Rigney v Littlehales

Case [2005] QCA 252

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Rigney v Littlehales & Ors [2005] QCA 252  

PARTIES:

IRENE FLORENCE RIGNEY
(plaintiff/applicant/appellant)
v
BRIAN LITTLEHALES
(first defendant)
DARREN JOHN THOMAS
(second defendant)
NRMA INSURANCE LIMITED
ACN 000 016 722
(third defendant/respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 11267 of 2004
DC No 1417 of 2004

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

22 July 2005

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

5 May 2005

JUDGES:

McMurdo P, Jerrard JA and Muir J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDER:

1.    Application for leave to appeal granted
2.    Appeal allowed
3.    The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs of the       appeal to be assessed
4.    The order made in the District Court on 8 December       2004 is set aside and instead it is ordered that the       application be dismissed with costs to be assessed for       the reasons given by this Court

CATCHWORDS:

INSURANCE – MOTOR VEHICLES – COMPULSORY INSURANCE LEGISLATION – RISKS INSURED – LIABILITY "IN RESPECT OF" MOTOR VEHICLES –applicant injured when Brisbane City Council bus in which she was travelling collided with a pedestrian – respondent compulsory third party insurer of bus under Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) – applicant applied for a declaration the pedestrian was an insured person under s 5(1)(b) of the Act claiming the collision was contributed to or caused by the pedestrian's negligence – respondent opposed application contending it was premature and could not be summarily decided in the absence of findings on all relevant facts at trial – no appearance entered by pedestrian – primary judge heard application on its merits – application refused on the basis there was no rational and discernible link between the pedestrian and the bus – whether in the circumstances primary judge correct to summarily determine application – whether issue should have been determined after all relevant findings of fact had been made at trial

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – WHEN APPEAL LIES – BY LEAVE OF COURT – INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS – primary judge's order appropriate – reasoning supporting primary judge's order wrong – whether substantial justice would result if leave to appeal refused

Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), s 5(1)(b)

Boath v Central Queensland Meat Export Co Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 139, cited
Curtain Bros (Qld) Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 142, considered
Megaw v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2002] 1 Qd R 499, considered
Rich v CGU Insurance Ltd (2005) 79 ALJR 856, applied
Suncorp Insurance and Finance v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland [1990] 1 Qd R 185, cited
Technical Products Pty Ltd v State Government Insurance Office(Q) (1989) 167 CLR 45, applied
Westpac Banking Corporation v Klef Pty Ltd [1998] QCA 311; Appeal No 8204 of 1998, 16 October 1998, applied

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Details
AGLC
Rigney v Littlehales [2005] QCA 252
Case
[2005] QCA 252
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Rigney v Littlehales, the applicant, Rigney, sought a declaration that the pedestrian, who was injured in a collision involving a Brisbane City Council bus, was an insured person under section 5(1)(b) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld). The respondent, Littlehales, was the compulsory third party insurer of the bus and opposed the application, arguing it was premature and should not be decided without the outcome of all relevant facts at trial. The primary judge heard the application on its merits and dismissed it, finding that there was no rational and discernible link between the pedestrian and the bus.

The central legal issue was whether the primary judge was correct in summarily determining the application without waiting for all relevant facts to be established at trial. The court also considered whether the issue of insurance coverage should have been decided post-trial. This case highlighted the tension between the procedural efficiency of summarily determining insurance coverage issues and the need to wait for all relevant facts to be determined at trial.

The Court of Appeal held that while the primary judge's order was appropriate, the reasoning supporting the order was flawed. The court found that there was a sufficient basis for the primary judge to summarily determine the application, as the pedestrian's absence and lack of evidence meant there was no rational link between the pedestrian and the bus. However, the Court of Appeal noted that the primary judge's reasoning was incorrect in that it did not adequately consider the statutory framework and the possibility of the pedestrian being an insured person under the Act. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the primary judge's order, dismissing the application with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to appeal granted

2. Appeal allowed

3. The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to be assessed

4. The order made in the District Court on 8 December 2004 is set aside and instead it is ordered that the application be dismissed with costs to be assessed for the reasons given by this Court

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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