Richardson v Turfco Australia Pty Ltd

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WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION: Richardson v Turfco Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWWCCPD 43
APPELLANT: Michele Richardson
FIRST RESPONDENT: Turfco Australia Pty Ltd
SECOND RESPONDENT: John Rozs
FIRST RESPONDENT INSURER: Employers Mutual NSW Ltd
FILE NUMBER: A1-7026/15
ARBITRATOR: Ms C McDonald
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: 28 April 2016
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: 6 September 2016
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: Death benefits, s 25 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987; dependency; meaning of “wholly or partly dependent for support”
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: President Judge Keating
HEARING: On the papers
REPRESENTATION: Appellant: Firths – The Compensation Lawyers
First Respondent: Hicksons Lawyers
Second Respondent: Rishworth Dodd Solicitors
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:

1.       The Senior Arbitrator’s Certificate of Determination of 28 April 2016 is revoked.

2.       The matter is remitted to another Arbitrator to determine afresh.

INTRODUCTION

  1. This matter concerns a claim in respect of a ‘lump sum death benefit’ pursuant to s 25 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act). The appellant claims that the Arbitrator erred in not finding that she was dependent upon her deceased son for support at the date of his death, in circumstances where it is not disputed that the deceased died in the course of his employment.

BACKGROUND

  1. On 1 December 2014, in the course of his employment, Blaine Ty Rozs, the deceased, was tragically run over by a tractor causing fatal injuries. The deceased was aged 19.

  2. On 15 December 2015, Ms Richardson, the deceased’s mother, lodged in the Commission an Application in Respect of Death of Worker (the Application). She claimed that she was dependent upon the deceased at the date of his death and therefore claimed lump sum compensation pursuant s 25 of the 1987 Act.

  3. On 23 December 2015, the respondent employer filed a reply advising that its insurer, Employers Mutual Ltd, had conceded liability to make the payment pursuant to s 25. However it contended that the claim for compensation had not “been fully ‘duly made’ until the Commission makes a determination” in respect to whom the lump sum payment ought to be made.

  4. On 27 January 2016, the second respondent, Mr John Rozs, the deceased’s father, filed a miscellaneous application claiming an interest in these proceedings. He contended that Ms Richardson was not a “dependant of the deceased and that the lump sum should be paid to the Estate”.  In a Direction issued by the Commission on 28 January 2016, the Application was amended to name Mr Rozs as the second respondent.

  5. The matter proceeded to conciliation and arbitration before Senior Arbitrator McDonald on 10 March 2016. The issue in dispute only concerned whether Ms Richardson was wholly or partially dependent upon the deceased for support at the date of his death, in accordance with s 4 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act) and therefore entitled to the death benefit payable under s 25.

  6. On 28 April 2016, the Senior Arbitrator…

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Details
Case
[2016] NSWWCCPD 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Richardson v Turfco Australia Pty Ltd involved the widow of a deceased worker, seeking death benefits under the Workers Compensation Act 1987. The deceased, Mr Richardson, had been involved in a workplace accident that resulted in his death. The primary issue in dispute was whether the widow was wholly or partly dependent on the deceased for support, a requirement under section 25 of the Act for her to be eligible for the death benefits. The decision at the heart of the case was the determination by the Senior Arbitrator that the widow was not dependent on the deceased, which the widow sought to overturn in the Court of Appeal.

The legal issues before the court were the interpretation of the phrase "wholly or partly dependent for support" as used in section 25 of the Workers Compensation Act, and whether the Senior Arbitrator's findings on the widow's dependency were legally sound. The court was tasked with reviewing the evidence presented and the application of the relevant statutory provisions to determine if the widow qualified for death benefits. This involved an examination of the widow's financial circumstances and her relationship with the deceased, including her financial reliance on him prior to his death.

The court found that the Senior Arbitrator had erred in law by not properly considering the evidence of dependency. The court held that the correct approach required a holistic assessment of all the evidence, rather than focusing narrowly on specific aspects. The decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted to another arbitrator for a fresh determination. The court emphasised that the dependency assessment should encompass all relevant factors, including the widow's actual reliance on the deceased's income and her overall financial situation. This ruling underscores the importance of a comprehensive evaluation in dependency claims under workers' compensation legislation.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Senior Arbitrator’s Certificate of Determination of 28 April 2016 is revoked.

2. The matter is remitted to another Arbitrator to determine afresh.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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