Rockett v Moneycorp Securities P/L

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Rockett v Moneycorp Securities P/L & Anor [2007] QSC 389
PARTIES:  LYNETTE JOY ROCKETT
(plaintiff)
v
MONEYCORP SECURITIES PTY LTD ACN 115 414
803
(first defendant)
ZORZAN – 0003 PTY LTD ACN 107 476 004
(second defendant)
FILE NO:  BS9525/06
DIVISION:  Trial
PROCEEDING:  Trial
DELIVERED ON:  20 December 2007
DELIVERED AT:  Supreme Court, Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  17, 18, 19, 20, 23 July 2007
JUDGE:  Wilson J

ORDER: 

1.

It is declared that the Contracts between the plaintiff and the first defendant, dated 5 July 2006, for the sale of units situated at:

(a) Unit 301, The Sands, 40 The Esplanade, Surfers Paradise and more particularly described as Lot 46, Building Unit Plan 82, County of Ward, Parish of Gilston (“Lot 46”); and
(b) Unit 216, The Sands, 40 The Esplanade, Surfers Paradise and more particularly described as Lot 15, Building Unit Plan 82, County of Ward, Parish of Gilston (“Lot 15”);

are enforceable against the first and second defendants and that they ought to be specifically performed and carried into execution by 4.00pm on Friday 1 February 2008 unless otherwise agreed between the plaintiff and the first defendant.

2.       The Caveat no. 709811116 lodged by the second defendant on or about 28 July 2006 and registered on title reference 13929215 in respect of Lot 15 on Building Unit Plan 82, County of Ward, Parish of Gilston be removed forthwith.

3.       It is directed that the plaintiff and the first defendant have liberty to apply, on 2 days written notice, for detailed orders for specific performance and any further directions, inquiries or other orders relating to specific performance of either contract.

4.       The purchase prices paid by the plaintiff on settlement of those Contracts referred to in Order 1 be applied firstly to the discharge of the first registered mortgage over Lot 46 and Lot 15, with the balance to be held by the first defendant’s solicitors, Gladstones, in trust pending the assessment or earlier agreement of the amount of costs payable to the plaintiff pursuant to the following orders.

5.       The first defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceedings between the plaintiff and the first defendant up to and including the first day of the trial, such costs to be assessed on the indemnity basis.

6.      The first defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs thereafter on the standard basis.

7.       The second defendant’s counterclaim against the plaintiff and the first defendant is dismissed.

8.       The second defendant pay the plaintiff’s and first defendant’s costs of and incidental to that counterclaim, such costs to be assessed on the standard basis.

9.       The first defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the application for summary judgment heard 12 March 2007, such costs to be assessed on the standard basis.

10.     The second defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the application for summary judgment heard 8 May 2007, such costs to be assessed on the standard basis.

11.    The total amount of the…

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Details
Case
[2007] QSC 389
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Rockett v Moneycorp Securities P/L, the primary dispute concerned the sale of two units under a second registered mortgage, wherein the second defendant defaulted, leading the first defendant to sell the units to the plaintiff. The second defendant contested the sale, arguing that the first defendant breached its duty in the mode of exercise of its power of sale, particularly regarding the price obtained for the units. The second defendant claimed that a potential purchaser was available who would have paid a higher price, and that the valuation evidence was conflicted.

The court needed to determine whether the first defendant acted in bad faith or colluded with the plaintiff in selling the units at what the second defendant considered an undervalued price. Additionally, the court examined whether the plaintiff, as the second defendant's letting agent, owed a fiduciary duty beyond the scope of the letting agreement, particularly concerning the sale of the units. The second defendant argued that the plaintiff breached a broader fiduciary duty by entering into the contracts without fully informed consent, whereas the plaintiff contended that its fiduciary duties were limited to the letting of the units.

After considering the evidence, the court concluded that the first defendant took reasonable care to ensure that the units were sold at market value, and there was no evidence of bad faith or collusion with the plaintiff. The court further found that the plaintiff's fiduciary duty was limited to the letting of the units, and no broader duty pertaining to the sale of the units existed. As such, the plaintiff did not breach any fiduciary duty owed to the second defendant.

The court made a declaration that the contracts between the plaintiff and the first defendant for the sale of the units were valid, and the first defendant did not breach its duty in the sale process. The second defendant's claims were dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

It is declared that the Contracts between the plaintiff and the first defendant, dated 5 July 2006, for the sale of units situated at:

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In all the circumstances I conclude that the first defendant took reasonable care to ensure that the units were sold at market value and that the contracts made between the plaintiff and the first defendant reflected their market value. No evidence that the first defendant acted in bad faith There is no evidence that in exercising its power of sale the first defendant acted in bad faith or in collusion with the plaintiff. Did the plaintiff act in breach of fiduciary duty owed to second defendant? The second defendant contended that the plaintiff owed it a fiduciary duty by virtue of the letting agreement,[76] which she breached by entering into the contracts without its fully informed consent.[77] It did not articulate the scope of the duty. The plaintiff admitted that she owed the second defendant a fiduciary duty, but contended that it was limited in its scope to matters pertaining to the letting of the units.[78] [76] Second defendant’s counterclaim, [3]. [77] Second defendant’s counterclaim, [10.2]; second defendant’s written submissions, [34]-[37], [41]. [78] Plaintiff’s amended answer, [2], [12]. The plaintiff admitted that she was the second defendant’s letting agent,[79] although the written letting agreements which went into evidence were actually made with a company controlled by her, The Sands Gold Coast Pty Ltd.[80] No point was taken about this, and the argument proceeded on the basis that the letting agreements were in terms of the documents. [79] Second defendant’s counterclaim, [2]; plaintiff’s amended answer, [1]. [80] Exhibits 11 and 12 (at pp 156-175 of the trial bundle). The scope of the fiduciary duty depends on the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the second defendant and the course of dealing between them.[81] The plaintiff’s obligations related only to the letting of the units: she was not engaged to sell them.[82] Her obligations in relation to unit 301 involved accounting for rent collected; inspecting the property (at least every six months); and changing the linen and cleaning. In relation to unit 216 she was obliged to account for all moneys received; and notify the second defendant of certain repairs and of the unit becoming vacant. Her contractual obligations were expressly limited to those in the written agreements. She held keys for the units, and was responsible for providing access to them.[83] [81] Birtchnell v Equity Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 384, 409; Hospital Products Limited v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, 102 (Mason J). See also 156 CLR 41, 97 (“The fiduciary relationship, if it is to exist at all, must accommodate itself to the terms of the contract so that it is consistent with, and conforms to, them.”). See also Chan v Zacharia (1983) 154 CLR 178, 195 (Deane J); Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205, 215; Hilton v Barker Booth and Eastwood [2005] 1 All ER 651, 661; R Meagher, D Heydon & M Leeming, Meagher Gummow & Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines & Remedies (4th ed, 2002) [5-010], [5-070], [5-075], [5-180], [5-205] and citations; P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youden (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989) 5, 31. See also Strother v 3464920 Canada Inc [2007] SCC 24, [39], [141], and discussion of the case by Ross Buckley, ‘Solicitors’ Conflicts of Interest and the Wider Fiduciary Question’ (2007) 81 ALJ 722 and Keith Fletcher, ‘Partnership: Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Remedies’ (2007) 81 ALJ 740. If this were not the case, the court would be free to effectively rewrite the parties’ agreement, by implying duties far beyond those agreed between them: see (2007) 81 ALJ 722, 724. [82] Transcript of the trial, pp 136, 329; exhibits 11 and 12 (at pp 156-175 of the trial bundle). Note that although exhibit 11 purports to appoint the plaintiff as agent for sale as well as management, it was common ground that the plaintiff was never appointed as agent for sale: transcript of the trial, p 375. [83] Transcript of the trial, pp 354-356.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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