CITATION: Rojo Building Pty Limited v Jillcris Pty Limited [2007] NSWSC 880 HEARING DATE(S): 11 and 12 July 2007
JUDGMENT DATE :
12 July 2007JURISDICTION: Equity Division
Commercial ListJUDGMENT OF: McDougall J at 1 DECISION: See paragraph [73] of judgment CATCHWORDS: BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION - Security of payment - Authority of solicitor to sign payment claim on behalf of claimant - Progress payments - Payment claim served on defendant - Failure of defendant to provide payment schedule within time limited by the Act - Plaintiff serves notice of intention to make adjudication application - Whether plaintiff thereby made any election - Whether open to plaintiff to withdraw any election made. LEGISLATION CITED: Building & Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999
Home Building Act 1989CASES CITED: Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd v Queensland Investment Corporation [2007] NSWCA 9
G J Coles & Co Ltd v Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal (1986) 7 NSWLR 503
Kell & Rigby Pty Limited v Guardian International Properties Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 554
Latter v Council of the Shire of Muswellbrook (1936) 56 CLR 422
Miller v Miller (1945) 45 SR (NSW) 73
O'Connor v S.P. Bray Limited (1937) 56 CLR 464
Rojo Building Pty Limited v Jillcris Pty Limited [2006] NSWSC 309
Sargent v A.S.L. Developments Limited (1974) 131 CLR 634
United Australia Limited v Barclays Bank Limited [1941] AC 1
Vince Schokman v Xception Construction Pty Limited [2005] NSWSC 297PARTIES: Rojo Building Pty Limited (Plainitff)
Jillcris Pty Limited (Defendant)FILE NUMBER(S): SC 55002/06 COUNSEL: J S Drummond (Plaintiff)
M H Southwick / C A Lambert (Defendant)SOLICITORS: Hewitts Commercial Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Surry Partners Lawyers (Defendant)
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION LIST
McDOUGALL J
12 July 2007 (ex tempore – revised 6 August 2007)
055002/06 ROJO BUILDING PTY LIMITED v JILLCRIS PTY LIMITED
JUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR: The Building & Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (the Act) was intended to provide those who carry out construction work, or supply related goods and services, under a construction contract with a statutory right to claim progress payments and a speedy method for the expeditious determination, although on an interim basis, of those claims. It has given rise to a vast number of cases in this Court. One might have thought that, by now, all the quirks of and possible gaps in the Act have been explored. Unfortunately, as these proceedings show, that is not the case. Further, and again as these proceedings show, the clear legislative intention - for swift enforcement of interim rights - is not always achieved.
Background; the fundamental question
2 The plaintiff (Rojo) is a builder. By contract dated 24 January 2005, Rojo undertook to construct a beach house for the defendant (Jillcris). There was no dispute, at least on the hearing before me, that the provisions of the Act applied to that contract. There is a dispute (which remains to be dealt with, although not - at least initially…
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- Case
- [2007] NSWSC 880
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the authority of the solicitor who signed the payment claim on behalf of Rojo Building, determining that the solicitor had the requisite authority. The court also considered whether the service of the notice of intention to apply for adjudication constituted an election under the Act. The court found that the service of such a notice did not amount to an election but rather was a preliminary step towards the adjudication process. Consequently, Rojo Building was not precluded from withdrawing the notice and subsequently making an application for adjudication.
The reasoning of the court was grounded in the statutory framework provided by the Security of Payment Act. It was held that the notice of intention to apply for adjudication did not irrevocably bind the parties and was not an election that precluded Rojo Building from pursuing other available remedies. The court emphasised the importance of the distinction between the preliminary step of serving a notice of intention and the actual making of an adjudication application, which is a distinct and separate process under the Act. The outcome of the case allowed Rojo Building the flexibility to proceed with an adjudication application, despite having previously served a notice of intention.
The final orders of the court confirmed that Rojo Building could proceed with its application for adjudication, without being bound by any prior notice of intention. The court's decision clarified the procedural steps available under the Security of Payment Act and reinforced the flexibility afforded to claimants in managing their dispute resolution strategies.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Supreme Court of Victoria in an interlocutory application. Prior to this, no adjudication application had been made, and no formal dispute resolution process had been initiated. Rojo Building applied to the court to determine whether the notice of intention served constituted an election that precluded it from pursuing other avenues of dispute resolution. The application was heard on an expedited basis due to the urgency of the underlying construction dispute.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the service of a notice of intention to make an adjudication application constitutes an election that precludes the claimant from pursuing other dispute resolution processes.
2. If such a notice constitutes an election, whether the claimant may subsequently withdraw from that election to pursue alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
Held
1. The court concluded that serving a notice of intention to make an adjudication application does not constitute an election that precludes the claimant from pursuing other dispute resolution processes.
2. The court held that if such a notice is not an election, then the claimant may subsequently withdraw from that election to pursue alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the statutory framework governing security of payment in the building and construction industry. It noted the importance of allowing claimants to have multiple avenues for resolving disputes while still ensuring that the statutory time frames are adhered to. The court considered the language of the legislation and found that serving a notice of intention to make an adjudication application does not necessarily signify an irrevocable choice to proceed solely with adjudication. This interpretation allows the claimant flexibility in their dispute resolution strategy, enabling them to opt for alternative processes if they choose to do so. The court also looked at relevant case law and statutory provisions to support its decision. The binding principle established in this case is that the service of a notice of intention to make an adjudication application is not an election that prevents the claimant from pursuing other dispute resolution processes, thus maintaining the claimant's ability to withdraw from any such perceived election and explore alternative mechanisms.