SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AUSTRALIA MURRAYLANDS AND RIVERLAND INC v SMITH
[2015] SASCFC 160
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Sulan and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)
10 November 2015
CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - DISCHARGE, BREACH AND DEFENCES TO ACTION FOR BREACH - IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE - IN WHAT CASES PERFORMANCE EXCUSED - FRUSTRATION
DAMAGES - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
DAMAGES - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - MITIGATION OF DAMAGES - WHAT MATTERS MAY BE CONSIDERED
Appeal against a District Court Judge’s finding that the respondent was entitled to damages in the amount of $335,574.08 following the repudiation of his Chief Executive Officer employment contract by his employer, the Riverland Development Corporation Inc (RDC). The respondent was employed by the RDC as its Chief Executive Officer under a fixed term contract. Before the respondent’s contract was due to expire, the RDC amalgamated with another organisation, the Murraylands Regional Development Board (MRDB) to form the appellant. The position of CEO of the RDC was abolished. The respondent remained effectively unemployed as at the time of trial, some two years and 18 weeks after the CEO contract had come to an end. The Judge assessed damages on the basis that the respondent should have “lowered his sights” and applied for lower paying positions no later than by the time of trial and his Honour discounted the award accordingly.
The respondent sued the appellant for damages on the basis (ultimately, not contested) that any liability consequent on the repudiation of his employment contract with the RDC had been transferred to the appellant, in accordance with section 22(6) of the Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA). The appellant contended that the contract had not been repudiated but, rather, frustrated as the result of a compelled amalgamation consequential on the withdrawal of government funding essential to the continued existence of the RDC. In the alternative, the appellant contended that the respondent had unreasonably failed to mitigate his loss. In particular, the appellant contended that the respondent had unreasonably failed to accept a position as Economic Development Manager of the appellant which, had he done so, would have eliminated the loss as claimed. In the alternative, the appellant contended that the respondent unreasonably failed to “lower his sights” at a time earlier than as found by the Judge and that, if he had done so, his losses would have been mitigated to an extent greater than as found by the Judge.
Held per Nicholson J (Sulan J agreeing, Gray J dissenting):
1. The contract of employment had not been frustrated and the Judge was correct to find a liability for damages following a repudiation of the contract.
Held per Gray and Nicholson JJ (Sulan J agreeing):
1. The respondent acted unreasonably in not accepting the alternative position of Economic Development Manager with the appellant as offered and, as a consequence, failed to mitigate his loss. Had he accepted the alternate position, the loss claimed and…
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- Case
- [2015] SASCFC 160
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Full Court were whether the respondent's employment contract had been frustrated by the amalgamation of the RDC and the Murraylands Regional Development Board Inc, and whether the respondent had adequately mitigated his loss by refusing an alternative position offered by the appellant. The court also considered, though ultimately found it unnecessary to decide, whether an implied term for termination upon reasonable notice existed in the respondent's contract due to the cessation of government funding.
The Full Court, in allowing the appeal, reasoned that the contract was not frustrated. Applying the principles of frustration as summarised in *oOH! Media Roadside Pty Ltd v Diamond Wheels Pty Ltd*, the court found that the amalgamation did not render performance of the contract radically different from what was undertaken, nor did it confound a mistaken common assumption essential to performance. Furthermore, the court concluded that the respondent had failed to mitigate his loss by refusing the alternative position of Economic Development Manager.
Consequently, the Full Court allowed the appeal and entered judgment in favour of the appellant. The court also indicated it would hear the parties on the application of the *Frustrated Contracts Act 1988* (SA).
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GRAY J, NICHOLSON J
It should be noted that the defendant did not at trial conduct its case on the basis that there was an implied term in the plaintiff’s contract of termination upon reasonable notice upon the cessation of government funding. There would seem, prima facie, to be an arguable case for the implication of such a term given the clear link between the resources agreement and the plaintiff’s Chief Executive Officer contract. However, in the absence of an evidentiary foundation having been laid at trial, this Court is unable to resolve the issue. Frustration In oOH! Media Roadside Pty Ltd v Diamond Wheels Pty Ltd, Nettle JA summarised the requirements to establish frustration in the following terms:[2]I approach this case on that basis. Consistently with Codelfa, I take the law to be that a contract is not frustrated unless a supervening event: a) confounds a mistaken common assumption that some particular thing or state of affairs essential to the performance of the contract will continue to exist or be available, neither party undertaking responsibility in that regard; andb) in so doing has the effect that, without default of either party, a contractual obligation becomes incapable of being performed because the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract.On the topic of foreseeability, Nettle JA said:[3]A number of the single instance decisions to which Stephen J referred in Brisbane City Council were concerned with application of the doctrine of frustration in circumstances where a supervening event was foreseeable or foreseen at the time of entry into the contract. As Lord Wright said in Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd, where a supervening event is not only foreseeable but actually foreseen at the time of entry into a contract, it is more difficult to conceive of the parties as having entered into the contract on the basis of a common understanding that the event could not occur during the life of the contract. Where, however, a supervening event, although foreseeable, was not foreseen at the time of entry into the contract, the fact that it was foreseeable may not be of much significance unless the degree of foreseeability is particularly high.Consequently, as later cases demonstrate, it is important to be precise about the nature and degree of foresight. So far as foreseen events are concerned, the parties to a contract may have foreseen an event but not foreseen the nature or extent of it. In The Sea Angel, Rix LJ gave as an example, based on The Nema, a case where the possibility of an industrial strike was foreseen, and actually provided for in the contract, but lasted so long as to go beyond the risk assumed under the contract. It was held to have frustrated the contract.... [2] oOH! Media Roadside Pty Ltd v Diamond Wheels Pty Ltd (2011) 32 VR 255, [70]. See also Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority(NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337. [3] oOH! Media Roadside Pty Ltd v Diamond Wheels Pty Ltd (2011) 32 VR 255, [72]-[73].