SCN v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld)

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

SCN v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) & Anor [2016] QCA 237

PARTIES:

SCN
(appellant)
v
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (QLD)
(respondent)
DIRECTOR OF MENTAL HEALTH
(not a party to the appeal)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 10164 of 2015
QMHC No 22 of 2014

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Mental Health Court at Brisbane – [2015] QMHC 8

DELIVERED ON:

16 September 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 April 2016

JUDGES:

Margaret McMurdo P and Gotterson and Morrison JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – GENERAL MATTERS – CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY – DEFENCE MATTERS – INSANITY AND MENTAL IMPAIRMENT – DISEASE OF THE MIND, MENTAL DISEASE OR MENTAL INFIRMITY – where the appellant was charged with two counts of unlawful stalking with violence – where the appellant was diagnosed with Delusional Disorder (Erotomanic Type) – where the Mental Health Court found that the appellant was not of unsound mind at the time of the offending – where the appellant contends the primary judge erred in finding that intoxication contributed to the appellant’s reasoning about the moral wrongness of the charged acts and therefore she was not deprived by her mental disease of the capacity to know she ought not do the acts – where the primary judge correctly applied the test in Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358 and considered as a relevant factor whether the appellant, when not intentionally intoxicated, understood her actions were punishable by law – whether the appellant was of unsound mind

Criminal Code (Qld), s 27
Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld), s 267, s 389, s 405

Attorney-General (Qld) v Bosanquet & Ors[2012] QCA 367, cited
DAR v DPP (Qld) & Anor[2008] QCA 309, cited
R v Codere (1916) 12 Cr App R 21, cited
R v Schafferius [1987] 1 Qd R 381, cited
R v Windle [1952] 2 All ER 1, cited
Re M’Naghten’s Case [1843 – 60] All ER 229; [1843] EngR 875, cited
Re W (Unreported, Mental Health Tribunal, Dowsett J, 14 October 1997), cited
Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358; [1952] HCA 56, considered
The King v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1, cited

COUNSEL:

J D Briggs for the appellant
M B Lehane for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. MARGARET McMURDO P:  The appellant was charged with two counts of unlawful stalking with violence, the first between 6 October and 31 December 2012 and the second between 7 March and 24 March 2013, together with three charges of breach of bail, the first between 20 and 29 December 2012; the second on 8 March 2013; and the third on 23 March 2013.  The alleged victim of the stalking was a male colleague with whom…

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Details
Case
[2016] QCA 237
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SCN v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld), the appellant, diagnosed with Delusional Disorder (Erotomanic Type), was charged with two counts of unlawful stalking with violence. The appellant argued that the Mental Health Court erred in finding that she was not of unsound mind at the time of the offending, asserting that her mental disease, combined with intentional intoxication, deprived her of the capacity to know she ought not do the charged acts. The court was tasked with determining whether the appellant's mental state, including her understanding of the legal wrongfulness of her actions, was such that she was incapable of appreciating the moral wrongness of her conduct.

The court considered the primary judge's application of the test set out in Stapleton v The Queen, which requires the assessment of whether the appellant, at the time of the offence, had the ability to reason about the moral wrongness of her actions with a moderate degree of composure. It was noted that the appellant, when sober, understood her actions were punishable by law, which was a relevant factor in establishing her capacity to reason about the wrongfulness of her actions. The court found that the appellant's delusional disorder, without her intentional intoxication, did not deprive her of the capacity to know she ought not do the charged acts. The combination of her mental illness and intoxication, however, did impair her reasoning abilities. The court concluded that the primary judge correctly applied the Stapleton test and that the appellant's mental state at the time of the offending did not meet the criteria for unsoundness of mind.

The court dismissed the appeal, confirming that the appellant was not of unsound mind at the time of the alleged offences. The reasoning and application of the legal test were found to be accurate, and the primary judge's findings were supported by the evidence presented. The court held that the appellant's delusional disorder, without intentional intoxication, did not prevent her from understanding the moral wrongness of her actions, and therefore she was not deprived of the capacity to know she ought not do the acts which constitute the stalking with which she was charged.

ORDERS:
Appeal dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The court next dealt with an argument similar to that which the appellant puts forward in this Court, although noting that her comments were obiter. After discussing Dowsett J’s observations in Re W,[47] Codere which was cited with approval in Stapleton,[48] Dixon J’s jury directions in The King v Porter[49] and Bosanquet,[50] the court noted that there are cases in which consciousness that an act is contrary to and punishable by law will be sufficient to establish consciousness that the alleged offender ought not do the act. This was such a case. The court noted that most of the time the appellant was capable of reasoning with a moderate degree of calmness as to the wrongfulness of contacting the complainant and comprehending the nature and significance of doing so by reference to ordinary standards, one of which was the provisions of the criminal law. But, the court observed, when the appellant became intoxicated she lost that ability, through a combination of her mental illness and intoxication. This was clear, the court considered, from both Dr Beech’s and Dr Butler’s evidence.[51] When not intoxicated, the appellant knew, the court found, that she ought not do the acts which constitute the stalking with which she was charged.[52][47](Unreported, Mental Health Tribunal, Dowsett J, 14 October 1997) 12 – 13.[48](1952) 86 CLR 358, 374 – 375.[49](1933) 55 CLR 182, 189 –190.[50][2012] QCA 367, [81] set out at [8] – [9] of these reasons.[51][2015] QMHC 8, [57] set out at [7] of these reasons.[52]Above, [58].Conclusion This comprehensive review of the primary court’s reasons shows it readily accepted that, at the time of the alleged offending, the appellant was suffering from a mental disease, Delusional Disorder (Erotomanic Type), which caused her to irrationally believe she must do the charged acts. She was therefore suffering from a “mental disease” under both the definition of “unsound mind” under the Act and s 27 Criminal Code. Her Honour also found that during every particularised act of offending, the appellant was drunk, and there is no longer any appeal from that finding. The court found her delusions alone, without her intentional intoxication, did not deprive her of the capacity to know she ought not do the charged acts. This was a factual finding open on the evidence of Drs Butler and Beech and consistent with the advice of Dr Varghese. Contrary to the appellant’s contentions, the court did not, in making that finding, incorrectly apply Stapleton. Her Honour recognised, consistent with Stapleton, that the question in determining whether the appellant was deprived of the capacity to know she ought not do the charged acts was whether, at that time, she had the ability to reason with a moderate degree of composure, according to the standards adopted by reasonable people, as to the wrongness of her acts. In answering that question it is relevant, although not decisive, to consider if she understood her acts were punishable by law. The two concepts are often intertwined. In giving weight to the uncontroverted evidence that the appellant, when sober, understood her charged acts were against the law and would get her into trouble with the police, the court was considering a highly relevant factor in determining whether she was able to reason with a moderate degree of composure, according to standards adopted by reasonable people, as to the wrongness of her acts. The court appreciated the subtle distinction between the essential question and the relevant factor. It did not misapply Stapleton in finding that, as a matter of fact, when not intentionally intoxicated, despite her delusions, she was not deprived of the capacity to know she ought not do the acts constituting the alleged offending. This central aspect of the appellant’s contentions is not made out.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established