R v McPaul

Case

[2025] NSWDC 171

03 March 2025

No judgment structure available for this case.

District Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v McPaul [2025] NSWDC 171
Hearing dates: 3 March 2025
Date of orders: 3 March 2025
Decision date: 03 March 2025
Jurisdiction:Criminal
Before: Haesler SC DCJ
Decision:

Special verdicts – Acts proven but not criminally responsible due to a cognitive mental health impairment

Catchwords:

CRIME — Property offences — Break and enter with intent to commit serious indictable offence — Circumstances of aggravation

CRIME — Violent offences — Offensive weapon

CRIME — Domestic violence — Intimidation

MENTAL HEALTH — Criminal proceedings —Defence of mental illness — Special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness — Referral to Mental Health Review Tribunal

Legislation Cited:

Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW)

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)

Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW)

Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Hawkins v R (1994) 179 CLR 500

M'Naghten's Case (1843) 8 ER 718

R vMinani (2005) 63 NSWLR 490; [2005] NSWCCA 226

RvPorter [1933] HCA 1;(1933) 55 CLR 182

Ryan v R (1967) 121 CLR 205

Stapleton v R [1952] HCA 56; (1952) 86 CLR 358

Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Lindon James McPaul (the accused)
Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
Representation:

Counsel:
P Williams (for the accused)
R Kimbell (for the Crown)

Solicitors:
Jennifer Chalker Lawyer (for the accused)
Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
File Number(s): 2023/60518
Publication restriction: A pseudonym has been used for the name of the those directly impacted on by Mr McPaul’s actions, some of whom were children. Pursuant to s 15A Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) identifying information has been removed from this version of the judgment to comply with that order.

JUDGMENT – Ex tempore revised

Introduction

  1. This morning when he was arraigned Lindon McPaul said that he was not guilty of six serious offences. He said that he was not guilty, not because he did not do the acts which would establish the offences, but because at the relevant time it is said he had a mental health impairment or a cognitive impairment that meant that he did not know that the nature and quality of his acts, and that he did not know that the act was wrong. That is, he could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether each act alleged against him, as perceived by a reasonable person, was wrong.

  2. Since 1843 the law of England and the law of Australia has been clear. A person who suffers from what is now called a mental health or cognitive impairment who, did not know the nature and quality of his act or did not know the act was wrong such that he could not reason with a moderate degree or sense of composure, has been entitled to a verdict of not guilty.

  3. For many years judge-made law applied, flowing from M'Naghten's Case (1843) 8 ER 718, and later refined by judges of the High Court: R v Porter [1933] HCA 1; (1933) 55 CLR 182; Stapleton v R [1952] HCA 56; (1952) 86 CLR 358. It is now given statutory form in the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW). Such a verdict does not end the proceedings, but it requires a different regime than the criminal justice system apply to manage the person and protect the community.

Agreed Facts

  1. The accused in this matter is Lindon James McPaul was born 16 July 1992. The complainants in this matter are the Lopez (a pseudonym) family which include Mr Lopez, his wife and two children whose names are not to be published. There is a prohibition on naming children in court proceedings.

  2. Mr Lopez has known the accused for approximately six years. Both worked at a local business where Mr Lopez is the foreman, the accused worked there for about six months before becoming unhappy and leaving the job. There had been no previous issues between the accused and Mr Lopez. At the time of the offences, which occurred in January 2023, Mrs Lopez was employed at a food outlet in the local town.

  3. On Tuesday 10 January the accused attended that outlet and asked for her. When he was told she had gone home he said, “What does [Mick]”, that is Mr Lopez, “like to eat? Well, no, [Mick] will probably be home with [Jen]”, Mrs Lopez, “so he won’t need anything to eat”. The accused then asked if he could purchase some food and “book it up” as “[Mick] and [Jen] will cover for me because they own the Deli”. The worker at the food outlet informed the accused that they did not own the Deli, and she could not “book it up”. The accused then left saying he needed to go to the bank.

  4. The accused returned a short time later and picked up a pasta salad and a potato salad. On his way out he left the pasta salad on the table saying, “I don’t need that”. He walked out of the store and sat in his car eating the potato salad with his hands. He declined the offer of a fork.

  5. While the worker and her colleagues were in the process of closing, the accused came back and asked for his pasta salad. He then tried to swap it for a patty. The accused continued walking in and out until he was told that the premises was closed.

  6. At around 8.30pm the accused attended the local pub. While at the pub he told the publican he was looking for “Little [Mick]”, the publican asked him “[Mick] who?”, to which the accused replied, “Little [Mick]”. The publican replied, “Mate, I know five [Mick]’s in [town]”. The accused said, “You know. He doesn’t drink here often but you would like him to”. The publican asked for his last name, but the accused failed to give it, just repeating “Little [Mick]”. The accused left the pub after being told, “Look Lindon, I don’t need to put up with your shit, just fuck off out of the pub will you”, by the publican.

  7. Later that evening, 10 January 2023, the complainant and his family were at home. They all went to bed about 8pm.

  8. At approximately 3.30am on Wednesday 11 January 2023 Mrs Lopez woke as the dog was pacing, growling and running up and down the hallway. At the same time Mr Lopez and his wife could hear the accused yelling angrily at the front of the home. The yelling could also be heard by neighbours. The accused yelled, “[Mick] come out the front and stab my dog. Come and stab my dog. [Mick] you’re a weak cunt I bet you won’t do it”. Mr Lopez tried to reason with the accused by saying, “Lindon can you please go away. I don’t need this. I don’t want to start anything. You are upsetting the kids, can you just leave”. At this point the accused ripped the screen door open and started to kick the front door. The door bowed in. The accused said, “I am going to go get my knife … I’m going to kill you all”. He left through the front gate and went to his car. The accused’s timber handled knife was later found inside the house inside the rear sunroom.

  9. The complainant, that is Mr Lopez, ran into his children’s room and grabbed them. The accused walked onto the front veranda and started to smash items belonging to the complainant, that is Mr Lopez, and his family. The accused kicked a hole in the wall, knocked over pot plants and used a metal chair to smash the front bedroom window.

  10. At 3.48am Mr Lopez called the police. His wife was also on the phone to police. Mr Lopez and his family made their way out of the house by the back door. Once out of the house Mr Lopez and his family ran down to the dairy located at the back of the house yard approximately 100 metres from the house. The complainant, Mr Lopez, put his children and his wife over the fence.

  11. As he did so, both Mr Lopez and his wife saw the accused standing in the sunroom at the back of the house having forced the sunroom door open to get inside. Mr Lopez could hear the accused going through the house turning items upside down and yelling. Mr Lopez and his family ran further into the paddock hiding behind a pile of rubble. They were dressed only in their underwear and huddled together to stay warm. The children were shaking and crying. The family then continued to flee, running towards the subdivision in the hope that if someone drove past, they could get their attention. The family could still hear the accused yelling and smashing items in the house.

  12. A neighbour called Triple 0 before calling Mr Lopez. Mr Lopez did not originally answer but called the neighbour back after calling the police. While Mr Lopez was on the phone to the neighbour the police arrived. The neighbour agreed to drive and pick up the family, turning his headlights off and driving through the paddock so as to remain undetected by the accused. The family stayed in the paddock until the neighbour picked them up and took them back to his house. The family were hiding for approximately 50 minutes before being picked up.

  13. At around 4.20am police arrived at the complainants’ home. The accused could be heard in the house as well as items being thrown around. Two of them activated their Body-Worn Video, jumped over the front gate and made their way to the house. Once on the veranda Sergeant Scarlett had a conversation with the accused. The accused was yelling at police including making threats to kill himself, kill the dog and kill the attending police officers.

  14. Senior Constable Royal and Sergeant Scarlett were physically holding the door shut while the accused attempted to open it. The accused was erratic and continued to make threats. The accused was holding a kitchen knife in one hand and a long, orange extension cord in the other. The extension cord was being used as a lead for a large black dog. The accused continued to yell at police as backup arrived.

  15. Another police officer, Senior Constable Morrow, had an opportunity for a 45-minute conversation with the accused and was able to get him to open the curtains. The accused sat down on the couch and put the knife down to take his shoes off. The accused did not pick up the knife again. The accused got up and walked towards another door taking the dog out the back. He left the knife where it was on the ground. Sergeant Scarlett, Senior Constable Morrow and Senior Constable Royal entered the house and approached the accused on the rear veranda. The accused was arrested, placed in handcuffs and brought back into the lounge room.

  16. The accused was eventually removed from the house at around 7am. He had to be physically carried out of the home and placed into an ambulance where he was sedated and conveyed to the Southeast Regional Hospital. While at the hospital Senior Constable Morrow completed a s 22 Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act form and the accused was scheduled shortly after.

  17. A weapon with a timber handle which did not belong to the family was found in the rear sunroom. The dishwasher was open and one of the complainant’s kitchen knives had been removed and was on the veranda. Prior to the incident the dishwasher was closed, and the knife was in the dishwasher. There is a related offence before the Court which I am asked to deal with. Multiple items were damaged in the property; the front gate latch bent, screen door completely removed from its latches, another screen door was damaged, the front bedroom window was smashed, pot plants were smashed, there were holes in the wall and photographs of the damage are attached to the Agreed Facts.

  18. On Wednesday 22 February 2023 the accused was entered into police custody. The accused was offered the opportunity to participate in a record of interview but declined. He consented to, and participated in, a forensic procedure. He was served with a provisional Apprehended Domestic Violence Order.

  19. On 22 February 2023 police visited the accused while he was in custody for the purpose of a forensic procedure. He told the police, “I don’t know what happened that night. I don’t know why I did it. I look up to [Mick], I respect [Mick]. I don’t know what was going on”.

Expert reports

  1. The parties tendered reports from two expert witnesses. It is not in dispute that the two experts, Dr Richard Furst, who prepared a report for the accused, and Dr Adam Martin, a forensic psychiatrist, both have knowledge and experience in their field. Both are known to and respected by the Court.

  2. Both psychiatrists were asked to give their professional opinion about Mr McPaul’s mental state at the time. Both refer to notes from the South East Regional Hospital on admission.

  3. In his report at p 7, Answer 3, Dr Furst said:

“Mr McPaul suffered a relapse of his schizoaffective disorder after discontinuing his medication in December 2022. His abrupt cessation of cannabis on 31/12/22 probably also precipitated psychosis and/or added to his mental disturbance. He was irrational when he attended his friend’s house with thoughts of asking his friend to kill his dog and ‘breaking bread’, getting upset when his friend did not want to break bread with him. Overall, his behaviour was bizarre, disorganised and paranoid with Mr McPaul being unable to distinguish reality from non-reality and being confused in his thinking. Accordingly, Mr McPaul did not know that the acts alleged against him were wrong (that is, he could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether those acts, as perceived by reasonable people, were wrong), such that [in the doctor’s opinion] he has a defence available to him [under the Mental Health and Cognitive Forensic Provisions Act].”

  1. Dr Adam Martin was aware of Dr Furst’s report. He was also of the opinion that Mr McPaul has a chronic mental illness. His view is he had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, a differential diagnosis with Schizoaffective Disorder. He notes in par 31:

“In Mr McPaul’s case the objective evidence clearly demonstrates that he had an extremely disturbed mental state at the time of the alleged offending and in my view, there was a direct nexus between a relapse of his psychotic disorder and his violent behaviour.”

  1. He further notes matters in par 33(1):

“In my view, Mr McPaul was suffering from a mental health impairment at the time of the alleged offences … The mental health impairment arose from a psychotic disorder … he clearly has a chronic mental illness, such that, in my view …"

  1. He excludes substance abuse at par 33(2):

“[It is] as a result of his mental health impairment, it is highly likely that he did not know that the act was wrong (that is that he could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether the act as perceived by reasonable people was wrong).”

  1. He sets out other material which he says justifies that conclusion, “I note with respect to Dr Furst’s findings and am in full agreement with his opinion”.

Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act

  1. The Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act at s 28 makes specific provision that a person is not criminally responsible for an offence if at the time of carrying out the act constituting the offence the person had a mental health impairment or cognitive impairment or both, and the law defines what a cognitive impairment is.

  2. Where a judge is sitting alone it is presumed they will have an understanding of those provisions. But where the provisions of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act are raised a judge sitting alone the public must be aware of the findings which may be made at trial and the legal practical consequences of those findings.

  3. A person who is found to have committed the act, that is the physical objective acts alleged, but is then found not to be criminally responsible, can be, and will be, placed under the control of the Mental Health Review Tribunal. Orders can be made by the court, ultimately that person will come before the Mental Health Review Tribunal. That Tribunal has jurisdiction and power to make orders either detaining the person in a mental health facility or releasing the person. Their primary concern is that members of the public are not seriously endangered by a defendant’s release.

  4. I must not be influenced in my judgment by the consequences of a special verdict. A court may enter a special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible at any time during the proceedings. There were a number of procedural matters that I raised initially with the parties.

  5. Earlier today I read to the public and the accused the facts which were agreed. I now need to relate those facts to what is set out in the indictment. All of the events are said to have occurred on 11 January 2023 at a town in southeastern NSW. It is not in dispute that Lindon McPaul was at the premises. It is not in dispute that the Lopez family was also at those premises.

Count 1: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), a 112(2)

  1. The offence of intimidation is at law a serious indictable offence. It is clear from the facts in front of me that the behaviour of the accused, looked at objectively, would have caused the residents of the home to fear for their own safety and it is also clear from the objective facts that Mr McPaul knew there were persons present at the premises, that is why he went round in the middle of the night. The elements of Count 1, the physical or objective facts to support Count 1, are made out beyond reasonable doubt.

Count 2: Crimes Act 1900, s 33B(1)

  1. When he arrived at the premises Mr McPaul was out the front. He had a knife with him, and he yelled out comments including that he would use the knife, “I am going to kill you all”. A knife is an offensive weapon, the words used were clearly intended to intimidate and they were clearly threatening. The objective matters required to prove Count 2 beyond reasonable doubt are made out on the facts before me.

Counts 3, 4, 5 and 6: Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), s 13(1)

  1. These counts relate to counts alleging intimidation with the intention of causing a person to fear physical or mental harm. Each relates to one of the four residents of the premises. It is not in dispute that the behaviour of the accused, viewed objectively, did intimidate each of the residents and although what they actually felt does not need to be proved. It is clear that McPaul’s words and behaviour could be viewed objectively (were it not for his mental state), to cause physical harm with consequence mental harm – given his behaviour, the fact he was armed. Each of the elements of Counts 3, 4, 5 and 6 are made out.

  2. There seems little doubt that those acts were as a result of willed and deliberate actions by Mr McPaul. At this stage I am not legally required to go further with regard to any proved intention as I understand it:  Ryan v R (1967) 121 CLR 205; Hawkins v R (1994) 179 CLR 500; R v Minani (2005) 63 NSWLR 490; [2005] NSWCCA 226.

  3. There was no contest about these facts.

  4. Police obviously formed the lay opinion Mr McPaul was mentally unwell as they took him, not into custody, but straight to the mental health ward in the local hospital

  5. Dr Furst’s report makes reference to Mr McPaul’s presentation at South East Regional Hospital, Bega on 11 January 2023. He was assessed as suffering from a Bipolar Affective Disorder with manic psychosis. He was expressing bizarre thoughts. As a consequence, he was admitted to the Acute Mental Health Unit from 11 January 2023 to 22 February 2023.

  6. His comments to police and comments to nursing and hospital staff were indicative of him being extremely unwell and irrational in his thinking at the time. There is evidence of bizarre delusions. He was then medicated.

  7. There is no dispute that Dr Furst is a respected and experienced forensic psychiatrist. He notes a diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder, which he says is a chronic and severe mental disorder characterised by distortions of thinking perceptions, emotions, language, sense of self and behaviour and intermittent periods of either mania and / or severe depression. It is frequently associated with considerable disability and impairment and psychosocial function including detrimental effects which he notes.

  1. He notes that the conditions of causation is not fully understood but is generally able to be treated by a combination of antipsychotic medication, mood stabling medication and psychosocial support including case management and assertive psychiatric follow-up.

  2. His conclusions at par 7, Question 3, I read out earlier. I will not repeat them again. In his view that Mr McPAul has the “defence” in the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act available to him.

  3. Dr Martin was qualified by the Crown. He saw the body-worn footage taken by police. He formed the view that Mr McPaul looked preoccupied and perplexed, making irrelevant statements out of keeping with the situation following arrest. In the doctor’s opinion his overall presentation was consistent with an acutely mentally ill person. He reviewed the New South Wales Health records, which were before him and to which I have earlier referred. He noted Mr McPaul was admitted involuntarily with an acute psychotic episode with risk of harm to self and others. His opinion was that, as I read earlier; Mr McPaul has a chronic mental illness, he has a diagnosis of schizophrenia, a differential diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder.

  4. He considered the history of Mr McPaul’s long term cannabis use and considered the Psychotic Disorder. He noted at par 33(1) that:

“While cannabis use may well have been a factor in precipitating his psychosis, he clearly has chronic mental illness, such that, in my view, the substance use cannot be said to be the sole cause of his impairment.”

  1. There is no evidence before me of anything other than long term past cannabis abuse.

  2. I previously read out pars 33(2) of Dr Martin’s report. Dr Martin’s opinion is that it is highly likely that Mr McPaul did not know his acts were wrong; that is, he could not reason with a logical degree and sense of composure that whether the act, as perceived by a reasonable person, was wrong. He notes that Mr McPaul was clearly exhibiting a highly disturbed mental state based on what he saw on the video and the other material before him.

  3. Dr Martin notes on page 12:

“[Mr McPaul] was hyper-aroused and disinhibited, and his judgement was highly distorted by experience of persecutory and bizarre delusional beliefs that would have been overwhelming, and clearly overriding any rational thought, depriving him of the capacity to understand that his actions [were] considered wrong.”

  1. He found there was a direct causal link between the relapse of his chronic mental illness and the alleged offending behaviour. He noted he was in full agreement with the opinion of Dr Furst.

Conclusions

  1. While it is open to the Crown to agree that the proposed evidence establishes a defence of mental health impairment or cognitive impairment, the Crown took the position that it was for me to decide.

  2. I am satisfied that Mr McPaul had a disease of the mind. He has suffered that condition for many years. He was suffering from it acutely on 11 January 2023. There is no suggestion, despite past cannabis use, that he was intoxicated by any drug or alcohol at the time. It is clear that that disease led to what old-fashionably was called a ‘defect of reason’.

  3. I have the opinions of the two experts, both of which I accept, and it was shown by his behaviour that day as witnessed by the residents of the house and the police Body-Worn Video of which I have a description.

  4. It is possible that McPaul had some appreciation of the nature and quality of his acts. It is also clear he wanted help from a person he perceived as a friend and mentor. On that point, I do not need to reach a final conclusion given the limited amount of material before me. But I cannot find that Mr McPaul appreciated on even a superficial level that what he was doing was wrong.

  5. It is clear that he could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether his acts, as perceived by reasonable persons, were wrong. Although Dr Martin expressed and used the term ‘likelihood’, he also agreed with the very firm opinion of Dr Furst, and doctors are entitled to give their opinion in such a manner.

  6. I am fully satisfied that the accused’s behaviour that night fell within the defence of mental health impairment and cognitive impairment. It is clear that he had no appreciation of the moral wrongness of his actions, and it is clear that he has the defence of mental illness impairment available to him. So, while he did the acts which are established beyond reasonable doubt, he was suffering at the time from a mental health impairment and cognitive impairment which mean that he was totally incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his actions.

  7. In each matter a special verdict of act proven, but not criminally responsible by reason of cognitive impairment and mental health impairment is required. In relation to Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 I return those verdicts.

  8. But that does not end the proceedings. I will need to hear the Victim Impact Statements and I will need to consider s 33 Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act.

Victim Impact Statements

  1. I received the statements read to the Court. There has been no objection to that material although some of it technically fell out of the rules, but Mr Williams is not concerned, nor am I. I take them into account. I can only do so in a limited way, but it is appropriate that they be read and acknowledged by the Court. I also acknowledge that these matters have impacts on the individuals concerned, and on the community concerned. Sadly, we do not have any resources so far as victim services available. They are desperately needed particularly in rural communities on the South Coast.

A special verdict

  1. When a verdict is reached that a person is not criminally responsible even though the acts committed would otherwise have led to a guilty verdict for serious criminal offences, the Court has no power to punish that person. There is a basic principle of law that Courts cannot punish people who are not criminally responsible for their acts. The person can however, be removed from the community and either placed in custody or detained in a mental health facility. Alternatively, they can, for the foreseeable future, be managed in the community by the Mental Health Review Tribunal.

  2. A judge cannot make an order for the release of a person to the care of the Tribunal unless they are satisfied, on balance of probabilities, that the safety a person, or any member of the public, will not be seriously endangered by the person’s release.

  3. The word ‘seriously’ has work to do. The possibility of a chance meeting, whether in compliance with conditions or not, is not enough, with great respect to the concerns expressed in the Victim Impact Statement, to justify the epithet ‘seriously’. I do not diminish those real concerns. It is clear from the material before me that any contact between victims of the acts and Mr McPaul may, and probably would, exacerbate their concerns about repetition of the behaviour or importantly just trigger a totally appropriate response to the ordeal that they were subjected to on the evening in January 2023.

  4. The prosecution’s submission is that the safest way of dealing with this matter is to remand Mr McPaul to custody until an order of the Mental Health Tribunal is made. The Tribunal can then consider all necessary material at that time.

  5. The Crown’s supplementary submission is that I would in the meantime, order a report from someone who is not currently involved in treating the defendant as to their condition about whether their release is likely to seriously endanger the safety of the defendant or any member of the public: Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW), s 66.

  6. These submissions, detention or the ordering of a report, are not supported by evidence, other than the Crown noting that these were very serious acts with very serious consequences to members of the public, whose home was invaded and who were subject to serious threats and intimidation.

  7. There is no utility in ordering another report. I have the benefit of the reports of Dr Martin and Dr Furst.

  8. Dr Martin’s report was prepared at a time when there was no Community Treatment Order in place. He has one now. He, quite properly, was concerned that there was no such Order. In Dr Martin’s opinion, Mr McPaul requires careful oversight of his mental illness with regular monitoring ensuring ongoing treatment and early intervention to prevent relapse.

  9. Dr Furst, at page 8 of his report, makes recommendations regarding future treatment; that Mr McPaul remain under the care of Bega Valley Mental Health as per his current Community Treatment Order. And adhere to a treatment plan, including prescribed medication, and to take any recommendations for early admission to hospital at the first signs of relapse.

  10. Given the expert opinions before me, although dated in 2023 and 2024, there is no need to get an additional report. Mr McPaul is presently subject to a Community Treatment Order and there is no evidence he has breached it. There are two matters where he appears to have either been in breach of Apprehended Violence Orders or his bail, but they were dealt with without bail being breached.

  11. If someone is sent to prison when they already have an established treatment plan in place in the community it is inevitable that that plan will be significantly interfered with. Mental health treatment in custody is possible once someone gets to the top of the waiting list. I have no evidence in this matter as to how long that would be, nor do I have any evidence as to how long it will take the Tribunal to do their review.

  12. Given that McPaul has been at large in the community subject to both Apprehended Violence Orders and bail, to send him to custody for the first time, to place him under the strictures of our custodial system, which is, frankly at the moment, even the police are saying is, “bursting at the seams” would be to seriously impede his obvious demonstrated progress towards rehabilitation. I will not make an order remanding him in custody. Nor is there is any evidence of another place that he could be detained presently before me.

  13. I have considered the question of community safety and whether it would be seriously endangered by his release. If Mr McPaul sticks to the conditions of his Community Treatment Plan and the conditions of the Apprehended Violence Order, then, while I cannot guarantee it, no court can, the chances of there being anyone seriously endangered, that can and will, be minimised.

Verdict

  1. Special verdict pursuant to s 28 Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act. Act proven but the accused is not criminally responsible due to a cognitive mental health impairment.

Orders

  1. In accordance with my verdicts, I refer Mr McPaul to the Mental Health Review Tribunal. He is to contact that tribunal within seven days to facilitate their further order. I direct that the registrar provide, as soon as it is taken out, a copy of these reasons and the reports of Dr Martin and Dr Furst to the Mental Health Review Tribunal.

  2. The conditions of release, Mr McPaul, are these:

  • That you reside until further order at [redacted].

  • Not to go within 100 metres of any place that the four complainants live or work, including their address which you know.

  • To comply with the Apprehended Violence Order, which is in place, you breach that you get locked up anyway.

  • To comply with the terms and conditions of your Community Treatment Order and maintain contact with the doctors providing that community treatment.

  • To attend any hearing or meeting set by the Mental Health Review Tribunal.

  • To attend on any doctor or medical practitioner as recommended by the Mental Health Review Tribunal.

  • To obey all orders of this Court until the Mental Health Review Tribunal imposes further orders.

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Decision last updated: 09 May 2025

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Cases Citing This Decision

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Cases Cited

7

Statutory Material Cited

4

Hawkins v The Queen [1994] HCA 28
R v Minani [2005] NSWCCA 226
R v Minani [2005] NSWCCA 226