Court of Appeal
New South Wales
Case Title: Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd v Registrar-General Medium Neutral Citation: [2011] NSWCA 395 Hearing Date(s): 23 June 2011 Decision Date: 15 December 2011 Jurisdiction: Before: McColl JA at 1, Campbell JA at 2, Tobias AJA at 2
Decision: (1) Direct the parties by 3 February 2012 to file and serve agreed Short Minutes of the orders to be made to give effect to these reasons for judgment.
(2) In the event that such agreement is not possible, direct the parties to file and serve by 3 February 2012 their respective drafts of such short minutes, together with written submissions in support of their respective drafts, and providing reasons why the draft of the opposite party is inappropriate, each such written submission not to exceed 8 pages without the leave of the court.
(3) Grant liberty to apply to any judge who heard the present appeal on 24 hours notice concerning such leave.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]Catchwords: REAL PROPERTY - Easements - Registrar-General expunged right of way from folios in the Register relating to two properties - expungement was procured by mistaken but arguable interpretation of terms of covenants - whether Registrar-General can be compelled to restore right of way to folios in the Register of the two properties -
REAL PROPERTY - Powers of Registrar-General - s 32(6) Real Property Act 1900 - power to cancel recordings -
REAL PROPERTY - Powers of Registrar-General - s 136 - power to call in and correct certificate of title or duplicate registered dealing - whether implied power to correct the Register itself - whether expungement of right of way from Register was "recording" - whether expungement was "wrongfully obtained" - whether expungement was "made in error" - whether Registrar-General was "satisfied" that expungement was "wrongfully obtained" or "made in error" -
REAL PROPERTY - Powers of Registrar-General - s 12(1)(d) - power to correct errors and omissions in the Register - whether expungement of right of way from Register was "error" - whether expungement was "omission" - whether term "omission" in s 12(1)(d) to be construed in the same way as "omission" in s 42(1)(a1) - term "omission" in s 12(1)(d) has the meaning of something "left out" or "not there" irrespective of the cause of, and without the attribution of cause or fault or reason for, the omission -
REAL PROPERTY - Powers of Court - s 138 - power of Court to order the Registrar-General to amend folios of the Register to reinstate the right of way - whether proceedings were proceedings for "recovery" of interest in land…
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- Case
- [2011] NSWCA 395
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court was required to determine whether the Registrar-General had the power to cancel recordings under s 32(6) of the *Real Property Act 1900*, and whether this power extended to correcting the Register itself. Specifically, the Court had to consider if the expungement of the right of way constituted a "recording" and whether it was "wrongfully obtained" or "made in error" to the satisfaction of the Registrar-General. Furthermore, the Court had to assess whether the term "error" or "omission" in s 12(1)(d) of the Act encompassed the expungement, and whether the term "omission" should be construed in the same manner as in s 42(1)(a1). The Court also considered its own powers under s 138 of the Act to order the Registrar-General to amend folios, and under ss 121 and 122 to review the Registrar-General's decision and order amendments, including whether the lapse of time affected these powers and the scope of orders the Court could make.
The Court reasoned that the term "omission" in s 12(1)(d) of the *Real Property Act 1900* referred to something "left out" or "not there," irrespective of the cause or fault. It found that the expungement of the right of way was an "error" and an "omission" within the meaning of s 12(1)(d). The Court also considered the implications of indefeasibility of title and exceptions thereto, referencing *Dobbie v Davidson* (1991) 23 NSWLR 625. The Court concluded that it had the power to review the Registrar-General's decision under s 122 and to order the amendment of the Register to reinstate the right of way, finding that the Registrar-General's decision to expunge the right of way was an error.
The Court ordered that the Registrar-General be directed to file and serve agreed Short Minutes of the orders to be made to give effect to the reasons for judgment by 3 February 2012. In the event of disagreement, the parties were to file and serve their respective drafts of such minutes, along with written submissions. Liberty to apply was granted to any judge who heard the appeal on 24 hours' notice concerning leave for submissions exceeding 8 pages.
Background
Background to the litigation
Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd, the appellant, is the registered proprietor of 69 Strathallen Avenue, Northbridge. Castle Constructions Pty Ltd, the second respondent, is the registered proprietor of 134 Sailors Bay Road, Northbridge. Sahab commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court against the Registrar-General, the first respondent, seeking to have a right of way restored to the folios in the Register of Titles relating to the two properties. The proceedings were initiated by the filing of an Amended Summons on 17 February 2009. The appeal against the orders made by Slattery J on 5 March 2010 dismissing Sahab's summons was heard on 23 June 2011. Castle has filed a Summons seeking leave to cross-appeal against the primary judge's order that there be no order as to costs between Sahab and Castle. Sahab now appeals against Slattery J's order dismissing its summons, and Castle has filed a Summons seeking leave to cross-appeal against the primary judge's order that there be no order as to costs as between Sahab and Castle.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What was the basis for the Registrar-General's 2001 decision to cancel the recording of the right of way from the Register?
2. Was Castle's 2001 request a "dealing" within the meaning of the Real Property Act?
3. What was the proper construction of the grant of the right of way and the attendant covenants?
4. Did the Registrar-General have the power to reinstate the right of way on the Register pursuant to s 136?
5. Did the Registrar-General have the power to reinstate the right of way on the Register pursuant to s 12(1)(d)?
6. Did the Registrar-General have the power to correct the Register pursuant to s 136(1)(b)?
7. Were Sahab's proceedings for the recovery of an interest in land within the meaning of s 138(1)?
8. Did the proceedings fall within s 138(2)?
9. Did the Registrar-General's 2001 decision fall within the meaning of s 121(a), (b), or (c)?
10. Did s 122(1) confer on the Supreme Court jurisdiction to conduct a merits-based review of the Registrar-General's decision?
11. Did the lapse of time remove the Court's power to review the Registrar-General's decision under s 122?
12. Was the correction of the removal of the right of way an order that the Registrar-General "could, but for the order, have taken"?
13. Did the Court have to be satisfied that there was evidence that appeared to it sufficient to make an order under s 122(4)(b)?
14. Does the coda to s 122(4) provide a broader power than that contained in s 122(4)(b)?
15. Does the principle of indefeasibility of title pose an obstacle to the orders the Court would make to restore the right of way to the Register?
16. Does the Registrar-General have the power to recall the duplicate certificate of title to correct the error in the Register?
Held
1. The Registrar-General neither purported nor was empowered to act in cancelling the recording of the right of way on the Register pursuant to s 49 Real Property Act 1900. This was because there had been no abandonment of the right of way either pursuant to s 49(2) or the general law. Appeal allowed on this issue.
2. Likewise, the Registrar-General neither purported nor was empowered to act in cancelling the recording of the right of way on the Register pursuant to ss 81I or 81J Real Property Act 1900. Appeal allowed on this issue.
3. Rather, s 32(6) provided the power pursuant to which the Registrar-General acted in cancelling the recording of the right of way on the Register. Appeal dismissed on this issue.
4. Castle's 2001 request seeking the cancellation of the right of way was not a "dealing" within the meaning of the Real Property Act. Appeal dismissed on this issue.
5. On the proper construction of the grant of the right of way and the attendant covenants, the existence of the right of way was not conditional upon the continued operation of any of the covenants. The covenants relating to the right of way continued in operation. Moreover the grant of right of way was permanent and not dependent on the ownership by the transferors or their executors, administrators and assigns other than purchasers of sale of the dominant tenement. Appeal allowed on this issue.
6. Section 136(1) merely enables the Registrar-General to call in and correct the certificate of title or duplicate registered dealing, but does not empower the Registrar-General to correct the Register itself. Appeal dismissed on this issue.
7. The Registrar-General did not have power to restore the right of way pursuant to s 136(1)(c). The expungement of the right of way from the Register was a "recording" but it was not "wrongfully obtained". Appeal dismissed on this issue.
8. The Registrar-General did not have power to restore the right of way pursuant to s 136(1)(b). The Registrar-General was not "satisfied" that the recording in the Register had been "made in error". Appeal dismissed on this issue.
9. The Registrar-General did have power in 2008 to restore the right of way under s 12(1)(d). There was an "omission" of the right of way from the Register. Appeal allowed on this issue.
10. It was not necessary to decide whether the concept of "error" in s 12(1)(d) could be engaged even if the concept of "made in error" in s 136(1)(b) was not. Appeal dismissed on this issue.
11. Castle did not obtain indefeasible title under s 42(1) because that indefeasibility is subject to an exception relating to "the omission...of an easement" in s 42(1)(a1). Appeal allowed on this issue.
12. Because Castle did not obtain indefeasible title under s 42(1), it was unable to rely on s 118(1). Appeal allowed on this issue.
13. The Registrar-General could not have called in the duplicate certificate pursuant of title pursuant to s 136(1)(b) on the basis that the recording had been "made in error" because he was not satisfied that a recording had been made in error in the Register. Appeal dismissed on this issue.
14. Sahab's proceedings were proceedings "for the recovery of any land, estate or interest from the person registered as proprietor" within the meaning of s 138(1). Appeal allowed on this issue.
15. Sahab's proceedings did not fall within s 138(2). There was no evidence to suggest that if called upon to do so, Castle would not have produced to the Registrar-General the certificate of title. Appeal allowed on this issue.
16. It was not necessary to decide whether s 138(3) provided a separate and independent source of authority for the Court to order the Registrar-General to correct the Register if the proceedings did not fall within s 138(1) or (2). Appeal dismissed on this issue.
17. The Registrar-General's 2001 decision was a decision within the meaning of s 121(b). Appeal allowed on this issue.
18. Section 122(1) confers on the Supreme Court jurisdiction to conduct a "review of the decision". That jurisdiction is wider than the powers that are conferred when there is an appeal to the Court of Appeal and extends to a merits-based review of the decision of the Registrar-General. Appeal allowed on this issue.
19. Lapse of time alone does not remove the Court's power to review under s 122(1). Appeal allowed on this issue.
20. Because s 12(1)(d) empowered the Registrar-General to correct the removal of the right of way when requested to do so in 2008, the correction was an action that the Registrar-General "could, but for the order, have taken". Appeal allowed on this issue.
21. It is not necessary to decide whether the coda to s 122(4) provides a broader power than that contained in s 122(4)(b). Appeal dismissed on this issue.
22. The principle of indefeasibility of title does not pose an obstacle to the orders the Court would make to restore the right of way to the Register. Appeal allowed on this issue.
23. The Registrar-General has the power to recall the duplicate certificate of title to correct the error in the Register. Appeal allowed on this issue.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court found that the Registrar-General did not have the power to cancel the recording of the right of way from the Register pursuant to s 49 of the Real Property Act 1900, as there had been no abandonment of the right of way. Instead, the Registrar-General acted under s 32(6) of the Act, which empowers him to cancel any recording in the Register that he is satisfied does not affect the land to which the recording purports to relate. The Court held that Castle's 2001 request was not a "dealing" within the meaning of the Act, as it did not involve a document relating to the disposition, devolution, or acquisition of land or evidencing title thereto.
The Court properly construed the grant of the right of way and the attendant covenants, finding that the existence of the right of way was not conditional upon the continued operation of any of the covenants. The covenants relating to the right of way continued in operation, and the grant of the right of way was permanent and not dependent on the ownership by the transferors or their executors, administrators, and assigns other than purchasers of sale of the dominant tenement.
Regarding the Registrar-General's power to reinstate the right of way on the Register, the Court found that s 136(1) of the Act merely enables the Registrar-General to call in and correct the certificate of title or duplicate registered dealing, but does not empower him to correct the Register itself. However, the Court held that the Registrar-General had the power to restore the right of way under s 12(1)(d) of the Act, as there was an "omission" of the right of way from the Register.
The Court found that Sahab's proceedings for the recovery of an interest in land fell within the meaning of s 138(1) of the Act, as they encompassed a claim for an interest in land to which Sahab was entitled. The Court also held that the Registrar-General's 2001 decision did not fall within the meaning of s 121(a), (b), or (c) of the Act, and therefore Sahab was a "person dissatisfied" with the Registrar-General's decision within the meaning of s 121(1).
The Court held that s 122(1) of the Act confers on the Supreme Court jurisdiction to conduct a merits-based review of the decision of the Registrar-General. The Court found that the lapse of time did not remove its power to review the Registrar-General's decision under s 122. The Court also held that the correction of the removal of the right of way was an order that the Registrar-General "could, but for the order, have taken," and that there was evidence that appeared to the Court sufficient to make an order under s 122(4)(b).
The Court found that the principle of indefeasibility of title did not pose an obstacle to the orders it would make to restore the right of way to the Register, as the omission of the right of way from the Register fell within the exception in s 42(1)(a1) of the Act. Finally, the Court held that the Registrar-General has the power to recall the duplicate certificate of title to correct the error in the Register.