Richards v Commissioner of Police

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JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

STREAM:   HUMAN RIGHTS

ACT: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT 1984 (WA)

CITATION:   RICHARDS and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2010] WASAT 115

MEMBER:   JUSTICE J A CHANEY (PRESIDENT)

MS D TAYLOR (SENIOR MEMBER)
DR D STEPNIAK (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER)

HEARD:   17, 18 AND 19 NOVEMBER 2009

DELIVERED          :   9 AUGUST 2010

FILE NO/S:   EOA 1 of 2009

EOA 2 of 2009

BETWEEN:   SHELDON RICHARDS

TYSON RICHARDS
Applicants

AND

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Respondent

Catchwords:

Equal opportunity - Discrimination on grounds of sex, race and age ­ Whether police officers engaged in provision of services ­ Police officers ­ Vicarious liability ­ Less favourable treatment

Legislation:

Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 4, s 8, s 20, s 36, s 46, s 66V, s 66ZF, s 161
Police Act 1892 (WA)
Police Act 1990 (NSW), s 6(2)(a)
Race Relations Act 1976 (UK)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA)

Result:

Application dismissed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicants:     Mr J Rosales-Castaneda

Respondent:     Ms CA Ide

Solicitors:

Applicants:     J Rosales-Castaneda

Respondent:     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Cheng v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police [2006] NSWADT 321

Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service v Estate of Russell [2001] NSWSC 745

Dare v Hurley [2005] FMCA 844

Farah v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1998] QB 65; [1997] 1 All ER 289; 1 WLR 824

IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1

Lambe v Anti-Discrimination Commission and Commissioner of Police (2001) NTMC 54

Mooney v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service (No 2) [2003] NSWADT 107

Rainsford v Victoria [2007] FCA 1059

Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 All ER 649

Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL: 

Summary of Tribunal's decision

  1. Two brothers, Sheldon and Tyson Richards, brought a claim against the Commissioner of Police on the basis that the Commissioner was vicariously liable for certain alleged discriminatory conduct on the part of two police officers in Kalgoorlie on 29 December 2006.  The two brothers had been engaged in a fight on Hannan Street which the police attended.  The applicants alleged that the police refused to escort them out of danger, failed to provide first aid to Sheldon Richards and failed to call an ambulance when requested to do so, and that the police officers thereby treated them less favourably than they would have treated someone of different characteristics of race, age or sex. 

  2. After the brothers left the scene of the initial incident, they were attacked again, and Tyson Richards was very seriously injured.  The same two police officers that had dealt with him in relation to the first incident attended after the second incident.  The applicants alleged that, at the second incident, the police acted towards them in a discriminatory way by failing to administer first aid to Tyson Richards.

  3. Because discriminatory behaviour contravenes the Equal Opportunity Act where the conduct is associated with the provision of goods or services, the Tribunal needed to…

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Details
Case
[2010] WASAT 115
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Richards v Commissioner of Police involves a dispute between the applicants and the Commissioner of Police regarding alleged discrimination based on sex, race, and age. The matter was heard by the court of appeal, which was tasked with determining whether the police officers were engaged in the provision of services and if there was any less favourable treatment based on the applicants' characteristics. The court examined the specific services provided by the police in the context of the alleged incidents, focusing on whether the service of restoring and keeping the peace, and protecting the public from physical danger and jeopardy to their health, was provided in a less favourable manner to the applicants compared to others of different characteristics.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the police officers were engaged in the provision of services within the meaning of the relevant legislation. The court considered the broader description of the service involved, which was the service of restoring and keeping the peace, and protecting the public, including individuals involved in the events, from physical danger and jeopardy to their health. The court also needed to determine if the police officers' actions constituted a refusal of a service within the meaning of the Act, and if there was any less favourable treatment of the applicants based on their sex, race, or age.

The court found that the police officers were engaged in the provision of services, which involved the broader service of restoring and keeping the peace, and protecting the public from physical danger and jeopardy to their health. The court held that the service of providing transport to hospital or administering first aid was not the central issue in this case. Instead, the focus was on whether the police had failed to provide the broadly described service in a less favourable manner to the applicants based on their characteristics. The court concluded that the allegations of particular failures by the police should be seen as particulars of the failure to provide the broadly described service, rather than separate services.

The court of appeal ultimately found that the Commissioner of Police was not vicariously liable for the alleged discriminatory actions of the police officers. The court held that the police officers were not engaged in the provision of services in the context of the alleged incidents, and therefore, there was no less favourable treatment based on the applicants' characteristics. The appeal was dismissed, and the applicants' claims were not upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUSTICE J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: JUSTICE J

In Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349 at 404 ­ 405, McHugh J said:Accordingly, the goods or services which must be identified are those goods or services which are relevant to the complainant or any person or persons whom the complainant represents. Before there can be a finding of discrimination by a person in relation to the provision of goods or services, therefore, the relevant goods or services must be identified with sufficient precision to relate them to the facts of the case and the issues which arise for determination. If a person is alleged to have refused to perform services, e.g., the services in question must be identified in sufficiently concrete terms to enable the Board to determine whether or not there has been a refusal to perform those services. What is a sufficiently precise identification of the service in one case may be too general in another. If the discrimination alleged was the refusal to allow impaired persons to travel on trams to St Kilda, it would be meaningless to identify the service provided as 'the public transport system'. If, however, the discrimination alleged was the refusal to allow impaired persons to travel on trams generally, 'transportation of members of the public by trams' might identify the service with sufficient precision to enable the relevant issues to be resolved. In this case, the applicants, in their amended statement of issues, facts and contentions, have expressed the issues relating to service as follows:(i)did the police officers' alleged refusal to escort the applicants out of danger constitute a refusal of a service within the meaning of the Act?(ii)did the police officers' alleged failure to provide first aid to the first applicant, or to request an ambulance for the first applicant, constitute a refusal of a service within the meaning of the Act? and(iii)did the police officers' alleged failure to provide first aid to the second applicant constitute a refusal of a service within the meaning of the Act? Inherent in those issues is the proposition that the service being provided by the police on the night in question was a service of escorting people out of danger, providing first aid or procuring the attendance of an ambulance at the scene. No doubt that level of precision is alleged in order to meet the requirements outlined by McHugh J in Waters. The consequence is, however, to focus the inquiry on considerations as to whether police are engaged in the provision of service of providing transport to hospital or administering first aid. In our view, a broader description of the service involved in the facts of this case is more apt. That service is the service of restoring and keeping the peace, and protecting the public, including individuals involved in the events, from physical danger and jeopardy to their health. The performance of that service required the police to assess the situation and the risks of harm faced by those with whom they were dealing, and to take appropriate action to remove or minimise those risks. In the context of that general service, the allegations of particular failures by the police to do certain things should be seen as particulars of the failure to provide the broadly described service, or in other words, particulars of the manner in which it is alleged the service was provided in a way less favourable to the applicants than it would have been to a person of different characteristics of race, age or gender.