Santos Limited v Fluor Australia Pty Ltd (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Santos Limited v Fluor Australia Pty Ltd & Anor (No 2) [2020] QSC 373

PARTIES:

SANTOS LIMITED
ACN 007 550 923
(plaintiff)
v
FLUOR AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
ACN 004 511 942
(first defendant)
FLUOR CORPORATION

(second defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BS No 12939 of 2016

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

15 December 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

17 and 18 February 2020
Further written submissions received 27 May, 4 and 15 June and 1 and 8 July 2020

JUDGE:

Bradley J

ORDER:

I will consider the parties’ submissions on the appropriate form of order.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – SEPARATE DECISION OR DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS AND CONSOLIDATION OF PROCEEDINGS – SEPARATE DECISION OR DETERMINATION – GENERALLY – where the plaintiff and defendants are in dispute about amounts paid by the plaintiff to the first defendant pursuant to a contract for the engineering, procurement and construction of certain facilities – where the dispute is complex and the quantum of the plaintiff’s claims is in excess of $1.4 billion – where it is estimated that a trial of the claims would take between six and nine months – where the plaintiff has applied for an order that the questions “raised on the pleadings as amended from time to time” be referred to three referees to conduct an inquiry into, and prepare a report to the Court on, those questions – where the defendants oppose the making of such an order, primarily on the bases that r 501 of the UCPR does not allow the Court to “refer out the whole proceeding” and that making a referral would not, in any event, be an appropriate exercise of the Court’s discretion – whether r 501 allows the Court to refer all of the questions in a proceeding to a referee or referees – whether referring all or some of the questions in this proceeding to three referees would facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues in the proceeding at a minimum of expense

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 5, r 501

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175, applied
Austin Engineering Pty Ltd v DA Story Pty Ltd [2000] QSC 97, cited
Buckley v Bennell Design & Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 1, considered
McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Cardno (Qld) Pty Ltd & Anor
[2019] QSC 320, cited
Netanya Noosa Pty Ltd v Evans Harch Constructions Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 650, explained
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, cited
Rankine v Rankine (1995) 124 FLR 340, considered
Wenco Industrial Pty Ltd v WW Industries Pty Ltd (2009) 25 VR 119, cited

COUNSEL:

M Stewart QC, with D J Piggott QC and J Mitchenson, for the plaintiff

D B O’Sullivan QC, with D M Turner, for…

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Details
Case
[2020] QSC 373
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Santos Limited initiated legal proceedings against Fluor Australia Pty Ltd in the Supreme Court of Queensland, contesting the amounts paid by Santos to Fluor under a contract for the engineering, procurement, and construction of certain facilities. The dispute is multifaceted and involves claims exceeding $1.4 billion, with an anticipated trial duration of six to nine months. Santos has requested that the questions raised on the pleadings be referred to three referees for an inquiry and report to the Court, while Fluor opposes this, arguing that Rule 501 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules does not permit the Court to refer the entire proceeding and that such a referral would not be an appropriate exercise of the Court's discretion.

The court considered whether Rule 501 allows the Court to refer all questions in a proceeding to a referee or referees and whether such a referral would facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the issues at a minimum of expense. The court referenced the decision in Netanya Noosa, where Lee J had considered the scope of the relevant rules and statute and concluded that the Court could not refer the entire proceeding to an expert for a report without specific statutory or rule-based authority. Lee J emphasised that the referral mechanism is for report purposes only and does not permit the Court to abdicate its fact-finding function.

The court concluded that while there is a historical precedent for using references to assist in resolving complex matters, the referral must be confined to specific issues and cannot encompass the entire proceeding. The court will now consider the appropriate form of order in light of the parties' submissions.

Orders

Orders of the court

I will consider the parties’ submissions on the appropriate form of order.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The historical context presents no impediment to the use of a reference to inquire into and report on all of the issues arising on the pleadings in a proceeding, in an appropriate case.The decision in Netanya Noosa In Netanya Noosa, Lee J considered the scope of O 39, r 7 of the then Rules of the Supreme Court and s 11 of the then Judicature Act 1876 (Qld). The relevant rule was in these terms:“Subject to such right as existed at the commencement of the Judicature Act to have particular cases submitted to the verdict of a jury, and subject to the like right under any later Statute, the Court or Judge may at any time direct the trial of any question or issues of fact, or partly of fact and partly of law, arising in any cause or matter to be tried without a jury, either by a Judge or by a Judge with assessors, or may refer the same for inquiry and report to a special referee.” Section 11(1) of the Judicature Act provided:“Subject to any rules of court and to such right as may now exist to have particular cases submitted to the verdict of a jury any question arising in any cause or matter before the Court may be referred by the Court or Judge before whom such cause or matter may be pending for inquiry and report to a special referee and the report of any such referee may be adopted wholly or partially by the Court and may (if so adopted) be enforced as a judgment by the Court.” The moving party in Netanya Noosa sought the referral of the entire proceeding to an expert for a report. Lee J concluded:“Whilst there is considerable temptation to make the orders sought, I have come to the conclusion that the present case cannot be referred in the way sought in the absence of some specific power to do so. Until an appeal court decides otherwise I feel constrained to follow the earlier authorities in limiting the powers of reference contained in s. 11 and O. 39 r. 7 in the manner outlined. The extent and breadth of the questions sought to be submitted makes it plain to me that what the plaintiff really seeks is to have all its grievances litigated in a different forum, a course which neither provision contemplates or authorises.”[32][32]Netanya Noosa at 656. Earlier, his Honour had noted:“The reference is not for decision, merely report. A fortiori, there is no power in the Court to refer the entire cause or matter or all of the factual disputes in it, or for that matter questions which may, in the end result, prove unnecessary to answer. The object of the report being to better enable the Court to decide the ultimate issues, s. 11 does not permit the Court to abdicate its fact finding function in favour of reference to some external tribunal. That function always remains a function of the Court, it being given the sole discretion to decide what assistance, if any, is to be derived from the referee’s report. The use of comparable language in O. 39 r. 7 indicates that similar limitations apply.”[33] [33]Netanya Noosa at 654 (citations omitted).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.