Lai v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld)

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

LAI v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) & Anor [2016] QCA 287

PARTIES:

LAI
(appellant)
v
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (QLD)
(first respondent)
DIRECTOR OF MENTAL HEALTH
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 535 of 2016
QMHC No 94 of 2014

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Mental Health Court at Brisbane – Unreported: 1 December 2015

DELIVERED ON:

11 November 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

14 June 2016

JUDGES:

Margaret McMurdo P and Gotterson JA and Peter Lyons J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   If necessary to do so, this Court extends time to appeal to 12 January 2016.

2.   The appeal is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – GENERAL MATTERS – CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY – DEFENCE MATTERS – INSANITY AND MENTAL IMPAIRMENT – DISEASE OF THE MIND, MENTAL DISEASE OR MENTAL INFIRMITY – where the appellant was charged with arson – where the Mental Health Court found that the appellant was not of unsound mind at the time of the offending – where the appellant contends the primary judge misapplied Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358 and erred in finding that the appellant could appreciate the wrongness of his conduct at the time of the alleged offence – where the appellant lit the fire at night to conceal his conduct and gave a false explanation to police about who was responsible – where the primary judge concluded the appellant had a psychotic illness at the time of the offence but was not deprived of the capacity to appreciate the moral wrongness of his conduct because he in part knew the burning of the car was against the law –whether the appellant was of unsound mind

Criminal Code (Qld), s 27
Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld), s 267, s 335, s 389, s 405

DAR v DPP (Qld) & Anor[2008] QCA 309, cited
R v Arnold (1724) 16 State Trials 704, cited
R v Codere (1916) 12 Cr App R 21, cited
R v Davis (1881) 14 Cox CC 563, cited
R v Schafferius [1987] 1 Qd R 381, cited
Re M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200; (1843) 8 ER 718; [1843] EngR 875, cited
Re S [2015] QMHC 8, cited
SCN v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) & Anor[2016] QCA 237, applied
Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358; [1952] HCA 56, considered
R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1, cited
Trial of James Hadfield (1800) 27 St Tr 1281, cited

COUNSEL:

J D Briggs for the appellant
T A Fuller QC for the respondents

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondents

  1. MARGARET McMURDO P:  On 17 March 2014 the appellant’s lawyers referred the charge brought against him, that on 10 January 2013 he wilfully and unlawfully set…

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Details
Case
[2016] QCA 287
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Lai, was charged with arson and was referred to the Mental Health Court under the Mental Health Act to determine whether he was of unsound mind at the time of the offence. The Mental Health Court found that Lai was not of unsound mind, and Lai now appeals this decision. Lai contends that the primary judge misapplied the decision in Stapleton v The Queen and erred in finding that Lai could appreciate the wrongness of his conduct at the time of the alleged offence. The central legal issue before the court was whether Lai was of unsound mind at the time of the alleged offence.

The court examined the definition of "unsound mind" under the Mental Health Act and the Criminal Code, focusing on the test for insanity as articulated in Stapleton. The court emphasised that the test is whether the accused person was capable of knowing the nature and quality of the act and of its wrongness, even if they could not reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure. The court found that Lai had a psychotic illness at the time of the offence but concluded that this did not deprive him of the capacity to appreciate the moral wrongness of his conduct. Lai had knowledge that burning the car was against the law, which was sufficient to establish that he appreciated the wrongness of his conduct.

The court dismissed Lai's appeal and upheld the decision of the Mental Health Court. The court found no error in the primary judge's application of Stapleton or in the conclusion that Lai was not of unsound mind at the time of the alleged offence.

ORDERS:
1. If necessary to do so, this Court extends time to appeal to 12 January 2016.
2. The appeal is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. If necessary to do so, this Court extends time to appeal to 12 January 2016.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant contends that the court’s error in not applying Stapleton correctly requires that this appeal be allowed, the decision of the Mental Health Court set aside and instead a finding substituted that the appellant was of unsound mind at the time of the alleged charge, with the matter remitted to the Mental Health Court for determination of any further orders.Conclusion Under s 267 Mental Health Act, the Mental Health Court is empowered to decide whether a person the subject of a reference to it was of unsound mind when the alleged offence was committed. The standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities, with no party bearing the onus, but with the qualification that clear and convincing evidence is required.[21] The Mental Health Court is constituted by a Supreme Court judge who is advised by two assisting psychiatrists on the meaning and significance of clinical evidence.[22] An appeal from a decision of that court to this Court is an appeal in the strict sense requiring the demonstration of error of fact or law.[23][21]Mental Health Act s 405; R v Schafferius [1987] 1 Qd R 381; DAR v DPP (Qld) & Anor [2008] QCA 309, [82] – [83]; SCN [2016] QCA 237, [4].[22]Mental Health Act s 389.[23]DAR [2008] QCA 309, [7] – [29], [95] and [98]; SCN [2016] QCA 237, [2]. The expression “unsound mind” is defined in the Schedule to the Mental Health Act as,“...the state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity described in the Criminal Code, section 27, but does not include a state of mind resulting, to any extent, from intentional intoxication or stupefaction alone or in combination with some other agent at or about the time of the alleged offence.” Section 27 Criminal Code relevantly provides: “(1)A person is not criminally responsible for an act...if at the time of doing the act...the person is in such a state of mental disease...as to deprive the person of capacity...to know that the person ought not do the act...”. I have not found the appellant’s reliance on historical cases or on Sir Samuel Griffith’s comments helpful in determining whether an accused person is of unsound mind because of this incapacity. The test is that stated by Dixon CJ, Webb and Kitto JJ in Stapleton.The focus must be on the accused person’s:“...knowledge of the nature and quality of the act and of its wrongness. For it is evident that a jury although satisfied that no capacity existed in a particular accused to reason at all may think that at the back of it all was an awareness of the nature of the act and of the fact that other people might regard it as wrong more especially if that means regarded by the law as wrong. That would not lead to a conviction if the jury understands that, given a disease disorder or defect of reason, then it is enough if it so governed the faculties at the time of the commission of the act that the accused was incapable of reasoning with some moderate degree of calmness as to the wrongness of the act or of comprehending the nature or significance of the act of killing. See Reg. v. Davis, Stephen J., R. v. Kay, Stephen J. In R v Porter this was expressed by Dixon J as follows:- ‘The question is whether he was able to appreciate the wrongness of the particular act he was doing at the particular time. Could this man be said to know in this sense whether his act was wrong if through a disease or defect or disorder of the mind he could not think rationally of the reasons which to ordinary people make that act right or wrong? If through the disordered condition of the mind he could not reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure it may be said that he could not know that what he was doing was wrong.’” (Footnotes omitted).[24][24]Stapleton (1952) 86 CLR 358, 367.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established