FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Samootin v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No. 2) [2012] FCA 316
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 164 of 2011
BETWEEN: ALEXANDRA SAMOOTIN
ApplicantAND: OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Respondent
JUDGE:
KATZMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 MARCH 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Order 2 of the orders made by Registrar Hedge on 14 September 2011 be varied to the extent that access (including photocopy access) be granted to the applicant to the documents described in Schedule 1 to these orders.
2.The applicant pay 75% of the respondent’s costs of the application for access to the documents over which the respondent claimed privilege.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 164 of 2011
BETWEEN: ALEXANDRA SAMOOTIN
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 316
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the documents in question were created for the dominant purpose of pending or anticipated litigation, or whether there had been a waiver of privilege. The court found that there was no evidence of a waiver of privilege by Ms Samootin. Additionally, the documents in contention were deemed to fall within the Sterling categories, specifically category (a), (c), or (d), indicating they were created for the purpose of legal advice in relation to litigation. The court also determined that documents 328 and 329, though initially appearing outside the privileged categories, were in fact privileged as they recorded communications between the Official Trustee and their legal representative.
In conclusion, the court granted access to 92 documents identified in Schedule 1, while denying access to the remaining documents listed in Schedule 2, which were found to be privileged. The court ruled that Ms Samootin should pay 75% of the Official Trustee's costs associated with the application for document access. This decision underscored the importance of maintaining legal professional privilege while also ensuring that the application process was handled fairly.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Order 2 of the orders made by Registrar Hedge on 14 September 2011 be varied to the extent that access (including photocopy access) be granted to the applicant to the documents described in Schedule 1 to these orders.
2. The applicant pay 75% of the respondent’s costs of the application for access to the documents over which the respondent claimed privilege.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined whether privilege had been waived by Ms Samootin. It noted that waiver occurs when a party entitled to privilege engages in conduct inconsistent with maintaining confidentiality of the communication. The onus of proving waiver lies on the party arguing for it. The court found no evidence of waiver and no basis in law or fact to support the contention that privilege is Ms Samootin's to waive.
In determining whether the documents fell within Sterling categories (a), (c) or (d), the court inferred from Ms Nash’s affidavit that the legal advice given or sought was for the dominant purpose of pending or anticipated legal proceedings or with respect to legal issues. The court found that the documents fit within these descriptions, except for documents 328 and 329 which were examined by the court and found to contain privileged communications.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that privilege has not been waived by Ms Samootin and that the documents fall within Sterling categories (a), (c) or (d), except for documents 328 and 329 which are also privileged. The court's decision reinforces the principle that the onus of proving waiver lies on the party arguing for it, and that privilege is not waived by mere disclosure.