Page v NSW Trains

CERTIFICATE OF DETERMINATION OF MEMBER
CITATION:	Page v NSW Trains [2025] NSWPIC 555
APPLICANT:	Sharan Page
RESPONDENT:	NSW Trains
MEMBER:	Rachel Homan
DATE OF DECISION:	16 October 2025
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workers Compensation Act 1987; claim for lump sum death benefit pursuant to section 25 and funeral expenses; liability to pay compensation accepted; identification of dependants; Held – orders for payment of compensation.
DETERMINATIONS MADE:	The Personal Injury Commission (Commission) determines: 1. Stephen Page (the deceased worker) died on 7 March 2017 as a result of his psychological injury deemed to have occurred on 27 April 2014 and sustained in the course of employment with the respondent, pursuant to s 25 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act). 2. The applicant was the only person who was wholly or partly dependent for support upon the deceased worker at the date of his death. 3. The lump sum death benefit payable in accordance with s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act is $765,650. The Commission orders: 4. The respondent to pay the applicant $765,650 in respect of the lump sum death benefit pursuant to ss 29(1A) and 85A(1)(a) of the 1987 Act. 5. The respondent to pay the applicant $6,135 for the reimbursement of funeral expenses pursuant to s 26 of the 1987 Act. A brief statement is attached setting out the Commission’s reasons for the determination.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

BACKGROUND

Stephen James Page (the deceased worker) died on 7 March 2017 as a result of end stage liver disease and alcohol use.
Prior to his death, the deceased worker made a claim for lump sum compensation pursuant to s 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) in respect of a psychological injury sustained in the course of his employment with NSW Trains (the respondent). Liability for the injury was disputed by the respondent’s insurer in a notice issued pursuant to former s 74 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act) on 17 February 2017.
On 15 August 2018, the deceased worker’s spouse, Ms Sharan Page (the applicant), made a claim for payment of a lump sum death benefit pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act in respect of the deceased worker’s death. Liability to pay the compensation sought was disputed in a further notice issued pursuant to s 74 of the 1998 Act on 17 October 2018. Amongst other things, the insurer disputed that there was sufficient evidence that the deceased worker’s death “resulted from an injury”.
The applicant sought internal review of the respondent’s decision on 4 December 2018 and a decision was made maintaining the dispute on 30 May 2019.
The present proceedings were commenced by lodgement of an Application in Respect of Death of Worker (the Application) in the Personal Injury Commission (Commission) on
23 March 2025, seeking orders for payment of the lump sum death benefit under s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act, as well as funeral expenses pursuant to s 26 of the 1987 Act.
Concurrent proceedings were commenced in respect of the claim under s 66 of the 1987 Act. Those proceedings resulted in a referral to a Medical Assessor and, on 14 July 2025, Medical Assessor John Baker issued a Medical Assessment Certificate in which it was determined that the deceased worker sustained 22% whole person impairment as a result of the psychological injury. Those proceedings were resolved with orders for the payment of compensation pursuant to s 66 of the 1987 Act.
The current proceedings were listed for a further preliminary conference upon receipt of the Medical Assessment Certificate, at which time the liability dispute pursuant to s 25 of the 1987 Act was maintained. The proceedings were referred for conciliation conference and arbitration hearing on 14 October 2025.
Prior to the commencement of the conciliation conference and arbitration hearing, proposed consent orders were filed by the parties by which the respondent agreed to pay the applicant the lump sum death benefit and funeral expenses.
The Commission wrote to the parties indicating that the conciliation conference and arbitration hearing would proceed to enable a determination as to the identification of any other dependants.
The parties appeared at the conciliation conference and arbitration hearing on
14 October 2025 and confirmed that the liability dispute had resolved by consent and that orders in the terms proposed could be made subject to the Commission’s determination of the issue of dependants.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The parties agree that the following issue requires determination:
(a) the identification of any family members who were wholly or partly dependent for support on the deceased worker in accordance with s 4 of the 1998 Act.

EVIDENCE

Documentary evidence

The following documents were in evidence before the Commission and considered in making this determination:
(a)    Application;
(b)    Reply filed by the respondent;
(c)    documents attached to an Application to Lodge Additional Documents lodged by the applicant on 23 March 2023;
(d)    documents attached to an Application to Lodge Additional Documents lodged by the applicant on 26 May 2025, and
(e)    documents attached to an Application to Lodge Additional Documents lodged by the applicant on 15 September 2025.

FINDINGS AND REASONS

Dependants

The term, ‘dependants’ is defined in s 4 of the 1998 Act as:
“…the members of the worker’s family as were wholly or in part dependent for support on the worker at the time of the worker’s death, or would but for the incapacity due to the injury have been so dependent, and includes—
(a)     a person so dependent to whom the worker stands in the place of a parent or a person so dependent who stands in the place of a parent to the worker, and
(b)     a divorced spouse of the worker so dependent, and
(c)     a person so dependent who—
(i) in relation to an injury received before the commencement of Schedule 7 to the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment (Dust Diseases and Other Matters) Act 1998—although not legally married to the worker, lived with the worker as the worker’s husband or wife on a permanent and genuine domestic basis, or
(ii)  in relation to an injury received after that commencement—is the de facto partner of the worker.”
The expression, “member of a family” is defined in s 4 of the 1998 Act to mean:
“member of a family means spouse (including wife or husband), father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, stepfather, stepmother, son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, stepson, stepdaughter, brother, sister, half-brother or half-sister.”
The term “spouse” is defined in s 4 of the 1998 Act to mean:
“spouse of a person means:
(a) in relation to an injury received before the commencement of Schedule 7 to the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment (Dust Diseases and Other Matters) Act 1998—a person to whom the person is legally married (including a husband or wife), or
(b) in relation to an injury received after that commencement:
(i)a person to whom the person is legally married (including a husband or wife), or
(ii) a de facto partner of the person.”
In TNT Group 4 Pty Limited v Halioris (1987) 3 NSWCCR 10; 8 NSWLR 486, McHugh JA stated (at [489]):
“Dependency is a question of fact: Potts v Niddre & Benhar Coal Co Ltd [1913] AC 531 at 539, 542; Aafjes v Kearney (1976) 50 ALJR 454 at 456, 457 and 459. It is concerned with actual and not theoretical support. A person claiming dependency need not be in actual receipt of support at the date of death. It is enough that, as at that date, he or she had a reasonable expectation of support in the future. Dependency may exist at the date of death although actual support cannot or is unlikely to occur until a future time.”
In Richardson v Turfco Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWWCCPD 43 (Richardson), Keating P identified a number of general statements of principle for determining dependency at [65]:
“(a)    dependency is not limited to the class of persons actually in receipt of financial assistance (Sadiq);
(b)     dependency refers to a state or condition of being dependent, to having been in this relationship to the deceased (Amaca Pty Ltd v Novek [2009] NSWCA 50);
(c)     although dependency is not limited to financial dependency, it does involve one person being beholden to another for some material or physical help or succour, emotional dependency is not enough (Skinner);
(d)     ‘dependent’ in the ordinary sense of the word, means the condition of depending on something or on someone for what is needed (Petrohilos);
(e)     a mother’s services to a young child may satisfy the test of dependency. To suggest that, in a money sense they are valueless, is simply wrong (Petrohilos);
(f)      while one of the commonest forms of dependence might be financial dependence, the word used in the statute (which I infer is the Conveyancing Act 1919) is not limited to financial dependence (Williams), and
(g)     the word ‘partly’ in the phrase ‘partly dependent’, whilst a word of ‘some elasticity’, does not mean ‘substantially’, but means ‘more than minimally’, or perhaps, ‘significantly’ (Bremner v Graham [2016] NSWSC 633 at [34] citing Priestley JA at [4] (with whom Hope AJA agreed) in McKenzie v Baddeley [1991] NSWCA 197) (McKenzie)). Meagher JA, in McKenzie at [6], commented that ‘[c]ommon sense requires that certain trivial activities should be disregarded’.”
I am satisfied on the uncontradicted evidence before me that the applicant was the deceased worker’s spouse. That evidence includes the death certificate issued on 21 March 2017 confirming the applicant’s marriage to the deceased worker; the deceased worker’s will, which identified the applicant as the deceased worker’s spouse; and the statements made by the applicant on 23 September 2016 and 23 May 2025.
The evidence also establishes that the deceased worker left two adult daughters, Tiarne and Sotarah Page and a former spouse, Melinda Laing. The applicant gave evidence in her supplementary statement that she was in regular contact with the deceased worker’s daughters.
On 28 November 2018, the applicant’s solicitors wrote to Tiarne and Sotarah Page and Melinda Laing advising them of the claim and recommending that they seek independent legal advice regarding their entitlement to a portion of the lump sum death benefit. Copies of that correspondence were attached to the Application.
In October 2024, the applicant provided her solicitors with updated addresses for each of the potential dependants and was advised by her solicitors that further letters would be sent to them regarding their possible entitlement to a portion of the lump sum death benefit. Copies of that correspondence and registered post tracking details confirming delivery are attached to the Application.
The applicant has given evidence confirming that the correspondence was received:
“I spoke to Tiarne and Sotarah and advised them that they would receive the letter soon, and that Melinda would also receive an updated letter. Tiarne and Sotarah confirmed to me that they had previously received the letters in 2018.
I am aware that in late-October 2024, my solicitors sent updated letters to Tiarne, Sotarah and Melinda again confirming that they may have entitlement to workers compensation. I have been advised by my solicitors that based on available tracking information, each of these letters were delivered.
In December 2024, I asked Tiarne if she and Sotarah had received the letters. Tiarne said that she had received the letter and she was also aware that both Sotarah and Melinda had also received their updated letters. Tiarne advised that she would be speaking with Sotarah that weekend to discuss whether they wished to participate in any legal claim proceedings.
I also spoke to Sotarah at a later date and she confirmed that she had received the updated letter. Sotarah advised that after speaking with Tiarne, they had decided not to take further compensation claim.
I asked Sotarah whether she, Tiarne or Melinda had sent any correspondence to my lawyers advising that they did not wish to participate with the legal proceedings. She stated that they did not formally respond, as they believed not responding and/or not claiming dependency confirmed that they did not wish to be involved.
I spoke to Tiarne again at a later time and she confirmed that she also did not wish to take any further action or claim any dependency in relation to Stephen’s death.
Based on my various discussions with Tiarne and Sotarah, and to the best of my knowledge, I understand that Tiarne, Sotarah and Melinda all received their letters from my lawyers in or around November 2018 and October 2024, and all parties have elected not to participate with any legal proceedings or claim dependency in relation to Stephen Page’s death.”
At the preliminary conference held on 1 September 2025, the parties confirmed that they were not aware of any other potential dependants.
In view of the evidence above, I am satisfied that Tiarne Page, Sotarah Page and Melinda Laing are aware of the claim and have elected not to seek a portion of the lump sum death benefit.
I am satisfied that the applicant was the only member of the deceased worker’s family who was wholly or partly dependent for support upon the deceased worker at the date of his death. Pursuant to s 29(1A) of the 1987 Act, the whole of the lump sum death benefit is to be paid to the applicant.
The applicant has sought, and I am satisfied that it is appropriate, that the lump sum death benefit be paid to her directly pursuant to s 85A of the 1987 Act.

Funeral expenses

Section 26 of the 1987 Act provides:
“If compensation is payable under this Division for a death resulting from an injury, the employer must pay additional compensation equal to reasonable funeral expenses not exceeding $15,000 or such other amount as may be prescribed by the regulations.”
The parties have agreed on an order pursuant to s 26 of the 1987 Act. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to give effect to that agreement.

[2025] NSWPIC 555

16 October 2025