Santos Limited v Fluor Australia Pty Ltd & Anor (No 1)

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Santos Limited v Fluor Australia Pty Ltd & Anor (No 1) [2020] QSC 372

PARTIES:

SANTOS LIMITED

ACN 007 550 923

(plaintiff)

v

FLUOR AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
ACN 004 511 942
(first defendant)

FLUOR CORPORATION

(second defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BS No 12939 of 2016

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

15 December 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

19 February 2020

JUDGE:

Bradley J

ORDER:

The Order of the Court is that:

1. The defendants have judgment against the plaintiff pursuant to r 293 on the parts of the plaintiff’s claim in which the plaintiff sought relief to the effect that:

(a)     The first defendant pay to the plaintiff as a debt due and owing under a contract the time-related overhead costs incurred by the first defendant in performing the work required to be completed in order to achieve mechanical completion of the water production system and the hub-compressor facility for each of Hubs 2, 4 and 5; and

(b)     The second defendant pay the amount of such costs to the plaintiff as monies owing under a guarantee or as a loss against which the second defendant has indemnified the plaintiff under a guarantee.

2.   The plaintiff pay the defendants’ costs of those parts of the plaintiff’s claim, including the costs of the application in the proceeding filed on 7 November 2019. 

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT OR RESPONDENT: STAY OR DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS – where the plaintiff and first defendant entered into a contract by which the first defendant agreed to engineer, procure and construct certain facilities for the plaintiff – where the first defendant failed to achieve mechanical completion of certain of the facilities by the date for mechanical completion under the contract – where the first defendant was paid costs it incurred performing work to complete the facilities, including costs incurred after the relevant dates for mechanical completion, by the plaintiff – where the plaintiff claims that it overpaid the first defendant sums attributable to the additional time taken to achieve mechanical completion of the facilities, on the bases that those sums were “Excluded Costs” and/or not “Actual Costs” under the contract – where the defendants say that, on the proper construction of the contract, the first defendant was entitled to be paid the costs it incurred performing work to complete the facilities, whether or not incurred after the relevant date for mechanical completion – where the defendants applied for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s “Mechanical Completion Delay Costs Claim” – whether the plaintiff has real, as opposed to fanciful, prospects of proving the claim at trial

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 5, r 171, r 293

Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552, cited
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256, cited
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949)…

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Details
Case
[2020] QSC 372
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Santos Limited v Fluor Australia Pty Ltd & Anor, the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with resolving a dispute arising from a construction contract. Santos Limited (the plaintiff) alleged that Fluor Australia Pty Ltd (the first defendant) overcharged for work performed under a contract, specifically claiming that the additional costs incurred due to delays in achieving mechanical completion were not allowable under the contract terms. Fluor argued that it was entitled to the full amount of costs incurred, irrespective of the delay, based on the contract's provisions. The case involved a motion for summary judgment by Fluor to dismiss Santos' claim for the additional costs, known as Mechanical Completion Delay Costs.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether Santos had a real prospect of proving its claim that Fluor was overpaid for costs attributable to delays in achieving mechanical completion. The court had to determine if the claim had sufficient merit to warrant a trial or if it could be summarily dismissed based on the evidence presented. The court also considered the implications of the contract terms, specifically whether Fluor was entitled to recover all costs incurred, regardless of the delays, as argued by Fluor.

The court's reasoning focused on the interpretation of the contract and the available evidence. It noted that Santos' claim for Mechanical Completion Delay Costs was not supported by the contract's terms or any precedent. The court found that the contract did not provide for such costs to be identified or claimed separately, and Fluor's entitlement to recover costs incurred was not contingent on the timing of those costs. The evidence presented by Santos did not substantiate a claim that Fluor had overcharged, and the court concluded that Santos had no real prospect of proving its claim. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Fluor, dismissing Santos' claim and ordering Santos to pay Fluor's costs associated with the application.

The final orders of the court included a judgment in favor of Fluor, dismissing Santos' claim for Mechanical Completion Delay Costs and ordering Santos to pay Fluor's costs for the application. This decision underscored the importance of clear contract terms and the limitations on claims for additional costs not provided for in the agreement.

Orders

Orders of the court

The Order of the Court is that:

1. The defendants have judgment against the plaintiff pursuant to r 293 on the parts of the plaintiff’s claim in which the plaintiff sought relief to the effect that:

(a) The first defendant pay to the plaintiff as a debt due and owing under a contract the time-related overhead costs incurred by the first defendant in performing the work required to be completed in order to achieve mechanical completion of the water production system and the hub-compressor facility for each of Hubs 2, 4 and 5; and

(b) The second defendant pay the amount of such costs to the plaintiff as monies owing under a guarantee or as a loss against which the second defendant has indemnified the plaintiff under a guarantee.

2. The plaintiff pay the defendants’ costs of those parts of the plaintiff’s claim, including the costs of the application in the proceeding filed on 7 November 2019.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The MC Delay Costs is a concept defined by Santos in SASOC [16](b). No such costs were separately claimed by Fluor or certified for payment by Santos during the life of the GLNG Project. In the EPC, the parties did not provide for them to be identified or separately claimed or certified. The parties used no such term in the EPC. Mr Rae’s evidence Santos has calculated that these costs are the equivalent of about $475 million. To give this amount some context, the original Target Budget Estimate of the amounts to be paid to Fluor for the Work under the EPC was about $3.576 billion and the total of all the sums claimed by Santos in the proceeding exceeds $1.4 billion. Santos relied on Mr Rae’s report to show that: “a delay to the completion of construction activities would lead to additional time-related costs being incurred which would not have been incurred had there been no delay”. In his report, Mr Rae explained a number of things about the effect of delay on a contractor’s costs for a major construction project, including the following: “2.3 Contractor Costs in Circumstances of Critical Delay2.3.1Contractor Costs – Overview20.There are broadly two categories of costs incurred by a contractor in performing a construction project. I refer to these categories as ‘direct costs’ and ‘indirect costs’. The terms ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ in this context are commonly used in the construction industry in reference to the categories of cost discussed. I adopt these terms merely for convenience, and do not use them in any legal context.Direct Costs21.Direct costs comprise costs of labour, plant and materials required to perform the construction of the permanent works. 22.Examples of direct costs are contained in Figure 2-2 below. Adopting Mr Rae’s descriptions, the following may be posited. The MC Delay Costs include time-related indirect costs of the kind identified by Mr Rae in Figure 2-4. They may include the costs of a dedicated project team based at the Fluor head office and inflationary costs. In the absence of a relevant exclusion of entitlement and limitation of liability, Fluor would be entitled to claim payment in respect of such costs and Santos would be bound to pay for them as part of the Contract Price calculated in accordance with Schedule 3.1. In Mr Rae’s schema, the MC Delay Costs do not include any direct costs, including any costs of disruption. They do not include any amount for Fluor head office overheads, as distinct from the costs of a dedicated project team. They do not include any amount for loss of profit or finance charges incurred by Fluor. This is because it is common ground that Fluor had no right under cl 4.2 (and Schedule 3.1) to claim for such costs and did not do so. The pleading of the MC Delay Costs Claim The MC Delay Costs Claim is summarised in SASOC [9](b)(i)(A): “9In the premises set out in Parts B to D of this second amended statement of claim: …(b)[Santos] is entitled to recover under the [EPC], moneys which [Fluor] claimed and was paid, which exceeded its entitlement pursuant to the [EPC], being: (i) Excluded Costs which comprise: (A)costs which [Fluor] was precluded from claiming under the [EPC] as a result of delays to achieving Mechanical Completion (as that term is defined in clause 1.1 of the [EPC]) of certain parts of the Work in the following amounts: (1)$431,374,798 Australian Dollars (AUD); (2)$31,265,789 United States Dollars (USD); (3)£355,971 Pound Sterling (GBP); and (4)€213,688 Euros (EUR).ParticularsThe material facts upon which [Santos] relies are set out in paragraphs 10 to 19 of this [SASOC].”

Decision

Reasons for decision

At the hearing, Santos advised the Fluor parties that it proposed another amendment to SASOC [19].[7] Where relevant, I have considered the application on the basis of the proposed amendments,[8] as well as on the formal state of the proceeding.[7]Santos proposes to amend so that in the chapeau to SASOC [19] Santos relies on “the premises set out in paragraphs 5(b)(i) and 10 to 18”. [8]Including the earlier amendment to SASOC [19](b) proposed on 18 March 2019.Summary judgment The court may give judgment for a defendant against a plaintiff for part of the plaintiff’s claim if satisfied the plaintiff has “no real prospect of succeeding” on that part and “there is no need for a trial” of that part of the claim.[9] [9]Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR), r 293(2). A plaintiff’s prospects of success and the need for a trial are separate topics. For summary judgment, the first has been formulated as: whether there exists a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success.[10] The second is not so constrained, as the need for a trial may arise for various reasons. Where material facts are disputed, ordinarily there should be a trial to determine those facts. The matters in issue may be such that the court should determine them only after the parties have an opportunity to complete interlocutory steps, adduce evidence, and test the evidence of witnesses in the usual way. Where summary judgment is sought on part of a claim, the court may assume a trial will occur in any event; so the extent of saving of the resources of the parties and the court may need to be assessed.[10]Queensland University of Technology v Project Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2003] 1 Qd R 259 at 265 [7] (Holmes J, Davies JA and Mullins J agreeing). The history of the power to summarily determine a claim or a defence was explained by Williams JA in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo.[11] The court’s power to give summary judgment for a defendant relevantly arises from and is to be exercised according to the clear language of r 293.[12] The court is to apply the rule with the objective of avoiding undue delay, expense and technicality and facilitating the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues at a minimum of expense.[13] The just resolution of the real issues is understood against the historical framework in which it is “well accepted” that ordinarily “a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes”.[14] [11][2005] 2 Qd R 232 at 234-237 [11]-[17] (McMurdo P and Atkinson J agreeing), quoted with approval by North J in Dupois v Queensland Television Ltd & Ors [2015] QCA 160 at [13] (Holmes and Fraser JJA agreeing).[12]LCR Mining Group Pty Ltd v Ocean Tyres Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 105 at [30] (White JA, Wilson AJA and Ann Lyons J agreeing); Gray v Morris [2004] 2 Qd R 118 at 133 [46] (McMurdo J, McPherson JA agreeing). See also Equititrust Ltd v Gamp Developments Pty Ltd & Ors [2009] QSC 115 at [12] (McMurdo J). [13]UCPR, rr 5(1)-(2).[14]Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 at 575-576 [57] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), cited with approval in Batistatos v Roads & Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256 at 275 [46] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ) and Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 at 132 [24] (French CJ and Gummow J).Striking out part of a pleading

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established