Regional Development Australia Murraylands and Riverland Inc v Smith

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AUSTRALIA MURRAYLANDS AND RIVERLAND INC v SMITH

[2015] SASCFC 160

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Sulan and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)

10 November 2015

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - DISCHARGE, BREACH AND DEFENCES TO ACTION FOR BREACH - IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE - IN WHAT CASES PERFORMANCE EXCUSED - FRUSTRATION

DAMAGES - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - MITIGATION OF DAMAGES

DAMAGES - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - MITIGATION OF DAMAGES - WHAT MATTERS MAY BE CONSIDERED

Appeal against a District Court Judge’s finding that the respondent was entitled to damages in the amount of $335,574.08 following the repudiation of his Chief Executive Officer employment contract by his employer, the Riverland Development Corporation Inc (RDC).  The respondent was employed by the RDC as its Chief Executive Officer under a fixed term contract.  Before the respondent’s contract was due to expire, the RDC amalgamated with another organisation, the Murraylands Regional Development Board (MRDB) to form the appellant.  The position of CEO of the RDC was abolished.  The respondent remained effectively unemployed as at the time of trial, some two years and 18 weeks after the CEO contract had come to an end.  The Judge assessed damages on the basis that the respondent should have “lowered his sights” and applied for lower paying positions no later than by the time of trial and his Honour discounted the award accordingly. 

The respondent sued the appellant for damages on the basis (ultimately, not contested) that any liability consequent on the repudiation of his employment contract with the RDC had been transferred to the appellant, in accordance with section 22(6) of the Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA). The appellant contended that the contract had not been repudiated but, rather, frustrated as the result of a compelled amalgamation consequential on the withdrawal of government funding essential to the continued existence of the RDC. In the alternative, the appellant contended that the respondent had unreasonably failed to mitigate his loss. In particular, the appellant contended that the respondent had unreasonably failed to accept a position as Economic Development Manager of the appellant which, had he done so, would have eliminated the loss as claimed. In the alternative, the appellant contended that the respondent unreasonably failed to “lower his sights” at a time earlier than as found by the Judge and that, if he had done so, his losses would have been mitigated to an extent greater than as found by the Judge.

Held per Nicholson J (Sulan J agreeing, Gray J dissenting):

1.  The contract of employment had not been frustrated and the Judge was correct to find a liability for damages following a repudiation of the contract.

Held per Gray and Nicholson JJ (Sulan J agreeing):

1.  The respondent acted unreasonably in not accepting the alternative position of Economic Development Manager with the appellant as offered  and, as a consequence, failed to mitigate his loss. Had he accepted the alternate position, the loss claimed and…

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Details
Case
[2015] SASCFC 160
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia heard an appeal concerning an employment dispute between Regional Development Australia Murraylands and Riverland Inc (the appellant) and Kenneth Smith (the respondent). The dispute arose from the respondent's employment as Chief Executive Officer of the Riverland Development Corporation (RDC), which subsequently amalgamated with the Murraylands Regional Development Board Inc to form the appellant. The appeal challenged a lower court's award of damages to the respondent for breach of his employment contract.

The primary legal issues before the Full Court were whether the respondent's employment contract had been frustrated by the amalgamation of the RDC and the Murraylands Regional Development Board Inc, and whether the respondent had adequately mitigated his loss by refusing an alternative position offered by the appellant. The court also considered, though ultimately found it unnecessary to decide, whether an implied term for termination upon reasonable notice existed in the respondent's contract due to the cessation of government funding.

The Full Court, in allowing the appeal, reasoned that the contract was not frustrated. Applying the principles of frustration as summarised in *oOH! Media Roadside Pty Ltd v Diamond Wheels Pty Ltd*, the court found that the amalgamation did not render performance of the contract radically different from what was undertaken, nor did it confound a mistaken common assumption essential to performance. Furthermore, the court concluded that the respondent had failed to mitigate his loss by refusing the alternative position of Economic Development Manager.

Consequently, the Full Court allowed the appeal and entered judgment in favour of the appellant. The court also indicated it would hear the parties on the application of the *Frustrated Contracts Act 1988* (SA).

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal against a decision of a Judge to award damages in respect of an employment dispute. Background Prior to about 2010, the Commonwealth, State and local governments established a network of regional development bodies, including Area Consultative Committees and Regional Development Boards, to promote economic development in rural and regional South Australia. The Consultative Committees, established by the Commonwealth Government, initially provided advice and support for labour market programs but over time became more involved in developing projects to attract government funding. The Regional Development Boards, established by the State Government, provided support services to local businesses and delivered programs on behalf of the State and Commonwealth governments. It may be understood that the activities of the various State and Commonwealth bodies overlapped. The Riverland Development Corporation Inc. was one of the Regional Development Boards. On 15 March 2007, the plaintiff and respondent, Kenneth Smith, entered into an employment contract to be the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation from 22 December 2006 to 30 June 2008. He had worked for the Corporation in various roles since 1998, including as Business Manager. The contract provided that the plaintiff would be paid an annual salary of $86,500.00 and be provided with a motor vehicle and a mobile phone. The plaintiff’s employment could be terminated by the Corporation forthwith for cause or with four weeks’ notice for a failure to meet the job requirements, which were set out in the contract as follows:5 POSITION DESCRIPTION5.1 The CEO has overall responsibility for all aspects of the Corporation.5.2 The CEO is accountable to the Board for the direction, management and coordination of all aspects of service delivery by the Corporation.5.3 The position is a non-Award position and subject to the terms and conditions set out in this Agreement subject only to variation by mutual agreement between the Chairman of the Board and the CEO.5.4 The CEO shall conform to such hours of work as may from time to time be reasonably required of him including both normal business hours and out of hours involvement on behalf of the Corporation.5.5 The appointment is subject to a National Police Certificate Clearance.5.6 The CEO is familiar with the policies and procedures of the Corporation and legislation relevant to operation of the Corporation.6OBLIGATIONS OF CEOAs Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, the CEO shall:6.1 Use his best endeavours to ensure that the Corporation meets all obligations imposed on it by the Resource Agreement.6.2 Meet the objectives set out in the Job Description provided by the Corporation to the CEO.6.3 Undertake such duties and exercise such powers in relation to the Corporation and its affairs as the Board shall from time to time assign to or vest in him.6.4 In the discharge of such duties and in the exercise of such powers conform to, observe and comply with all resolutions, regulations and directions from time to time made or given by the Board.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY J NICHOLSON J
The foregoing analysis makes it unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiff should have “lowered his sights” at an earlier time than that found by the trial Judge. However, since preparing these reasons, I have had the benefit of reading the draft reasons of Nicholson J. I agree with his reasons and conclusion on this topic. Conclusion I would allow the appeal and enter judgment in favour of the defendant. I would hear the parties on the application of the Frustrated Contracts Act 1988 (SA). I have had the opportunity of considering the draft reasons of both Gray and Nicholson JJ. I agree with Nicholson J that the contract was not frustrated. I agree with his reasons. I conclude that the respondent failed to mitigate entirely his loss in refusing to accept the alternative position of Economic Development Manager. I agree with the reasons of Gray and Nicholson JJ. Although it is unnecessary to deal with the issue of whether the respondent should have sought alternative employment at an earlier time than that allowed by the trial Judge, I agree with Nicholson J that the respondent failed to mitigate his loss by seeking alternate employment at a lower salary at a time earlier than that allowed for by the Judge. I would allow the appeal. Introduction The respondent to this appeal (plaintiff at trial) Mr Kenneth Smith, until sometime in January 2010, was employed by the Riverland Development Corporation (the RDC) as its Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The RDC was incorporated pursuant to the Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) (the Act). In January 2010, the RDC amalgamated with the Murraylands Regional Development Board Inc (the MRDB) also incorporated pursuant to the Act, to form the appellant (defendant at trial) with the name Regional Development Australia Murraylands and Riverland Inc, also incorporated pursuant to the Act. The amalgamation took place in accordance with the provisions of section 22 of the Act. An effect of any such amalgamation is that the new association becomes a body corporate subject to the provisions of the Act and, as a consequence of subsection 22(6),[6] each incorporated association that was a party to the application for amalgamation (in this case, each of RDC and MRDB) is dissolved. [6] Section 22 deals with amalgamations of incorporations registered under the Act. Subsection (6) provides as follows:(6) Upon incorporation of an association under subsection (4)— (a)the association becomes a body corporate— (i)with perpetual succession and a common seal; and (ii)with a corporate name as set out in the certificate of incorporation (in which the word "Incorporated" must appear as part, and at the end, of the name); and (b) any incorporated association that was a party to the application for amalgamation is dissolved; and (c)the property of the associations that were parties to the application for amalgamation becomes the property of the incorporated association formed by the amalgamation (subject to any trusts that may affect that property); and (d)the rights and liabilities (whether certain or contingent) of the associations that were parties of [sic] the application for amalgamation become rights and liabilities of (sic) the incorporated association formed by the amalgamation.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY J, NICHOLSON J

It should be noted that the defendant did not at trial conduct its case on the basis that there was an implied term in the plaintiff’s contract of termination upon reasonable notice upon the cessation of government funding. There would seem, prima facie, to be an arguable case for the implication of such a term given the clear link between the resources agreement and the plaintiff’s Chief Executive Officer contract. However, in the absence of an evidentiary foundation having been laid at trial, this Court is unable to resolve the issue. Frustration In oOH! Media Roadside Pty Ltd v Diamond Wheels Pty Ltd, Nettle JA summarised the requirements to establish frustration in the following terms:[2]I approach this case on that basis. Consistently with Codelfa, I take the law to be that a contract is not frustrated unless a supervening event: a) confounds a mistaken common assumption that some particular thing or state of affairs essential to the performance of the contract will continue to exist or be available, neither party undertaking responsibility in that regard; andb) in so doing has the effect that, without default of either party, a contractual obligation becomes incapable of being performed because the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract.On the topic of foreseeability, Nettle JA said:[3]A number of the single instance decisions to which Stephen J referred in Brisbane City Council were concerned with application of the doctrine of frustration in circumstances where a supervening event was foreseeable or foreseen at the time of entry into the contract. As Lord Wright said in Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd, where a supervening event is not only foreseeable but actually foreseen at the time of entry into a contract, it is more difficult to conceive of the parties as having entered into the contract on the basis of a common understanding that the event could not occur during the life of the contract. Where, however, a supervening event, although foreseeable, was not foreseen at the time of entry into the contract, the fact that it was foreseeable may not be of much significance unless the degree of foreseeability is particularly high.Consequently, as later cases demonstrate, it is important to be precise about the nature and degree of foresight. So far as foreseen events are concerned, the parties to a contract may have foreseen an event but not foreseen the nature or extent of it. In The Sea Angel, Rix LJ gave as an example, based on The Nema, a case where the possibility of an industrial strike was foreseen, and actually provided for in the contract, but lasted so long as to go beyond the risk assumed under the contract. It was held to have frustrated the contract.... [2] oOH! Media Roadside Pty Ltd v Diamond Wheels Pty Ltd (2011) 32 VR 255, [70]. See also Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority(NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337. [3] oOH! Media Roadside Pty Ltd v Diamond Wheels Pty Ltd (2011) 32 VR 255, [72]-[73].