Reported Decision:
(2002) 56 NSWLR 146
137 A Crim R 180
New South Wales
Court of Criminal Appeal
CITATION: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S APPLICATION UNDER s37 OF THE CRIMES (SENTENCING PROCEDURE) ACT 1999 NO 1 OF 2002 [2002] NSWCCA 518 FILE NUMBER(S): CCA AG 001/02 HEARING DATE(S): 25 November 2002 JUDGMENT DATE:
20 December 2002PARTIES :
Applicant: Attorney General
Intervenor: Director of Public Prosecutions
Intervenor: Senior Public DefenderJUDGMENT OF: Spigelman CJ at 1; Wood CJ at CL at 70; Grove J at 71; Sully J at 72; James J at 73
COUNSEL : Applicant: R Cogswell SC / P Singleton /
J Quilter
Intervenor: Director of Public Prosecutions,
LMB Lamprati
Intervenor: Senior Public Defender,
C Craigie SC / RJ ButtonSOLICITORS: Applicant: IV Knight
Intervenor: Director of Public Prosecutions,
SE O'ConnorCATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW - sentencing - application for guideline judgment - take into account - uncharged offence - Form 1 - whether sentencing for principal offence only - discretion not to take into account - Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, s 33. LEGISLATION CITED: Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act No 1 1987CASES CITED: Maxwell v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 501
Murrell v The Queen (1985) 4 FCR 168
The Queen v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383
The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270
The Queen v White (1981) 28 SASR 9
R v AEM Snr [2002] NSWCCA 58
R v Anderson [1978] AC 964
R v Barton (2001) 121 A Crim R 185
R v Bavadra (2000) 115 A Crim R 152
R v Burtt (1981) 5 A Crim R 34
R v Daley [2002] NSWSC 148
R v Dawson [2000] NSWCCA 399
R v Harris (2001) 125 A Crim R 27
R v Irusta (2000) 117 A Crim R 6
R v Jones [1978] Tas SR 126
R v Kay [2002] NSWCCA 286
R v Lemene (2001) 118 A Crim R 131
R v McAllister (1982) 30 SASR 493
R v Morgan (1993) 70 A Crim R 368
R v Perese (2001) 126 A Crim R 508
R v Vougdis (1989) 41 A Crim R 125DECISION: Application granted in part.
AG 001/02Friday 20 December 2002SPIGELMAN CJ
WOOD CJ at CL
GROVE J
SULLY J
JAMES J
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S APPLICATION UNDER s37 OF THE CRIMES (SENTENCING PROCEDURE) ACT 1999 NO 1 of 2002
The Attorney General applied to the Court for a guideline judgment in relation to the statutory procedure under Div 3 of Pt 3 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 whereby a court sentencing an offender for one offence may take into account the offender’s admitted guilt of another offence which is not charged on the indictment.
AG 001/02
Friday 20 December 2002SPIGELMAN CJ
WOOD CJ at CL
GROVE J
SULLY J
JAMES J
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S APPLICATION UNDER s37 OF THE CRIMES (SENTENCING PROCEDURE) ACT 1999 NO 1 of 2002
Judgment
1 SPIGELMAN CJ: This…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Re Attorney-General's Application (No 1 of 2002) (NSW) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
Details
- Case
- [2002] NSWCCA 518
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of Re Attorney-General's Application (No 1 of 2002) arose in the context of a sentencing application where the Attorney-General sought clarification on whether a court could consider an uncharged offence when determining a sentence for a principal offence. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Attorney-General's application aimed to understand whether courts should be bound to consider only the principal offence when sentencing, or if they have the discretion to take into account other, uncharged offences under the provisions of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.
The primary legal issue before the court was whether section 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 mandates that courts consider only the principal offence when passing sentence, or if there is a discretion to take into account other, uncharged offences. The court needed to interpret the statute and assess whether the plain reading of the legislation permitted or precluded the consideration of uncharged offences.
The court found that the plain language of section 33 of the Act does not restrict courts to considering only the principal offence when determining an appropriate sentence. Instead, it provides that courts should consider the particular offence for which the offender is being sentenced, but this does not exclude the possibility of taking into account other relevant circumstances, including uncharged offences, if they are pertinent to the sentencing process. The court emphasised that the Act grants a discretion to courts to consider broader circumstances in the context of sentencing, which includes the possibility of taking into account uncharged offences when it is relevant and necessary.
The court concluded that section 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 does not preclude the consideration of uncharged offences in sentencing. The Attorney-General's application was dismissed, and it was clarified that courts retain the discretion to take into account relevant uncharged offences when determining an appropriate sentence for the principal offence.
The primary legal issue before the court was whether section 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 mandates that courts consider only the principal offence when passing sentence, or if there is a discretion to take into account other, uncharged offences. The court needed to interpret the statute and assess whether the plain reading of the legislation permitted or precluded the consideration of uncharged offences.
The court found that the plain language of section 33 of the Act does not restrict courts to considering only the principal offence when determining an appropriate sentence. Instead, it provides that courts should consider the particular offence for which the offender is being sentenced, but this does not exclude the possibility of taking into account other relevant circumstances, including uncharged offences, if they are pertinent to the sentencing process. The court emphasised that the Act grants a discretion to courts to consider broader circumstances in the context of sentencing, which includes the possibility of taking into account uncharged offences when it is relevant and necessary.
The court concluded that section 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 does not preclude the consideration of uncharged offences in sentencing. The Attorney-General's application was dismissed, and it was clarified that courts retain the discretion to take into account relevant uncharged offences when determining an appropriate sentence for the principal offence.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi