Rush v Commissioner of Police

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12

APPLICATION – preliminary discovery – 0 15A rr 3 and 6 Federal Court Rules – prospective claims against members of the Australian Federal Police – police disclosure to Indonesian authorities of information putting applicants at risk of exposure to the death penalty – whether the prospective claims are speculative or devoid of prospects of success.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – principles to be applied – s 8 of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) – extent to which s 8 can be read down in light of other domestic legislation and international instruments

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – allegation that police acted without lawful authority in providing information concerning applicants to the Indonesian police – whether the AFP acted in accordance with requirements of relevant legislation

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – procedural fairness – claim that the applicants have a substantive legitimate expectation that police would not act in such a way so as to expose them to the risk of the death penalty – whether the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is part of Australian law

TORT – negligence – allegation that assurances allegedly given by the AFP to father of one applicant gave rise to a duty of care to that applicant – nature of duty of police in conducting a criminal investigation – whether a duty to an individual member of the public can exist concurrently with police’s duty to the public at large – whether alleged duty inconsistent with public duty in performing their statutory functions

TORT – potential claim for misfeasance in public office – no reasonable cause to believe that the commission of this tort was other than a mere possibility

Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) ss 5A, 6, 8, 8(1)(b)(i)(iii)(c), 9, 17, 37, 37(1)(2)(4), 38, 39, 40, 64B
Judiciary Act 1903 s 39B(1A)(c)
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth) ss 5, 5(c), 6, 7, 7(3)(a), 8, 8(1A)(1B),10, 10(1)(2), 11, Pt II to VIIA
Death Penalty Abolition Act 1973 (Cth)
Extradition Act 1998 (Cth) s 22(3)(c)
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Republic of Indonesia) Regulations 1999 reg 4
Australian Federal Police (Discipline) Regulations 1979, reg 4
Federal Court Rules O 15A rr 3, 6

Law of the Republic of Indonesia No 22 of 1997 on Narcotics, Primary Art 82(1)(a), Supplementary Art 78(1)(b)

Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 27 October 1995, Art 2 and Art 4.2(d)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 13 November 1980, Art 6.1
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, 2 October 1990, Art 1
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1940, Art 3

Allsop, “Statutes:  Context, Meaning and Preenactment History”, Jo of NSW Bar Assoc, Winter 2005, 19 ff
Mason, (2005) 12 Aust Jo of Admin Law 103
Craig, Administrative Law, 639-656 (5th ed 2003)
Sedley, “The last 10 years’ development of…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 12
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Rush v Commissioner of Police, the applicants sought preliminary discovery of information from the Australian Federal Police (AFP) regarding the disclosure of information to Indonesian authorities that put them at risk of exposure to the death penalty. The applicants argued that the police acted without lawful authority and breached their substantive legitimate expectation. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the prospective claims against the AFP were speculative or devoid of prospects of success, and whether the discovery sought was warranted under the Federal Court Rules. The court also had to interpret the relevant statutory provisions and consider the principles of administrative law and tort law in the context of police actions.

The primary legal issues the court had to decide were whether the police acted without lawful authority in disclosing information to Indonesian authorities, whether the applicants had a substantive legitimate expectation that they would not be exposed to the risk of the death penalty, and whether the prospective claims were speculative or devoid of prospects of success. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the applicants could claim misfeasance in public office or negligence against the AFP, and whether the police owed a duty of care to the applicants.

The court found that the applicants' claims that the police acted without lawful authority were untenable. The requests for assistance were not of a kind that could be made under the Mutual Assistance Act, and the Mutual Assistance Act and Treaty did not limit the applicability of other legislation. The court held that the applicants had not established that the prospective proceedings would be other than speculative. Furthermore, the court found that the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation was not part of Australian law, and that the applicants had not met the threshold for discovery of information in respect of the potential tort of misfeasance in public office. The court concluded that the application for preliminary discovery should be dismissed.

The court ordered that the application be dismissed, finding that the applicants had not satisfied the conditions for information discovery under the Federal Court Rules. The court held that the requests for assistance were not of a kind that could be made under the Mutual Assistance Act, and that the applicants had not established that the prospective proceedings would be other than speculative. The court also found that the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation was not part of Australian law, and that the applicants had not met the threshold for discovery of information in respect of the potential tort of misfeasance in public office.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J
Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the applicants have met the limiting conditions of O 15A r 6(a) for the purposes of information discovery in respect of the potential tort of misfeasance in public office. Equally I am not satisfied for the purposes of O 15A r 3 identity discovery that the prospective proceedings intended to be commenced would be other than speculative: Hooper v Kirella, at [33]. Hence this form of discovery will not be ordered. CONCLUSION I will order that the application be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FINN J

I will consider each of these three possibilities in turn. CONSIDERATION1. Acting without lawful authority As it was initially put, the applicants’ case as I understand it would be to the effect that the requests made to the INP for assistance in the two Hunniford letters of 8 and 12 April 2005 ought to have been made, if at all, under the Mutual Assistance Act in which case they would have to have been made by the Attorney-General. The requests in consequence were made unlawfully. To the extent that this contention was premised on the proposition that the requests made were for assistance of a kind that could be obtained under the Mutual Assistance Act it is demonstrably untenable. The Hunniford requests were not for the exercise in Indonesia of any of the coercive powers specified in that Act and for that reason they could not be requests for assistance under the Act: cf s 10(1). I need not repeat here what I have earlier said in relation to the limited scope of the Mutual Assistance Act. To avoid this conclusion the applicants now seek to construe the Act in such a way that any request for international assistance in a criminal matter, whether or not of a kind that may be made under the Act, must be made by the Attorney-General. Section 10(2) is relied upon to that end. This is not what the sub-section says. Section 10(1) prescribes that the Attorney-General alone must make any request for assistance of a kind that Australia is authorised to make under the Act. Subsection (2) of the same section, though, makes plain that subsection (1) does not prevent the Attorney-General on behalf of Australia from requesting assistance beyond what can be obtained under the Act. What the subsection does not say is that the Attorney-General is to be the exclusive channel for such other requests. It is permissive not prescriptive. Other provisions both of the Mutual Assistance Act and of the Mutual Assistance Treaty with Indonesia make plain that no such limitation on the making of other requests was so intended. Section 6 of the Act expressly states that the Act does not prevent the provision etc of international assistance in criminal matters other than assistance of a kind that may be provided under that Act. Section 5 (the objects provision) states the purpose of the Act to be (inter alia) to facilitate the obtaining by Australia of international assistance in criminal matters: s 5(c). The interpretation of s 10(2) proposed by the applicants impedes rather than advances that purpose especially in light of s 6. Distinctly, the Mutual Assistance Treaty (the provisions of which limit the applicability of the Mutual Assistance Act to requests between Australia and Indonesia: see s 7(3)(a)) expressly provides that the Treaty does not derogate from obligations subsisting between the contracting parties, nor does it prevent them from providing assistance to each other: Art 2. Finally, if Parliament had intended through s 10(2) to impose such a fetter on obtaining international assistance in criminal matters as the applicants submit, thereby precluding the taking of such action as would otherwise be mandated by other legislation (e.g. the AFP Act: see below), one would have expected it to have spoken with far greater clarity than it has, the moreso given the purpose of the Act noted above: see Re Wilcox; Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 137 ALR 47 at 63-64.