FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Rumble v The Partnership Trading as HWL Ebsworth Lawyers [2020] FCAFC 37
Appeal from: Rumble v The Partnership Trading as HWL Ebsworth Lawyers [2019] FCA 1409 File number: NSD 1601 of 2019 Judges: RARES, FLICK AND KATZMANN JJ Date of judgment: 13 March 2020 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – adverse action – where applicant employee of law firm, who made repeated criticisms in media about government clients of firm, dismissed for breaching firm’s media policy – where firm’s media policy prohibited employees criticising clients or potential clients in the media without permission – where primary judge found that managing partner did not take action against employee because of applicant’s political opinion – whether adverse action taken against applicant because he breached firm’s media policy necessarily taken because of his political opinion – whether managing partner of firm dismissed applicant because of his political opinion in contravention of s 351 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether not open to primary judge to find that applicant’s political opinion was not a substantial and operative factor in decision maker’s reasons – appeal dismissed Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Cases cited: Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 243
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Endeavour Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 231 FCR 150
Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2015) 327 ALR 460
Date of hearing: 12 February 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: Fair Work Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 81 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J C Sheahan QC with Ms R Francois and Mr J Widjaja Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr R Ishak of William Roberts Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M J Kimber SC with Mr G Fredericks and Mr S McIntosh Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr S Penning of HWL Ebsworth ORDERS
NSD 1601 of 2019 BETWEEN: GARY RUMBLE
Appellant
AND: THE PARTNERSHIP TRADING AS HWL EBSWORTH
Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, FLICK AND KATZMANN JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 MARCH 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RARES AND KATZMANN JJ:
The issue in this appeal is whether an employer contravenes s 351(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by dismissing an employee because the employee repeatedly breaches the employer’s policy prohibiting its employees from criticising the Government (being a client of the employer) in the media when the employer reasoned that that conduct could affect its ability to continue to attract and earn income from fees from Government work. Section 351(1) provides:
351 Discrimination
(1)An employer must not take adverse action against a person who is an employee, or prospective employee, of the employer because of the person’s race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, age,…
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- Case
- [2020] FCAFC 37
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the primary judge was correct in finding that Dr Rumble was dismissed for breaching the firm's media policy, not because of his political opinion. The primary judge found that the managing partner of the firm, Mr Martinez, did not act against Dr Rumble because of his political opinion but was concerned about the earning of fees and the elimination of insubordination. The court emphasised that the Act did not require the decision-maker to establish that his or her reason for adverse action had nothing to do with the employee’s political opinion, but rather that the political opinion should not be a substantial and operative factor in the decision-maker’s reasons. The court found that the primary judge's conclusion that Dr Rumble’s political opinion was not a substantial and operative factor in Mr Martinez’s decision to terminate his contract was consistent with the law established in previous cases.
Given the reasoning above, the court dismissed the appeal. The decision reaffirmed that the protection under s 351(1) of the Fair Work Act applies to adverse action taken because of the employee’s political opinion, but the mere presence of a political opinion in the decision-maker’s mind is insufficient to constitute a breach of the Act. The court's decision upheld the primary judge's findings and the dismissal of the appeal.
The final order was that the appeal be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Perram J came to the same conclusion. He gave the example that, while a judge in giving reasons for his or her decision will have regard to the unsuccessful party’s submissions as an important part of arriving at that decision, those submissions will not be the reasons that are substantial and operative in why the judge made the decision: Endeavour Coal 231 FCR at 173 [91].CONSIDERATION Dr Rumble’s arguments must be rejected. The rationes decidendi in each of Barclay 248 CLR 500, BHP Coal 253 CLR 243 and Endeavour Coal 231 FCR 150 required the primary judge to find as a fact why Mr Martinez decided to terminate Dr Rumble’s contract. His Honour found (at [139]):I therefore find as a fact that Dr Rumble was not terminated for having or expressing a political opinion. Mr Martinez gave evidence to that effect and was extensively cross-examined on this issue. Although there were reasons to reject other parts of Mr Martinez’s evidence, I am satisfied that this aspect of his testimony was correct. In truth, Mr Martinez did not care about Dr Rumble’s views on the Government’s implementation of his recommendations to which he was most likely indifferent. What he did care about was the earning of fees and the elimination of insubordination.(Emphasis added.) Of course, Dr Rumble’s conduct in contravening the media policy was the event that led Mr Martinez to act to bring an end to Dr Rumble’s contract. Mr Martinez regarded that conduct as insubordinate and a threat to the firm’s interests in attracting and retaining clients, including from Government. Just as in each of the trilogy of cases that Dr Rumble sought to distinguish, this adverse action necessarily had a connection to a reason that the Act proscribed the decision-maker (here Mr Martinez) from acting on. But, as French CJ and Crennan J explained in Barclay 248 CLR at 523 [62], the Act did not require the decision-maker there to establish that his or her reason or reasons for adverse action “be entirely dissociated from an employee’s union position or activity”. Likewise here, the Act did not require Mr Martinez to establish that his decision had nothing to do with Dr Rumble’s political opinion. Rather, the proscription in s 351(1) is against Dr Rumble’s political opinion being a substantial and operative factor in Mr Martinez’s reason or reasons for his termination. In essence, the primary judge found as a fact that Mr Martinez’s only substantial and operative reasons for terminating Dr Rumble’s contract were protection of the firm’s business interests and Dr Rumble’s repeated acts of insubordination. There was no issue at trial or on appeal about whether s 351(1) extended to proscribe adverse action taken because of the employee’s expression of his or her political opinion. Like the primary judge, it is appropriate to deal with the issues on the appeal by assuming that s 351(1) operates to protect from adverse action not only the holding of a political opinion but also the expression of political opinion. Whether this assumption is correct (as Mortimer J found, in relation to a person’s membership of a political party, in Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2015) 327 ALR 460 at 493–496 [166]–[177]) can be decided in a proceeding where that is in issue.