she wanted to build a house. She explained that her parents had promised to leave this property to her in their wills. I explained to her that I declined because it was contrary to our pre-nuptual agreement and because, as the property was apparently owned in her family's business structure, I couldn't get title to such a house. Ms KLD now resides in a house built by her family on that property at a cost of $850,000.

In about March 2003 when I had returned to work after my illness Ms KLD asked me to invest in factory units with her and her siblings in central S Town. She said that despite our pre-nuptual agreement I should do income splitting through my family trust and transfer to her about $50,000, and pay the tax on it. She said she didn't have enough cash for her $80,000 share of the deal, so she would instead invest my money in those properties, because otherwise she'd have to get a mortgage loan from a bank. She said this could be a way we do our first joint investment together, and it was good because I'd be in business with her family too.

A few weeks later when we visited Ms KLD's family in S Town, she drove us by the proposed properties in DD St and FF St saying - See these have a great location, you'll get good capital growth on your money because the Government Department Offices is moving nearby and they'll be easy to sell later. I asked her how will it be structured and how could she be sure about the government project being in S Town. She replied that she would just do it in her name on my behalf to keep it simple and her family's good friends, the GG Family, are selling part of their HH livestock property nearby her EE property to the government.

I checked media reports to confirm the Government Department offices moving to S Town, and then I proceeded with the transaction because I trusted my wife and was persuaded by her suggestion that I go into a business transaction jointly with her siblings. I had been disappointed that her family insisted on a pre-nuptual agreement as it showed a lack of trust/commitment to our marriage, and this proposed joint investment might help build some trust with her family.

A few months later after I had transferred the money to Ms KLD she drove us past the properties again, she said the family's happy, and you'll see, we'll make good money on these properties. 14 I distributed income of $47,742 from my family trust for the year ended 30 June 2003 to Ms KLD, paid the distribution to her and paid her consequential tax liabilities.

Particulars

(a)       As trustee of the SCVG Family Trust I made a distribution of income for the year ended 30 June 2003 to beneficiary Ms KLD of $47,742.

(b)       Ms KLD's income tax return for the year ended 30 June 2003 returned the income distributed to her by the SCVG Family Trust as assessable income received.

(c)       The SCVG Family Trust financial statements for 30 June 2004 showed that the income distribution of $47,742 for the year ended 30 June 2003 to Ms KLD was paid to her before 30 June 2004.

(13) Ms KLD told me during 2004 that the two factory units in which she had invested the money borrowed from me were in FF and DD Streets S Town, in which she and her two siblings had a one third interest each.

(14) I consequently paid income tax on behalf of Ms KLD totalling $20,668.90 being the total of the following payments made by me to the ATO, of which the last three amounts totalling $9210 has subsequently been refunded to her by the ATO due to her tax instalments for 2003/4 (paid by me) being unnecessary and in excess of her tax liability for that year largely because she received no further distributions from my family trust following our separation:

Particulars

(a)       $11,458.90 paid on 27 May 2004 upon lodgement of Ms KLD's 2003 income tax return

(b)       $3090.00 paid on 30 June 2004 being Ms KLD's April - June quarterly income tax instalment for 2003/4

(c)       $3060.00 paid on 26 October 2004 being Ms KLD's July - September income tax instalment for 2003/4

(d)       $3060.00 paid on 28 February 2005 being Ms KLD's October- December income tax instalment for 2003/4

(15) Ms KLD and I separated on 17 January 2005. In March 2005 I sent an email to Ms KLD's solicitor Mr Macphillamy requesting repayment of the loans created by my payment of her tax instalments. I received an email in reply from Mr Macphitlamy in words to the effect "These matters will be included in payments as part of the property settlement. "

(16) My total payments to and on behalf of Ms KLD of $68,411 ($47,742 income distribution plus $20,669 tax paid) constituted 85% of the $80,000 Ms KLD invested in the two S Town industrial properties, so I claim an 85% equitable interest in Ms KLD's one-third share of those properties.

(17) On 1 April 2014 I sent a Letter of Demand I sent to Ms KLD and her solicitor requesting repayment of these amounts.

(18) In her Affidavit affirmed 16 March 2015 filed for a Local Court action I had initiated to recover these payments Ms KLD admitted that I had paid her 30 June 2003 tax liability of $11,458.90 on her behalf and that a later tax instalment of $3090 had been refunded to her by the ATO, and she did not deny any of the other tax payments described in particulars in ( 14) above, in the following terms: " I did not pay the tax on this (2003/4) tax return. lt is my belief that $11,458.90 was paid by the plaintiff ..... In my 2004 income tax return there is a PAYG Income Tax instalment of $3090 which was refunded to me as my income for that financial year was $220. The Plaintiff alleges more money was paid to the ATO but I have neither a record or a memory of it".

(19) As a matter of court record, Ms KLD has admitted ownership of a 33% interest in property at DD Street and FF Street S Town with a current value at 16 March 2015 of $300,000. Particulars 16 The Financial Statement filed by Ms KLD on 16 March 2015 in the Family Court showed these properties at FF and DD Streets S Town at item 36 disclosing the current market value of her 33% interest as $300,000.

(20) The Property Ownership Search I conducted showed Ms KLD at 23 December 2012 owned properties at DD St and FF St S Town.

(21) I conducted internet searches that show that similar industrial properties in nearby JJ Town are currently selling for $900,000 to $1.4 million and that Ms KLD's DD St and FF St properties are currently worth at least $800,000 each (with a rental yield of 3-4%).

(22) Thus Ms KLD's one third interest in these properties is currently worth at least $530,000, and my 85% equitable interest is worth at least $450,000.

(23) In the unlikely event Ms KLD (as an unemployed borrower) was able to obtain a bank loan of $68,411 to buy investment property in 2003, it would have cost Ms KLD at least the mortgage interest rate applicable to investment property in 2003 of about 10% per annum.

(24) Compound interest at 10% per annum capitalised onto a base loan of $68,411 for the 15 years from 2003 to 2018 equates to $322,500.

(25) The NSW Valuer General's reports from 2013 said "the land in the small industrial precinct in S Town has shown strong increase in value". Real estate expert Company KK estimated commercial and industrial property growth in S Town since 2004 at about 12-15% per annum (average 13.5%).

(26) An equitable interest in property of $68,411 in 2003, at a compound increase in value of 13.5% per annum would equate in 2018 to $457,155.

(27) The value increase in S Town property has been assisted by the increased property demand and reduction in supply due to the relocation of the Government Department offices to S Town in 2006.

(28) As Ms KLD has not paid me any interest on the funds for 15 years and as I have been exposed to the risk of my equitable interest in the DD St and FF St S Town properties being adversely affected by market movements, in law my equitable interest also shares in the actual increase in the market value of these properties.

(29) Even in a worst case scenario of assuming that Ms KLD's 16 March 2015 affirmed valuation figure of $300,000 for her interest in these properties is accepted, with a conservative rate of increase of 12% per 17 annum, her one third interest in these properties would today be worth $421,000 and my 85% equitable interest worth $358,000.

(30) In the alternative to a liquidated claim for $450,000, I apply for an order that Ms KLD sell her interest in the relevant properties by auction and pay me 85% of the proceeds."

(e)       Ms KLD filed her Statement of Financial Circumstances in the child support case before the SSAT on 12 December 2012 valuing her shareholdings in the J Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd companies at nil or nominal value, thereby perpetrating a fraud on the SSAT, and on the Federal Magistrates Court (before Scarlett J) and the Full Court of the Family Court in the consequential appeal proceedings all of which resulted in cost orders against me.

(f)        My Applications in SYC5956/2015 and EA75/2015 to set aside orders in child support proceedings and appeals on the basis of fraud.

(g)       The AA T 's child support decision made 1 May 2018,

(h)       Ms KLD perpetrated a fraud on the Commonwealth by successfully applying for the means-tested Family Tax Benefit despite her wealth.

(i)        Mr Macphillamy benefitted financially from his participation in the frauds by at least $500,000 in legal fees.

1. Despite Ms KLD continuing to file perjured evidence as to her financial circumstances with her filed Financial Statement and submissions to the AAT in our child support case in 2016, the AAT in its decision made 1 May 2018 rejected her fraudulent evidence, found her to be very wealthy and materially reduced my child support liability.

   Particulars

   (a)       On 1 O August 2016 Ms KLD filed her Statement of Financial Circumstances in which she again valued her shareholdings in the J Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd companies at nil or nominal current value and stated she had a liability to her mother of $750,000.

   (b)       Ms KLD did not comply with the MT's directions to provide documents with information about the assets held by the family businesses and the 18 income and assets they provide to her, thus the AAT obtained relevant ATO documents which proved Ms KLD's nil or nominal valuations to be false.

   (c)       In its decision the AA T said "Mr SCVG made assertions in written submissions about the value of property held by Ms KLD through the family businesses and that she has annual income and financial resources available to her of approximately $1,000,000. The Tribunal does not accept all the assumptions on which he bases his calculations. (For example, he refers only to Internet searches to support his assertion about the annual turnover of one company.) However, it gives the submissions some weight because Ms KLD chose not to address them at hearing and has not complied with directions to provide documents with information about the assets held by the family businesses and the income and assets they provide to her. She failed to frankly disclose her financial circumstances and the Tribunal cannot make accurate findings about her access to income, assets and property Therefore, the Tribunal "should be reasonably robust in assessing [her] financial circumstances adversely to [her] and in favour of' Mr SCVG. While it does not accept the detail of his submission, it accepts the businesses own real property worth many millions of dollars. It finds Ms KLD is a very wealthy woman with access to significant income and financial resources generated by family businesses from the substantial assets owned by family companies.

   (d)       The AAT materially reduced my child support liability to 20% of the cost of the children.

   (e)       Its decision was backdated to December 2015 as follows: the annual ratel of child support is to be 20% of the maximum costs for the children in the . Costs of the Children Table from 4 December 2015 until a child support 1 terminating event happens for C.

   (f)        For the whole of the period to which the AA T decision applies I had a care percentage of 0%.

   (g)       The AA T said in its decision that the child support formula would operate to allocate each parent a proportion of the maximum cost of a child according to their relative incomes. For example, in a case where one parent earns approximately $1,000,000 a year and the other earns approximately $2,000,000, the first parent earns approximately 33% of the combined child support income of $3,000,000. Their child support income percentage would be approximately 33% and they would be obliged to meet that proportion of the cost of the child (either as child support or through meeting expenses while the child is in their care).

2. Ms KLD has not appealed against the AAT decision made 1 May 2018.

3. I have filed an Application in SYC5956/2016 seeking that the AAT decision made 1 May 2018, after adjustment for my 24% to 37% care percentages prior to April 2013, be backdated to 15 July 2011 being the commencement of the period to which Ms KLD's first fraudulent Financial Statement filed in the SSAT applied, as there has been no material change in our relative financial circumstances since 15 July 2011.

Particulars

My Application filed 27 July 2018 seeks orders that:

(1) Leave is granted pursuant to s 111 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 for the court to make an order under s118 of the Act in respect of a child support period more than 18 months earlier, being the period from 15 July 2011 to 3 December 2015.

(2) That the decision of the AA T made 1 May 2018, that I pay an annual rate of child support of 20% of the maximum costs for the children in the Costs of the Children Table from 4 December 2015 onwards, be extended to also apply to the earlier child support period from 15 July 2011 to 3 December 2015, after adjusting the 20% annual rate of child support for the care percentages and cost percentages ranging from 24% to 37% as applied by the CSA prior to 15 February 2013.

1. If my Application referred to in 31 above is successful, my unpaid child support liability claimed by Ms KLD of $44,000 would be reduced to nil and Ms KLD would be liable to pay me child support for the period from 15 July 2011 to 3 December 2015 at least approximately $15,000 (being average $4000 x 3.5 years-see (f) below).

Particulars

(a) Under the formula for calculation of child support in the Child Support Assessment Act and published by the CSA, your cost % is deducted from your income % to arrive at your child support%, ie the % of the children's cost that you should pay to the other parent.

(b)       Eg, if you have a 24% care of the children you are acknowledged as directly meeting 24% of the cost of the children, ie you have a 24% cost %.

(c)       For the period prior to 2 April 2013 the CSA acknowledged I had a care% and cost % of between 24% and 37% and assessed my child support accordingly.

(d)       As the AAT decided my child support% should be 20% for the period since 4 December 2015 when my care% and cost% have been nil, it follows the AAT has effectively determined my income % to be 20%. 20

(e)       It follows that for the period before 15 February 2013 when my care% and cost% was between 24% and 37%, my child support% should be between -4% (20% less 24%) and -17% ( 20% less 37%).

(f)        Historically, the CSA assessed Ms KLD's annual child support payable to me as:

-For period 15/7/11 to 31/7/11, $1214 based on incomes of $35,446 (me) and $75,059 (Ms KLD)

- For period 1/8/11 to 31/3/12, $3262 based on incomes of $23,331 (me) and $75,059 (Ms KLD)

- From 1/4/12 onwards, $4226 based on incomes 23,331 (me) and $88,301(Ms KLD). ( Average for period 7/11 to 12/15 approx $4000 ).

The CSA then made a decision on 11 /5/12 that my annual child support liability to Ms KLD would be:

- 1/1/11 - 14/7/11 $11,000 - 15/7 /11 - 30/6/13 $6,000

I appealed to the SSA T which made the decision on 7 March 2013 referred to in 8. above.

1. Ms KLD and her solicitor attempted to pervert the course of justice.

Particulars

(a)       Mr Macphillamy advised Ms KLD to remove the children to S Town to create a status quo which was then used by Moore J as the basis for unjust orders not in the children's best interests.

(b)       Mr Macphillamy advised Ms KLD to breach Altobellii FM's contact orders to create another status quo of no contact to facilitate Ms KLD's further alienation of the children before their interviews by the experts and failed to disclose to the court a disqualifying relationship - refer 27 above .

(c)       Mr Macphillamy knew that I had attempted to seek an adjournment and to attend by telephone the hearing before Justice Gill on 14 September 2017 but remained silent when His Honour enquired why I was absent during the hearing. I have applied to set aside Gill J's orders made 14 September 2017 for fraud.

(d)       Mr Macphillamy knew that as Justice Cronin had said he would decide the cost application on the papers, Ms KLD's affidavit and financial statement evidence could not be challenged under cross examination and thus for the integrity of the court's processes, they needed to be truthful.

(e)       Mr Macphillamy filed Ms KLD's evidence knowing it to be false and instructed counsel to rely on it in multiple submissions to Courts

(f)        1 to 44 above.

Annexure B

Email Fraud Matter Statement of Claim filed 14 January 2019

RELIEF CLAIMED

1. The Orders of Justice Gill made 14 September 2017 be set aside pursuant to Rule 17.02 on the basis they were procured by fraud.

2. Costs

PLEADINGS AND PARTICULARS

1. The parties married on … 2001 after executing a Binding Financial Agreement dated 11 December 2001 pursuant to s90B of the Family Law Act 1975 at the Defendant Ms KLD's insistence.

2. When the parties commenced our relationship, Ms KLD"s family already owned and operated extensive livestock properties acquired many decades ago by free land grants, the N Pty Ltd and the K Pty Ltd businesses in S Town.

3. In 2001 Ms KLD's brother Mr U acquired the Suburb AA land in order to expand the farm business.

4. Our first daughter B was born in … 2002. In … 2002 Mr U suffered a fatal accident in S Town and I suffered a major illness. Upon my hospital discharge Ms KLD wanted to conceive immediately and after suffering 3 miscarriages C was born in 2004.

5. Ms KLD removed the children to S Town without my knowledge in January 2005, after consulting her solicitor Mr Macphillamy and her father told her he had only a year to live. Despite Ms KLD giving evidence of her consultation with Mr Macphillamy, he told Altobelli FM that no such meeting occurred.

6. Ms KLD denied me any access to the children until the Court ordered interim contact in May 2005.

7. Upon the passing of Mr U Ms KLD took an increasingly controlling role in the farm business and by May 2009 was its spokeswoman.

8. Our parenting case came initially before Le Poer Trench J who recused himself when Mr Macphillamy reminded the judge that he was friends with the KLD family. His Honour left the bench saying "I will find another judge to hear this case"

9. In June 2006 just before the long-promulgated shared care amendments became law, Moore J ignored their legislative intent and ordered the children live with Ms KLD on the basis of being settled in the status quo Moore J had herself created by her interim orders. I appealed through to seeking special leave of the High Court.

10. Triggered by C's near death in 2008 from undiagnosed pneumonia, another trial was granted before Altobelli FM materially increased my contact but left the children with Ms KLD again based on Moore J's status quo and denied me the meaningful time I had always sought. Again I appealed unsuccessfully.

11. The SSAT required in our 2012 child support case that we file Financial Statements with our financial circumstances truthfully and fully disclosed.

12. Ms KLD on 12 December 2012 commenced to grossly misrepresent her financial circumstances in proceedings before various tribunals and courts with her Financial Statement filed in the SSA T and her oral evidence.

13. As a result of the fraud perpetrated by the gross misrepresentations in Ms KLD's Financial Statement of 12 December 2012 and her oral evidence the SSAT set my adjusted income at $360,000 and Ms KLD's at $130,000 and I was assessed with materially increased and unfair child support, penalties for non-payment and suffered damage by being prevented from attending overseas holidays.

14. Further parenting proceedings were heard by Cronin Jin February 2015 in which Ms KLD sought to totally exclude me from the children's lives and prevent all contact with me. She partly succeeded and successfully obtained an indemnity cost order against me, which I appealed unsuccessfully to the Full Court.

15. I appealed the SSAT decision to the Federal Circuit Court with Scarlett J dismissing my appeal and making a costs order against me on 30 April 2015. I appealed to the Full Court in EA75/2015.

16. I was the appellant in relation to appeals EA 75 of 2015, EA 156 of 2015 and EA 51 of 2016 which were heard by the Full Court on 27 May 2016. The Full Court delivered its judgment on 24 May 2017, dismissing my application for leave to appeal in EA 75 of 2015, the appeal EA 156 of 2015 (re Cronin J's costs order) and my application for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal in EA 51 of 2016 and ordered costs against me.

1. I appealed the SSAT decision to the Federal Circuit Court with Scarlett J dismissing my appeal and making a costs order against me on 30 April 2015. I appealed to the Full Court in EA75/2015.

2. I was the appellant in relation to appeals EA 75 of 2015, EA 156 of 2015 and EA 51 of 2016 which were heard by the Full Court on 27 May 2016. The Full Court delivered its judgment on 24 May 2017, dismissing my application for leave to appeal in EA 75 of 2015, the appeal EA 156 of 2015 (re Cronin J's costs order) and my application for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal in EA 51 of 2016 (re Cronin J's parenting orders) and ordered costs against me.

3. The integrity of these Full Court decisions was undermined by fraud.

4. By way of background, in 2012 I applied to the Child Support Registrar ("the CSR") for a determination to depart from various child support assessments as between me and Ms KLD ("the respondent"). A decision was made, which I objected to. A new decision was made, and again objected to by me. The matter came before the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (the SSA T) on 6 February 2013. In March 2013 the SSAT recorded its decision setting the my adjusted taxable income at $360,000 per annum and the respondent's at $130,000 per annum. I appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and in 2015 Judge Scarlett affirmed the decision of the SSAT. It was this decision that was the subject of appeal EA 75 of 2015.

5. The Full Court found that leave to appeal the decision of Judge Scarlett should be refused and the application for leave was dismissed.

6. I have filed Application in an Appeal to set aside the Full Court's cost order for fraud. At the review of the registrar's decision regarding this application in an appeal on 30 January 2018 before Ainslie Wallace J, the CSR sought and was granted leave to be excused from participating further in those proceedings.

7. Heard at the same time as the child support appeal was my appeal against a costs order made by Cronin J on 20 August 2015. The costs order provided that I pay 50 per cent of the respondent's costs of the parenting proceedings before Cronin J on an indemnity basis. This appeal (EA 156 of 2015) was dismissed by the Full Court.

8. The Full Court further ordered that I pay the costs of both respondents of and incidental to the appeals.

9. I applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal the Full Court decision, but that application was dismissed.

10. On 13 July 2016 I applied for a review of a Child Support decision in the AAT which was heard on 4 March 2017 and the decision made 1 May 2018.

11. I have filed an Application in a Case in the Federal Circuit Court seeking the orders of Scarlett J made in 2015 be set aside on the basis of fraud and this application has been transferred to the Family Court (SYC5956/2016).

12. I have filed an Application in a Case seeking the cost order of Cronin J made 20 August 2015 (underlying EA156/2015) be set aside for fraud and this matter is part heard before Gill J.

13. The second fraud:

14. Ms KLD perpetrated a second fraud on the Court by her solicitor failing to disclose a relationship his employed solicitor had with Faulks DCJ's associate in 2013 with the intent of denying me the opportunity to apply for the recusal of Faulks DCJ for apprehended bias. … had been Faulks DCJ's associate from … 2013 and Mr Macphillamy specifically does not deny knowledge of …'s relationship at that time with Mr Macphillamy's employed solicitor.

Particulars

(a)       On 2 July 2013 in the parenting proceedings before Faulks DCJ, I put in issue the potential apprehended bias of Faulks DCJ by asking whether he knew Ms KLD's family and by responding to Faulk DCJ's denial and irrelevant statement that he knew a Company I partner.

(b)       Faulks DCJ warned me he was aware of my criminal charges, denied knowing Ms KLD's family and coached Ms KLD to apply for final orders to totally exclude me from the children's lives. She responded that that was not her intention but she ultimately did so apply. Mr Macphillamy was aware of, but remained silent about, his employed solicitor's relationship with Faulks DCJ's associate. Faulks DCJ ordered suspension of all physical contact on 4 July 2013.

(c)       Faulks DCJ conducted another directions hearing on 7 August 2013 at which Mr Macphillamy appeared and made orders over my objections relating to the parenting trial.

(d)       I appealed Faulks DCJ's orders because suspension of physical contact would facilitate Ms KLD further alienating the children by traversing with them my criminal charges before they were interviewed by the so-called experts. The children told me that their mother discussed with them my criminal charges and unsurprisingly, the children apparently told the socalled experts they were afraid to see me because of my criminal charges, which was ostensibly determinative for Cronin J in removing equal shared parental responsibility and all physical contact.

(e)       The Full Court dismissed my appeal of Faulks DCJ's orders with costs on 25 March 2014, resulting in the $19,760 costs order against me.

(f)        On 9 April 2014 Faulks DCJ disclosed that his associate's partner was employed as a solicitor by Mr Macphillamy.

(g)       In June 2014 my counsel Alison Stenmark SC asked Faulks DCJ to recuse himself for bias and not to be involved in any way in the appointment of a replacement judge. His Honour agreed to the request.

(h)       Faulks DCJ contacted Cronin J and effectively appointed him to hear the case.

(i)        Cronin J said that if he could not hear the case for any reason he would have to ask Faulks DCJ to find another judge to replace him.

(j)        On 2 February 2015 Faulks DCJ and Cronin J together attended the "start of the legal year" event in Canberra immediately before Cronin J commenced the final hearing at 11 am that day.

(k)       Mr Macphillamy was aware of the relationship of his employed solicitor with Faulks DCJ's associate but remained silent, thereby denying me the opportunity to seek Faulks DCJ's recusal during the 2 and 4 July 2013 hearings and to raise apprehended bias as an appeal ground in the Full Court.

(l)        Mr Macphillamy's failure to disclose the disqualifying relationship necessitated my appeal, resulting in the Full Court's costs order of $19,760 against me.

(m)      I unsuccessfully sought an extension of time to appeal Cronin J's parenting orders made 27 February 2015 on grounds of apprehended bias and procedural unfairness related to Faulks DCJ's involvement and facilitation of Ms KLD's further alienation of the children before their interviews by the experts.

1. In 2015 I filed a Claim in the Local Court to recover the money Ms KLD had persuaded me to give her during our marriage but was told by the Magistrate that my claim was equitable in nature and the Local Court lacked equitable jurisdiction and I also had costs awarded against me.

2. Ms KLD and her solicitor maximised their costs for the simple local court matter by apparently briefing three different barristers including a senior counsel specialising in Family Court proceedings and claimed $53,644 in costs.

3. Ms KLD tried to intimidate me into ceasing my court proceedings by bankrupting me based on the $19,760 unpaid cost order. The bankruptcy proceedings were expensive with Ms KLD upgrading to a senior counsel, and were ultimately dismissed by Justice Farrell in November 2016, and I received a costs order for $3,400 which remains unpaid.

4. It was a requirement of the Court that the parties in the cost proceedings before Cronin J file a Financial Statement in which their financial circumstances were truthfully and fully disclosed.

5. In breach of that requirement Ms KLD, aided and abetted by her solicitor Mr Macphillamy, perpetrated a third fraud on the Court by making another gross misrepresentation of her financial circumstances, with the intent of obtaining an onerous indemnity cost order against me. Cronin J relied on Ms KLD's misrepresentations in making his indemnity costs order against me.

Particulars

(a)       Ms KLD filed a Financial Statement and Affidavit on 16 March 2015 stating her shareholdings in L Pty Ltd, K Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd to have a nil or nominal current value and that she had a liability owing to her mother of $650,000 for legal costs paid.

(b)       Ms KLD and Mr Macphillamy knew that her shareholdings in L Pty Ltd, K Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd had a very substantial current value, exceeding millions of dollars, and that she 8 had no legally enforceable liability to her mother for $650,000 of legal costs.

(c)       Ms KLD gave sworn evidence to the SSAT in the 2013 hearing that her mother paid all her legal costs as a "gift" to her.

(d)       Ms KLD together with her brother and sister at 16 March 2015 (and since 3 October 2006) held all 4 of the available ordinary shares in K Pty Ltd, which for 2015/16 had an income of approximately $6,500 and expenditure of approximately $5,500, along with assets of $970,000 and liabilities of $600,000 at 30 June 2016. Prior to 3 October 2006 Ms KLD owned 3 of the 4 ordinary shares of K Pty Ltd.

(e)       K Pty Ltd at 16 March 2015 owned the farm property at Suburb AA where 200 acres of product were initially grown and after the 2002 acquisition the second "pivot" was installed thereby doubling the acreage under cultivation. This property's value continues to increase materially due to its proximity to transport.

(f)        K Pty Ltd was in 2015/16 the trustee of the M Settlement discretionary trust in which Ms KLD was a beneficiary and which held 100% of the 1 O ordinary shares in J Pty Ltd since 27 August 2004.

(g)       The M Settlement trust disclosed for 2015/16 a net income of $1.6 million and $226,000 of carried forward losses, and a distribution to Ms KLD of $25,000.

(h)       Ms KLD is a director and company secretary of K Pty Ltd (since 26 June 2002) and a director of J Pty Ltd (since 20 June 2003).

(i)        J Pty Ltd had for 2015/16 total income of approximately $5 million, expenditure of $3 million, taxable income of $2 million, and tax of $600,000, assets of $3.6 million, liabilities of $396,000 and shareholders funds of $194,000.

(j)        Ms KLD held at 16 March 2015, 660 (67%) of the 990 ordinary shares of L Pty Ltd, being 198 shares beneficially and 462 shares as trustee for the T trust, of which she was also a beneficiary.

(k)       L Pty Ltd at 16 March 2015 owned the livestock properties at V Street W Town NSW (which also has extensive homestead 9 and holiday facilities) and X Street S Town NSW (where Ms KLD has resided since 2007 in a 5 bedroom new house built by her family at a cost of $850,000) and the industrial property at Y St Z Town NSW, and had for 2015/16, taxable income $90,000, tax of $25,000, assets of $5. 7 million and a liability of $700,000.

(l)        Ms KLD knew that her shareholdings in L Pty Ltd had a current value materially in excess of her shareholding's percentage of the shareholders funds of L Pty Ltd as shown in the company's balance sheet because the balance sheet did not include the historical or current value of the extensive livestock properties acquired for free in a crown land grant many decades earlier.

(m)      At 16 March 2015 (and since 17 April 2012) Ms KLD held 2,765 of the 17,000 ordinary shares in N Pty Ltd and the M Settlement trust (since 26 July 2012) held 6725 ordinary shares in N Pty Ltd. N Pty Ltd for 2015/16 had a profit of $200,000, tax liability of $70,000, assets of $4.7 million (at historical cost) and liabilities of $1. 7 million.

(n)       Ms KLD knew at 15 March 2015 that N Pty Ltd had for decades owned, and operated from, the property at NN St S Town NSW, which continues to increase in value due to its location in central S Town.

(o)       Ms KLD relied on her Financial Statement and Affidavit filed 16 March 2015 in her written submissions to Justice Cronin filed on 16 March 2015. Mr Macphillamy instructed counsel to rely on her evidence that he knew was materially false.

1. Before commencing the costs Application Justice Cronin had already been deceived and persuaded by Ms KLD (with the aid of her solicitor) that "she was not engaged in any paid employment and that she cared for the children on a full time basis", rather than the truth of her being actively employed in the farm business, including as a major shareholder, director and company secretary of K Pty Ltd and J Pty Ltd and the controlling shareholder of L Pty Ltd. Ms KLD's intent was to gain an advantage over ~e in both the parenting orders and cost orders made by Cronin J. Cronin J did order removal of ESPR and all physical contact with me and indemnity costs.

Particulars

Justice Cronin's Reasons published 27 February 2015.

Particulars 32(a) to (o) above.

1. Ms KLD's Financial Statement and Affidavit filed on 16 March 2015 were prepared by, and affirmed before, Mr Macphillamy who through his decadeslong work as solicitor for the business and personal affairs of the KLD family knew that her statements made on 16 March 2015 were materially false, and he instructed Ms KLD's counsel to rely on those false statements in submissions to Justice Cronin.

Particulars

(a)       Mr Macphillamy had acted as the solicitor for the KLD family and their businesses for decades including in their acquisition of the land at Suburb AA in 2001, and in the structuring of the KLD family's estate planning and tax planning trust structures and wills.

(b)       Ms KLD's Financial Statement, Affidavit and Submissions filed 16 March 2015.

(c)       I seek to provide further particulars following evidence produced pursuant to subpoenas.

1. As a result, Justice Cronin at the time of making his indemnity cost order had been deceived by Ms KLD into having a grossly false understanding of Ms KLD's business activities, the relative financial circumstances of the parties and His Honour regarded those financial circumstances to be relevant pursuant to s117 of the Family Law Act.

Particulars

Justice Cronin's judgements of 27 February 2015 and 20 August 2015.

1. As a result, Justice Cronin's cost order against me was more onerous than it otherwise would have been.

2. There have been no reductions or adverse changes to Ms KLD's shareholdings in the J Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd businesses since she acquired her shareholdings in L Pty Ltd (in 2000), K Pty Ltd (in 2000) and N Pty Ltd (in 2003), and the changes and growth of the farm business since the Suburb AA land acquisition in 2002 and of the N Pty Ltd business since 2000 have increased the value of Ms KLD's shareholdings in those companies.

Particulars

(a)       The acreage under cultivation at Suburb AA has been doubled since acquisition of that property.

(b)       The value of the properties owned by the J Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd companies has increased substantially since 2000.

1. The value of Ms KLD's shareholdings in L Pty Ltd, K Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd have remained stable or increased materially since 12 December 2012 and there has been no material change to my financial circumstances since my retirement on 30 June 2011.

Particulars

Particulars 32 (b) to (o) and 37 (a) and (b) above

There have been no material adverse events affecting the J Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd businesses since 2012.

1. On 24 July 2018, I took up the Magistrate's suggestion and filed a Statement of Claim for $425,000 in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of NSW for my equitable interest arising from the money Ms KLD had persuaded me to transfer to her for investment during the marriage -refer 40(d) below.

2. Ms KLD's frauds on the SSAT, this Court, and on the Commonwealth, are exceptional. Her actions were part of a plan commenced during our marriage to take personal and financial advantage of me and to grossly misrepresent her financial circumstances before multiple tribunals and courts in order to unfairly gain excessive child support payments, cost orders and Family Tax Benefit, and because her solicitor knowingly participated therein.

Particulars

(a)       All particulars in 1 to 38 above.

(b)       Ms KLD consulted with Mr Macphillamy immediately before removing the children to S Town in 2005.

(c)       Despite insisting we sign a prenuptial agreement with the substantive intent to keep our financial affairs separate, Ms KLD persuaded me (contrary to the spirit and terms of our pre-nuptual agreement) to transfer $50,000 to her ( and pay the tax on it) to invest in industrial property with her siblings in S Town and after separation refused to acknowledge my interest in the properties or pay me a money amount to liquidate my interest.

(d)       To seek relief from the fraud described in (c) above on 24 July 2018 I filed a Statement of Claim for $450,000 in the Equity division of the Supreme Court of NSW which was technically defective. A new Statement of Claim 12 seeking relief for unjust enrichment and fraud with the following revised pleadings and particulars will be filed shortly:

(1)The parties married on … 2001 after executing a Binding Financial Agreement dated 11 December 2001 pursuant to s908 of the Family Law Act 1975 (BFA) at the Defendant Ms KLD's insistence.

(2)At all material times the parties were bound by the BFA.

(3)At all material times I was a partner of the Company I partnership and derived materially all my income and assets, and all the income and assets of the SCVG Family Trust, from that partnership interest. Particulars As for (7) below.

(4)In the BFA the parties expressed as the prime purpose of the BFA their desire to define their financial rights and obligations towards each other in the event of marriage breakdown. Particulars Recital Q of the BFA.

(5)The BFA provided that each party's excluded property includes the "assets and financial resources " in Schedule 1 and 2 respectively "and any accretion thereto or property or financial resources acquired in substitution thereof, and that the "parties shall each remain individually entitled to their respective excluded property to the exclusion of the other party". Particulars Recitals I, J and K of the BFA.

(6)In the BFA each party acknowledged that they made no contribution to the other party's excluded property nor had any entitlement to it or any accretion to it, or property acquired in substitution for it, or any income from it. Particulars Recitals O and P of the BFA.

(7)My excluded property included, inter alia, my interests in Company I (Capital Account) - estimate$305,000, interest in Company I current account balance - estimate $274,127, Company LL Deferred Share proceeds - estimate $364,201, Capital account with Company I Partnership - $5,000, Loan account with SCVG Family Trust - $1, 117,000, and Interest (if any) in the property at BB St, Suburb CC then the subject of property proceedings in the Family Court. The 13 Company LL Deferred Share proceeds was an asset distribution from my partnership interest in Company I. Particulars Schedule 1 of the BFA.

(8)Ms KLD's excluded property included, inter alia, 100 shares in J Pty Ltd and 100 shares in N Pty Ltd and did not include any interest in property at DD Street or FF Street, S Town. Particulars Schedule 2 of the BFA

(9)On the hearing I will rely on the BFA for its full terms and effect.

(10)They were express terms of the BFA that each party made no contribution to, and had no entitlement to, the other party's excluded property (as listed in Schedule 1 and 2 respectively) or any accretion to it, or property acquired in substitution for it, or any income from it. Particulars Recitals 0, P and Q and Terms 1, 2 and 7 of the BFA

(11)It was an implied term of the BFA that the parties maintain their individual wealth and assets without access to the other's wealth, assets or income, and maintain and keep each party's financial affairs, other than normal shared household expenditures, entirely separate from the other's financial affairs, , such that any money transferred from one to the other for other than household costs would not be a beneficial transfer but in the nature of money held or invested in trust for the transferor. Particulars The term is implied by Recitals I to R and Terms 1 to 15 of the BF A and by law.

(12)In mid 2002 Ms KLD asked me to provide the money to build a new house on the EE property owned by her family and she took me on a tour of this undeveloped livestock property in X Street S Town to show me where she wanted to build a house. She explained that her parents had promised to leave this property to her in their wills. I explained to her that I declined because it was contrary to our pre-nuptual agreement and because, as the property was apparently owned in her family's business structure, I couldn't get title to such a house. Ms KLD now resides in a house built by her family on that property at a cost of $850,000. In about March 2003 when I had returned to work after my illness Ms KLD asked me to invest in factory units with her and her siblings in central S Town. She said that despite our pre-nuptual agreement I should do income splitting through my family trust and transfer to her about $50,000, and pay the tax on it. She said she didn't have enough cash for her $80,000 share of the deal, so she would instead invest my money in those properties, because otherwise she'd have to get a mortgage loan from a bank. She said this could be a way we do our first joint investment together, and it was good because I'd be in business with her family too. A few weeks later when we visited Ms KLD's family in S Town, she drove us by the proposed properties in DD St and FF St saying - See these have a great location, you'll get good capital growth on your money because the Government Department Offices is moving nearby and they'll be easy to sell later. I asked her how will it be structured and how could she be sure about the Government project being in S Town. She replied that she would just do it in her name on my behalf to keep it simple and her family's good friends, the GG Family, are selling part of their HH livestock property nearby her EE property to the Government Department. I checked media reports to confirm the Government Department offices moving to S Town, and then I proceeded with the transaction because I trusted my wife and was persuaded by her suggestion that I go into a business transaction jointly with her siblings. I had been disappointed that her family insisted on a pre-nuptual agreement as it showed a lack of trust/commitment to our marriage, and this proposed joint investment might help build some trust with her family. A few months later after I had transferred the money to Ms KLD she drove us past the properties again, she said the family's happy, and you'll see, we'll make good money on these properties. I distributed income of $47,742 from my family trust for the year ended 30 June 2003 to Ms KLD, paid the distribution to her and paid her consequential tax liabilities.

Particulars

(a)       As trustee of the SCVG Family Trust I made a distribution of income for the year ended 30 June 2003 to beneficiary Ms KLD of $47,742.

(b)       Ms KLD's income tax return for the year ended 30 June 2003 returned the income distributed to her by the SCVG Family Trust as assessable income received.

(c)       The SCVG Family Trust financial statements for 30 June 2004 showed that the income distribution of $47,742 for the year ended 30 June 2003 to Ms KLD was paid to her before 30 June 2004.

(13)Ms KLD told me during 2004 that the two factory units in which she had invested the money borrowed from me were in FF and DD Streets S Town, in which she and her two siblings had a one third interest each.

(14)I consequently paid income tax on behalf of Ms KLD totalling $20,668.90 being the total of the following payments made by me to the ATO, of which the last three amounts totalling $921 O has subsequently been refunded to her by the ATO due to her tax instalments for 2003/4 (paid by me) being unnecessary and in excess of her tax liability for that year largely because she received no further distributions from my family tru~t following our separation:

Particulars

(a)       $11,458.90 paid on 27 May 2004 upon lodgement of Ms KLD's 2003 income tax return

(b)       $3090.00 paid on 30 June 2004 being Ms KLD's April - June quarterly income tax instalment for 2003/4

(c)       $3060.00 paid on 26 October 2004 being Ms KLD's July- September income tax instalment for 2003/4

(d)       $3060.00 paid on 28 February 2005 being Ms KLD's October- December income tax instalment for 2003/4

(15)Ms KLD and I separated on 17 January 2005. In March 2005 I sent an email to Ms KLD's solicitor Mr Macphillamy requesting repayment of the loans created by my payment of her tax instalments. I received an email in reply from Mr Macphillamy in words to the effect "These matters will be included in payments as part of the property settlement. ".

(16)My total payments to and on behalf of Ms KLD of $68,411 ($47,742 income distribution plus $20,669 tax paid) constituted 85% of the $80,000 Ms KLD invested in the two S Town industrial properties, so I claim an 85% equitable interest in Ms KLD's one-third share of those properties.

(17) On 1 April 2014 I sent a Letter of Demand I sent to Ms KLD and her solicitor requesting repayment of these amounts.

(18)In her Affidavit affirmed 16 March 2015 filed for a Local Court action I had initiated to recover these payments Ms KLD admitted that I had paid her 30 June 2003 tax liability of $11,458.90 on her behalf and that a later tax instalment of $3090 had been refunded to her by the ATO, and she did not deny any of the other tax payments described in particulars in (14) above, in the following terms: " I did not pay the tax on this (2003/4) tax return. It is my belief that $11,458.90 was paid by the plaintiff ..... In my 2004 income tax return there is a PAYG Income Tax instalment of $3090 which was refunded to me as my income for that financial year was $220. The Plaintiff alleges more money was paid to the A TO but I have neither a record or a memory of it".

(19)As a matter of court record, Ms KLD has admitted ownership of a 33% interest in property at DD Street and FF Street S Town with a current value at 16 March 2015 of $300,000. Particulars The Financial Statement filed by Ms KLD on 16 March 2015 in the Family Court showed these properties at FF and DD Streets S Town at item 36 disclosing the current market value of her 33% interest as $300,000.

(20)The Property Ownership Search I conducted showed Ms KLD at 23 December 2012 owned properties at DD St and FF St S Town.

(21)I conducted internet searches that show that similar industrial properties in nearby JJ Town are currently selling for $900,000 to $1.4 million and that Ms KLD's DD St and FF St properties are currently worth at least $800,000 each (with a rental yield of 3-4%).

(22)Thus Ms KLD's one third interest in these properties is currently worth at least $530,000, and my 85% equitable interest is worth at least $450,000.

(23)In the unlikely event Ms KLD (as an unemployed borrower) was able to obtain a bank loan of $68,411 to buy investment property in 2003, it would 17 have cost Ms KLD at least the mortgage interest rate applicable to investment property in 2003 of about 10% per annum.

(24)Compound interest at 10% per annum capitalised onto a base loan of $68,411 for the 15 years from 2003 to 2018 equates to $322,500.

(25)The NSW Valuer General's reports from 2013 said "the land in the small industrial precinct in S Town has shown strong increase in value". Real estate expert Company KK estimated commercial and industrial property growth in S Town since 2004 at about 12-15% per annum (average 13.5%).

(26)An equitable interest in property of $68,411 in 2003, at a compound increase in value of 13.5% per annum would equate in 2018 to $457,155.

(27)The value increase in S Town property has been assisted by the increased property demand and reduction in supply due to the relocation of the Government Department offices to S Town in 2006.

(28)As Ms KLD has not paid me any interest on the funds for 15 years and as I have been exposed to the risk of my equitable interest in the DD St and FF St S Town properties being adversely affected by market movements, in law my equitable interest also shares in the actual increase in the market value of these properties.

(29)Even in a worst case scenario of assuming that Ms KLD's 16 March 2015 affirmed valuation figure of $300,000 for her interest in these properties is accepted, with a conservative rate of increase of 12% per annum, her one third interest in these properties would today be worth $421,000 and my 85% equitable interest worth $358,000.

(30)In the alternative to a liquidated claim for $450,000, I apply for an order that Ms KLD sell her interest in the relevant properties by auction and pay me 85% of the proceeds."

(e)       Ms KLD filed her Statement of Financial Circumstances in the child support case before the SSAT on 12 December 2012 valuing her shareholdings in the J Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd companies at nil or nominal value, thereby perpetrating a fraud on the SSAT, and on the Federal Magistrates Court (before Scarlett J) and the Full Court of the Family Court in the consequential appeal proceedings all of which resulted in cost orders against me.

(f)        My Applications in SYC5956/2015 and EA75/2015 to set aside orders in child support proceedings and appeals on the basis of fraud.

(g)       The AAT 's child support decision made 1 May 2018,

(h)       Ms KLD perpetrated a fraud on the Commonwealth by successfully applying for the means-tested Family Tax Benefit despite her wealth.

(i)        Mr Macphillamy benefitted financially from his participation in the frauds by at least $500,000 in legal fees.

1. Despite Ms KLD continuing to file perjured evidence as to her financial circumstances with her filed Financial Statement and submissions to the AAT in our child support case in 2016, the AAT in its decision made 1 May 2018 rejected her fraudulent evidence, found her to be very wealthy, much wealthier than me, and materially reduced my child support liability.

Particulars

(a)       On 1 August 2016 Ms KLD filed her Statement of Financial Circumstances in which she again falsely valued her shareholdings in the J Pty Ltd and N Pty Ltd companies at nil or nominal current value and falsely stated she had a liability to her mother of $750,000, with the intent of causing the AAT and CSR to assess me with unfair excessive child support obligations.

(b)       Ms KLD did not comply with the AAT's directions to provide documents with information about the assets held by the family businesses and the income and assets they provide to her, thus the AA T obtained relevant ATO documents which proved Ms KLD's nil or nominal valuations to be false.

(c)       In its decision the AAT said "Mr SCVG made assertions in written submissions about the value of property held by Ms KLD through the family businesses and that she has annual income and financial resources available to her of approximately $1,000,000. The Tribunal does not accept all the assumptions on which he bases his calculations. (For example, he refers only to Internet searches to support his assertion about the annual turnover of one company.) However, it gives the submissions some weight because Ms KLD chose not to address them at hearing and has not complied with directions to provide documents with information about the assets held by the family businesses and the income and assets they provide to her. She failed to frankly disclose her financial circumstances and the Tribunal cannot make accurate findings about her access to income, assets and property Therefore, the Tribunal "should be reasonably robust in assessing [her] financial circumstances adversely to [her] and in 19 favour of' Mr SCVG. While it does not accept the detail of his submission, it accepts the businesses own real property worth many millions of dollars. It finds Ms KLD is a very wealthy woman with access to significant income and financial resources generated by family businesses from the substantial assets owned by family companies.

(d)       The AAT materially reduced my child support liability to 20% of the cost of the children.

(e)       Its decision was backdated to December 2015 as follows: the annual rate of child support is to be 20% of the maximum costs for the children in the Costs of the Children Table from 4 December 2015 until a child support terminating event happens for C.

(f)        For the whole of the period to which the AA T decision applies I had a care percentage of 0%.

(g)       The AA T said in its decision that the child support formula would operate to allocate each parent a proportion of the maximum cost of a child according to their relative incomes. For example, in a case where one parent earns approximately $1,000,000 a year and the other earns approximately $2,000,000, the first parent earns approximately 33% of the combined child support income of $3,000,000. Their child support income percentage would be approximately 33% and they would be obliged to meet that proportion of the cost of the child (either as child support or through meeting expenses while the child is in their care).

1. Ms KLD has not appealed against the AAT decision made 1 May 2018.

2. I have filed an Application in SYC5956/2016 seeking that the AAT decision made 1 May 2018, after adjustment for my 24% to 37% care percentages prior to April 2013, be backdated to 15 July 2011 being the commencement of the period to which Ms KLD's first fraudulent Financial Statement filed in the SSAT applied, as there has been no material change in our relative financial circumstances since 15 July 2011. Particulars My Application filed 27 July 2018 seeks orders that:

   (1) Leave is granted pursuant to s 111 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 for the court to make an order under s118 of the Act in respect of a child support period more than 18 months earlier, being the period from 15 July 2011 to 3 December 2015.

   (2) That the decision of the AA T made 1 May 2018, that I pay an annual rate of child support of 20% of the maximum costs for the children in the Costs of the 20 Children Table from 4 December 2015 onwards, be extended to also apply to the earlier child support period from 15 July 2011 to 3 December 2015, after adjusting the 20% annual rate of child support for the care percentages and cost percentages ranging from 24% to 37% as applied by the CSA prior to 15 February 2013. 44. If my Application referred to in 31 above is successful, my unpaid child support liability claimed by Ms KLD of $44,000 would be reduced to nil and Ms KLD would be liable to pay me child support for the period from 15 July 2011 to 3 December 2015 at least approximately $15,000 (being average $4000 x 3.5 years -see (f) below).

   Particulars

   (a) Under the formula for calculation of child support in the Child Support Assessment Act and published by the CSA, your cost % is deducted from your income % to arrive at your child support %, ie the % of the children's cost that you should pay to the other parent.

   (b) Eg, if you have a 24% care of the children you are acknowledged as directly meeting 24% of the cost of the children, ie you have a 24% cost%.

   (c) For the period prior to 2 April 2013 the CSA acknowledged I had a care% and cost % of between 24% and 37% and assessed my child support accordingly.

   (d) As the AAT decided my child support% should be 20% for the period since 4 December 2015 when my care% and cost% have been nil, it follows the AAT has effectively determined my income % to be 20%. (e) It follows that for the period before 15 February 2013 when my care% and cost% was between 24% and 37%, my child support % should be between -4% (20% less 24%) and -17% ( 20% less 37%).

   (f) Historically, the CSA assessed Ms KLD's annual child support payable to me as:

   - For period 15/7/11 to 31/7/11, $1214 based on incomes of $35,446 (me) and $75,059 (Ms KLD)

   - For period 1/8/11 to 31/3/12, $3262 based on incomes of $23,331 (me) and $75,059 (Ms KLD)

   - From 1/4/12 onwards, $4226 based on incomes 23,331 (me) and $88,301 (Ms KLD). ( Average for period 7/11 to 12/15 approx $4000 ).

   The CSA then made a decision on 11 /5/12 that my annual child support liability to Ms KLD would be:

   - 1/1/11 - 14/7/11 $11,000

   - 15/7 /11 - 30/6/13 $6,000

   I appealed to the SSAT which made the decision on 7 March 2013 referred to in 8 above.

3. Ms KLD and her solicitor attempted to pervert the course of justice.

Particulars

(h)       Mr Macphillamy advised Ms KLD to remove the children to S Town to create a status quo which was then used by Moore J as the basis for unjust orders not in the children's best interests.

(i)        Mr Macphillamy advised Ms KLD to breach Altobell ii FM's contact orders to create another status quo of no contact to facilitate Ms KLD's further alienation of the children before their interviews by the experts and failed to disclose to the court a disqualifying relationship - refer 27 above.

(j)        Mr Macphillamy knew that I had attempted to seek an adjournment and to attend by telephone the hearing before Justice Gill on 14 September 2017 but remained silent when His Honour enquired why I was absent during the hearing and told the court, after making enquiries of the registry during an adjournment, that I had made no contact with the court. He instead instructed counsel to make the misrepresentation to the court that they had not anticipated the possibility of me being able to attend court that day. I have applied to set aside Justice Gill's orders made 14 September 2017 for fraud.

(k)       Mr Macphillamy knew that as Justice Cronin had said he would decide the cost application on the papers, Ms KLD's affidavit and financial statement evidence could not be challenged under cross examination and thus for the integrity of the court's processes, they needed to be truthful.

(l)        Mr Macphillamy filed Ms KLD's evidence knowing it to be false and instructed counsel to rely on it in multiple submissions to Courts.

(m)      1 to 44 above.