Rumble v The Partnership trading as HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rumble v The Partnership Trading as HWL Ebsworth Lawyers [2020] FCAFC 37

Appeal from: Rumble v The Partnership Trading as HWL Ebsworth Lawyers [2019] FCA 1409
File number: NSD 1601 of 2019
Judges: RARES, FLICK AND KATZMANN JJ
Date of judgment: 13 March 2020
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – adverse action – where applicant employee of law firm, who made repeated criticisms in media about government clients of firm, dismissed for breaching firm’s media policy – where firm’s media policy prohibited employees criticising clients or potential clients in the media without permission – where primary judge found that managing partner did not take action against employee because of applicant’s political opinion – whether adverse action taken against applicant because he breached firm’s media policy necessarily taken because of his political opinion – whether managing partner of firm dismissed applicant because of his political opinion in contravention of s 351 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether not open to primary judge to find that applicant’s political opinion was not a substantial and operative factor in decision maker’s reasons – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 243

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Endeavour Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 231 FCR 150

Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2015) 327 ALR 460

Date of hearing: 12 February 2020
Registry: New South Wales
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 81
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J C Sheahan QC with Ms R Francois and Mr J Widjaja
Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr R Ishak of William Roberts Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M J Kimber SC with Mr G Fredericks and Mr S McIntosh
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr S Penning of HWL Ebsworth

ORDERS

NSD 1601 of 2019
BETWEEN:

GARY RUMBLE

Appellant

AND:

THE PARTNERSHIP TRADING AS HWL EBSWORTH

Respondent

JUDGES:

RARES, FLICK AND KATZMANN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

13 MARCH 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RARES AND KATZMANN JJ:

  1. The issue in this appeal is whether an employer contravenes s 351(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by dismissing an employee because the employee repeatedly breaches the employer’s policy prohibiting its employees from criticising the Government (being a client of the employer) in the media when the employer reasoned that that conduct could affect its ability to continue to attract and earn income from fees from Government work. Section 351(1) provides:

    351     Discrimination

    (1)An employer must not take adverse action against a person who is an employee, or prospective employee, of the employer because of the person’s race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, age,…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 37
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter under consideration was an appeal by Dr Rumble against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, where the primary judge found that Dr Rumble, a former employee of the firm HWL Ebsworth Lawyers, was dismissed for reasons not prohibited under s 351 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Dr Rumble had been dismissed for breaching the firm's media policy, which prohibited employees from criticising clients or potential clients in the media without permission. The central legal issue was whether the dismissal was taken because of Dr Rumble's political opinion, which would contravene s 351(1) of the Act. The appeal focused on the application of the law to the primary judge's findings of fact.

The court held that the primary judge was correct in finding that Dr Rumble was dismissed for breaching the firm's media policy, not because of his political opinion. The primary judge found that the managing partner of the firm, Mr Martinez, did not act against Dr Rumble because of his political opinion but was concerned about the earning of fees and the elimination of insubordination. The court emphasised that the Act did not require the decision-maker to establish that his or her reason for adverse action had nothing to do with the employee’s political opinion, but rather that the political opinion should not be a substantial and operative factor in the decision-maker’s reasons. The court found that the primary judge's conclusion that Dr Rumble’s political opinion was not a substantial and operative factor in Mr Martinez’s decision to terminate his contract was consistent with the law established in previous cases.

Given the reasoning above, the court dismissed the appeal. The decision reaffirmed that the protection under s 351(1) of the Fair Work Act applies to adverse action taken because of the employee’s political opinion, but the mere presence of a political opinion in the decision-maker’s mind is insufficient to constitute a breach of the Act. The court's decision upheld the primary judge's findings and the dismissal of the appeal.

The final order was that the appeal be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Dr Rumble did not challenge any of the primary judge’s findings of fact on the issue under s 351(1) and those facts are in narrow compass. Rather, he challenged his Honour’s application of the law to those facts. The following background summarises the primary judge’s findings of fact on the issue under s 351(1).BACKGROUND Dr Rumble has had a career in the law, particularly public law, since he was admitted to practice in 1975. He holds a doctorate in constitutional law from the Australian National University and has been both an academic and a practitioner. He was a well-regarded public lawyer in Canberra with a specialty in constitutional law. In April 2011, Dr Rumble was a partner in the law firm, DLA Phillips Fox, when the Secretary of the Department of Defence appointed that firm to conduct a review into allegations of sexual and other abuse in the military (the 2011 Review). The three lawyers with DLA Phillips Fox who conducted the review were Dr Rumble, Professor Dennis Pearce AO and another partner, Melanie McKean. The Minister announced that those three were to act as the members of the review. Under their appointment, the three reviewers were expected by all concerned (including DLA Phillips Fox, the Government and the firm) to report their independent views as individuals and not as persons acting for the firm of solicitors for which each worked. This position continued after each of Dr Rumble, Professor Pearce and Ms McKean took up positions with the firm after leaving DLA Phillips Fox during the period between 1 May 2011 and October 2011. On 22 July 2011 Dr Rumble signed a contract under which he was to be a casual consultant to the firm. Thereafter, DLA Phillips Fox (which became known as DLA Piper) and the firm worked cooperatively together in supporting the three reviewers’ work on volume 1 of their report on the 2011 Review. On 11 October 2011 the three reviewers delivered volume 1 of their report to the Minister. On 12 April 2012, Dr Rumble delivered volume 2 of the report from the 2011 Review to the Minister. Dr Rumble formed the view that his and his two colleagues’ appointments entitled each of them to continue to criticise the Government of the day’s implementation of the recommendations of the 2011 Review. As events transpired, Dr Rumble engaged in such criticisms for over four years after work on volume 2 of the report from the 2011 Review had finished. On 10 July 2012 the Minister publicly released volume 1 of the report from the 2011 Review. Thereafter, Dr Rumble began expressing his concerns about the then Minister’s delay in responding to and, later, in implementing the recommendations from the 2011 Review. He wrote to the Minister and began engaging with the media about his concerns. On 27 April 2014, Dr Rumble appeared on the Seven Network’s Weekend Sunrise program and during his interview by the well-known journalist, Laurie Oakes, he criticised the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Defence (which were both clients of the firm). The interview came to Mr Martinez’s attention who asked a Canberra partner in the firm, Michael Will, and Russell Mailler, the firm’s national marketing manager, to seek an undertaking from Dr Rumble that he would not speak to the media without first obtaining the firm’s permission.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Endeavour Coal 231 FCR 150 at 160–161 [32] (and see too at 164–165 [47]), Jessup J (who, with Perram J constituted the majority) explained the principle established in Barclay 248 CLR 500 and BHP Coal 253 CLR 243 as follows:The “connection” which was held not to be sufficient in BHP Coal was between the adverse action taken by the employer and the industrial activity in which the employee had engaged. It was not between two different characterisations of the conduct of the employee, in that case, as a contravention of the employer's conduct policy and as participation in industrial activity. As French CJ and Kiefel J made clear, if adverse action was taken because the conduct involved such a contravention, it did not become a breach of s 346 merely because the conduct was, at the same time, participation in industrial activity. The existence of such a “connection” was insufficient. What was necessary was that the actual reason of the decision-maker, in his or her own mind, be the employee's participation in industrial activity. To see their Honours' reasons in this way is, in my view, to recognise the consistency of those reasons with the statements of principle contained in the reasons of Gageler J in the same case. Those statements represent the law after Barclay and BHP Coal .(Emphasis added.) Perram J came to the same conclusion. He gave the example that, while a judge in giving reasons for his or her decision will have regard to the unsuccessful party’s submissions as an important part of arriving at that decision, those submissions will not be the reasons that are substantial and operative in why the judge made the decision: Endeavour Coal 231 FCR at 173 [91].CONSIDERATION Dr Rumble’s arguments must be rejected. The rationes decidendi in each of Barclay 248 CLR 500, BHP Coal 253 CLR 243 and Endeavour Coal 231 FCR 150 required the primary judge to find as a fact why Mr Martinez decided to terminate Dr Rumble’s contract. His Honour found (at [139]):I therefore find as a fact that Dr Rumble was not terminated for having or expressing a political opinion. Mr Martinez gave evidence to that effect and was extensively cross-examined on this issue. Although there were reasons to reject other parts of Mr Martinez’s evidence, I am satisfied that this aspect of his testimony was correct. In truth, Mr Martinez did not care about Dr Rumble’s views on the Government’s implementation of his recommendations to which he was most likely indifferent. What he did care about was the earning of fees and the elimination of insubordination.(Emphasis added.) Of course, Dr Rumble’s conduct in contravening the media policy was the event that led Mr Martinez to act to bring an end to Dr Rumble’s contract. Mr Martinez regarded that conduct as insubordinate and a threat to the firm’s interests in attracting and retaining clients, including from Government. Just as in each of the trilogy of cases that Dr Rumble sought to distinguish, this adverse action necessarily had a connection to a reason that the Act proscribed the decision-maker (here Mr Martinez) from acting on. But, as French CJ and Crennan J explained in Barclay 248 CLR at 523 [62], the Act did not require the decision-maker there to establish that his or her reason or reasons for adverse action “be entirely dissociated from an employee’s union position or activity”. Likewise here, the Act did not require Mr Martinez to establish that his decision had nothing to do with Dr Rumble’s political opinion. Rather, the proscription in s 351(1) is against Dr Rumble’s political opinion being a substantial and operative factor in Mr Martinez’s reason or reasons for his termination.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Perram J came to the same conclusion. He gave the example that, while a judge in giving reasons for his or her decision will have regard to the unsuccessful party’s submissions as an important part of arriving at that decision, those submissions will not be the reasons that are substantial and operative in why the judge made the decision: Endeavour Coal 231 FCR at 173 [91].CONSIDERATION Dr Rumble’s arguments must be rejected. The rationes decidendi in each of Barclay 248 CLR 500, BHP Coal 253 CLR 243 and Endeavour Coal 231 FCR 150 required the primary judge to find as a fact why Mr Martinez decided to terminate Dr Rumble’s contract. His Honour found (at [139]):I therefore find as a fact that Dr Rumble was not terminated for having or expressing a political opinion. Mr Martinez gave evidence to that effect and was extensively cross-examined on this issue. Although there were reasons to reject other parts of Mr Martinez’s evidence, I am satisfied that this aspect of his testimony was correct. In truth, Mr Martinez did not care about Dr Rumble’s views on the Government’s implementation of his recommendations to which he was most likely indifferent. What he did care about was the earning of fees and the elimination of insubordination.(Emphasis added.) Of course, Dr Rumble’s conduct in contravening the media policy was the event that led Mr Martinez to act to bring an end to Dr Rumble’s contract. Mr Martinez regarded that conduct as insubordinate and a threat to the firm’s interests in attracting and retaining clients, including from Government. Just as in each of the trilogy of cases that Dr Rumble sought to distinguish, this adverse action necessarily had a connection to a reason that the Act proscribed the decision-maker (here Mr Martinez) from acting on. But, as French CJ and Crennan J explained in Barclay 248 CLR at 523 [62], the Act did not require the decision-maker there to establish that his or her reason or reasons for adverse action “be entirely dissociated from an employee’s union position or activity”. Likewise here, the Act did not require Mr Martinez to establish that his decision had nothing to do with Dr Rumble’s political opinion. Rather, the proscription in s 351(1) is against Dr Rumble’s political opinion being a substantial and operative factor in Mr Martinez’s reason or reasons for his termination. In essence, the primary judge found as a fact that Mr Martinez’s only substantial and operative reasons for terminating Dr Rumble’s contract were protection of the firm’s business interests and Dr Rumble’s repeated acts of insubordination. There was no issue at trial or on appeal about whether s 351(1) extended to proscribe adverse action taken because of the employee’s expression of his or her political opinion. Like the primary judge, it is appropriate to deal with the issues on the appeal by assuming that s 351(1) operates to protect from adverse action not only the holding of a political opinion but also the expression of political opinion. Whether this assumption is correct (as Mortimer J found, in relation to a person’s membership of a political party, in Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2015) 327 ALR 460 at 493–496 [166]–[177]) can be decided in a proceeding where that is in issue.