Re Opposition by Jean Patou to registration of trade mark application 1914945 (3) - Joy Looks Good On You - in the name of Plexus Worldwide LLC

[2020] ATMO 86

TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

ReOpposition by Jean Patou to registration of trade mark application 1914945 (3) – JOY LOOKS GOOD ON YOU – in the name of Plexus Worldwide LLC

Delegate:                 Robert Wilson

Representation:       Opponent: Baldwins Intellectual Property

Applicant: Banki Haddock Fiora

Decision:                   2020 ATMO 86

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) - Section 52 opposition: s 60 considered – deception or confusion likely because of reputation of Opponent’s trade mark – goods with high esteem – registration refused

Background

1. This decision concerns an opposition brought by Jean Patou (‘the Opponent’) pursuant to s 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’) to registration of the trade mark the subject of the application detailed below in the name of Plexus Worldwide LLC (‘the Applicant’):

Application Number:

1914945

Filing Date:

22 March 2018

Specification:

Class 3: (including) cosmetics, non-medicated skin care soaps

Full specification in appendix.

(‘the Applicant’s Goods’)

Trade Mark:

JOY LOOKS GOOD ON YOU

(‘the Applicant’s Trade Mark’)

1. On 9 August 2018, the application’s acceptance for possible registration was advertised in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks. The Opponent filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose the registration on 5 October 2018 and a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘the SGP’) on 5 November 2018. The SGP nominated grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 44 and 60 of the Act. The Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend on 11 December 2018.

   Evidence

2. The Opponent filed Evidence in Support of its opposition, being:

   ·Affidavit made on 19 March 2019 by Lionel Darolles, Legal Counsel of the Opponent, with Exhibits JP-01 to JP-18 (‘the Darolles affidavit).

3. The Applicant filed Evidence in Answer, being:

   ·Declaration made on 3 July 2019 by Christopher Reid, the Vice President of Compliance and General Counsel of the Applicant, with Exhibits 1 to 4 (‘the Reid declaration’).

4. The Opponent did not file Evidence in Reply.

5. Once the time allowed for filing evidence had ended the parties were given an opportunity to request a hearing or to file written submissions. Originally, the parties requested an oral hearing and this was scheduled for 6 April 2020. I was appointed, as a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, to hear the matter. In the end, the parties elected to be heard by way of written submissions. Both parties filed initial and reply submissions. The Opponent’s submissions were prepared by Baldwins Intellectual Property. The Applicant’s submissions were prepared by Banki Haddock Fiora.

6. I have decided the matter on the material discussed in the previous paragraphs.

   The Opponent

7. According to the Darolles affidavit, the Opponent in headquartered in Paris, France and:

   The beginning of JOY family of marks can be traced back to 1929 when Jean Patou’s founder, Jean Patou, created the iconic JOY perfume to ‘blow the depression blues away’. [The Opponent] has since diversified its influence and portfolio, and its products are stocked in a significant number of retail outlets across Australia and around the world. Meanwhile, JOY remains one of the cornerstones of our branding and product range, and the iconic JOY perfume remains one of the most famous of all time.

   The JOY family of marks include, JOY, ENJOY … JOY FOREVER, JOY BY DIOR, J’ADORE IN JOY, JOYFUL, JOYFUL MOMENTS.

8. The Opponent is the owner of a number of registered trade marks in Australia, including those detailed below (collectively ‘the Opponent’s Trade Marks’):

Trade Mark Number	Trade Mark	Priority Date	Specification (all in Class 3, including)
255404	JOY	25 Jan 1972	Perfumes
401460	JOY	20 Dec 1983	Hair care preparations
928292	5 Aug 2002	Toilet soaps, cosmetics
957967	JOY	16 Jun 2003	Perfumes, cosmetics
1562494	JOY FOREVER	19 Dec 2012	Perfumes, cosmetics
1675640	JOYFUL	15 Jan 2015	Soaps, perfumes
1745044	JOYFUL MOMENTS	26 Nov 2015	Perfumed soaps, perfumed cosmetics

1. The Darolles affidavit also states:

   [The Opponent] has traded in ‘class 3’ goods for 100 years. The main products falling within [the Opponent’s] JOY portfolio include perfumes, and cosmetics.

   The Applicant

2. According to the Reid declaration:

   [The Applicant] is the owner of a number of health and beauty-related brands including the Joyome brand which is used in relation to a range of skincare products (Joyome Range). …

   The Joyome Range currently comprises two key skincare products, being the Illuminating Day Serum and Intensive Overnight Repair. …

   [The Applicant’s Trade Mark] is used by [the Applicant] as a sub-brand in relation to the Joyome Range.

   [The Applicant’s Trade Mark] has been used by [the Applicant] in the United States of America since 2018 and in Australia since 2018.

   [The Applicant’s Trade Mark] was developed as a message to consumers of the Joyome Range regarding the positive emotional and physical results of using the Joyome Range. [The Applicant’s Trade Mark] as a whole is intended to function as a warm compliment to the consumer, while the word JOY in [the Applicant’s Trade Mark] is intended to be an allusion to the Joyome Range.

3. The Applicant’s Joyome trade mark is registered in Australia, with details provided below:

Trade Mark Number	Trade Mark	Convention Priority Date (Canada 1873787)	Specification
1903435	JOYOME	19 Dec 2017	Class 3: (including) cosmetics, non-medicated skin care soaps, anti-aging lotions

Grounds of Opposition, Onus and Standard of Proof

1. As indicated above, in the SGP, the Opponent nominated grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 44 and 60. The Opponent need establish only one of those grounds to successfully oppose registration of the Applicant’s Trade Mark.

2. The onus of proof in an opposition rests upon the Opponent.[1] The relevant standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard based on the balance of probabilities.[2] The date at which the rights of the parties are to be determined is 22 March 2018, being the filing date of the application (‘the Relevant Date’).[3] The Relevant Date is also the priority date for the purposes of ss 44 and 60.

   Discussion

   [1] Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2010] FCAFC 58, [32].

   [2] Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156, [132]-[133].

   [3] Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd [1954] HCA 82, [2].

   Section 60

3. The particulars for s 60 in the SGP include the following:

   The Opponent is one of the oldest perfume houses in the world. Its earliest, most famous, and best-selling perfume was created in 1925 under the trade mark JOY. The trade mark JOY has become iconic and well-known. …

   By reason of the use of the Opponent’s Trade Marks internationally and in Australia, the Opponent’s Trade Marks have become known in Australia, have acquired a goodwill and reputation in Australia, and are distinctive of the Opponent.

   The Opponent’s reputation for the Opponent’s Trade Marks, predates the application date of [the Applicant’s Trade Mark]. …

   Use of [the Applicant’s Trade Mark] is likely to deceive consumers and/or cause confusion …

4. Section 60 of the Act is reproduced below:

   Section 60 - Trade mark similar to trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia

   The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:

   (a)another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first‑mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and

   (b)because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first‑mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.

5. To establish a ground of opposition under s 60 the Opponent must demonstrate that at the Relevant Date there was another trade mark which had acquired a reputation in Australia amongst a significant number of persons in the relevant market, and because of that reputation use of the Applicant’s Trade Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. The Opponent has stated that, amongst other trade marks, its trade mark – JOY – has such a reputation.

   Reputation

6. In McCormick & Co Inc v McCormick, Kenny J considered what is intended by the word ‘reputation’. Her Honour had consulted the Macquarie Dictionary and on the basis of the definition provided decided that, in s 60, reputation is ‘the recognition of the [trade mark] by the public generally’.[4] Her Honour quoted with approval the following words of Lockhart J from Re ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd:

   [R]eputation within the jurisdiction may be proved by a variety of means including advertisements on television or radio, or in magazines and newspapers within the forum. It may be established by showing constant travel of people between other countries and the forum and that people within the forum, (whether residents there or persons simply visiting there from other countries) are exposed to the goods of the overseas owner …[5]

   [4] [2000] FCA 1335, [81].

   [5] [1992] FCA 159, [118].

7. On the subject of reputation Kenny J also referred to the Hugo Boss decision, where the Registrar’s delegate observed:

   [I]t is true that the assessment of the reputation of a trade mark goes far beyond mere examination of sales or turnover of goods sold under that trade mark and contemplation of the advertising and promotional figures.

   As regards a trade mark, its reputation derives both from the quantum of sales under that mark and also its esteem, or image, projected by that trade mark. The quantum of sales, advertising and promotion contributes to the ‘recognition’ component of the trade mark’s reputation. The credit, image and values projected by a trade mark attaches to the ‘esteem’ component of the reputation as do the public events and other trader’s marks with which [the] owner of the trade marks in question chooses to associate the trade marks via sponsorships, cross-promotions, ‘contra deals’ and so forth.

   It follows that a trade mark used in relation to goods with comparatively low sales may have a high and strong reputation by virtue of the high credit or esteem in which it is held, or, conversely, that a trade mark which has very high sales may have a strong reputation notwithstanding the lack of esteem that attaches to it. The particular popular images, or sets of values, that attach to the trade mark are also, therefore, important parts of the reputation of the trade mark and may be as strong an associative force in the minds of the public as the association of the trade marks with the goods or services themselves.[6]

   [6] Jackson International Trading Co Kurt D Bruhl GMbH & Co KGv Hugo Boss AG [1999] ATMO 23 (Thompson).

8. In its submissions, under the heading ‘Reputation in Australia’, the Applicant describes the Opponent as ‘an historical and largely forgotten fashion house’, ‘abandoned’ and ‘reinvented as Patou’. It is not clear what conclusions the Applicant feels ought to be drawn from those assertions; nevertheless, to a very large degree it is irrelevant, for the purposes of s 60, who owns or uses a particular trade mark. It is not the reputation or status of the owner of the trade mark that is relevant, it is the acquisition of a reputation, if any, by the trade mark itself which is the crucial matter. It may even be the case that the trade mark relied upon is no longer used. The user of the trade mark may even be an entity which no longer trades. Reputation may be residual, having been acquired many years previously. Further, an opponent could be entirely unrelated to the user of the trade mark upon which it relies. In very many cases, the company behind a trade mark is unknown. This is illustrated very well by the Applicant’s observation that the Opponent, Dior and Escada

   are part of the LVMH fashion and luxury empire which has ‘75 houses’ and ‘25 legacy houses’ and sells goods from wine to watches … and perfumes under brands such as Krug, Veuve Clicquot, Hennesy whiskey [sic], Fendi, Pucci, Dior, Louis Vuitton, Givenchy and Guerlain.

   There are likely to be very few consumers of the goods sold under the trade marks above who are aware of the existence LVMH. This is so, despite many of the trade marks listed possessing significant reputations. Consequently, submissions regarding the current state of an opponent are of little relevance.

9. The Darolles affidavit provides examples of some of the Opponent’s Trade Marks as they are applied to perfumes, soaps and cosmetics. The trade marks are referred to by Mssr Darolles as JOY, ENJOY, JOY FOREVER and JOY BY DIOR, respectively.

1. Despite the additional material which appears in the get-up of the packaging, in each of the examples provided above, JOY is the most prominent word and immediately catches the eye. Because of this, sales and promotion of the goods in the get-ups shown have the potential to contribute to the acquisition of a reputation by JOY solus.

2. I note the Darolles affidavit states that, in 2018, the Opponent licensed Dior, ‘one of the biggest cosmetic and perfume houses in the world, to offer goods under the mark JOY BY DIOR’. Given that the Relevant Date is 22 March 2018, sales or promotion of goods bearing JOY BY DIOR (or goods with the get up depicted in the fourth example above) are unlikely to contribute significantly to the acquisition of a reputation by JOY, solus, before that date. JOY BY DIOR and goods bearing that get-up need not be considered further.

3. The Darolles affidavit also provided examples of how the Opponent’s trade marks, JOYFUL and JOYFUL MOMENTS, are depicted on goods; examples are provided below. In these get-ups JOY, solus, does not appear and is not the principal distinguishing feature: it being largely lost in the word JOYFUL. Use of the JOYFUL and JOYFUL MOMENTS trade marks in the way shown is unlikely to contribute to the acquisition of a reputation by JOY. These trade marks need not be considered further in this decision other than to say that the Darolles affidavit indicates that in 2014-2015, the Opponent licensed Escada to offer goods for sale under these trade marks.

1. It is stated in the Darolles affidavit that Jean Patou made ‘his first iteration of the now-iconic’ JOY perfume in 1929. The perfume quickly gained fame as ‘the costliest perfume in the world’ and ‘even after 80 years since its genesis, JOY remains the ultimate symbol of quality and prestige’. In 1990, JOY was inducted into the ‘Fragrance Hall of Fame’ and in 2000, JOY was voted ‘Scent of the Century’ at the UK FiFi Awards ‘beating its longstanding rival Chanel No. 5 (widely regarded as the most famous perfume of all time)’.

2. The Darolles affidavit further states that:

   In 2002, [the Opponent] created ENJOY, a contemporary take on JOY aimed for younger women. This proved successful, and had a bath and body range launched. As attached in Exhibit JP-05, this range continues to be sold via [a number of websites]. …

   In 2013, [the Opponent] created JOY FOREVER. A flanker to the original 1929 fragrance JOY … JOY FOREVER is an iconic label in the JOY family of brands aimed at contemporary consumers. …

3. The Darolles affidavit includes unit sales for a number of goods bearing the JOY trade mark. The figures cover from 2013 up to March 2017. The sales figures are broken down by items, such as ‘Jean Patou Joy 10 ml EDP Purse spray’, ‘Jean Patou Joy Forever 50ml EDT spray’, ‘Jean Patou Joy Gift Set Vintage 30ml EDP Spray & 4x50g Soap Set’ and ‘Jean Patou Joy 15ml Parfum Vintage Splash’. The unit sales of the goods are not high but given the apparent high esteem in which the product is held in conjunction with the relatively high unit price, the numbers are significant.

4. The Applicant’s submissions regarding the acquisition of a reputation by the Opponent’s JOY trade mark do not address, to any significant degree, reputation which might have been acquired as a result of the long history of the trade mark, the esteem in which it is held and the sales figures provided. Rather, the submissions focus on asserted shortcomings regarding the acquisition of reputation arising out of the JOY BY DIOR, JOYFUL and JOYFUL MOMENTS trade marks and the licensing thereof. For the reasons discussed above, which concerned the likelihood that those trade marks would contribute to any reputation acquired by JOY, I need not discuss those particular submissions of the Applicant further.

5. It is apparent from the Opponent’s evidence that the Opponent’s JOY trade mark and its goods are held in high esteem and are high priced, luxury items. I am satisfied by the evidence that JOY acquired a reputation in Australia, in connection with perfume and cosmetics, before the Relevant Date.

   Deception or confusion

6. It is not sufficient that the Opponent merely establish that its trade mark had acquired a reputation, I must also be satisfied that because of that reputation use of the Applicant’s Trade Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. Discussions and decisions on the subjects of deception and confusion are legion and a good number provide relevant comments in relation to a consideration of deception and confusion for the purposes of s 60. In a case concerning infringement and passing off, Australian Woollen Mills Limited v F S Walton and Company Limited, Dixon and McTiernan JJ said the following:

   An attempt should be made to estimate the effect or impression produced on the mind of potential customers by the mark or device for which the protection of an injunction is sought. … The usual manner in which ordinary people behave must be the test of what confusion or deception may be expected.  Potential buyers of goods are not to be credited with any high perception or habitual caution. On the other hand, exceptional carelessness or stupidity may be disregarded. The course of business and the way in which the particular class of goods are sold gives, it may be said, the setting, and the habits and observations of men considered in the mass affords the standard.[7]

   [7] (1937) 58 CLR 641, 658.

7. The concepts of ‘deceive’ and ‘confuse’ were explained in the New Zealand case of Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co v Hyline Chicks Pty Ltd, where Richardson J said:

   ‘Deceived’ implies the creation of an incorrect belief or mental impression and ‘causing confusion’ may go no further than perplexing or mixing up the minds of the purchasing public. Where the deception or confusion alleged is as to the source of the goods, deceived is equivalent to being misled into thinking that the goods bearing the applicant's mark come from some other source and confused to being caused to wonder whether that might not be the case. ^[8]

   [8] [1979] RPC 410, 423 (citations omitted).

8. It is well established that the kind of confusion contemplated by s 60 need not lead to actual purchase of the goods or services covered by the impugned trade mark. As Heerey J put it in Nettlefold Advertising Pty Ltd v Nettlefold Signs Pty Ltd:

   A probability of confusion, if it is real, is sufficient even though the confusion may be unlikely to persist up to the point of, and be a factor in, inducing actual sales. There may be confusion or deception in the minds of persons to whom the mark is addressed, even if actual purchasers will not ultimately be deceived.[9]

   [9] (1997) 38 IPR 495, 501(citations omitted). His Honour’s remarks were made in the context of s 28 of the Trade Marks Act 1955, but are no less applicable to s 60 of the current Act.

9. In Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd French J highlighted the following further matters concerning confusion:

   A trade mark is likely to cause confusion if the result of its use will be that a number of persons are caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products or closely related products and services come from the same source. It is enough if the ordinary person entertains a reasonable doubt. It may be interpolated that this is another way of expressing the proposition that the trade mark is likely to cause confusion if there is a real likelihood that some people will wonder or be left in doubt about whether the two sets of products or the products and services in question come from the same source.

   In considering whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion all surrounding circumstances have to be taken into consideration. These include the circumstances in which the marks will be used, the circumstances in which the goods or services will be bought and sold and the character of the probable acquirers of the goods and services.[10]

   [10] [1999] FCA 1020, [50]. These considerations by French J are a restatement of the principles set out by Kitto J in Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, 594-5.

1. In respect of deception or confusion the Opponent submitted:

   An opposition under section 60 will have a greater chance of success where the trade marks in question are used for similar goods or services.[11] Here the relevant goods are indeed similar, as are their likely consumers. If [the Applicant’s Trade Mark] is registered, the Applicant could use [the Applicant’s Trade Mark] for goods sold through the same channels and to the same consumers as the Opponent’s goods; and the Applicant could advertise or promote its goods in exactly the same way as the Opponent. …

   For the same reasons set out under [the Opponent’s section 44 submissions], [the Applicant’s Trade Mark] is similar to the Opponent’s JOY marks, and could easily be mistaken as being a part of the Opponent’s ‘family’ of marks …

   [11] Shachihata Industrial Co Ltd v Magic Marker Corp (1984) 3 IPR 519.

2. The Opponent made submissions in respect of the deceptive similarity of the trade marks for the purposes of s 44. ‘Deceptively similar’ for the purposes of s 44 is defined in s 10 which states that ‘a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion’. For the purposes of s 60, it is not necessary that the Applicant’s Trade Mark falls entirely within the definition of ‘deceptively similar’, it is only necessary that because of the reputation acquired by JOY, the use of the Applicant’s Trade Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. Nevertheless, the s 44 submissions of the Opponent are pertinent. The Opponent submitted that:

   JOY is the first seen, first spoken, and first remembered element of the marks. It is the essential and most memorable feature. When the parties’ marks are referred to by shorthand, that will be as ‘JOY’.

   The word ‘JOY’ is the essential feature and core element by which the marks will be remembered and referred to. It is identical in positioning (first), concept (meaning), and importance (centrality) to each mark.

   For all of these reasons, the marks are similar.

3. The Applicant’s submissions are centred around the use of JOY along with other material by the Opponent:

   [T]he Opponent’s evidence shows that consumers are used to seeing the word or part word JOY used in relation to a range of different perfumes and other products in the marketplace, including JOY and ENJOY by [the Opponent], JOYFUL by Escada and JOY BY DIOR … The premise that consumers would likely be deceived or confused by the use of the mark JOY LOOKS GOOD ON YOU in the face of these various and distinguishable uses by the Opponent is predicated on the assumption that a reasonable consumer would be aware that all current use of the mark JOY in the marketplace by the Opponent are, in fact, use by the Opponent – which, as the Applicant has submitted, is not the case.

4. In respect of deceptive similarity under s 44, the Applicant submitted:

   [T]he mark JOY LOOKS GOOD ON YOU in no way carries away or retains an impression of similarity to the mark JOY alone or any other of [the Opponent’s Trade Marks] (which are each more different to JOY LOOKS GOOD ON YOU).

   While the mark JOY LOOKS GOOD ON YOU contains the word JOY, the mark is not perceived by a consumer as comprising the word JOY with some anonymous additional material. On the contrary, the mark JOY LOOKS GOOD ON YOU is read as an entire phrase, as one concept and as a whole. Separating out, or placing undue emphasis on, the word JOY outside of this entire phrase is artificial. No consumer would approach the mark in such a way.

   There is no particular visual or linguistic emphasis on the word JOY within the mark to encourage consumers to take this step. …

   Where the word JOY conveys a pure sense of emotion or feeling, JOY LOOKS GOOD ON YOU is a conversational phrase, using the second person to create the abstract idea of an emotion being ‘worn’ and creating an appearance. Consumers will perceive the mark conceptually as a whole statement.

5. The Reid declaration sets out a number of trade marks which include the word JOY, and which coexist with the Opponent’s Trade Marks on the Register for similar goods. Examples are: GREENJOY & device, CAROL JOY, JOYVIN, PURENJOY, JOYMAX & device, LIP JOY, JOY OF SPRING, JOYRIDE and JOSS & JOY. There is no surprise that (at least the vast majority) of the trade marks listed co-exist with the Opponent’s Trade Marks and the examples are of little assistance to the Applicant.

6. On the face of it, conceptually, JOY LOOKS GOOD ON YOU, makes no sense when considering perfumes—you cannot actually see a perfume. It makes some sense in the case of cosmetics. Nevertheless, this sentence seems typical of the puffery and vague phrases and descriptions which seem to surround the marketing of perfumes and cosmetics. It would not be a surprising sentence to see used in connection with perfumes or cosmetics. In the light of the reputation acquired by JOY, if JOY LOOKS GOOD ON YOU were to be used in connection with perfume, it is likely to be interpreted as alluding to the effect that JOY perfume might have on a person wearing the perfume: perhaps that it imbues them with a look of calm sophistication and beauty. If used in connection with cosmetics generally, the meaning is perhaps more obvious: possibly, that the particular cosmetic, with the brand JOY, improves the appearance of the wearer or user.

7. The Applicant’s Goods are in many cases the same as, and in other cases similar to, perfumes and cosmetics. The goods are typically manufactured by the same entity and are sold under the same trade marks.

8. Because of the reputation acquired by the JOY trade mark before the Relevant Date, use of the Applicant’s Trade Mark in connection with the Applicant’s Goods would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. This ground of opposition is, therefore, established.

   Decision

9. Section 55 of the Act relevantly provides:

   55Decision

   (1)Unless subsection (3) applies to the proceedings, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:

   (a)to refuse to register the trade mark; or

   (b)to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;

   having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.

   Note:For limitations see section 6.

10. I have found the Opponent has established the ground of opposition it raised pursuant to s 60 of the Act. As the delegate of the Registrar I accordingly refuse to register the Applicant’s Trade Mark.

    Costs

11. The Opponent has sought an award of costs in its favour. I see no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event. As the Opponent has established a ground of opposition, I award costs against the Applicant under s 221 in line with the amounts in Schedule 8 of the Trade Mark Regulations 1995 (Cth).

    Robert Wilson
    Hearing Officer
    Trade Mark Oppositions and Hearings
    25 May 2020

    
    

    Appendix

    Applicant’s Goods

    Cosmetics, make-up and cosmetic preparations; cosmetic sunscreens, beauty serums, and cosmetic lotions; non-medicated skin care soaps, cleansers, lotions, moisturizers, toners, creams and serums; anti-wrinkle creams, moisturizers, preparations, lotions and serum; non-injectable cosmetic wrinkle correction fillers in the nature of wrinkle removing skin care preparations; cosmetic anti-aging lotions, moisturizers, toners, lotions, creams, preparations and serums; anti-aging lotions, moisturizers, toners, preparations, creams and serums that contain retinoic ingredients not for medical purposes; anti-aging lotions, moisturizers, toners, preparations, creams and serums that contain alpha hydroxy ingredients not for medical purposes; anti-aging lotions, moisturizers, toners, preparations, creams and serums that contain glycolic acid ingredients not for medical purposes; non-medicated exfoliating cleansers, lotions, creams, serums and preparations for care of skin; non-medicated soaps, cleansers, lotions, moisturizers, toners, preparations, creams and serums with essential oils for use in aromatherapy and skin health; non-medicated stimulating lotions for the skin; cosmetic foundations and facial concealers; body lotions, cosmetic body care preparations; body creams