Charge to the jury upon a plea of temporary insanity set up to an indictment CANBERRA, Jan. 31;
TRIAL on Indictment.
On 31st January and 1st February 1933 (before the passing of the Seat of Government Supreme Court Act 1933) Bertram Edward Porter was tried on indictment for murder at Canberra before Dixon J. sitting in the original jurisdiction of the High Court under sec. 30B of the Judiciary Act 1903-1932.
It appeared that the prisoner had administered strychnine to H. his infant son aged eleven months and had then attempted to take strychnine himself but had been interrupted by the entry of the police. The child died, and this was the murder with which he was charged. His defence was that he was insane at the time he committed the act.
The facts set up in support of the defence were briefly as follows :- After a period of separation from his wife during which he looked after the child, he had made desperate but unsuccessful efforts to effect a reconciliation. He became extremely emotional and showed symptoms of a nervous breakdown. He was sleepless, and took quantities of aspirin, phenacetin and caffein. He then travelled with the child from Canberra to Sydney in circumstances which made it probable that he was without sleep for three nights. On his return he had a final interview with his wife, in which he appeared to have lost all control of his emotions. On her refusing to have anything to do with him or the child, he told her he would poison himself and the child and hastened away to obtain the strychnine. She informed the police, who found him shut in his house, sobbing. He had just given the strychnine to the child and was about to take it himself.
P. v. Storkey, for the Crown. O'Sullivan and Hidden, for the prisoner.
DIXON J., in summing up, said :- The accused stands charged under the name of Bertram Edward Porter, for the murder of his child, Charles Robert Porter, com- mitted on 28th November 1932. The crime of murder is committed when, without any lawful justification, without any excuse, without any provocation, a person of sufficient soundness of mind to be criminally responsible for his acts intentionally kills another. To begin with, every person is presumed to be of sufficient soundness of mind to be criminally responsible for his actions until the contrary is made to appear upon his trial. It is not for the Crown to prove that any man is of sound mind it is for the defence to establish
inferentially that he was not of sufficient soundness of mind, at the
time that he did the actions charged, to be criminally responsible. On the other hand, every person is to be presumed to be innocent of the actions charged against him until it is proved to the satisfaction of the jury beyond any reasonable doubt…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
R v Porter [1933] HCA 1
Case
[1933] HCA 1
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In this case, Bertram Edward Porter was tried on indictment for murder before Dixon J. in the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The charge arose from the death of the accused's infant son, to whom the accused had administered strychnine, after which the accused had attempted to take his own life. The defence raised was that the accused was insane at the time of the act.
The legal issues before the court were whether the accused had committed the act of murder, and if so, whether he was criminally responsible for his actions due to unsoundness of mind at the time of the offence. The court was required to instruct the jury on the respective burdens of proof for these elements. Specifically, the jury had to determine if the Crown had proven beyond reasonable doubt that the accused administered strychnine with the intention of causing death and that death resulted from this act. If this was proven, the jury then had to consider whether the defence had established, on a balance of probabilities, that the accused's mental state rendered him criminally irresponsible.
Dixon J. directed the jury that every person is presumed to be of sound mind for criminal responsibility unless the contrary is made to appear. The burden rests on the defence to establish insanity on a balance of probabilities, not to the exclusion of all doubt. The judge explained that legal insanity requires a disease, disorder, or disturbance of the mind that prevents the accused from knowing the physical nature of the act or knowing that the act was wrong. He clarified that "wrong" refers to the everyday standards of reasonable people and that the disorder must be such that the accused is incapable of rationally considering the reasons that make an act right or wrong. The jury was instructed to consider outward actions and medical opinion to assess the accused's mental state at the critical time of the offence.
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity at the time of the commission of the act charged.